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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

017428-1

ATTNG-26 350.05/2(DOCI)(C)(17 Feb 53)

17 February 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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1 Incl 1976 BY Rabers  
Extracts from sources  
640 thru 665

*T. J. Smith*  
T. J. SMITH  
Colonel, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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SOURCE: Command Report - 245th Tank Bn

DATE: September 1952

Source No 640

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

DEVELOPMENT OF DEVICE FOR RELEASING HAND GRENADES FROM TANKS DURING CLOSE COMBAT. - All but one of the tankers who were wounded or killed sustained their injuries when they were outside their tanks. It should be emphasized again that if tankers stay in their tanks and fight, they have an excellent chance of coming out without casualties. The value of tanks as a nucleus about which infantry can form in a desperate situation was again demonstrated.

Recommend the development of a device for releasing hand grenades from tanks for use in close-in fighting. Possibly a swing door arrangement on the turret would provide constant protection to the crew.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

TANKS ON MLR. - The battalion has had the opportunity during the month of September, to test the effectiveness of tank fire from positions on the MLR.

Tanks did not fire from MLR positions during August. As a consequence, it was noted that the enemy had moved many of his installations to forward slopes and his working and carrying parties could be observed from each tank position. The fire of our tanks apparently came as a surprise, and many profitable targets were engaged and destroyed.

Aggressive tank firing from positions on the MLR is effective in punishing the enemy and forcing him behind hills.

Tanks should be placed on MLR positions in pairs to provide mutual support in the event of close-in fighting.

(RESTRICTED)

ENEMY TACTICS. - The North Korean attacks appeared to follow a pattern. During the day before the attack there were heavy H&I fires and registrations. Early in the evening, probes of platoon strength were made and infiltrations by groups as large as companies were made with the apparent purpose of isolating the main objectives. These infiltrating

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groups were equipped with AT mines which were placed on the road leading to a hill. Shortly before the main assault, propaganda broadcasts were made, possibly to provide noise camouflage and to give a false sense of security. They were followed by extremely heavy concentrations of artillery and mortars which were, in turn, followed very closely by assaulting infantry.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Inf Div

DATE: September 1952

Source No 641

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

"ABE LINCOLN" BUNKERS. - GENERAL: The "Abe Lincoln" prefabricated bunker program was initiated by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion on 21 July 1952. The purpose of this program was to provide a stout bunker that could be (1) mass produced for quantity production, (2) transported easily to front line unloading points, (3) handled easily by carrying parties to the construction site, and (4) erected speedily by untrained personnel. The notched log design adopted provides a high degree of structural strength. Eight-inch logs are used for the sides and roof; smaller logs are used for the bursting plate. Each side log is notched on both ends. Firing apertures are constructed according to infantry requirements. At present the apertures are approximately 14" x 36". The inside of the bunkers measure 10' in width and 8' in depth.

DISTRIBUTION: The logging site for the division is located 20 miles from the construction site. Approximately 17 trucks are provided daily by the Division Quartermaster to transport the logs from the logging site. Each log is marked to indicate its position in the bunker. Each bunker is loaded on a quartermaster truck which delivers it to a front line battalion. Delivery is co-ordinated with regimental supply officers.

PRODUCTION: Four hundred ninety-eight bunkers have been prefabricated and delivered between 21 July and 1 October 1952.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED: The greatest difficulty encountered in the bunker production was the availability of logs. Existing stands of suitable trees were small and widespread. A secondary obstacle was that other engineer projects restricted the number of personnel available to operate the program. At first the effectiveness of the program was

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considerably lessened by misuse of the bunkers. Many of the logs were used for construction in battalion and regimental CP areas. Units on outposts were not inclined to carry the heavier logs up the hills but would take only the lighter logs designed for the top burster plate. Only by the concentrated efforts of pioneer and ammunition platoons, antitank and mine platoons and the engineers did the operation become effective.

**ADVANTAGES:** The prefabricated bunkers have proved to be superior to those of other construction. Use of these bunkers automatically eliminates poor and often dangerous construction practices. Once the logs are in the platoon area and the holes are dug, a rifle platoon can complete three (to include proper overhead cover) in one night. Of the 250 "Abe Lincoln" bunkers on position during the rainy season, none collapsed; whereas, approximately 375 of other design did collapse.

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**SOURCE:** Command Report - 40th Div Arty

**DATE:** August 1952

Source No 642

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(RESTRICTED)

DIVISION AVIATION. - Normally in Korea, the air sections of the division will operate from a base which is some distance from other division elements. The present T/O&E does not authorize personnel for housekeeping duties, mess, local security or communications. These personnel must be drawn from other units and combining the sections into a single administrative unit will assist in the conservation of manpower.

It was decided that the division air officer should be responsible for over-all supervision of both air sections, and that the division staff should control the administrative and rear-area operation of the aircraft. The division artillery air officer should be the co-ordinator of tactical flights, and frequently can combine infantry and tank reconnaissance missions with regular, scheduled artillery surveillance missions.

The observers and pilots from infantry and tank units should be trained in the adjustment of artillery fire. By incorporating the infantry and tank liaison aircraft in the routine surveillance schedule, the infantry and tank observers should improve from more frequent experience; the combat missions would be more equitably distributed among the pilots; and aircraft would always be available for special combat missions for both infantry and armor.

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EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURE TO ENEMY TACTICS. - On 8, 9, and 10 August, all of the known and suspected hostile mortar positions facing the 2d ROK Division sector were attacked with artillery fire. There were a total of 170 of these positions, and the decrease in the number of incoming mortar rounds following these over-all attacks-by-fire indicates that this may be an effective countermeasure to the hit-and-run mortar tactics employed by the enemy.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 23d Inf Regt

DATE: September 1952

Source No 643.

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(RESTRICTED)

FIELD EXPEDIENT - EVACUATION OF THE WOUNDED. - The 23d Medical Company came up with a practical solution for the evacuation of the wounded over the muddy roads of Korea. With a set of adapters received from Hot Rod Magazine they could change an ordinary jeep into an eight-wheeler in twenty minutes. The jeep has since been tested under almost every condition and proved to be effective. It was found to be almost impossible to bog down and it will go many places that a weasel can not.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army

DATE: June 1952

Source No 644

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(RESTRICTED)

USE OF L-19 IN MEDICAL EVACUATIONS. - A field expedient was developed by substitution of an L-19 for helicopters in medical evacuations. Because of distance involved in air evacuation by helicopter of hemorrhagic fever patients, an L-19 was transferred to the 8193d Helicopter Detachment. The L-19 was modified to accommodate an improvised litter which was built of one-inch plywood, and padded to provide comfort for the patient. Most of the patients being evacuated are not in advanced stages of the fever and can be transported as ambulatory patients.

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Use of the L-19 by this unit has proved successful since it has reduced appreciably the travel time from pick-up to delivery at the hemorrhagic fever MASH. Use of the L-19 has also resulted in reduced flying hours by the helicopters of the detachment. Thus, the availability of rotary-wing aircraft has increased proportionately for the evacuation of combat casualties from front-line units.

In view of the frequency of hemorrhagic fever cases a requirement exists for the issue of an additional L-19 to the 8193d Helicopter Detachment. Arrangements have been made with corps headquarters aviation officers throughout Korea to provide aerial support to the helicopter detachments in times of emergency, especially for the evacuation of hemorrhagic fever patients.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Inf Div

DATE: August 1952

Source No 645

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

KATUSA PERSONNEL. - There are 1930 KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army) personnel assigned to the division. All are enlisted men of two categories of training; 16 weeks basic training and a limited number of leaders with additional advanced training. KATUSA personnel are apportioned to artillery and infantry units to be assigned duties comparable to US troops.

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SNIPER TRAINING. Intensified training was directed and implemented concurrently with regimental unit training programs in all phases of sniper operations. The mountainous terrain of eastern Korea is particularly adapted to the tactical use of snipers. At least one expert rifleman from each rifle squad was given detailed sniper training including the following subjects: telescopic sight nomenclature, weapon zeroing, hold-off technique, range estimation, selection of positions, and field firing exercises. Regimental committees were formed to conduct sniper training.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Cml Sec

DATE: July 1952

Source No 646

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T/O&E CHANGES FOR INFANTRY DIVISION TO PROVIDE CHEMICAL UNIT. - The shortage of chemical personnel and equipment continues to be a serious handicap. In order for the Chemical Corps to properly perform its mission under the existing conditions in Korea, it is necessary that there be established a dependable and practical service unit under the control of the division chemical officer. Bearing in mind the conditions as they exist in Korea, and as they probably will exist elsewhere in the future, viz, that each US division has one or more UN combat units attached, and in addition is flanked by other UN divisions which are satellites of the US divisions for chemical service and maintenance support, a change in the organization and assignment of chemical troops and equipment is the only permanent solution.

Recommend that T/O&E for the infantry division be modified to provide for a division chemical unit comparable to those which presently exist for other branches of the service. Such a unit should include a maintenance team, depot team, decontamination team, and a small laboratory team, plus the necessary headquarters and administrative personnel in order to be self-sufficient.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div

DATE: August 1952

Source No 647

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(RESTRICTED)

VALUE OF SCOUT DOGS. - Scout dogs from the 26th Scout Dog Platoon were assigned the 5th US Infantry for use on patrols. The dogs had been trained to give either an aerial alert or a sound alert to their handlers when sensing enemy in the area, and dogs and handlers were trained together and used together on patrols.

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Dogs were employed well forward in patrols. At times, when the wind was favorable or when the terrain was steep, the position of a dog was shifted to the rear of the patrol. In preparing ambushes, a dog was located to the front of the ambush site. Usually, after about three hours on the site, a dog either grew restless or dozed off and had to be moved to the rear of the patrol.

Scout dogs proved valuable when patrols were moving from and returning to the MLR. This permitted the patrol to advance more rapidly with less hazard of being ambushed. Members of patrols employing dogs were favorably impressed and always expressed a desire to use them again. Patrol leaders pointed out that the use of dogs could warn them of impending ambushes on patrol routes.

In view of the static situation facing front-line units and the numerous patrols which are required of these units, recommend that more scout dogs be made available.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div

DATE: June 1952

Source No 648

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(RESTRICTED)

CLEARING VEGETATION IN FRONT OF MLR. - Increased emphasis is being placed upon the importance of clearing vegetation and brush growing in front of the MLR in order to provide a clear field of fire and to prevent the enemy from approaching unobserved within grenade-throwing distance of the trenches or emplacements. On 23 and 24 June, this division conducted a brush-burning operation forward of the MLR in the 5th US Regimental sector. A flamethrower service team was set up just behind the MLR where both the PFT's and MFT's were filled and pressurized. The PFT's worked to the left flank and the MFT's, mounted in jeep trailers, worked to the right flank where the MSR was within a few feet of the MLR. This operation was considered very successful and is being continued by the infantry. An estimated two-platoon front is being covered per day of operation. In addition to accomplishing an important job of clearing vegetation, this operation has provided units in the line with practical instruction and experience in the use of flame-throwers and the E32 compressor.

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The most practical and expeditious way to remove this vegetative cover is by the use of a defoliating solution such as 2-4-D or 2-4-5-T delivered as an airplane spray.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Inf Div


DATE: June 1952

Source No 649

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

BOUNCING NAPALM MINE.



Materials required:

- One pull-type fuse with nonelectric detonator
- One 10-foot length of trip wire or communication wire
- One stake to anchor trip wire
- One length of wire to attach pull fuse to can
- Two 8-to 10-foot lengths of primacord
- One electric detonator
- One BA 70 battery or blasting machine
- One length of communication wire to reach from electric detonator lead to position of battery
- One 5-gallon can filled with napalm

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Method of installation:

A hole is dug of sufficient depth to allow a cushion of 4 to 6 inches of dirt to be placed between a coil of primacord in the bottom of the hole and the 5-gallon can. One 8-to 10-foot length of primacord is coiled in the bottom of the hole with electric detonator attached and 4 to 6 inches of dirt placed on top of it. The mine is placed on top of this cushion after fastening a pull-type fuse to the outside of the can with pull ring down. A stake is driven alongside the can and a wire is fastened between the stake and the pull ring of the pull-type fuse. Another length of primacord is attached to the non-electric detonator and coiled into the napalm. Care must be exercised to insure that no sharp bends are made in the primacord. The mine is placed in the hole, covered with an inch of dirt and the pull-type fuse activated. The lead wire of the electric detonator is connected to a sufficient length of wire to reach a nearby bunker, at least 40 yards from the installation.

Method of operation:

When the mine is to be fired the electric circuit is completed causing the electric detonator to explode and set off the coil of primacord under the can, projecting it 15 to 30 feet in the air. When the can reaches the height of the trip wire, the pull-type fuse is activated causing the length of primacord inside the can to explode and spread burning napalm over an area of approximately 30 yards in diameter.

Observations:

This method of installation will reduce the number of mines rendered inoperative by enemy artillery, small arms fire and sabotage.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 650

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(RESTRICTED)

REPORT ON POWER UNIT, PE-210. - The PE-210 is unsatisfactory compared to other power units. In order to prevent carbonation, the method employed in lubrication necessitates more frequent maintenance and adjustment than the conventional-type motor. The proper fuel

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mixture must be used to prevent over heating. To maintain such an exact mixture, careful adjustment must be made on the carburetor every time the motor is started. The construction of the unit is not adequate for combat conditions. Vibration causes loosening of poorly reinforced parts, such as the fly wheel housing. The Power Unit, PE M45-D, has been used with much better results than the PE-210.

Recommend that the Power Unit, PE-210, be replaced by a more substantial type unit.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Div Arty

DATE: September 1952

Source No 651

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METHODS OF COMPUTING FIRING DATA FOR HIGH-ANGLE FIRE.

- In mountainous terrain a large percentage of close artillery support must be fired using high-angle techniques. This, coupled with a shortage of all calibers of ammunition, makes the problem of delivering continuous, accurate artillery fire a very serious one.

A test has been conducted in the 25th Division Artillery to determine how to get the best results with high-angle fire. The following conditions prevailed:

- a. An accurate map was used by the battalion fire direction center and by the observer.
- b. Accurate survey was available.
- c. Meteorological data from a visual station and a radiosonde station were available.

During August and September 1952, a registration with high-angle fire by each battery in the battalion, each on a different check point in the battalion zone of fire, was made, visibility permitting, each morning and evening. Whenever possible, a metro message was obtained within a plus or minus two hours of these registrations. One purpose of this was to compare the computed metro and VE data for the check point with the data obtained by the registration. A total of 99 comparisons were obtained.

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The results showed that of the initial firing data given by the computed metro plus VE data, 70% were within 75 yards, or 3 probable errors of that data actually obtained by registration, while 37% were within 25 yards.

These results were obtained when range changes of as much as 400 yards were computed from successive metro messages. Any battalion using registration corrections only must register every time the weather changes, and will require an excessive amount of ammunition for registration. The average ammunition expenditure using this method has been found to be 8 plus rounds per battery per registration. Based on the two months' observation, one registration per day in each sector with a concurrent metro message will provide accurate results.

When the observer gives accurate coordinates to designate a target, little if any adjustment is required to place effective fire on the target any place within transfer limits of the registration point.

The foregoing methods have been studied throughout the battalions of the 25th Division Artillery and the following conclusions have been drawn:

- a. Using the methods of computing firing data described above, time and ammunition can be conserved.
- b. With firing data computed in this manner, accurate surprise fire can be delivered, observed missions can be adjusted in a minimum of time and satisfactory unobserved transfers can be made all with high-angle fire.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 140th AAA AW Bn (SP)

DATE: September 1952

Source No 652

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(RESTRICTED)

ENEMY TACTICS AND WEAPONS. - Heavy friendly artillery and tank-fire has forced the enemy to adopt new concepts in organizing his defense of a hill. The enemy maintains observation posts along the trenches that encircle the hill, and the bulk of his troops remain in tunnels on the reverse slopes, prepared to move to any critical point as

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needed. He has crossed friendly barbed wire by having personnel lie on the wire while others stepped over them. Remnants of bloody clothing substantiated this. Another procedure of the enemy is to mark paths through friendly mine fields. Some of the methods used are: finding a path through the mine field and then marking it with 5-foot high branches; marking the edges of friendly mine fields with green tape one and one-half inches wide; attaching pieces of paper to the trip wires of mines and flares to mark the way for enemy patrols.

Several recent reports indicate that units in the CCF are equipped with a 107-mm mortar (M-1938, Mountain type, Soviet) and mortar fragments found along the MLR indicate the employment of this weapon in an active artillery support role. The 107-mm mortar is believed to be a part of an enemy artillery battalion's T/O&E equipment and is used as a replacement for the 105- or 75-mm howitzers where use of the latter weapons is unsuitable due to their limited mobility. Because of its relatively long range, 6900 yards, the 107-mm mortar may be encountered along the front wherever a requirement for such a mobile, long-range infantry support weapon exists.

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**SOURCE:** Command Report - 1st FA Obsn Bn

**DATE:** September 1952

Source No 653

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

ENEMY WEAPONS. - During the past four months, one hundred five recoilless rifle locations were made. Several of these locations consisted of clusters of two or three rifles. From these figures, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The recoilless rifle is becoming one of the principal weapons employed by the CCF against our forward positions.

2. The enemy tactics for employment of these weapons are similar to our own. He uses the recoilless rifle mostly for direct fire upon targets on our own OPLR and MLR. Because they are direct-fire weapons and due to their ease of detection from their backblast, the location of these weapons by flash observation posts presents no difficulty.

3. The artillery observation flash base, with its series of centrally controlled, surveyed OP's located on commanding terrain, is one of the most effective means of coping with these weapons.

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EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS. - Considerable difficulty has been experienced recently with the observing instruments in use on the flash OP's. This unit has had several of its T/O&E instruments damaged and destroyed by hostile fire. As a result of these losses and to equip additional OP's, several battery commanders' telescopes have been installed on OP's throughout the battalion. These instruments have certain advantages as well as disadvantages when compared with the M-2 flash spotting scope. The periscope-type telescope has, on several occasions, saved the life of the operator when the instrument has been destroyed by shell fragments without injuring the operator. This is a definite advantage over the M-2 flash spotting scope which requires the operator's head to be above the line of sight. Neither of the above telescopes has the required magnification for accurate, long range flash ranging. The major disadvantage of the BC telescope is the lack of rigidity of the tripod. This necessitates frequent orientation, a difficult process at night on an exposed OP. A definite need exists for a sturdy ground-mount-type base for use with observing instruments on front-line observation posts.

Considerable difficulty has been experienced due to erratic operation of the automatic plotter, RC-308, used in conjunction with the radar set, SCR-784. A more stable automatic plotter, the RD-54, can be used with the SCR-784 with the proper modifications. A modification work order has been authorized for adapting the SCR-784 to operate with the RD-54 plotter. This will greatly enhance the value of the radar set, SCR-784, as a target locating agency.

Difficulty has been experienced by failure of the generator, M-7, used with the radar set, SCR-784. The SCR-784 is capable of operating continuously for long periods of time. The M-7 generator, however, is incapable of such continuous operation. When this generator is subjected to prolonged operation, it invariably results in malfunctions. The generator, M-15, is capable of operating over much longer periods without serious malfunction.

Recommend that:

1. Representatives from Army Field Forces Board make an on-the-spot study of new types of equipment needed for sound, flash and radar ranging.



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2. The automatic plotter, RD-54, be issued to this type battalion to replace automatic plotters, RC-308.

3. A minimum of three each generators, M-15, w/trailer (one per battery) be issued to this type battalion for use as spares.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 159th FA Bn

DATE: September 1952

Source No 654

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SHORTAGE OF PLOTTING NEEDLES. - The shortage of plotting needles poses a problem in the fire direction center for which Army supply channels offer no solution. Vital accuracy is lost when improvised pins and needles must be used. It is necessary to order this essential equipment from The Book Store, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and to use personal funds for such purchases. Plotting needles should be procured by the appropriate military supply source and furnished to field artillery units.

Recommend that plotting pins and needles be made available through Army supply channels in sufficient quantities to meet essential needs, thus eliminating improper expenditure of personal funds for such items.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 158th FA Bn

DATE: September 1952

Source No 655

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COMPLETE FIRE MISSION CONDUCTED BY RADIO. - This battalion has conducted complete fire missions by radio, daily as a training device designed to improve operator discipline and to check equipment serviceability. Training in this phase of communications paid excellent dividends during recent attacks on two hills. All wire lines to liaison boards and firing batteries went out during the preparation fires. For a period of approximately 30 minutes, a single SCR-608 radio handled both incoming fire requests and outgoing fire commands. The smooth rapid operation of this net resulted in the timely delivery of fires at all critical points.

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Recommend that radio training be continuously emphasized as a daily practice within artillery battalions.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 57th FA Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 656

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T/O&E CHANGE, FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION. - At present one watch, stop, type B, class 15, stock number F001-0028211, is authorized by T/O&E 6-26N, as amended, for the regimental FSCC operated in this battalion. Recommend that two such watches be authorized. Many times more than one TOT is being plotted, and one watch is insufficient. Also at times when the watch is being repaired, the FSCC is entirely without a watch. Further recommend that each firing battery's FDC be authorized one of the above described watches as none is authorized by T/O&E 6-27N, as amended. This watch is essential for the purpose of properly conducting fire when the battery is operating independently and separately from the battalion and when the FSCC is inoperative or is out of communication with the batteries.

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SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps Arty

DATE: August 1952

Source No 657

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(SECRET)

NIGHT ARTILLERY ADJUSTMENT. - Beginning in June and continuing through August, Corps Artillery has been experimenting with night adjustment of artillery by use of organic light aviation and MSQ-1 radar from Detachment Number 1, 608th AC&W Squadron (Air Force). At this stage in the problem, one concrete fact is known. Artillery fire can be successfully adjusted at night from the air.

(RESTRICTED)

INDICATION OF NEW TYPE ENEMY ARTILLERY SHELL. - PW reports indicate that there is a new type of artillery shell being used by the enemy. Available information pictures the shell as being somewhat

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smaller than the 76.2-mm and indicates that the shell was fired from a howitzer-type weapon. The projectile was composed of a perforated shell around a solid core and there was no indication that the shell had a rotating band. Reports stated that seven of these shells were carried by each man and that the projectile could penetrate the best of bunkers.

(RESTRICTED)

COMBAT PAY. - The recently established criteria of awarding combat pay has caused a morale problem among the enlisted men of the Corps Artillery battalions. The wide publicity given to this pay by state-side radios and newspapers seems to indicate that all personnel in a combat arm, committed to action in Korea, are entitled to this pay. The mere fact that personnel are told that they are in a combat role in a theater of operations and committed to action and then deprived of combat pay is not easy to explain. Under the present plan, personnel must be under hostile fire for at least six days during a month to be eligible for combat pay. A battery could receive a hundred rounds of counter-battery fire in two hours, have 10 killed, 40 wounded, and lose considerable materiel, yet not be eligible for combat pay because they were not shelled on at least six days during the month. The present criteria, as far as artillery is concerned, is not adequate.

Recommend: That regulations be changed to include all combat units when committed to action against the enemy. The paper work, bookkeeping, and time lost administering the present regulations are enormous.

That a clear interpretation, with descriptive examples of this pay bill be given the public.

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SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps Arty

DATE: August 1952

Source No 658

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(RESTRICTED)

TRAINING IN ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE. - Target-getting assumes equal importance with the ability to shoot in a combat situation. The tools for locating hostile mortars and batteries are woefully short in this theater. For a Division Artillery or Corps Artillery to accomplish

its primary mission, better "balance" should be obtained between target-getting facilities and the number of tubes to deliver fire power to the target that has been located. There has been an acute lack of aggressive target-seeking on the part of battalion S2's. While most personnel assigned to intelligence work appear to be professionally competent, they seem to flounder in confusion in their primary duty of finding targets for the artillery. For a battalion S2 to be effective, he must be aggressive from the first day of his assignment, and he must have a basic knowledge of intelligence principles. Training in locating targets (artillery intelligence) should be as thorough as that of field artillery gunnery. The artillery officer should come to combat equipped with these tools:

1. Ability to locate a target.
2. Ability to place the fire power of the artillery on the target.

Recommend: That special attention be placed on artillery intelligence in officer training courses so that officers charged with intelligence matters will be able to accomplish their missions effectively and quickly.

That better balance be obtained between gun tubes and target-getting facilities such as countermortar radar, sound, flash, etc.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div Arty

DATE: August 1952

Source No 659

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(RESTRICTED)

ARTILLERY OFFICER REPLACEMENTS. - It is highly desirable that officers in the grades of captain and higher have some training in field artillery tactics and techniques. Reference is made here particularly to artillery officers whose sole background has been in antiaircraft gun units. In many cases officers are being received in the grade of captain without field artillery background, and who received terminal leave promotions upon separation from the service after WW II. Most of these officers have not attended the one-month refresher course at Fort Sill.

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Strongly recommend that all artillery officers attend this course before departing for Korea and that all officers without field artillery background be required to attend the three-month associate course applicable to their grade.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 999th Armd FA Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 660

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(RESTRICTED)

ADDITIONAL GRAPHIC SITE TABLES FOR ARMORED FA BN. - Recommend that the T/O&E of this type organization be changed to include two graphical site tables (GST) per battalion fire direction center and one GST for each of the three firing batteries' FDC's.

The mission of an armored field artillery battalion is to deliver rapid and accurate fire. This mission is seriously impaired by the lack of the above items.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 158th FA Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 661

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. - Enemy morale does not seem as high as in previous periods. He will not man his pieces under counterbattery fire, and will cease his own counterbattery fires as soon as it becomes evident that our fires are seeking him out. The number of deserters surrendering to friendly forces has increased during the period. Interrogation reveals that psychological warfare leaflets and broadcasts have influenced their action.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 378th Engr Combat Bn

DATE: September 1952

Source No 662

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. - We are road bound and unable to build roads in mountainous terrain rapidly which is essential to exploit our firepower and mobility. Such mountainous terrain features are located at many strategic points throughout the world. Engineers should exert every effort to increase their capabilities of road construction in mountainous terrain.

Recommend:

1. Standardization of engineer equipment to permit maximum flexibility and interchangeability of parts, thereby resulting in a greatly reduced deadline.
  2. Development of a gasoline driven rock drill with a rotating drill steel that can be carried by one or two men and operated by one man. This equipment will permit advance demolition crews to drill and blast rock faces effectively where at the present time mud capping and snake holing is necessary. This is inefficient and very costly in demolitions. Such practices were never intended for road construction on the scale employed in Korea.
  3. Development of a helicopter capable of picking up a D-8 dozer and carrying it to a landing point 5,000 feet above sea level. The roads presently under construction could have been built in 1/3 to 1/2 the required time had it been possible to get dozers to high ground otherwise inaccessible until the road was built. Air speed and range of operation are secondary to ability to lift such a heavy load to inaccessible spots. Such a helicopter should be available at corps level.
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SOURCE: Command Report - Yokohama Engr Depot

DATE: August 1952

Source No 663

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(RESTRICTED)

INADEQUATE PACKING. - A shipment of rock salt for Korea was rejected for loading by the 2d Major Port. The salt had absorbed considerable moisture and the paper sacks in which the salt was packaged had become unserviceable. As a result, Storage Division repacked the salt in sandbags and packed the sandbags in boxes. Prior to the port rejection, this problem had been recognized and a letter forwarded through channels in an effort to have rock salt and similar items more suitably packed for overseas shipment in the Zone of Interior. This request was rejected. Due to high humidity in the Far East and the fact that complete repacking has to be accomplished by Storage Division, more consideration should be given to the packing of supplies for shipment to the Far East Command.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr Combat Gp

DATE: August 1952

Source No 664

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(RESTRICTED)

REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION, IN LIEU OF GROUP ORGANIZATION, FOR COMBAT ENGINEERS. - Based on observations of combat group operations in Korea for the past thirteen months, the group organization has little to offer over the engineer regiment. The "flexibility" aspects of the group have been of limited importance, and the same results obtained by using a regimental organization. Groups in Korea have operated both administratively and technically, and the administrative personnel have been added to those required for the separate battalions. A regiment would not eliminate the battalion headquarters company, but could materially reduce the administrative personnel therein. In addition, a regimental organization would insure a continuity of unit history, morale, and esprit de corps which would more than compensate for the loss of flexibility. Additional separate battalions could be assigned, or attached to the regiments as operation needs might require. Recommend that regimental organizations be restored.

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T/O&E CHANGE, COMBAT ENGINEER GROUP HEADQUARTERS.

- Recommend the combat engineer group headquarters T/O&E be changed to include a group dentist. Headquarters and other separate companies have total dental requirements equivalent to those of a combat battalion, and an additional dentist is needed to cover these cases.

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SOURCE: Command Report - UNC POW Camp No 2 Pusan (Hosp)  
Hq 93d MP Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 665

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(RESTRICTED)

TRAINING IN OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PW CAMPS.

- Recommend that school training of officers stress such subjects as basic operations and administration of prisoner of war camps, handling of oriental prisoners including customs, food and housing. One of the basic problems underlying the treatment of oriental war prisoners may be attributed to the tendency of United Nations personnel handling them on the western principles of humanity which is often construed by prisoners as weakness. Fair but firm treatment in dealing with prisoners of war is constantly emphasized in training United States troops. Experience acquired by officers in the field should be beneficial to school instruction upon their return to the United States.

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