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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

117500-4

ATTNG-26 350.05/3(DOCI)(C)(20 Mar 53)

20 March 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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666 thru 683

*T. J. Smith*  
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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div, Arty

DATE: October 1952

Source No 666

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RADIO AND OBSERVATION INSTRUMENT REQUIREMENT FOR UNITS OCCUPYING THE DEFENSE LINE. - In the present static defensive situation of this division it has been necessary to supply forward observers with two radios and to increase the number of available observers, for the following reasons:

- a. Most enemy attacks are accompanied by violent mortar and artillery fire resulting in immediate loss of wire communication.
- b. This fire normally makes rapid replacement of communication equipment impossible.
- c. Although a single company usually occupies a single hill mass, the configuration of the ground is frequently such as to require more than one forward observer in order to insure adequate coverage.

As a result of the above, this organization has found it necessary to issue instructions to the effect that each forward observer will have two radios and that liaison officers have extra spares, and further finds itself manning 29 OP's, all with two radio sets.

The additional ground observation posts necessitated by peculiarities of the terrain results in a requirement for additional observation instruments. Present authorization for such instruments is insufficient to provide an instrument for each observation post, four of which are not equipped with battery commander's telescopes.

In order to provide the necessary radios it has been necessary to pool all radios under division artillery control. However, even this method has resulted in a dangerous weakening of the radio communication capability of the general support battalions.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 204th FA Bn

DATE: October 1952

Source No 667

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(RESTRICTED)

FLASH REDUCER FOR 155-MM GUN. - Recent difficulties experienced by this battalion with flash reducers when firing charge super in the 155-mm gun has resulted in suspension of the use of flash reducers with charge super.

The flash of the charge super is of such magnitude that it can readily be located by the most primitive flash locator methods. In view of the improved enemy counterbattery capabilities, it is necessary that all practicable means of concealment be utilized. Therefore, it is imperative that some type of flash reducer be utilized during night firing.

It is recommended that necessary action be taken at the earliest practicable date to provide a usable flash reducer for the 155-mm gun.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Div Arty

DATE: August 1952

Source No 668

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(RESTRICTED)

SHORTAGES OF FA NCO'S AND OFFICERS. - Critical shortages still exist in some categories of personnel. Those vitally affecting combat efficiency are lack of trained noncommissioned officers, communication officers and survey officers. Recent officer graduates of field artillery courses are fully trained in survey procedures.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Inf Regt

DATE: August 1952

Source No 669

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

HEAVY MORTAR COMPANY IN DEFENSE. - During the present static situation in Korea, the basic principles of employment of the heavy mortar company in defense have held true, although modifications of these principles have been made to utilize more effectively the firepower available.

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In a normal defense situation, the mortars are placed well to the rear of the MLR so that fires may be placed not only in defense of the MLR but, without displacement, on the MLR and to its rear in order to limit any possible enemy penetration. In the present situation, it has been found that the mortars are best employed directly behind the MLR. This enables the mortars to engage more targets along the enemy OPLR and MLR. With the mortars employed in this manner, it is also possible to mass the fires of the entire company in defense of any portion of the OPLR. Other positions have been selected and prepared 1000 to 1500 yards behind the MLR so that, in the event of a withdrawal of the OPLR, the mortar platoons may be quickly displaced for defensive fires forward of the MLR.

In some instances the mortar platoons have been employed directly behind the outposts in order to fire close supporting fires in conjunction with the artillery for a far ranging patrol or raiding party; this has proven particularly successful.

Detailed prior planning and co-ordination must be made between the patrol leaders of friendly patrols and the heavy mortar forward observer. Details which should be considered are patrol routes, suspected enemy positions which may fire on the patrol, prearranged concentrations to be fired on call and well established methods of communication. All patrol leaders should be well versed in the adjustment of mortar fire, in the event these supporting fires need to be brought in close to the patrol or adjusted on targets of opportunity spotted by the patrol.

The fire of the gun platoons is controlled from a central fire direction center where the target grid method of fire control is employed. Working in conjunction with the FDC is the operations section of the regimental counterfire platoon. Having the operations section of the counterfire platoon present in the FDC eliminates the time lag in transmission of fixes on enemy mortar locations, and gives the mortar company a greater opportunity to engage enemy mortars while they are still firing.

A sound platoon of the observation battalion is located in this sector, and has direct communication with the FDC. The value of close cooperation with this unit lies in fire adjustment. The sound location microphones of this unit are surveyed in and, therefore, their locations are fixed accurately. The FDC calls the sound operator and informs him where and when the unit intends to fire at a target, giving the grid

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co-ordinates so that the impact can be recorded on the sound tape. By sound intersection precise adjustment can be rapidly made. This procedure has been found to be accurate for fixing exact ranges to unobserved points within the sector.

Although the regiment is in a static situation, a system has been set up in the company to allow the platoons to practice displacement. A platoon is ordered to move to an alternate position on short notice. Once the platoon is in position, harassing and interdiction fires are placed on enemy positions during the night and the unit moves back to the primary position the following morning; this also serves to conceal the platoon's primary position and lessens hostile countermortar fire.

Recommendations:

1. Employ the mortars directly behind the MLR to enable fire to be placed on the enemy OPLR and MLR positions and at the same time to mass fires of the entire company in defense of any position of the OPLR.
2. Select other positions 1000-1500 yards to the rear of the MLR so that in the event of a withdrawal of the OPLR, the mortar platoons may be displaced for defensive fires forward of the MLR.
3. Initiate detailed prior planning and co-ordination between patrol leaders and forward observers to include briefings on suspected enemy positions which may fire on the patrol, prearranged concentrations to be fired on call and established methods of communication.
4. Insure that patrol leaders are versed in the adjustment of mortar fire in the event support fires must be brought in close to the patrol.
5. Insure that operations section of the counterfire platoon works physically with the FDC in order to eliminate the time lag in the transmission of fixes on enemy positions.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 160th Inf Regt

DATE: October 1952

Source No 670

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COMMUNICATIONS. - This subject is mentioned merely to re-emphasize the known principle that several means of communication must be provided. In each of three engagements wire communications within companies and from companies to battalion were disrupted or destroyed in the early phases by enemy artillery and mortar fires. Greater reliance must be placed on radio and visual means of communication.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 279th Inf Regt

DATE: August 1952

Source No 671

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

INTEGRATION OF KATUSA PERSONNEL. - On 23 August four hundred ninety-four Korean Augmentation Troops, United States Army, (KATUSA) were assigned to the organization. In accordance with current directives, KATUSA personnel were reassigned to organic units and integrated on the basis of two men per squad in the combat units. These new men presented a soldierly appearance, demonstrated a knowledge of the M1 rifle, keen interest in military subjects and a willingness to learn. The difference in language constituted a barrier; however, training progressed steadily.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Regt Combat Team

DATE September 1952

Source No 672

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(RESTRICTED)

USE OF NAPALM MINES FOR ILLUMINATION. - In the latter part of the period, the regiment received quantities of napalm land mines to be used to provide instantaneous illumination when needed forward of the MLR, as well as for their antipersonnel effect.

Electrically detonated, these mines were employed in clusters of three forward of combat posts and controlled by the occupants of those posts.

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Napalm mines were successfully used to reveal enemy patrols near friendly positions. One such incident occurred on the night of 23 September when members of a friendly combat post heard noises that indicated the possibility of approaching enemy. One of the men immediately detonated one of the mines forward of the combat post. The mine functioned perfectly and illuminated the area disclosing the position of ten enemy.

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SOURCE: Command Report - I Corps

DATE: August 1952

Source No 673

(RESTRICTED)

PANEL VIOLATIONS. - Fifty-three panel violations were reported by mosquito aircraft and fighter-bomber pilots across the Eighth Army front during the period 1 July through 6 August. Several incidents revealed that improper displays and lack of panels had contributed to misstrikes on friendly positions. Eighth Army ordered all commanders to insure that units habitually display air-ground recognition panels.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 49th FA Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 674

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PROBLEMS OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN LAST 100 YARDS OF THE ASSAULT. - Attacks which have been supported by this battalion have all encountered difficulty in the last 100 yards of the assault. In one raid, a thorough preparation was fired which forced the enemy to remain under cover while the assaulting force moved into position. When support fires were lifted for the last few yards of the attack, an almost solid wall of Chinese stood up in their communication trenches and began firing. Friendly casualties were highest during this period.

It is recommended that investigation be made into the plausibility of developing a projectile using a concussion effect without fragmentation. The Chinese have been using concussion grenades which have bounced off UN personnel causing only a stunning effect. A base ejection projectile with concussion canisters could be fired directly over an attacking force with a minimum of casualties, but might still have the effect of keeping the enemy under cover long enough for the infantry to close.

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FUSES FOR SMOKE SHELLS. - Recently there have been more and more smoke mission requests by the infantry. The two fuses available in Korea for smoke are the M54 and M67. The M54 is an accurate fuse but is very limited because of the short burning time. The M67 fuse, when used with base ejection projectiles, must be used without the booster. There has been no problem obtaining M67 fuses with boosters, but deboostered fuses have been difficult to obtain. The high dispersion obtained with this fuse has sometimes reduced the effectiveness of smoke projectiles fired.

It is recommended that time fuses for smoke shells be given further study.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Div, Arty

DATE: September 1952

Source No 675

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

SYSTEM FOR CONDUCT OF AIR OBSERVED MISSIONS. - The initial rounds in adjustment will be called "ranging rounds" and will be fired by the center two pieces of the adjusting battery. Shell HE will be used and the pieces will be fired at an interval of 10 seconds with a 400-yard range spread. The short round will be fired first, and adjustment will be continued from the round falling nearest to the target. Reasons for adoption of the "ranging round" system are:

a. The shortage of white phosphorous precludes the possibility of firing the initial round with smoke and necessitates the firing of more than one round of HE on the initial volley to assist the observer in locating his first round.

b. The 400-yard range spread gives the observer an immediate gun-target line and a yardstick at the beginning of his mission. By always firing in the same sequence, the observer knows whether he is observing the short or the long round in the event one is "lost." In many instances, the ranging rounds will establish a range bracket and fire for effect may be started on the second volley.

The decision as to whether the short or long round should be fired at the observer's co-ordinates will be made by the battalion S3 and will depend on the results of the first mission fired during any metromessage period.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 213th FA Bn

DATE: September 1952

Source No 676

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REMOTE CONTROL RADIO EQUIPMENT. - It was impossible to maintain wire communication with the three observation posts due to the extremely heavy shelling. Radio communication was used throughout the operation and proved to be satisfactory. For maximum results, it was necessary to locate the radios outside and at the rear entrance to the bunkers so the antenna would be in a position to operate at maximum efficiency. In placing the radio in this exposed position, the operating personnel were, of necessity, vulnerable to enemy artillery fire.

This unit lost three radios due to enemy shell fire on Hill \_\_\_\_  
Two of the operating personnel received minor wounds.

Operating under current T/O&E, this unit is not authorized remote control equipment RC-261, but is authorized two RC-298's which were not suitable as they require an operator at the radio set.

Recommend that this type battalion be authorized 5 each RC-261 remote control equipment in order to remote and operate the receiver-type 600 series radios from a sheltered position.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Inf Div

DATE: October 1952

Source No 677

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(RESTRICTED)

M16 MODIFICATIONS. - Since the middle of July, the 2d Division has employed one platoon of M16 fire units in direct support of each regiment. These units were integrated into the regimental protective and supporting fire plans. In addition, each unit fired nightly harassing and interdicting fires. There have been three noticeable results: (1) the solenoid cable could not withstand the shock and vibration produced by prolonged, intermittent firing - many broke and pulled loose at the point where the cable enters the bell housing; (2) a highly satisfactory field modification was developed by members of the 2d Division Ordnance Company - cables were reinforced with speedometer cable sheath and replaced in the unit; and (3) reclaimed tubes with a steel liner (stellite)

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caused malfunctions. This was true even when burst were limited to twenty-five to forty rounds and the barrel removed after two to three hundred rounds. The liner separated from the tube and caused incorrect headspace - the resulting malfunction ruined the .50 caliber machine gun.

It is recommended that:

- a. A solenoid cable be developed which will have the approximate strength of the modified cable discussed above.
- b. Reclaimed tubes be provided with a more permanent liner.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 780th FA Bn

DATE: October 1952

Source No 678

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NEED FOR HEAVIER TRACTOR, FA BATTALION. - It is recommended that a heavier cargo tractor be issued in lieu of the M4 tractor as the latter is too light to negotiate the mountain roads while towing an 8-inch howitzer. On numerous occasions while maneuvering the howitzers into firing position the pintle plate on the M4 has been completely snapped off.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 623d FA Bn

DATE: October 1952

Source No 679

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

LESSONS LEARNED FROM ENEMY SHELLING. - In one day in October, a battery of this battalion received counterbattery fire, totaling 480 rounds of mixed 122-mm and 76-mm calibers. In this shelling one officer was killed and four enlisted men were wounded. Considerable damage to materiel and equipment was also experienced.

After questioning the officers and men, and examining the effect of the shelling, the following conclusions were reached:

- a. Few direct hits were suffered, in spite of the large number of rounds landing in the area.

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b. Sturdy bunkers offer good protection against even direct hits with the common calibers and fuses presently being used by the enemy.

c. Howitzer pits of current design are effective in reducing damage to a minimum. Likewise, revetments are desirable for tractors and trucks.

d. The morale and efficiency of battery personnel are less likely to slump during a shelling if the men have confidence in their bunkers. The casualties suffered were all caused by a direct hit on a two-layer sandbag bunker, one of the less substantial ones in the area at the time.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Bn (M)

DATE: September 1952

Source No 680

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EVACUATING DISABLED TANKS UNDER FIRE. - A method of evacuating disabled tanks under fire was evolved which holds exposure of the recovery crew to a minimum. Prior to entering the exposed area the crew must be thoroughly briefed on the action to follow. A cable is laid over the deck of the tank so that one end of the cable hangs down within reach of a man under the tank; the tank is moved either forward or backward, up against the disabled tank. At this time the bow gunner drops his escape hatch, dismounts through it and crawls under the tank. The bow gunner pulls the cable down off the deck and connects the two tanks. He then re-enters his tank through the escape hatch, and the disabled tank is ready for evacuation. This method will work only with another tank, as it is necessary to move from under the tank when coupling to an M32.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army

DATE: July 1952

Source No 681

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PIPELINE MAINTENANCE. - Since the POL pipeline became operational, there has been an excessive number of breaks in the line

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resulting in the loss of petroleum products and interruption in rail service. The following factors are considered primarily responsible for the breaks:

- a. Tampering and associated pilferage because of insufficient security along the line.
- b. Inadequate maintenance resulting from using the engineer pipeline company as security forces.
- c. Breaks caused by excessive expansion of the pipelines in hot weather.

In view of the serious situation that could result from frequent and prolonged interruption of rail service and/or pipeline delivery, it is essential that all pipeline personnel available in the vicinity be used only on construction or maintenance of POL facilities.

The following steps have been taken regarding pipeline breaks along the railroad:

- a. All crossings on railroad bridges are being made of welded pipe.
- b. All pipes crossing railroad bridges or supported by them are constructed so that pipe is six feet from the bridge.
- c. All pumpings are made during daylight which aids in controlling steel pipe expansion and pressure from product. When the line is not pumping, valves are left open to tanks to allow product pressure relief.
- d. Agreement was unanimous that pipe sleeves at bridges create more hazard than they prevent because the sag allows a volume of POL to collect which in time spills at the ends. Maintenance is prevented or delayed by sleeves. It was also noted that if the pipe is placed 30 feet from the tracks, it will be in rice paddies, which is unsafe.

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SOURCE: Command Report - I Corps, Arty

DATE: September 1952

Source No 682

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ENEMY TACTICS. - During the month, the enemy employed a very simple idea in an attempt to confuse or delay our counterbattery intelligence section. On the night of 17 September, numerous flashes were seen in enemy territory; however, the normal "Bang" was not forthcoming. In the heat of battle this ruse could conceivably impair the effectiveness of our counterbattery effort by causing us to fire on one or two individuals who are sitting back in a bunker setting off these flashes. In the past several months, there have been indications that the enemy has fired time fire; however, there was no positive proof of this. In the latter part of September air bursts were actually observed by forward observers during one period of enemy firing.

(RESTRICTED)

USE OF FLASH REDUCER WITH SUPER CHARGE. - In the past month the 204th FA Bn (155-mm gun) reported a number of instances of firing locks being blown from the guns when the super charge was fired with flash reducer. An ordnance team was called in and the following data were obtained:

- a. Maximum allowable working pressure in chamber is: 40,000 PSI.
- b. Using Flash Reducer Lot #RAD 152 with super charge, chamber pressure was: 40,680 PSI.
- c. Using Flash Reducer Lot #RAD 176 with super charge, chamber pressure was: 42,865 PSI.

In view of the above data, the battalion was ordered to stop using the flash reducer with the super charge. This action will eliminate the possibility of a gun blowing up and inflicting severe casualties on the gun crew.

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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS - MORE EMPHASIS ON SHELL REPORTING. - Shell reporting is a necessary and important duty of each

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individual in a combat unit. The importance of this job can not be over-emphasized in the training of both officers and enlisted men alike. Instructor personnel in the continental United States are not impressing this subject too well on their students. The time for shell reporting is immediately after a round lands, not an hour or a day later. If the front-line soldier will send in a shell report immediately after the incoming round, corps artillery can effectively deliver counterbattery fire on the weapon firing. Corps artillery has the capability of neutralizing any weapon which can fire on our front-line troops. However, we can not accurately fire without shell reports from the troops themselves.

It is recommended that service schools, replacement training centers and training divisions place more emphasis on the subject of shell reports.

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SOURCE: Eighth Army Armor Bulletin No 1

DATE: November 1952

Source No 683

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USE OF TANK MOUNTED FIGHTING LIGHTS AND AUTO-  
MATIC COUPLING AND TOWING DEVICE IN A COMBAT  
OPERATION

1. INTRODUCTION. - The seizure of Hill BH involved the employment of experimental items of tank equipment, and the use of tanks in offensive night action.

2. TANKS IN THE NIGHT ATTACK. - On the night of 11-12 August elements of the 1st Marine Regiment, supported by Company C (Reinf), 1st Tank Battalion, attacked Hill BH in the 1st Regiment sector. The objective of this attack was the seizure and occupation of Hill BH in order to place fires on the reverse slope of Hill R and thereby make it untenable. Three previous infantry assaults on Hill R had failed to permanently dislodge the enemy from that area. (See sketch, page 20.) ✓

a. The general plan of attack provided for:

(1) A diversionary effort by flame tanks and gun tanks mounting fighting-lights toward Hill R, followed by an infantry platoon sweep to clear this hill.



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(2) An attack by an infantry company to seize Hill BH following the diversionary attack. Stealth was to be employed in this action insofar as possible.

b. The diversionary attack plan was as follows:

(1) At 2030, two M46 medium tanks, each equipped with a tank mounted fighting-light, were to proceed from an attack position at M along the road to position X; two additional M46 medium tanks mounting tank fighting-lights were to proceed by the same route to position Y following the first two tanks at an interval of about 100 yards.

(a) The mission of this tank platoon was to place heavy fire on areas to the front and flanks in order to create the impression of a main effort in that area; to cover and support the flame tanks and infantry in their assault on Hill R; and to draw enemy artillery and mortar fire away from the main effort on Hill BH.

(b) Since this route had not been completely swept of AT mines, the lead tank would be equipped with special towing hooks by which the second tank in column, equipped with an automatic coupling towing device, could retrieve the lead tank without exposure of personnel.

(c) The tank platoon leader and an artillery forward observer were located in the second tank.

(d) As soon as the last of the four M4 medium tanks cleared the junction at Z, two flame tanks were to proceed from the attack position to Hill R, by the route indicated on the sketch, place flame on the top and reverse slope of the objective, and cover the objective and surrounding areas with machine gun fire. Upon expenditure of their basic load of napalm, these two tanks would return to their assembly area to rearm and to stand by for subsequent missions. When these two tanks cleared the junction Z, two additional flame tanks would proceed to Hill R, repeat the mission assigned the first flame section and then return to their assembly area to rearm and to stand by for subsequent missions.

(e) An infantry platoon would be in position to sweep Hill R upon completion of the flame tank mission on that objective.

c. At the period of maximum effectiveness of this diversionary attack, and on order of the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, the infantry assault would be launched on Hill BH from the MLR.

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d. Eight M46 medium tanks and one armored communications and control vehicle (Porcupine) were positioned in hull defilade positions on the MLR to furnish direct fire support to the assault units. The Porcupine vehicle was located on the MLR to provide protected observation and communications facilities for observers.

e. Six armored personnel carriers were to stand by for casualty evacuation and ammunition replenishment.

3. CONDUCT OF ASSAULT. a. Leading tank elements cleared their attack position at 2030 and crossed the MLR at 2045. The night was clear and dark. Moonrise was at 2230. A light wind was blowing from east to west. Upon reaching the junction at Z, it was found that a road bypass to be used was so overgrown with grass that it could not be seen in the darkness. The lead tank located the bypass by flicking its fighting-light on and off.

(1) Progress was slow due to limited visibility, but all gun tanks were in position by 2110 without mishap.

(2) Tanks commenced using their lights on the prescribed target areas, flickering intermittently at five-second intervals. In this manner targets could be continuously illuminated with minimum danger from enemy fire.

(3) These tanks had expended almost all their ammunition by 0300 and were ordered to withdraw to their assembly area. The second tank in column developed mechanical difficulties and was unable to return under its own power. Using the quick coupling device in reverse, the lead tank backed its special coupling hook into the automatic coupling device mounted on the front of the disabled tank and towed the disabled tank to its assembly area without exposure of its crew to enemy fire.

(4) Moderate to heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire was received during the time these tanks were in position.

b. At approximately 2110, when the four M46 medium tanks were in position, two flame tanks moved from the attack position to their objective on Hill R. The darkness forced tank commanders to observe from open hatches and to light their way to the objective with occasional short bursts of flame. Upon reaching their objective about 2200, the flame tanks burned over the topographical crest and reverse slope in a series of short bursts, at the same time sweeping the area

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in a crisscross fashion with their bow machine guns to discourage the enemy flushed from their positions by the flame.

(1) Enough flame fuel was conserved to light the way down from the crest of Hill R. When they reached the junction at Z, two other flame tanks standing by at that point were dispatched to the objective to continue the attack. Conduct of this attack was identical to that of the first section. All flame tanks had returned to their assembly area by 2330.

(2) Enemy reaction to the flame attack on Hill R was more intense than that experienced by the M46 medium tanks on the road, and consisted of moderate to heavy concentrations of mixed mortar and artillery fire and small arms fire.

c. The infantry assault on Hill BH commenced at 2305 when the diversionary action was most intense.

(1) Tanks of the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company C and the Tank Platoon, AT Company, 1st Marines, under operational control of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, furnished direct fire support from positions on the MLR as indicated on the sketch (pg 20). The 3d platoon placed tank fires on enemy firing points on T, V, W and XX; the objective itself was masked by the MLR.

(2) The 2d Platoon fired on targets to their direct front and in support of the assault on Hill BH. The tank platoon, AT Company, furnished deep direct fire support on enemy positions to the north.

(3) Tanks of the 2d and 3d Platoons, Company C, and the tank platoon, AT Company, used HE- and WP-type ammunition exclusively in firing on enemy personnel and positions.

(4) During the night's action, tanks destroyed four bunkers, killed ten enemy, wounded five enemy and destroyed one AT gun.

(5) By approximately 0400, 12 August, all platoons had been withdrawn to their respective assembly areas to rearm and refuel in preparation for further action.

#### 4. DECEPTION ACHIEVED BY DIVERSIONARY ACTIONS.

a. Enemy reactions and the small number of friendly casualties incurred indicate that the enemy was completely deceived by the tank diversion.

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b. Although no infantry accompanied the tanks as they moved out on the road, intelligence indicates that the enemy thought this force to include a company of infantry. Movement of tanks between periods of fighting-light illumination created the impression that more tanks were present than were actually committed. Considerable artillery and mortar fire was directed against the tanks. The combined effectiveness of the flame tanks and the gun tanks with fighting-lights in neutralizing enemy opposition permitted the infantry platoon to move over Hill S, and onto Hill R with a minimum of casualties. Two of the casualties of this platoon resulted from enemy fire on the MLR. The only other casualty was suffered as the platoon withdrew from its objective.

c. Although the enemy reacted strongly to the tank diversion, he failed to react to the main effort until the objective was almost completely occupied. His reaction was weak and ineffective. Intelligence indicates that the enemy thought this force to be of platoon strength, rather than of company size as it actually was.

5. CONCLUSIONS. a. Flame tanks. - The psychological and casualty effect of the flame tank seemed a tremendous factor in the success of the operation. It destroyed or drove the enemy from Hill R.

b. Armored communication and control vehicle. - Through the use of this vehicle as a radio relay station, the tank company commander was able to control all his units effectively and, at the same time, maintain close liaison with the infantry units.

c. Searchlights.

(1) The effectiveness of the searchlight for the tank on which it is mounted is very limited. The two principal reasons are: (1) visibility is reduced when looking down the beam; and (2) the muzzle blast and smoke from the 90-mm gun obscured the target entirely.

(2) The light is very effective when two tanks are used together, one spotting targets and adjusting fire with the light and the other firing on the targets illuminated. If both tanks have lights the roles may be shifted periodically. Used in this manner they are very effective and give excellent observation to the firing tank. It was noted that the periphery of the beam of light on a target gives better observation of movement than the center of the beam. The reason for this phenomenon is not understood. Most of the fire of the tank has to be adjusted by the tank commander as the gunner's sights react to the light

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the same as on a foggy or rainy day. If there is a great deal of artillery fire on the lighted target, smoke cuts the observation by about 75 per cent; therefore, it is best to observe the objective with the lights before any supporting fires commence. This enables the tank commander to become familiar with the terrain, and to pick out bunkers, avenue of approach and other suitable targets.

(3) Once the light lens is broken, the muzzle blast from the main armament will shatter the bulb and will also blow dust and small rock and sand particles to the rear thus chipping the reflector. The enemy did not place fire close enough to the tanks to damage their lights.

(4) Maximum effectiveness of the machine guns when used in conjunction with the lights was achieved by a coordinated sweeping method. Parallel and crisscross sweeping methods were used, the parallel method being used when the adjacent tank wished to sweep the target area together and the crisscross method being used when the tanks wished to cross their fire throughout the target area.

d. Automatic coupling device. - This device worked extremely well, and is a definite improvement over the manual hookup with cables. However, the spring arrangement causes the bar to bounce up and down and at times to dig into the ground. Also, it decreases the tanks maneuverability in close places.

e. Although a night operation in poor tank terrain is extremely hazardous, this operation was successful because:

(1) The flame platoon leader had operated in the area before and was familiar with the ground.

(2) Tank mounted fighting-lights and flame guns were used as aids to tank movement.

## 6. AFTER ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS.

### a. Flame tanks.

(1) That a small control panel be installed with switches to control the flame gun. The control panel should be in an easily accessible location to relieve the cramped and crowded turret conditions. These controls should be placed near the tank commander's hatch (Cupola).

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(2) That the flame gun range be increased.


b. Tank mounted fighting-lights. That range of the light be increased from 1200 to 2000 yards to match the first round accuracy of the 90-mm gun.

c. Automatic coupling device. - That a skid of some type be affixed to the towing bar so that the bar will not dig in when it touches the ground.

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- TANK - M46
  - FLAME TANK - M4A3
  - SEARCHLIGHT TANK - 16
  - COMMUNICATION TANK
- LD=MLR IN ZONE OF ACTION

NOT TO SCALE

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