UNCLASSIFIED [redacted] INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

III

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/11(DOCI)(C)(10 Sep 53) 10 September 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

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2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to training at the company/battery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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Asst Adjutant General

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(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 29

FLAME THROWERS IN TANKS. - The only mechanized flame throwers available in Korea at present are obsolescent M3-4-3 models which were designed for mounting in the M-4 series tanks. As all tank units of this division are equipped with M-46 tanks it was not possible to utilize these flame throwers. The value of mechanized flame throwers mounted in tanks, particularly in offensive operations, was thoroughly proven in World War II and they could be employed effectively in Korea. Recommend that intensive efforts be made to develop mechanized flame throwers of large capacity suitable for mounting in the M-46 and later model tanks. (Command Report - 40th Inf Div - Mar 53)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

/ OCAFE Comment: Integral and non-integral flame throwers for M-47 and M-48 tanks and armored infantry carriers are being developed and tested./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 30

FAMILY OF UNITED NATIONS DECORATIONS. - A family of United Nations decorations is urgently needed. The system for and limitations in providing US decorations for personnel of UN contingents leaves much to be desired. The Division Commander cannot issue an "on the spot" award for heroism to a KATUSA soldier even though all other members of his squad or patrol are decorated and despite the fact that often he has the longest period of service of any soldier in the group. Similar restrictions prevent any prompt recognition of heroic action by personnel of foreign units. Relaxation of restrictions on the award of the Silver Star and Bronze Star Medal (Valorous) would provide an expeditious but temporary solution. United Nations decorations are the proper answer. (Command Report - 7th Inf Div - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 31

EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE CO IN STABILIZED SITUATION. - The unit was divided into two elements, forward and rear. The forward CP was situated approximately 2000 yards in

the rear of the MLR. In conjunction with the Division G-2, the forward element maintained 6 screening patrols daily during the hours of darkness for the purpose of safeguarding the Division MLR against possible infiltration by the enemy. Three daylight outposts were established approximately 200 yards in the rear of the MLR for the purpose of detecting possible enemy infiltration and civilian line crossing. On numerous occasions the forward element dispatched reconnaissance patrols to report on the area controlled by the 3 daylight outposts. (Command Report - 40th Recon Co - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: This is one of the effective methods of employing the Reconnaissance Company, Infantry Division, in a stabilized situation./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 32

AMMUNITION SUPPLY DURING HEAVY FIRING WITH 155-MM HOWITZER. - During the firing in defense of outposts Vegas and Carson certain problems were encountered in the supply of ammunition for the pieces.

The new type powder cans (no type or model number available) appears to be well designed but unhandy to use. The can has a locking lip of increased diameter with recessed locking-lug wells, and a lightly-made locking handle with a brass locking screw.

When the can is opened rapidly, the cap locking mechanism often sticks and frequently bends or breaks before the three locking lugs can be disengaged from the can lip. In this situation, the lugs cannot be knocked loose rapidly because they are recessed below the surface of the lip of the can. (The older model can, with a stronger locking mechanism and protruding lugs, is easier to handle at the piece). The result was frequent delay in preparing powder charges while several powder cans were handled in succession. Because of its increased size, fewer rounds (less than basic load) can be packed into each ammunition well on the M5 tractor, for transportation with the piece.

Some powder is being received with a primer packed in the can. Where firing is conducted at rapid rates such as in close defense, this packing is unsuitable.

Tests show that it takes from 45 to 60 seconds to extract the primer from its protective packing. If the No 1 man (who inserts the primer) does this as an additional job, about 1-1/2 minutes are required to fire each round. If the No 1 man is not used, an additional man is required on each crew solely to prepare primers. The net result of this type of packing is either to require additional manpower or to reduce the piece firepower from 50% to 67% at the time it is most needed. (The use of battery personnel for this job is not desirable, since nonfiring personnel are already employed on other phases of ammunition supply.)

Malfunctions of "canned" primers can be almost eliminated if they are kept dry and covered at all times when not in use. (Command Report - 90th FA Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 33

DEFICIENCIES IN BLOOD RECIPIENT SET (STANDARD ITEM 3-103-615). - The type of disposable, blood-recipient set now in use (Stock Number 3-103-615) is subject to the following objections:

a. Supplemental injections cannot be made through the plastic tubing without producing a leak.

b. Due to the conformity of the needle and of the adaptor, apposition between needle and adaptor is often poor and leakage common.

c. The inelasticity of the tubing makes it virtually impossible to obtain a reflux of blood upon starting intravenous therapy to ascertain whether or not the needle lies within the lumen of the vein.

Recommend that the blood recipient set described above be replaced by a type which will correct the objections listed. (Command Report - 25th Med Bn - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: The deficiencies in Standard Item 3-103-615, Blood Recipient Set, Disposable, are known and experimental work is in progress to correct the deficiencies. /

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 34

SURGICAL HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS. - In field use, the Heidbrink apparatus is superior to the McKesson apparatus in rate of gas flow, durability of machine, presence of pop-off valve at "Y" piece to which mask is attached and more effective mask and headstrap combination. One outstanding omission in both machines is an emergency bypass flush oxygen valve by which the rebreathing bag may be rapidly filled with oxygen.

/ OCAFF Comment: The two types of anesthesia apparatus meet the military characteristics for this type equipment; however the military characteristics are under study with a view to eliminating the difficulties enumerated./

Present endotracheal sets are inadequate while the utilization of one type of laryngoscope and one type endotracheal catheter is better than nothing. The presence of newer, more adaptable laryngoscopes and newer types of plastic and thin wall endotracheal catheters make the equipment now on hand obsolete and has resulted in inferior anesthesia.

/ OCAFF Comment: New types of endotracheal sets are being studied and the decision on whether or not to utilize plastic is expected in the near future./

The use of small high pressure electric autoclaves for rapid sterilization would cut to a minimum the amount of wrapped sterile instruments on hand. Also the use of a small regular electric autoclave would serve to sterilize all packs. The present method of superheated steam and drying by baking would be abolished at a saving on linens and rubber gloves. Also the safety factor in an electric autoclave would be increased.

The revision of instrument sets to include basic requirements for the surgeons would be a saving. There is an excess of unused special instruments and lack of routinely used instruments.

The addition to the T/O&E of a small overhead operating lamp for use over the operating table is recommended.

Portable light metal packing cases with collapsible legs would increase the mobility and proficiency of the unit.

/ OCAFF Comment: The opinion of the Medical Board which studied packing cases was that collapsible legs were too easily broken and were not practicable./

The laundry, mobile, two-trailer type, stock #66-L-155, should be used in lieu of laundry unit, portable, stock #66-L-320. This latter unit requires too much space, time, and labor to prepare for movement. (Command Report - 47th Surg Hosp - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: Laundry requirement for this type of unit is under review and the two-trailer type will be considered./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 35

REPAIR OF BOOTS, COMBAT RUBBER, INSULATED. - The method authorized by the technical manual for repair of rubber footwear has proved unsatisfactory for rubber insulated combat boots as the patches do not properly seal to the boot. To remedy this situation, experiments were conducted using hot patches. A jig press, having similar characteristics to a tire tube vulcanizing press, was manufactured. The surface around the damaged area was roughened by the use of a wire brush; one coat of rubber cement was applied to the area; the boot was placed on the jig press and a hot patch was applied to the damaged area; the press was tightened down to insure proper adhesion to the boot; the magnesium disc on the patch was ignited; and the patch remained pressed for ten minutes. This method has proved satisfactory.

Recommend that OQMG conduct a study to determine the most efficient method of repairing the rubber insulated combat boot. (Command Report - 55th QM Base Depot - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 36

FUMIGATION OF WINTER CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. - Quartermaster clothing and equipment being returned from Korea to Japan is required to be fumigated with methyl bromide prior to being evacuated to prevent the spread of any infectious disease, lice or insect that may

have contaminated the clothing. Portable fumigation vaults have been used to fumigate this clothing at the reclamation installation. Clothing was removed from the cars, segregated, loaded on trucks and taken to the fumigation area three miles away. There the clothing was unloaded, fumigated, reloaded on trucks and taken to the quayside where they were loaded for shipment to Japan for dry cleaning. Under a new method adopted, methyl bromide capsules are placed in the railcars while the cars are in the marshalling yard. Thus, when the cars are moved to the rail siding, the fumigation process has been completed and immediate final processing takes place.

Recommend that, in subsequent situations requiring fumigation, the clothing and equipment be fumigated while enroute to the reclamation installation by placing methyl bromide capsules in the railcars at the time of sealing the cars at the salvage collecting points. This procedure will effect economies in manpower and transportation. (Command Report - 55th QM Base Depot - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 37

USE OF SENTRY DOGS. - Three war-weary scout dogs of the 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon were utilized for augmenting the security by use of "running leashes" attached to steel cables anchored in concrete, and located so that the dogs can patrol the entire length of the ration issue area. Prior to utilization of the dogs, intrusions were almost a nightly occurrence, despite a double-apron barbed-wire fence, trip flares and three walking sentries. Since the guard dogs were employed, only a relatively few attempts to enter the supply point have occurred (on two occasions, the attempted intrusions occurred on nights when the guard dogs could not be used because of broken cables or "running leashes"). Although satisfactory results have been obtained from the use of scout dogs, sentry-trained guard dogs would probably be more effective.

Recommend that the T/O&E for the Quartermaster Company be changed to provide a minimum of ten sentry dogs (dogs trained to accompany walking guards) to be used to guard Class I, Class III and Class II and IV supply points. No additional personnel will be required, although at least four enlisted personnel should receive special training as dog handlers and trainers. (Command Report - 3d QM Co - May 53)

[OCAFF Comment: The use of sentry dogs for guarding supply installations is considered sound; however, it is not considered desirable to include dogs in the T/O&E of this type unit. When the situation is such that dogs can be used they should be obtained as Class IV items.]

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 38

USE OF ELECTRIC FENCES AS A SECURITY MEASURE AT SERVICE CENTERS. - Electric fences are being, or have been erected at each service center to reduce the security problem. The fences serve a twofold purpose in keeping unauthorized personnel out and eliminating exit from the service center other than through authorized passages. No accidents have occurred as a result of using this means to enhance security. The low cost and effectiveness have made electric fencing the most economical and desirable means of curtailing illegal entries and exits with their attendant pilferages. (Command Report - 501st QM Bn - May 53)

[OCAFF Comment: Security of service and supply installations is a continuous problem in active theaters. Commanders of service type units must provide security from sources available to them without hampering the performance of their primary mission.]

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 39

DEFICIENCIES IN NEW M-SERIES 1/4-TON TRUCKS. - The new M-series 1/4-ton trucks are not sturdy enough to absorb the constant shaking they receive from the "washboard effect" on the surface of dirt roads. The cable connecting the two 12-volt batteries and the generator cable have broken while the vehicles were in operation. The bracket holding the spare tire has cracked and in many cases broken off. (Command Report - 212th MP Co - May 53)

[OCAFF Comment: Information from Office, Chief of Ordnance indicates a study is being conducted to determine means of correcting the above deficiencies.

A modification work order concerning strengthening of the spare tire bracket will be published in the near future.]

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 40

DEFICIENCIES IN M-SERIES VEHICLES. - Deficiencies reported in the new M-series vehicles include failures of the spare tire mounting bracket, windshield frame, and battery cable on the 1/4-ton utility truck, M38A1, clutch failures on the 5-ton truck, M41, and numerous sheet metal failures on the 2-1/2-ton truck, M211 and 5-ton truck, M41. (Command Report - 60th Ord Gp - Apr 53)

[OCAFF Comment: See Comment, Item No 39.]

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 41

PROBLEMS WITH TRUCK 1/4-TON, M38A1. - Inspections have indicated that a number of the M38A1 vehicles have cracked frames. Some of this may be due to the bad roads in Korea. The tire racks on the rear of the vehicles require constant repair. This problem could possibly be eliminated if bolts were issued to hold the rack in place. (Command Report - 5th Cav Regt - Apr 53)

[OCAFF Comment: See Comment, Item No 39.]

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 42

DEFENSIVE MEASURES FOR INDIVIDUAL TANKS. - Present close-in defensive measures for individual tanks are not adequate; tank guns cannot depress enough to engage the enemy at close ranges. Firing weapons or throwing hand grenades from the turret have proven ineffective when a tank is surrounded by enemy infantry. Tanks firing at each other and the utilization of VT artillery fire may be effective in some cases, but frequently there are dead spaces which may be taken advantage of by the enemy. Isolated tanks must rely almost entirely on friendly artillery fire for close-in protection.

A requirement exists for the development of a means of close-in protection of tanks against enemy antitank personnel. The device should have the following characteristics:

a. Provide complete all-round protection of the tank for a distance of 25 yards.

b. Be designed to permit reloading from within the tank without exposing the crew, and be capable of providing protection for intermittent periods up to a total of three hours.

c. Device should be simple and easy to maintain, and installed so that it would not take up space in the tank fighting compartment. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 43

USE OF SMOKE POTS: A new method for the employment of the smoke pot (M4A2) was used in conjunction with a "Tank Shoot" staged in Pork Chop Valley.

A protective screen was requested in this position for the departure of the tanks as the most vulnerable part of the tanks were exposed to enemy fire.

Five minutes prior to departing, 6 smoke pots were ignited to give this coverage.

The tank crews also ignited 2 smoke pots each and let them drop alongside of tanks, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the smoke.

The operation provided sufficient coverage so the tanks could leave the area without being subjected to enemy fire. (Command Report - 71st Cml (SG) Co - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: This operation is in conformity with doctrine and illustrates the principle of using area smoke to cover assembly, organization and initial deployment of friendly troops.

For land operations the best smoke pot is the 30-pound M5 type, if available, rather than the M4 which is a floating type designed for use in water./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 44

SNIPERSCOPE BATTERIES. - Sniperscopes issued have been of two types, M-2 and M-3. Three types of batteries have been issued (M-1, M-2 and M-3) for use with these scopes. The M-1 and M-2

batteries are not interchangeable with the M-3 batteries. Further, the M-2 battery recharging racks will not take the M-3 batteries. Twice in recent months, M-2 racks packed and labeled as M-3 racks have been received by airlift. Field expedient recharging of M-3 sniperscopes has been necessary. However, lacking proper adapter fittings, the methods necessary are so complex as to require a central facility, tightly controlled in order to recharge batteries without excessive losses from damage. This function has been performed with considerable success by an improvised battery recharging facility constructed and operated by maintenance section of headquarters and service company. However, much loss of the use of sniperscopes by using units resulted prior to this improvisation, and unwarranted travel and transportation of batteries are necessary in this method of alleviating this critical situation.

Recommend that one type of sniperscope be adopted and issued uniformly to all infantry divisions at the earliest practicable date, and that in future development of the sniperscope, every possible effort be made to retain interchangeability of parts with older types, particularly batteries and battery recharging facilities. (Command Report - 65th Engr Cmbt Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 45

USE OF 7-TON UTILITY TRAILERS AS MOBILE SPARE PARTS TRAILERS. - Difficulties have been encountered in the collection, storage and retention of serviceable 2d echelon engineer and ordnance spare parts for support of the large number of vehicles and engineer equipment items in the battalion. As a result of each move, critical spare parts were lost or damaged beyond salvage. Excessive delays resulted while parts were unloaded from any available transportation at each destination, sorted, and readied for issue. Recently, to retain essential mobility of the battalion and to provide a means of overcoming these difficulties, two 7-ton utility trailers, issued for transportation of truck-mounted crane extra attachments, were converted to large mobile spare parts trailers, one each for engineer and ordnance parts. Nonessential crane spare attachments were turned in. The resultant savings in critical spare parts plus the ability to issue parts immediately upon reaching any destination are considered extremely valuable.

Recommend that 2 truck or trailer mounted vans containing necessary bins be provided in the T/O&E of the Engineer Combat Battalion,

Divisional, for storage and transportation of engineer and ordnance spare parts. These vans should be weatherproof and capable of positive security from pilferage. (Command Report - 65th Engr Cmbt Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 46

NEED FOR INTERPRETER PERSONNEL IN TYPE B UNITS. - The language barrier seems to be the greatest problem. The unit has alleviated this problem somewhat through the integration of English classes into the daily training schedule. Further, all drill is given in English and the trainee learns about his truck, using the English nomenclature. One civilian translator and one Army interpreter are being utilized to the fullest in training and in breaking down the language barrier. To teach personnel to drive and care for a vehicle the size of a 5-ton dump truck is a slow process. Add to that the fact that none of the students ever drove any kind of vehicle before. The only solution to this problem is long and detailed practical exercise on every phase of driving from shifting gears to maintenance responsibility.

Recommend that Type B units in the future be authorized more interpreter personnel. (Command Report - 595th Engr Co (Dump Truck)(Type B) - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 47

CLEARING PATH THROUGH AP MINE FIELD. - A relatively safe expedient method of clearing a path through AP mine fields was devised. The technique consisted of fastening two long barbed wire steel pickets to the nose of a bangalore torpedo. Working from a trench, successive five foot sections of bangalore are added until 80' to 100' are extended. The function of the pickets is to explode trip mines which might otherwise cause premature detonation of the torpedo. After detonation of the bangalore torpedo, a cleared path two to four feet wide is obtained for passage of patrols. The first time the improvised nose was used in an actual operation it was successful in that it exploded a mine without detonating the bangalore torpedo. After the first operation, further tests resulted in the pickets being welded together instead of lashed, and the addition of swept back runners made from 24" bolts salvaged from ammunition boxes. The runners were welded to the front picket to prevent the gooseneck nose from turning

on its side while the bangalore was being pushed out. This method proved satisfactory and eliminated the danger inherent in hand removal. (Command Report - 65th Engr Cmbt Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 48

DITCHING PROCEDURES. - Sections of road which were bounded on either or both sides of rice paddies were difficult to stabilize. This was mainly due to the continued ponding of water in the paddy and the resulting high water table. After several methods were tried, it was found that combining a dike and ditch gave excellent results. A dike of earth is built in the paddy parallel to the line of the road and a sufficient distance away from the shoulder to allow at least a 3' x 3' ditch to be dug. Spoil from the ditch is used to build up the dike. This dike contains the water in the paddy, and allows the water in the subbase to flow out and along the ditch as run-off. Some extremely soft road has been successfully drained and stabilized by this method. (Command Report - 62d Engr Const Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 49

ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS. - Immediately after the recapture of outpost Pork Chop engineers engaged in the reconstruction of defensive positions discovered a booby trap in one of the communication trenches.

The demolition consisted of twelve 1# blocks of TNT. The two firing systems each consisted of a nonelectric cap, time fuze, and a friction ignitor. The time fuze has a white covering on it. The burning rate of this fuze is approximately four seconds per inch.

The charge was placed in the trench to give the appearance of an abandoned satchel charge (see sketch). The charge was partially buried as it might conceivably be by debris and earth. One firing system was lying in an obvious position across the top. The second firing system was buried, the pull ring attached with communication wire to fixed stakes such that a movement of the charge would cause the detonation sequence to be initiated. (Command Report - 13th Engr Cmbt Bn - Mar 53)

SKETCH OF BOOBY TRAP



(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 50

ENEMY MINE TACTICS. - In early March, tanks of the 73d Tank Battalion struck enemy mines immediately in front of the MLR while on a trail they had used numerous times before. The mine clearing operation which immediately followed resulted in the discovery of four Russian box mines (TMD-B). Three of these mines were blown in place and the fourth recovered.

The recovered mine was in good condition. The outside of the mine showed only slight signs of deterioration. The metallic fuze recovered from this mine was free of rust or other signs of prolonged exposure to the elements. The condition of the mine indicated it had not been in the ground for more than two months.

These enemy mines had been placed along a known tank trail and not across it. Variations in the route of advance through a given area are essential to a successful operation. (Command Report - 13th Engr Cmbt Bn - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 51

BUNKER PROBLEMS. - The Marine bunker design proved inadequate to satisfy the variety of demands. To meet the requirements for CP, fighting, aid station and operations bunkers, a family of bunkers was developed which utilized standard parts. These provided adequate protection as well as space, and were adaptable to rapid mass production.

To further speed up construction, units were asked to standardize principally on two sizes, 11' x 18' for CP and aid station use and 8' x 8' for fighting and personnel use.

These bunkers were designed with similar posts, roof beams and footers. The simple expedient of increasing length of caps and furnishing additional posts yielded a longer bunker.

During construction, the primary problem encountered was the weight of roof beams and posts. It was difficult, and required considerable manpower to transport the prefabricated bunkers to forward

outposts. However, the protection furnished upon completion more than offset this hardship. (Command Report - 65th Engr Cmbt Bn - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 52

WEAKNESSES IN ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND. - Principal weaknesses are:

a. Limited strength prevents occupation of positions near the forward base of hills to obtain the best fields of fire, especially flanking and grazing fire.

b. Many bunkers for automatic weapons are not well designed; few are sited or employed to provide fire to flanks. Generally they are used only to fire to the front. Rarely are they dug down so that the normal slope of the terrain can be restored upon completion. As a result, most bunkers have a distinct profile and consequently offer choice targets for enemy destruction.

c. Trenches vary from shallow to too deep. Many have long straight sections that increase the hazards from enfilade fire in close-in fighting. Very few have overhead cover except at points where fighting or sleeping bunkers join. Many of proper depth (6' to 6-1/2') contain no firing steps. In most cases, no effort has been made to cover sandbags with natural earth to improve concealment. Few trenches exist on the reverse slopes; thus there is a lack of secondary firing positions to the flanks and rear.

d. Fighting bunkers, in addition to many structural weaknesses, are frequently located so that they give a false sense of security for close-in fighting and become death traps. This also applies to the numerous sleeping bunkers which are integrated with the fighting trenches.

e. Protective wire needs improvement. The most common weaknesses are: (1) Failure to repair existing wire, (2) Insufficient number of bands of wire, (3) Outside band within grenade range of trenches and (4) Dependence on concertina rather than single and double-apron fence.

f. Communication wire is invariably poor, due to failure to bury it in trenches and approaches. This causes general failure of wire communications during attacks and is highly wasteful.

g. The concealment effort has been inadequate, and far below that of the enemy in quality. Many installations are openly exposed to the front; others are poorly camouflaged. There has been little or no attempt to prepare dummy positions.

h. Minefields are improperly recorded. Apparently successive units have placed mines without insuring that locations were precisely plotted and made known to relieving troops. Enemy fire has further upset such locations. In consequence, mines are now considered to be more hazardous to friendly forces than to the enemy, and there is a reluctance to lay additional ones.

The essence of improving the techniques in this field revolves around the following points, with due consideration for available units, manpower and firepower:

a. Careful selection and development of positions, based on thorough study of observation, field of fire, concealment, obstacles and communications. Development of positions for actual all-around defense.

b. Broken trench traces to minimize artillery and small arms enfilading fire. Frequent covered sections of trench and shelters to permit cover from enemy mortar and artillery fire on positions. Adequate depth to trenches, installation of firing steps, and restoration of natural earth and slopes insofar as practicable.

c. Sightings of automatic weapons to the flanks for maximum effect to provide final protective fire and maximum coverage of intervening terrain.

d. Construction of properly designed bunkers to minimize any changes to contours or profile of natural terrain.

e. Separation of sleeping (living) bunkers to reduce absence of men from firing positions during periods of close combat.

f. Location of protective wire beyond grenade throwing distance and with due regard to best final protective line of automatic

weapons. Wire must consist of multiple bands of single or double-apron fence interspersed with flares and when practicable, personnel mines.

g. Carefully selected emplacements for searchlights, anti-aircraft and antitank (tank) weapons. Dummy emplacements are also desirable.

h. Well defiladed communications trenches and routes of approach.

i. Buried or sandbagged wire lines.

j. Good distribution and storage of all types of ammunition and essential supplies.

k. Reasonable sanitary arrangements.

l. Improvement of concealment, camouflage, and dispersion.

m. Further effort to record existing mine fields.

n. Continuing and systematically planned improvement of all positions.

Recommend that expanded instruction in the techniques of organization of the ground be instituted at appropriate service schools. Newly arrived officers give little evidence of being well-grounded in this subject and state that they have received minimum instruction in this subject at service schools. (Command Report - 7th Inf Div - Mar 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: Letter, ATTNG-24 353/151(7 Jul 53), OCAFF, 7 July 1953, subject: "Model Defensive Positions," stresses the main points enumerated above and adds the requirement that model defensive positions be built at each installation where infantry, armored, artillery, or engineer replacements are being trained, where General Reserve Divisions or RCT's are stationed, and at The Infantry, Armored, Artillery and Engineer Schools. Instruction in proper methods of construction and utilization of defensive positions will be included in appropriate service school courses./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 53

PLASTIC BAGS USED AS EXPEDIENT WITH AN/PRC-10 RADIOS. - During use of the AN/PRC-10 in the rice paddies and rainy weather it was found that by covering the top of the set and the handset with plastic bags, which batteries come in, it is possible to keep the water and dampness out of these items and so keep the set in operation. The handset works perfectly through the plastic bag. (Command Report - 49th FA Bn - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 54

USE OF AAA AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN GROUND SUPPORT. - M-16's were utilized for patrol support. When employed in this role, the squad leader of the M-16 was in constant communication with a FA forward observer who, in turn, was in communication with the patrol leader. The quad 50, M-16 was then able to provide covering fire for the patrol by firing sporadic overhead bursts with fire shifting at the direction of the patrol leader. (Command Report - 3d AAA AW Bn (SP) - May 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 55

VERSATILITY OF AAA AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN THE GROUND ROLE. - A position was required from which a .50 cal machine gun could fire on the Star Hill group at a range of approximately 6,000 yards so that the proper plunging effect could be obtained. Hill 430 satisfied the requirements since the range to the Star Hill group was 5,900 yards, and this member of the group could be seen from the position. It was then possible to deliver direct .50 cal machine gun fire which would have an angle of fall of 611.3 mils as compared with the angle of fall of 116.3 mils at a range of 2,800 yards. Another advantage of employing this type of fire is the fact that a much larger area is covered due to the dispersion of the rounds at near maximum range. At a range of 5,900 yards the 82% beaten zone of a .50 cal machine gun is 114 yards long and 15 yards wide as compared with a beaten zone of 76 yards long and 5 yards wide at a range of 2,800 yards. With this dispersion it was found that by firing all four guns of the M-16 at the top of Star it was possible to hit the trenches on both the forward and rear slopes with one burst. (Command Report - 3d AAA AW Bn (SP) - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: This employment of M-16's is a good example of the versatility of AAA automatic weapons in a ground support role. The high angle of fall and increased dispersion of the M-16 at near maximum range were used to advantage in attacking enemy trenches on both forward and rear ridge slopes./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 56

INDIVIDUAL ROTATION IMPACT ON INFANTRY REGT. - The constant struggle to maintain the basic tactical element impairs the efficiency of the unit as a whole. Only constant retraining, repetition of effort, and correction will keep the unit's standard on an even plane. The normal problems of control, operation, terrain, and season, which ordinarily are solved by training and experience, are never completely settled. The basic team, the squad or tank crew, by the time it has been trained and has learned by experience to surmount obstacles, is broken up by individual rotation. Thus, the major unit must return to its elementary goal and reform instead of progressing forward to the next higher level of efficiency. (Command Report - 224th Inf Regt - May 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: The implementation of the oversea four-man team replacement system for infantry (SR 600-150-10) should reduce many of the problems created by individual rotation in infantry regiments. The infantry rifle platoon packet replacement system will be initiated on an experimental basis at Fort Jackson, SC, in the near future./

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 57

ACCRUED LEAVE. - Recommend that Department of the Army establish a policy in regard to loss of leave time for personnel serving in Korea and elsewhere who are not permitted to take advantage of accumulated leave. Leave accumulated under these conditions should be permitted to accrue beyond sixty days so that an individual will not be made to suffer loss of leave, or else a monetary adjustment should be made. (Command Report - 3d TMRS - Dec 52)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 58

UNFUSED NAPALM IGNITION WITH ARTILLERY DELIVERED WP. - One planned operation was to utilize unfused napalm to saturate an enemy position and then ignite it with white phosphorus mortar and artillery fire. This, in conjunction with psychological warfare broadcasts, was to be used for the purpose of obtaining prisoners. (Command Report - 7th Div Arty - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 59

SEARCHLIGHT FOR TARGET DESIGNATION FOR NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. - An experiment was conducted by the 1st Marine Division in the use of searchlights for designation of targets for visual night close air support as follows:

Two 24-inch searchlights, from positions surveyed in to provide "on-call" light, were beamed to intersect on a target at an angle of about 1600 mils. An L-19 carried the airborne controller, an artillery FO, who rapidly adjusted the beams. The controller identified the target to a flight of two F7F aircraft flown by pilots who were experienced in night flying techniques.

The aircraft attacked from 6000 ft altitude on a glide angle of 35-40 degrees, approaching the target down one of the beams, and pulling out at about 2000 ft above the target. The beam over which the attack was made illuminated dangerous terrain beyond, and the cross-beam provided a horizon reference. It was found that reverse slopes could be attacked successfully when the forward slope was illuminated. Flak suppression was fired by artillery as for a daylight mission.

The over-all effectiveness was equal to daylight visual bombing, and target identification was more positive than current daylight methods. Some difficulties were encountered with the improvised communications which linked FSCC, controller, and searchlights. While much remains to be developed, this technique for night close air support is entirely workable and offers to extend greatly the effectiveness of air-ground operations. (Eighth Army Arty Info Bulletin No 6 - June 53)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 60

SAFETY TESTS - PORTABLE FLAME THROWER. - A natural fear of most personnel who use the portable flame thrower in combat is that they will be seriously burned or killed if a bullet, particularly tracer, or shell fragment should penetrate the fuel tank while the flame thrower is on the person's back. To determine what would happen in the event of such a penetration a test was made of a mix of napalm thickened fuel and two cans filled with liquid gasoline. Several hundred rounds of .30 cal ball and tracer ammunition were fired at these cans from a machine gun at a range of approximately 300 yards. Penetrations of both cans with both types of ammunition were obtained. No ignition of either napalm fuel or liquid gasoline was obtained which indicates that a flame thrower operator would be safe as far as fire is concerned if the flame thrower fuel tanks were penetrated by ball or tracer ammunition or shell fragments. (Command Report - X Corps - Jan 53)

/ OCAFF Comment: Chemical tests show that there is no great danger to the wearer if the fuel tanks are ruptured prior to being pressurized. If a rupture occurs, the flame thrower should be discarded at once in order to prevent the wearer from becoming wet with fuel which could be ignited from tracers or other flame throwers. Rupture of the fuel tanks after being pressurized increases the hazard slightly because the fuel tends to spray and ignites more easily. Danger from flame because of rupture of the pressure bottle is highly remote. There is more danger because of rupture of the highly stressed steel./