as ORIGINAL 5-5

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

A5/A9-9/A16-3/(jds)
Serial 059-50

2 August 1950

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Report of Operations for period 16-31 July 1950 (against North Korean invasion forces)

Ref: (a) ComCarDiv-3 Conf. ltr. ser 066 dtd 19 July 1950

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1. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Air Group FIVE on 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29 of July as directed by Commander Carrier Division THREE in compliance with Commander Seventh Fleet Secret Op Orders #10 and 11-50.

2. Comment and Recommendations:

a. Air Operations -

(1) For large strikes on a definite target and for "armed reconnaissance" patrols the operation schedule consisted of a complete 32-plane prop launch twice a day with both flights overflown by two 8-plane waves of jets.

For controlled close-support operations four separate three (3) hour prop launches of 12-16 aircraft were scheduled plus four 8-plane jet sweeps. This kept airplanes over the target area at intervals of every other hour and a half throughout the day. Two attack carriers operating together could maintain continuous support over the target.

b. Tactics -

(1) Since no air opposition was encountered and anti-aircraft fire was, in general, light or non-existent, individual and repeated

(ENCLOSURE) (1)

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runs could be made to insure greater accuracy and more thorough target destruction.

(2) Targets 125-140 miles away were hit by jet divisions flying at all times beneath a 5000 foot ceiling. Going in with 80% engine rpm at 3000 feet and 210 knots IAS allowed 3600 lbs. of fuel still aboard when reaching the target. 1600 lbs. of this could be used over the target either by:

(a) 28 minutes of continuous strafing at 86%, or

(b) 18 minutes of high speed strafing, or combat, at 100%.

A return to the carrier at 72%, 200 kts. IAS, 300 feet altitude gave a landing reserve of 1000 lbs. of fuel.

(3) Because of the F9F's speed fairly flat strafing runs were employed. This allowed a longer sighting period without sacrificing any safety.

(4) Moderate success was obtained by the prop planes against tunnels and bridge abutments by skip bombing or mast head attacks with bombs having a 4-5 second delay fuse.

(5) Armed reconnaissance patrols and ground support work are best controlled by using a flight of no more than four planes to a selected target.

(6) At times the shortage of VF (props) for escort required that the VA squadron form its own cover. In a four division VA flight, two divisions are used as base element in a VA defense formation and the other two fly cover. In a three division flight of VA aircraft, one division is the base element and two fly cover.

c. Anti-Submarine Patrol -

(1) For a more efficient ASW attack team, it would be highly desirable to have VA(S) and VA(W) aircraft in the same unit. The different investigator pilots and aircraft now being employed quite often lack the specialized training and equipment necessary for successful hunter killer tactics.

(2) Since efficiency of the radar operator is greatly reduced after two hours of operation, flights should be limited to three hours when practicable.

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d. Aircraft Ordnance -

(1) The following ordnance and fusing is considered desirable for the targets indicated:

Target	Weapon	Fuse
(a) A/C on ground	20MM	
(b) A/C revetted or personnel	Bombs	VT
(c) Locomotives	20MM and rockets	
(d) Oil Cars	20MM and rockets	
(e) Power Stations	20MM, rockets, small bombs	
(f) Bridges	2000 pound (dive bomb) 1000 or 500 lb (skip bomb)	.025 4-5 sec. delay
(g) Factories	Bombs	Instant or .025
(h) RR Yards	Bombs and rockets	
(i) Tunnels	Bombs	4-5 sec. delay
(j) Vehicles-trucks	20MM and rockets	
(k) Tanks	Napalm and rockets (SAP)	
(l) Boats	All ordnance	

e. Electronics Countermeasure -

(1) Enemy radar has been detected in several cases but since countermeasure transmitters are not yet available our "Q" planes were unable to do any jamming.

f. Communications -

(1) The 4-digit "tactical mission" voice call signs for individual aircraft as prescribed in section 7 of JANAP 119(A) are unsatisfactory due to:

(a) Awkwardness because of length.

(b) The difficulty of quick association of the call with the pilot or aircraft.

A tally-ho message must be rapidly made and must immediately identify the sender. Also in the case of operating with a Tactical Air Coordinator in close support work simplicity and clarity of call signs between aircraft is imperative. Use of side numbers would be best for both the above examples and for all cases of aircraft on tactical missions, flight leaders being an exception. This is authorized by the note under paragraph 726 of JANAP 119(A).

(2) To date no plane in the Air Group has been called upon to use authentication or recognition signals although much time and effort have been spent on the dissemination to all pilots of the proper daily codes. For the current type operations of penetrating strikes and close support it does not seem necessary that the pilots of our single seat aircraft need be encumbered with this extra non-essential data. This is especially true of the recognition codes since none of our aircraft are equipped with either a Very's pistol or an Aldis lamp.

g. Air Intelligence -

(1) Non-flying Air Intelligence Officers are still urgently needed by the squadrons of the Air Group. The aviators of the Group, now acting in the AIO capacity, have to date done an excellent job in addition to their primary duty of flying plus other collateral squadron duties. However, this overload situation has, in a couple of instances, resulted in inadequate briefing and debriefing.

(2) Photo coverage and intelligence information, collected by other sources, should be expeditiously disseminated to the lower echelons, namely the squadrons that will actually be participating in the mission. At times in the past it has been noted that such target information has not reached the participating elements until the mission had been completed.

(3) The best charts available in any quantity for our close support work have been the World Aeronautical Charts with a scale of 1:1,000,000 which is entirely inadequate for target pin-pointing. A few grid charts of a more appropriate scale were issued but they lacked contour and riverline coloring and when covered over with the necessary grid markings they were most difficult to read.

h. Personnel -

(1) The transition from peace to wartime operations has indicated an immediate need in the Air Group for non-flying Air Intelligence and Maintenance Officers.

Increased complement of ordnance, electronic, and aviation machinist ratings is also needed. With our present peacetime strength of 542 men, less 75 detailed to the ship, an extended period under combat conditions would be accomplished only with difficulty. It has been during these combat periods that the shortage of ordnancemen has been most keenly felt.

i. Material Discrepancies -

(1) Aircraft -

(a) In an effort to prevent any future F9F-3 operational losses due to partial loss of engine power after catapulting it is recommended that a friction lock be installed on the throttle quadrant and also that the fuel system and its emergency features be thoroughly investigated for possible malfunction due to the accelerating effects from the catapult shot.

(b) Hydrolube now in use in the F9F-3 hydraulic system is causing deterioration of seals and rubber parts and failure of hydraulic valves. Hydraulic fluid AN-O-366, although inflammable, is recommended.

(c) Wartime operating conditions revealed the following facts regarding the F4U-4B:

(1) RB-19 spark plugs have given the best performance in the R2800-42W engine.

(2) Oil cooler shut off valves should be installed on an urgency basis.

(3) Armor plate protection is desirable if planes are to be used for extensive close support work.

(4) Activate war emergency power equipment and install all up to date service changes before the aircraft leaves the States.

(2) Ordnance -

(a) On the Corsairs and Skyraiders, the Mark 9, Mod 2 & 3 rocket launchers are frequently rendered unserviceable under the stress of an arrested landing with HVARs aboard and should be

modified. The Mark 55 bomb rack should be added to the Corsair configuration, however, it should first be modified to withstand arrested landings with stores aboard.

(b) It is strongly recommended that future VA aircraft have four forward firing 20mm guns. Also the AD spare parts list should be enlarged to include 200 Mark 55 bomb racks, 100 Mark 9, Mod 3 rocket launchers, 2 20MM gun kits, four spare guns and forty ammunition cans.

(c) In the F4U-5N, improper functioning of the link stripper on the 20mm gun allows the rounds to enter the feed mechanism in a canted position, jamming the gun and oftentimes rupturing the round. An improved stripper is recommended.

(d) Ordnance difficulties with the F9F-3 were as follows:

(1) Wing gun camera - recommend re-wiring to permit ground checks without requirement of 30% generator output of plane system.

(2) Fire control system - recommend rewiring to make separate from armament system. Damage to bearings in the sight result from arrested landings and deck spotting. Should be energized when battery switch is turned on.

(3) Booster motors - recommend electrical cut-off switch to relieve pressure when gun jamming occurs. At present, operation of the booster continues after a jam occurs and causes rupturing of the ammunition chutes.

(4) Elevating bolt - recommend shortening to permit removal of instrument panel without requiring removal of the gun sight.

(5) Split cartridge ejection doors - recommend changing to a single door. The split type door is presently bending upward permitting a crack sufficient for an empty round to lodge and prevent doors from opening.

(6) Gun heater cannon plugs - recommend installing between the number 1 and 2 guns and 3 and 4 guns, preventing damage to gun heater wires when removing the guns.

(7) Radio compartment bolts - recommend countersinking or shielding to prevent personnel injury during loading.

(8) Muzzle covers - recommend a celluloid muzzle cover which does not require removal prior to firing. In the event of aborted firing missions, protection of the barrels will thus be provided.

(9) Sliding nose section - hangar deck spots preclude opening the nose for routine maintenance and loading operations, which is considered unsatisfactory.

(10) Cartridge and link collecting space - capacity or shape, even with the link deflectors installed, is inadequate. Jams are occurring in the ejection chute after approximately 500 rounds have been fired.

(11) Gun camera magazines - recommend pre-loaded, fifty foot magazines stock No. (E) 18-F-32091-100 be provided.

(12) Outboard ammo cans - partial ammo loads, if not expended, move forward on arrested landing causing ammo can securing pins to shear or bind and allow can to move forward. Recommend a securing rod to retain can in proper position.

3. Summary of Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

a. Skip and mast head bombing be included in the training syllabus of the dive-bomber and fighter-bomber propeller squadrons.

b. The ASW attack team of VA(S) and VA(W) aircraft and pilots train and operate in the same squadron or unit.

c. Side number tactical call signs be used between aircraft on "tactical missions".

d. The carrying of authentication codes and recognition signals should not be required of single seat aircraft pilots when conducting strike missions. If necessary a simplified code should be used.

e. All aircraft be completely outfitted with radio gear and latest service changes before being sent to the forward area.

f. Non-flying Intelligence Officers be assigned the Air Group and that the squadrons personnel be increased to wartime complement, especially in the rates of ordnance, electronics and aviation machinists.

g. Complete target information be given the strike pilots as early as possible prior to the mission and that appropriate grid charts be provided all pilots engaged in close support work.

h. The following corrective action be taken in regards aircraft and ordnance discrepancies of the F9F-3:

(1) Install friction lock on throttle quadrant.

(2) Change the fluid in the hydraulic system to a type that will not deteriorate the seals and rubber fittings.

(3) Rewire the fire control (gunsight) system to prevent damage to sight bearings on arrested landings.

(4) Install an electrical cut-off switch on the booster motors to relieve pressure when gun jamming occurs.

(5) Countersink or shield radio compartment bolts to prevent injury to ordnance personnel.

(6) Increase capacity or change shape of cartridge and link collecting space to prevent jamming.

(7) Install a strong enough securing rod in the outboard ammo cans to prevent the cans from breaking loose on an arrested landing with partial ammo remaining.

i. The following corrective action be taken in regards aircraft and ordnance discrepancies of the F4U-4B:

(1) Install armor plate protection.

(2) Install oil cooler shut-off valves.

(3) Use only RB-19 spark plugs.

(4) Activate the war emergency power equipment.

(5) Redesign the Mark 9, Mod 2 and 3 rocket rails to withstand arrested landings with 5" HVARs.

(6) Provide the Corsair with the Mk. 55 bomb racks modified to withstand arrested landings while carrying external stores.

j. The corrective actions necessary for the AD are:

(1) Modify the rocket launchers and Mk. 55 bomb rack the same as the F4U-4B.

(2) Install four forward firing 20mm on the future VA aircraft.

[redacted]

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"ORGANIZATION" - CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CCVG-5 Commander H. P. LANHAM

No Aircraft
4 Pilots

VF-51 Lieutenant Commander A. D. POLLOCK (Commanding Officer)

16 F9F-3 Aircraft
16 Pilots on Board

VF-52 Lieutenant Commander W. E. LAMB (Commanding Officer)

14 F9F-3 Aircraft
18 Pilots on board

VF-53 Lieutenant Commander W. R. PITTMAN (Commanding Officer)

8 F4U-4B Aircraft
14 Pilots on Board

VF-54 Lieutenant Commander D. K. ENGLISH (Commanding Officer)

12 F4U-4B Aircraft
15 Pilots on board.

VA-55 Lieutenant Commander N. D. HODSON (Commanding Officer)

14 AD Aircraft
20 Pilots on Board

VC-3 Detachment Lieutenant Commander W. E. HENRY (Officer in Charge)

2 F4U-5N
3 AD-3N
6 Pilots on Board

VC-11 Detachment Lieutenant Commander S. M. SHELTON (Officer in Charge)

3 AD-3W Aircraft
4 Pilots on Board

MAG-12 Detachment Captain J. V. BOOKER, USMC (Officer in Charge)

2 F4U-5P
3 Pilots on Board

NOTE: Figures reflect number of flyable planes and qualified pilots available at commencement of operations.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

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NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS (16 July - 31 July)

Offensive operations against North Korean forces were conducted during this period on the following days of July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.

On the morning of the 18th precautionary cover was provided for the unopposed amphibious landing of the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang, South Korea. A prop strike in the late afternoon of the 18th did considerable damage to the Wonsan Oil Refinery. In general, the remainder of the flights and sweeps on the 18th, 19th, 22nd and 25th were "armed reconnaissance" in nature and covered an area inland from Pohang to north of Hamhung on the east coast and on the west coast ranged from Kwangju north to Kaesong going inland as far as Namwon. Targets attacked and damaged were airfield installations, railroad facilities, locomotives and rolling stock, bridges, power stations, oil tanks, small boats, factories, troops and vehicles.

On 26, 28 and 29 of July close support operations were conducted under control of Air Force Tactical Air Coordinators in an area along the front line from Hadong north to Hamchang. Targets were mainly troops, armor, and transportation facilities.

The HMS TRIUMPH operated with us at all times, except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

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TABULATION OF SORTIES AND HOURS FLOWN

16 - 31 July 1950

Jet hours	260.3	Jet sorties	157
Prop hours	1344.1	Prop sorties	491
Total hours	1604.4	Total sorties	648

Sorties over Korean targets:

Jet	157
Prop	416
Total	573

[redacted] ENCLOSURE (3)

MATERIAL DAMAGE

31 July 1950

Score of damage inflicted against Korean targets by Carrier Air Group FIVE during the period 16-30 July, 1950. The VALLEY FORGE launched the Air Group planes from both sides of the Korean peninsula in order to get them as close to the targets as possible. During the period 25-29 July, under the direction of TAC our planes were able to give valuable support to the ground forces in the critical southwest sector of Korea.

TYPE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	31	13	8
Locomotives	27	2	5
Train (24 cars oil or ammo)	1	-	-
Railroad Cars	3	-	41
Tank Cars	6	-	2
Rail Yards	-	-	2
Railroad Carbarns	-	-	1
Railroad Bridges	2	-	9
Railroad Tunnels	-	-	5
Railroad Handcar	-	1	-
Wonsan Oil Refinery	75-100%	-	-1
Oil Storage Tanks (large)	11	-	2
Oil Storage Tanks (small)	2	-	-
Refinery (small)	-	-	1
Highway Bridge	-	-	4
Factories	50%	-	5
Chemical Plant	-	-	1
Cement Plant	-	-	1
Warehouses	-	3	4
Power Stations (Transformer)	3	1	8
Hangars	-	-	3
Trucks	77	24	65
Jeeps	5	2	3
Reconaisaance	1	1	2
Armored Cars or Jeeps	-	-	3
Buses	1	-	2
Weapons Carrier	-	-	1
Horse Carts	8	-	2
Motorcycle and Sidecar	-	1	-
Tanks	3	2	4
Towns or Villages	1	8	19
Aircraft Installations	-	-	1
Ammo dump (small)	-	-	1
M/G Nest	-	1	-
Field Artillery Piece	-	-	1

ENCL (4A)

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

TYPE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Small Freighters	2	2	1
Gunboats	-	-	3
Barges	2	-	2
Junks (large)	-	-	9
Fishing Boats	-	-	4
Tugs	2	-	-

One road was blocked by landslide. The possibility that many of the trucks which did not burn were hit on successive strikes must be considered.

An undetermined number of personnel were killed in attacks on villages, trucks and other installations. Other equipment was probably damaged in these strikes.

H. P. LANHAM

ENCL (4A)

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MATERIAL DAMAGE

B. Self

2 F4U-4B lost when forced down due to enemy AA action.

1 AD-4 lost when it dragged a wing on a hillock, crashed and exploded over enemy territory during a strafing run.

1 AD-4 Class "C" damage from enemy AA or own bomb blast. (Unrepairable aboard ship)

2 F9F-3 operational losses. Partial loss of power after take-off.

13 other aircraft received minor repairable damage from light and medium AA fire.

[redacted]

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PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

A. Enemy

Unknown

B. Own

1. Ensign D. R. STEPHENS, USN, 513260/1310. Killed 22 July 1950 in crash and explosion of an AD-4 near Kangnyong-ni, Korea.

2. Ensign K. E. THOMSON, USN, 496511/1310. Missing. Forced down (F4U-4B) uninjured, from AA fire near front lines 15 miles NE of Posong, 22 July. Present whereabouts unknown.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (5)

[redacted]

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CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY ORIGINATOR

a. Policies concerning operations and tactics mentioned in the basic letter of this report have already been placed into practice by this Air Group.

b. AIO and Maintenance Officers were requested by despatch. No Air Intelligence Officers have yet reported to the Group.

c. ACDMs or other appropriate reports have been submitted on all aircraft discrepancies noted within this report.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (6)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

as ORIGINAL

CVG5/A4-3/A16-3/(cfc)
Serial 067-50

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AUG 24 1950

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Action Report for period 4-21 August 1950

Ref: (a) ComCarDiv-3 Conf ltr ser 070 dtd 4 August 1950

I. NARRATIVE:

1. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Air Group FIVE on 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 of ~~July~~ August as directed by ComCarDiv-3 in compliance with Com7thFlt Secret Operation Order #13-50 of 4 August 1950.

2. The Air Group, under the command of Commander H. P. LANHAM, commenced this operation with the following number of aircraft and pilots available.

a.	F9F-3 Jets (two squadrons)	28 aircraft, 40 pilots
b.	F4U-4B Fighter Bombers (two squadrons)	22 aircraft, 39 pilots
c.	AD-4 dive bombers (one squadron)	15 aircraft, 21 pilots
d.	F4U-5N & AD-2N night unit	5 aircraft, 6 pilots
e.	AD-3W AEP unit,	3 aircraft, 4 pilots
f.	F4U-5P photo unit,	2 aircraft, 3 pilots

3. During this period our carrier (USS VALLEY FORGE) operated in company with the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and Air Group ELEVEN. Flight operations against the North Korean invasion forces comprised controlled close suport work, armed reconnaissance patrols and sweeps, and interdiction-strike work on assigned targets by small and medium size strike groups.

Close support to the front line ground forces was furnished on four days (5, 6, 9 and 16 of August). To assist the Air Force in target spotting and controlling, the Air Group supplied Target Air Controllers to Taegu Air Force Base for a three day period (5, 6 and 7 of August). These controllers directed both Navy and Air Force aircraft on the north-south bombline from Chinju to Hamchang.

Armed Reconnaissance patrols and interdiction strikes reached targets over practically the entire Korean peninsula. The majority of the patrols were on the west side ranging from Chinju in the south, northward past Kunsan, Taejon, Suwon, Seoul, Sariwon, Haeju, and Pyongyang to as far north as Anju and Sonchon. Eastern areas covered centered near Chongjin in the north, around the Hamhung-Wonsan area, and along the Wonju-Tanyang-Pohang line.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE 1

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4. The daily air plan best suited for this mixed type of combat operations consisted of four 3½ hour prop launches (12-24 aircraft) each followed 1 3/4 hours later by a 90 minute jet launch (8 aircraft). The PHILIPPINE SEA paralleled our schedule so that strike groups from the two carriers could be joined when necessary.

Routine CAP, ASP, and courier flights were divided between the two carriers. These non-offensive missions accounted for additional flight operations on 4, 8, 11 and 18th of August.

The total hours and sorties for the fifteen days of flight operations in this period of 4-21 August were:

				Sorties over Korean Targets	
Jet Hours	381.1	Jet Sorties	240	Jet	234
Prop Hours	2543.5	Prop Sorties	742	Prop	530
Total	2924.6	Total	982	Total	764

II. ORDNANCE

1. 214,174 rounds of 20MM ammunition were fired by all squadrons during the 11 days of action. With very few exceptions, each target sortie involved strafing. The wear from this high usage of the 20MM guns, coupled with insufficient spare parts, is beginning to be noticed in more frequent gun failures during flight. The new 7-1-50 BuOrd allowance list for an 18 plane squadron allows 4 spare guns. For continued action, of the type this Air Group has experienced in Korea, one spare gun for every four installed plus a proportionate increase of spare parts is deemed necessary.

The 20MM gun has proven to be a devastating attack weapon. Pilots of World War II experience are unanimous in their preference for the 4 20MM installation over the 6 .50 caliber installation. It is recommended that .50 caliber gunned aircraft be sent forward only in dire emergency.

2. The Mark 9, Mod 2 and 3, rocket launchers are unsatisfactory in that they are not strong enough to withstand all arrested landings with a hung 5"HVAR or 1001b bomb. Either the locking-latch-shear-pin shears allowing the projectile to drop to the deck, or the after part of the launcher starts pulling away from its base plate due to the high moment from the overhanging rocket tail. HUDM's covering this are being submitted.

A sturdy and reliable combination bomb-rocket pylon is sorely needed. It should be quickly adaptable to either choice of ordnance. Further it should be strong enough to withstand bringing stores back aboard and also have a manual as well as electrical positive release for jettisoning hung ordnance.

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III. BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own Losses -

1 F4U-5P Forced down by enemy small arms AA.
1 F4U-4B Ditched at sea. Damaged by enemy AA.
1 F4U-4B Crashed in enemy territory. Cause unknown.
1 F9F-3 Missing over enemy territory. Cause unknown.

2. Forty other aircraft received minor battle damage, mostly from light anti-aircraft fire. Damage on ten of these necessitated changing a component such as a stabilizer, aileron or wing.

3. Enemy Losses -

TYPE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	5	-	2
Trains (15 ammo cars)	1	-	-
Locomotives	63	9	24
Box Cars	48	-	145
Tank Cars	23	-	17
Railroad Yards	-	-	12
Railroad Carbarns	-	1	-
Railroad Bridges	1	-	3
Railroad Tunnels	-	-	-
Refinery (small)	1	-	-
Oil Storage Tanks (large)	7	-	-
Oil Storage Tanks (small)	4	-	-
Hydro-electric Plant	-	-	1
Dam	-	-	1
Factories	-	-	15
Chemical Plant	-	-	1
Warehouses	34	-	24
Power Stations (Transformer)	2	3	46
Radio Stations	-	-	3
Hangars	-	-	1
Barracks	7	-	3
Buildings (unidentified)	22	-	4
Ammo Dumps	4	-	-
Supply Dumps	-	-	5
Fuel Dumps	2	-	3
Highway Bridges	2	-	12
Trucks	165	38	146
Jeeps	8	1	7
Tanks	14	1	11
*Other Vehicles	72	6	41
Gunboats	1	-	2
Freighters (small)	1	-	-
**Miscellaneous Small Craft	10	35	45
AA Gun Emplacement	1	-	3
Field Artillery Pieces	-	-	1
Villages with military installations	-	-	29

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* Armored cars, reconnaissance cars, buses, autos, halftracks, tractors and horse carts.

** Barges, junks, sampans, fishing boats, power boats, motor launches, ferry boats and PC boats.

IV. CASUALTIES

1. Own Personnel Losses -

   a. Captain J. V. BOOKER, USMC, 020617/7302. Missing. Forced down (F4U-5P), uninjured, by small arms fire near Chorwon, 7 August 1950.

   b. Ensign A. W. HANTON, USN, 49696/1310. Missing. F4U-4B crashed and burned near Chenui. Parachute nearby in tree, 10 August 1950.

   c. Ensign J. H. NYHUIS, USN, 496613/1310. Missing. Last seen in strafing attack (F9F-3) on train north of Kumchon, 12 August 1950.

V. (a) COMMENTS

1. It is desirable for CV Air Groups to be consolidated in wartime into three squadrons, (VF(Jet), VF(Prop), and VA(Prop) plus the necessary specialized detachments. Administrative work is reduced, the confusion regarding the same type aircraft in two different squadrons and two separate squadrons in one ready room is eliminated, and closer control can be maintained throughout the group..

2. Three replacement F4U-4B's transferred 2 August 1950 from FASRon 119 Detachment Navy 3923 were received with the following high engine time -

Aircraft BuNos.	Hours on Engine
97499	470.6 hrs.
62917	484.4 hrs.
62974	450.5 hrs.

Engine changes are now being made on two of these with the third to be changed within a month's time. Receiving such high-time engines on replacement aircraft places an undue work load on already overworked maintenance crews.

3. There were several instances where target assignment, target information, and the proposed operating schedule would not reach the squadrons until shortly prior to take off time. Such short advance notice does not allow time for squadron CO's to get together to plan their attack, designate a flight leader if its to be coordinated, and then properly brief their own pilots.

[redacted]

Efficiency and full effectiveness of our aircraft are often lost as a result of such short notice, especially so when a new target is involved.

4. There still remains a sorely felt shortage of personnel in the Air Group. Three non-flying AIO's are needed for the squadrons and a non-flying Administrative Officer is required on the Air Group Commander's staff. With the men, the lack of ordnance, aviation machinist, and electronic rates is still outstanding. The former rate being the most in demand.

V. (b) RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Increase the ordnance allowance list for 20MM gun squadrons to allow one spare gun for every four installed and increase the accompanying spare parts proportionately.

2. Use only 20MM guns in carrier aircraft.

3. Design a sturdy, reliable, and easily converted combination bomb-rocket pylon for use on carrier aircraft.

4. Consolidate the five squadrons of CV Air Group into three by combining those squadrons which fly similar type aircraft.

5. Aircraft with high-time engines should not be transferred to forward area squadrons as replacements. In World War II no aircraft was sent forward with greater than 150 hours engine time. This is still an excellent rule.

6. Squadrons should receive operation plans with target assignments and information early enough before launching to conduct adequate planning and briefing.

7. Increase squadron and Air Group complement to include -

   a. A non-flying Air Group administrative officer.
   b. Three non-flying Air Intelligence Officers
   c. More enlisted men in rates of ordnance, aviation machinist, and electronics.

H. P. LANHAM

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-3/A9-9/(jds)
Serial 070-50
20 September 1950

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Action Report for period 25 August - 6 September 1950

Ref: (a) CNO rest. ltr Op 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group FIVE for the period 25 August - 6 September 1950 required by reference (a) is forwarded for inclusion in the report of VALLEY FORGE.

I. NARRATIVE

1. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Carrier Air Group FIVE on 26, 27, 29, 30 of August, and on 1, 2, 3 and 4 of September as directed by OTC, Commander Carrier Division ONE, in compliance with Commander Seventh Fleet Secret Operation Order #14-50.

2. The Air Group, under the command of Commander H. P. LANHAM, USN, commenced this operation with the following number of aircraft and pilots available.

a.	F9F-3 Jets (two squadrons)	28 aircraft,	39	pilots
b.	F4U-4B Fighter-Bombers (two squadrons)	24 "	38	"
c.	AD-4 Dive Bombers (one squadron)	13 "	23	"
d.	F4U-5N and AD-3N Night unit	4 "	6	"
e.	AD-3W ASP unit	3 "	4	"
f.	F4U-5P Photo unit	1 "	2	"

3. During this period Carrier Air Group FIVE operated from the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE in company with the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA and Carrier Air Group ELEVEN. Flight operations against the North Korean invasion forces comprised controlled close support work, armed reconnaissance patrols and sweeps, and interdiction-strike work on assigned targets by small and medium size strike groups.

This Air Group furnished close support to the front line ground forces on 26 August and 1, 2 and 3 September. Bad weather prevented similarly scheduled action on 5 September.

Routine CAP, ASP, or utility flights also conducted along with these offensive operations included the additional dates of 28 and 31 August and 5 and 6 September.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

The total hours and sorties for this period, 25 August through 6 September, were:

				Sorties over Korean targets	
Jet Hours	186.3	Jet Sorties	107	Jet	96
Prop Hours	1900.9	Prop Sorties	604	Prop	399
Total	2087.2	Total	711	Total	495

II. BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own Losses:

1 F4U-4B ditched at sea after being hit by AA.

15 other aircraft received battle damage from enemy AA or own bomb blast. Two of these required transfer for repairs. Five others were repairable aboard ship by changing a component part such as a wing, fuel cell, aileron, or stabilizer. Damage on the remaining eight was minor.

2. Enemy Losses:

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
Aircraft	6 (one airborne)	0	5
Locomotives	24	2	17
RR Cars	54	10	95
RR Tank Cars	8	0	10
RR Bridges	5	0	11
Highway Bridges	2	0	4
Trucks	116	7	70
Tanks	5	0	1
* Other Vehicles	14	7	5
Warehouses	33	5	11
Factories	2	0	2
Other Buildings	14	0	21
Supply Dumps	2	0	4
Fuel Dumps	6	0	8
Ammo Dumps	1½	0	0
Freighters	0	0	1
Tankers	0	0	1
Corvettes	0	0	7

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

[redacted]

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
** Other Vessels	6	10	26
Gun Emplacements	13	2	8
Water Tower	0	0	1
Canal Locks	0	0	1
Villages (containing military targets)	15	0	3
Shipbuilding Crane	1	0	0
Oil Tanks	5	0	0

* Other vehicles includes jeeps, half-trucks, buses, carts, and autos.

** Other vessels includes LCT's, barges, power boats, schooners, and junks.

III. CASUALTIES

1. Own - None

2. Enemy - Unknown

IV. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

H. P. Lanham
H. P. LANHAM

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

AS ORIGINAL 3-5

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-3/A9-9/(cfc)
Serial 072-50

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

4 October 1950

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Action Report for period 6 September through 21 September 1950

Ref: (a) CNO rest. ltr Op 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group FIVE from 6 September through 21 September 1950 required by reference (a) is forwarded for inclusion in the report of VALLEY FORGE.

I. NARRATIVE

1. During this period Carrier Air Group FIVE (U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE) participated in the United Nations invasion of the Inchon-Seoul area. This operation was in compliance with:

a. CJTF SEVEN and Com7thFlt Op Plan 9-50 dtd 3 Sept 1950
b. ComPhibGrp ONE Op Order 14-50 dtd 2 Sept 1950
c. ComCarDiv ONE Op Order 1-50 dtd 10 Sept 1950

2. The Air Group commenced this operation with the following number of aircraft and pilots available.

a. F9F-3 Jets (two squadrons)	28 aircraft,	36 Pilots
b. F4U-4B Fighter Bombers (two squadrons)	27 "	33 "
c. AD-4 Dive Bombers (one squadron)	12 "	23 "
d. F4U-5N and AD-4N Night Unit	6 "	6 "
e. AD-3W Early Unit	3 "	4 "
f. F4U-5P Photo Unit	1 "	2 "

3. Offensive flight operations for Air Group FIVE, coordinated with those of CVG-11 (U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA) and CVG-2 (U.S.S. BOXER), were conducted on 12, 13, 14, 15 (D-DAY), 16, 18, 19, and 21 September. Additional operations were conducted on 11 and 17 September for routine defensive and utility flights.

During this phase the jet aircraft were utilized for daily sweeps over the enemy airfields and for combat air patrol. All operations were conducted from a launching point in the Yellow Sea convenient to the Inchon-Seoul area. In general all propeller offensive flights were concentrated in the objective area (Wolmido Island, Inchon, and Seoul) or on the surrounding road nets leading to the area. Missions were comprised of Tarcap, Naval Gun Fire Spotters, Close Support, Deep Support, Call Strikes, Night Heckler, Night Intruder, and Night Tarcap.

[redacted] ENCLOSURE (1)

Far reaching interdiction flights were conducted at the opening of the phase and again at the end of the period. Routine defensive, operational, and utility flights were conducted as necessary.

The total hours and sorties for this period, 6 September through 21 September, were:

				Sorties over Korea	
Jet Hours	472.4	Jet Sorties	288	Jet	112
Prop Hours	1717.5	Prop Sorties	538	Prop	434
Total	2189.9	Total	826	Total	546

II. BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own Losses:

1 F9F-3 ditched at sea. Gradual loss of power presumably due to an AA hit.

1 F4U-5N ditched at sea. Operational loss.

1 F4U-4B ditched at sea. Operational loss.

2 AD-4 damaged by AA. Transferred for overhaul.

17 other aircraft received minor battle damage and were repaired aboard the carrier.

2. Enemy Losses:

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
[illegible]	19	0	8
Railroad Cars	17	[illegible]	47
[illegible]	0	0	6
Railroad Bridges	1	[illegible]	5
Oil Storage Tanks	1	0	2
Factories	0	[illegible]	3
Warehouses	11	0	13
Barracks	2	[illegible]	7
Buildings (unidentified because of camouflage)	15	0	3
Ammo Dumps	3	[illegible]	1
Supply Dumps	4	1	2
Fuel Dumps	4	0	0
Highway Bridges	[illegible]	[illegible]	5
Trucks	171	6	84
Jeeps	10	0	2
Tanks	10	1	3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
* Other Vehicles	40	1	16
Gun Emplacements	30	2	12
Small Craft	3	2	16
Military Installations	2	1	0

* Buses, autos, tractors, halftracks, and carts.

III. CASUALTIES

1. Own - None
2. Enemy - Undetermined number of troops killed or wounded.

IV. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

H. P. [illegible]

AS ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A9-9/A16-3/(jds)
Serial 077-50

21 November 1950

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Action Report for period 11 October - 31 October 1950

Ref: (a) CNO rest ltr Op 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group FIVE for the period from 11 October to 31 October 1950, required by reference (a), is forwarded for inclusion in the report of VALLEY FORGE.

I. Mission and Composition of Own Forces

1. During this period Carrier Air Group FIVE (USS VALLEY FORGE) operated in the Sea of Japan against North Korean targets, our primary mission being to assist as necessary in the amphibious landing at Wonsan. This operation was in compliance with:

(a) ComTthFlt Op Plan 10-50
(b) ComTthFlt Op Order 14-50
(c) ComCarDivONE Op Order 3-50

2. The Air Group commenced this phase with the following availability of pilots and aircraft:

	Aircraft	Pilots
(a) F9F-3 Jets (two squadrons)	26	37
(b) F4U-4B Fighter-Bombers (two squadrons)	23	34
(c) AD-4 Dive-Bombers (one squadron)	12	22
(d) F4U-5N and AD-3N Night Unit	4	5
(e) AD-3W ASW Unit	3	4
(f) F4U-5P Photo Unit	1	2

II. Order of Events

1. Offensive flight operations for Air Group FIVE, coordinated with those of CVG-11 (USS PHILIPPINE SEA), CVG-3 (USS LEYTE), and CVG-2 (USS BOXER), were conducted on 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28 of October. Additional flights were conducted on 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 29 of October for routine defensive and utility operations.

2. During this period only minor assistance was required of the carriers in the Wonsan administrative amphibious landing. Preliminary softening attacks were made on islands controlling the approach to Wonsan Harbor plus a few close support hops for the ROK troops in the vicinity.

3

In lieu of supporting the landing, air operations were diverted to armed reconnaissance, small interdiction strikes, coastal naval gunfire spotting, and jet sweeps, all in an area north and northeast of Wonsan.

The total hours and sorties for this period of flight operations were:

				Sorties over Korean targets	
Jet hours	290.8	Jet sorties	179	Jet	71
Prop hours	1642.1	Prop sorties	582	Prop	350
Total	1932.9	Total	761	Total	421

III. Ordnance Equipment

1. The 2000# bomb, with an instantaneous nose fuse and a .025 sec. tail fuse, was found to be the most effective weapon for the destruction of bridges. However, due to this carrier's limited 2000# bomb stowage capacity, this heavier bomb could not be carried as frequently as desired. Corrective measures are being made by the VALLEY FORGE to alleviate this shortage of heavy bomb stowage racks.

2. The Mark 66 napalm container is inadequate in size. The Mark 12 tank, with its larger capacity, is much more effective.

3. Use of the unspliced pigtail on the 5" HVARs considerably reduced the number of dud rockets brought back aboard. This single piece wire lead had the added strength necessary to prevent the pigtail from parting during high speed bombing dives.

   The variety of targets encountered necessitated the universal use of the instantaneous AN-M-149 nose fuse on the HVAR allowing a selection to be made between contact detonation or deeper penetration as offered by the standard base fuse.

4. The 20MM guns continued to give about 85% availability. This rate was higher for the F9F-3 and lower for the older and more heavily used F4Us. Contributing detrimental factors were:

   (a) Short life of the 20MM firing pin and driving spring.
   (b) Link chute jams in the F9F.
   (c) Inability of the spring tensioning coils to immediately cut out the booster motor operation when stoppages occurred in the F9F outboard guns. An overload in the feed chutes resulted.
   (d) Frequent jams from the Mark 7 belting links.

IV. Battle Damage

1. Own -

1 AD-4 Ditched after being hit in the oil system by 50 cal. bullets.
3 ADs Minor repairable AA damage.
1 F4U Minor repairable AA damage.

2. Enemy -

Type	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
Locomotives	8	-	5
Railroad Cars	21	-	75
Railroad Bridges	1	-	4
Oil Storage Tanks	1	-	-
Warehouses	1	-	8
Buildings (unidentified due to camouflage)	-	-	1
Ammo Dumps	1	-	-
Fuel Dumps	2	-	1
Trucks	180	-	48
Jeeps	1	-	-
Tanks	3	-	-
* Other Vehicles	40	-	44
Gunboats	1	10	-
Corvettes	1	-	-
** Miscellaneous Small Craft	19	-	56
Gun Emplacements	4	-	9
Villages (containing military targets)	-	-	38

Many attacks were made on hidden enemy troops as directed by Tactical Air Control personnel when the Air Group had planes on close support missions.

* Reconnaissance cars, buses, halftracks, autos, tractors, and carts.

** Junks, fishing boats, motor launches, schooners, and power boats.

V. Personnel

1. Casualties

a. A plane captain was critically injured by a propeller as he attempted to remove the rudder batten from his AD.

b. There were no fatalities.

2. Performance and Training

a. There have been two cases where replacement pilots, direct from the training command and lacking fleet experience were unable to quickly adjust themselves and soon prove the combat organization of the squadron. It is recommended that, before being sent into the combat area, replacement pilots should have had training in a fleet squadron and have been recently carrier qualified. "Bounce drill" and requalifications were an impossibility in the forward area.

b. A course in enemy camouflaging and how to detect it should be given pilots going to the Korean area. There are known instances of armed reconnaissance aircraft from newly arrived carriers passing over several camouflaged vehicles which were spotted and destroyed less than an hour later by our more seasoned pilots.

c. Pre-combat training in strafing and bombing under varying conditions should not be neglected. Low level and shallow attacks should be included. Targets located in varying terrain and altitude should be utilized with the aircraft flying in a fully loaded condition of bombs, rockets and fuel.

d. Although the operating schedule for this period was somewhat lighter than previously there were still occasions where working around the clock was necessary to keep up the availability of the aging aircraft. This situation was alleviated somewhat as squadron men, originally loaned to the ship to augment flight deck crews, were returned when drafts of new men were received by the ship.

e. Pilot complement for WesPac deployment should be increased to 1.5 per aircraft. In the undercomplemented Corsair squadrons there were cases of pilots flying up to 85 combat hours in a month.

f. The two-plane section reconnaissance sweep conducted by the jets during this period did much to increase the individual pilots proficiency in navigation, communications, leadership, objective observation and reporting.

g. It is recommended that the personnel of the night flying detachment be given a separate berthing space rather than being spread out in the spaces of several day operating squadrons. Similarly, the officers should room together.

b

VI. Operations, Tactics, General Topics.

1. A 20MM ammunition loading of only HEI was found to be most successful by the night flying detachment. Pilots were not blinded during firing. Sight corrections could be made from the bullet explosions at the target.

2. Some means of illumination is needed for the RAPCAP aircraft in order to identify a surface target. Since the AD-3N is not provided with any lights it would be of more value on CAP or as a Night Intruder than as RAPCAP.

3. Night Intruder pilots felt their missions would be more successful if they could arrive at the target area with 30 minutes of daylight remaining on the evening hops or remain over the target for 30 minutes after daylight on the dawn flights.

4. Jets were employed for fast road reconnaissance and airfield sweeps in order to hold down enemy aircraft activity and spot any large troop or convoy movements. However, the rugged mountainous terrain precluded detailed searching by the F9F. This type work was handled by the prop aircraft.

5. Air Group FIVE maintained the only carrier-flown photo plane (F4U-5N of MAG-12 Detachment) equipped with an operating Sonne camera. Extensive use was made of this aircraft for obtaining "Stereo" pictures of future amphibious-landing beaches.

H. P. LANHAM

C. H. GATES,
By direction

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CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CVG5/A16-3/(jds)
Serial 073-50

30 October 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FVIE
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
(2) Commander Carrier Division THREE

Subj: Close Air Support in Korean Theater

Encl: (1) Statement of Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY-ONE
(2) Statement of Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY-TWO
(3) Statement of Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY-THREE
(4) Statement of Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY-FOUR
(5) Statement of Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron FIFTY-FIVE

1. In compliance with the verbal request of Commander Task Force 77 the following comments and recommendations concerning Close Air Support in the Korean campaign is submitted. These comments are based upon personal observation, discussion with pilots, liaison officer, and the statements of the squadron commanders of the Air Group.

2. (a) Air Support in the Pusan Beach-head

Close Air Support in the southeast sector of Korea was provided by Air Group FIVE on the following dates: 26, 28, and 29 July, 5, 6, 9, 16 and 26 August, and 1, 2 and 3 September.

Most of the occasions on which actual Close Air Support was performed was under a high degree of urgency, which demanded a maximum effort of all forces available to prevent complete loss of our beach-head in Korea. Unfortunately, Naval air close support was not employed to a very high degree of effectiveness for the following reasons:

(1) Communications were chiefly responsible for lack of effectiveness. All aircraft were required to report in to the Joint Operations Center which was located first at Taegu, then moved to Pusan and later returned to Taegu. The radio equipment provided the JOC was always so restricted in range that Naval Aircraft invariably had to fly within a mile or two of the station to achieve satisfactory reception. This caused flights to go considerably out of their way and lose time on station. After reporting in to JOC the flight would be assigned a sector of the front and a controller to report to. On all too many occasions the controller to which the flight was ordered to report would be just returning to base, engaged in handling F60's or F51's or be on some other VHF channel conferring

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with a ground control party. In addition to these difficulties, the Air Force employed 4 channel VHF equipment which might have provided a suitable number of frequencies for normal Air Force use but, when both Air Force and Navy responded to a plea for maximum air effort, the available channels became so crowded that communications often broke down entirely.

(2) Grid Charts. Adding to the overall difficulty was the lack of common grid charts between Army, Air Force and Navy. The charts in use by the carrier pilots at this time were the World Aeronautical Chart series. This required explanation by the Navy pilots, shift by the controller to Latitude - Longitude coordinates, and a consequent loss of time and an added burden to already strained communication channels. Multiple place-names, all difficult to pronounce, contributed to this problem.

(3) Liaison - On two occasions a system employing direct liaison between the Carrier Task Force and JOC, together with air controllers furnished from the carriers, was instituted. These measures aided greatly in improving effectiveness of Naval air close support. On both these occasions, however, the system was discontinued after a short period when the ground forces emergency had apparently subsided. When in effect, the work of the liaison officers and the Navy controllers was hampered by the slow and undependable communications between JOC and the Carrier Task Force and the non-availability of 115/145 Octane gasoline at Taegu and Pusan.

(b) Air Support in the Inchon Invasion.

During the Amphibious Operation at Inchon close air support was furnished during the period 12 September 1950 to 30 September 1950. During this period Naval close air support was considered very effective. There were good reasons for this effectiveness. The Air Group was now working with the same Tactical Air Control Squadron with which it had trained before deploying forward. The same systems of reporting in, orbitting, marking targets and designation of targets with which the pilots were familiar were employed. Radio channels were assigned so that although a tremendous volume of traffic was handled, no individual frequency was over-burdened. Good grid charts were provided and were available in both single chart form or in the form of booklets of small charts. In addition, rapid reliable communications between the carrier and the Tactical Air Direction Center was available.

CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CVG5/A16-3/(jds)
Serial 073-50 (Cont'd)

30 October 1950

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(c) Discussion. It now seems apparent that all carriers deployed overseas should be prepared to perform close air support, at least during the early stages of hostilities. No other operation in which the Navy engages requires such a high degree of coordination of effort and teamwork as properly performed air support. To depend upon another service to provide the Tactical Air Controller and Ground Controller to direct Naval Aircraft is comparable to sending a football team into an important game with a borrowed backfield. No degree of standardization is going to achieve the degree of integration desirable and obtainable by controlling Naval aircraft with Naval personnel.

Although many phases of the Naval airground support furnished in the Pusan beachhead period of the Korean campaign showed need for improvement, it should not be construed that the overall result was ineffective. On the contrary, there were many indications of the tremendous assistance furnished by Naval aircraft to the ground forces. Time and again the enthusiasm for results achieved was expressed by the Tactical Air Controllers and Ground Controllers. The heavy ordnance loads carried by the Corsairs and Skyraiders was always welcomed heartily. As one Air Controller put it, reporting to his ground counterpart on the front lines, "I'm coming over with a bunch of Navy planes and, Brother, they're really loaded." On another occasion the Navy liaison pilots at Taegu heard everywhere the glowing praise of the Navy pilot who had wiped out a complete company of enemy troops by tossing a Napalm bomb into the mouth of the tunnel in which they had sought refuge. Navy liaison officers at Taegu in August heard the results of POW interrogation at the J.O.C. To the question "What U.S. weapon do you fear the most?", the POW's were unanimous in answering, "the blue airplanes".

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Tactical Air Control Squadrons be required to furnish readily deployable "splinter units" equipped with mobile communication equipment and be prepared to control carrier aircraft in close support wherever and whenever required.

2. That more joint exercises in which Naval aircraft support ground forces be scheduled for peacetime training.

3. That a standard grid system be used in all branches of the service.

4. That all pilots be afforded an opportunity to spend 2-4 weeks with an Army Division on a field problem to obtain a familiarity with the equipment and methods employed by Army ground forces.

H. P. LANHAM

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

PART III (Cont'd)

(Enclosre (1) to CAG-5
Conf. ser 073-50)

United States Pacific Fleet
Air Force
FIGHTER SQUADRON FIFTY-ONE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

FvF-51/A16-3:ac
Serial: 366-50
26 October 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE

Subj: Close air support; information concerning

Ref: (a) CAG-5 memo dtd 21 Oct 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following information concerning the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness of close air support as accomplished in the Korean Theatre, is hereby submitted as requested.

2. Although flights were scheduled with the primary mission of providing close air support to the ground forces in the Pusan beach-head, only one division was subsequently utilized. In all other cases, flights scheduled for air support were directed to secondary missions of interdiction or armed reconnaissance. The division which furnished close support was of the opinion that there were insufficient air coordinators to efficiently utilize aircraft available, and further, that insufficient VHF radio channels were provided. No close air support missions were scheduled or flown in the Inchon beach-head.

A.D. POLLOCK

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

PART III (Cont'd)
(Enclosure (2) to CAG-5
Conf. ser 073-50)

United States Pacific Fleet
Air Force
FIGHTER SQUADRON FIFTY TWO

22 October 1950

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY TWO
To: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE

Subj: Note on Air Support

1. Fighter Squadron FIFTY TWO had no assigned close air support missions subsequent to the Inchon landings and as a result can not qualify any comments comparing the close air support effectiveness after Inchon to that rendered in the Taegu beach head.

2. The few close air support missions flown by this squadron indicated a lack of sufficient control units and a faulty communication set-up. Closer liaison would permit assigning strike groups directly to control units.

W.E. LAMB

Air Force
FIGHTER SQUADRON FIFTY-THREE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

VF53/JMM:er
A2-11(2)
25 October 1950

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY THREE
To: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE

Subj: Close Air Support; comments concerning

1. The following comments and discussion of Close Air Support as experienced by Fighter Squadron FIFTY THREE during the Pusan and Inchon beachheads are submitted herein:

a. Factors favorably affecting operations at Pusan:

(1) The most important attribute was the constant surveillance of ground targets by controllers which guaranteed complete coverage of the target area. The presence of controllers so familiar with the area aided tremendously in identification of targets and the front lines.

(2) The use of smoke rockets employed at a later date by our own Valley Forge TAC's speeded up identification of targets. During later flights over the Pusan beachhead target assignment was more accurately identified by the use of various colored smoke rockets fired by the ground artillery which positively outlined the area of support.

(3) Coordinated attacks by use of ground controllers in the target area and in direct communication with the aircraft definitely increased the overall effectiveness. It is suggested that this technique be employed for effective close support missions.

b. Factors unfavorably affecting operations at Pusan:

(1) The most predominate factor that greatly reduced operations was lack of available VHF channels employed to control flights in the objective area. The four (4) VHF channels were constantly overcrowded by the number of support aircraft and controllers operating in the area.

(2) The lack of coordination in the scheduling of flights over the target area resulted in confusion and in many instances long delays. It was necessary at times to assign a secondary target on which to jettison bomb load, due to limited time available over the target.

(3) Flights experienced poor to unsatisfactory communications with "Mellow Control Center." It was necessary to proceed to within ten (10) miles in order to "check in" or "out" due to the limited reception of JOC's radio equipment.

(4) A standard grid system would have aided in the location of targets. It was apparent that both services were using nothing more than standard aeronautical chart (scale 1 - 1,000,000).

2. The following comments apply to the Inchon landings:

a. Factors favorable in effecting operations:

(1) The reporting in and out system employed was very effective and greatly minimized congestion and delay in report to assigned areas.

(2) The method used in assigning targets and close support missions were well coordinated and accurately disseminated to the incoming flights.

(3) Target assignments were consistent with loedings allowing for maximum effectiveness. This factor was particularly noticeable and encouraged the pilots to exort maximum effici- on each mission.

(4) The grid system employed during this operation was very effective and resulted in pin point identification of targets.

b. Unfavorable comments:

(1) The grid system used during Inchon support was excellent, however, it is recommended that the grid maps be printed on smaller sheets to be used in the cockpit. The large sheets were bulky and often very unhandy.

(2) Close air support missions and gun fire support often were intergrated during the same period causing unnecessary risks and danger. There were two (2) instances in which gunfire support was conducted during and on the same target; thus causing decreased efficiency of the support aircraft due to emphasis on look out precautions.

(3) In comparing the operations conducted at both the Inchon and Pusan areas, it was very noticeable that there was a definite lack of over all control and scheduling during the Pusan operation.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That a standard grid system be employed for both Air Force and Navy support work.

(2) That greater emphasis be placed in giving pilots the latest accurate information and briefing on the position of the current bombline.

(3) That more training be given to new pilots in close air support tactics and target identification.

(4) That more VHF channels be used for close air support missions.

(5) That Control Centers be given more adequate communications equipment.

W.R. PITTMAN

(Enclosure (4) to CAG-5
Conf. ser 073-50)

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
FIGHTER SQUADRON FIFTY FOUR
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

VF54:CRJ:hs
A16
Ser: 511-50
26 OCT 1950

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FIFTY FOUR
To: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE

Subj: Close Air Support

Ref: (a) CCVG-5 Memo of 21 October 1950

1. In compliance with reference (a), comments on the Close Air Support in the Pusan and Inchon areas are submitted herewith. Operational procedures are discussed on a comparitive basis.

A. Planning

1. All close support missions in the Pusan area were primarily "call strike" missions, whereas the Inchon area flights were scheduled in accordance with a promulgated operation order.

B. Charts.

1. No close support charts of the Pusan defense perimeter were made available to pilots in this squadron. For this reason no targets could be pin pointed by use of target coordinates alone. Only a general area, such as a village, could be designated by name or by latitude and longitude. In all cases of a pin point target the flight had to be shown the target by a T.A.C.

At Inchon, close support charts were available which enabled flights to strike pin point targets outside the bomb line without the services of a T.A.C.

C. Target Information.

1. At Pusan there were generally no predetermined targets to attack in the event contact was not made with T.A.D.C. or a T.A.C. However, at Inchon, pilots were thoroughly briefed on

road sweeps which were used as alternate targets for flights that were not assigned a close support mission.

D. Bomb Line.

1. Daily and accurate bomb line information in the Pusan area was generally available to pilots prior to launch. Bomb line information in the Inchon area was usually vague because of the rapid progress made by friendly forces.

E. R.I.O. Procedures.

1. At Pusan flights frequently could not report to the T.A.C.C. without proceeding directly over its geographic location. As a result, flight leaders, because of limited time on station, had to by pass the T.A.C.C. and report to any available T.A.C. for target assignment. This prevented the T.A.C.C. from having complete positive control of all aircraft in the area.

2. Terrain features and use of emergency equipment by the T.A.C.C. is considered to be the main cause of the R.I.O. failures at Pusan.

3. At Inchon R.I.O. control was rigidly controlled and communications were very good. However, when the T.A.C.C. was established ashore, both the T.A.C.C. and the T.A.D.C. required R.I.O. on the same channel, resulting in confusion and increased traffic on an already overloaded channel.

F. Target Designation and Controllers.

1. Controllers at Pusan were Air Force air and ground controllers. Pin pointing of targets was difficult due to lack of charts common to Air Force and Navy. Air Force controllers usually had too many flights to control with the result that it took entirely to much time to brief one flight on a target's location. Often, flights of propeller aircraft would have to stand by while jet aircraft were briefed on the target and completed their attack.

2. At Inchon Marine controllers could easily pin point targets by use of gridded charts and pilots experienced no difficulty in locating assigned targets. Flights reporting on station were without undue delay when close support targets were not available.

G. Armament.

1. Specified armament loads, designated by code name to facilitate reporting and target assignments were used at Inchon, but not at Pusan. It is considered that the NAPALM bombs, MK66, used were inaccura e and generally ineffective. The considered optimum Corsair loading for general purpose targets is the 1000 lb. GP bomb with VT nose fusing and inst. or .025 second delay tail fusing, together with a wing load of four (4) 100 lb. GP bombs inst. fused or four (4) HVAR's.

2. In summation, it is considered that the following items were weak points in the Inchon and Pusan operations, and improvement is desired:

(a) VHF Radio Equipment.

1. Adequate channels common to both Air Force and Navy.

2. Ground radio equipment should have added range and reliability.

(b) Grid Charts.

1. Grid charts common to all services and available for all operations.

(c) R.I.O. Procedures.

1. Standardized R/T vocabulary and procedure for both Air Force and Navy.

2. Either T.A.D.C. or T.A.C.C. control, with no overlapping of functions or control.

(d) Armament.

1. Continued study on optimum loadings, particularly proper fusing.

D. K. ENGLISH

(Enclosure (5) to CAG-5 Conf.
Ser. 073-50)

VA55:OP:jd
A16-3
26 OCT 1950

(Enclosure (5) to CAG-5
Conf. ser 073-50 Cont'd)

MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron FIFTY FIVE
To: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE

Subj: Close Air Support in the Pusan and Inchon Beachheads; comments concerning

Ref: (a) CCVG-5 memo of 21 Oct 1950

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following are this squadron's comments concerning the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of close air support in subject areas:

a. Pusan area:

(1) Liaison: Seemed to be lacking on the higher levels. In most instances it was not known where front lines were. This information came in very slowly and was uncertain.

(2) Coordination and scheduling was lacking in most instances. It was seldom known whether a flight was to be close air support or armed reconnaissance from one day to the next. There seemed to be no scheduling of Navy flights over any one particular area or target. There was no central orbit points to hold flights away from the target area until called for, thus an area would have many aircraft for a while and then when the flights had to return to base the TAC would be completely without. Frequently Navy flights would be held orbiting a target while Air Force F-51's were called in from other areas.

(3) JOC and TADC: In most instances the reception of instructions from the JOC and TADC was extremely weak necessitating flying directly over the station to obtain desired reception. The number of radio channels available to the JOC and TADC was limited to four, consequently they were always crowded and in may instances reception was completely blanked out.

(4) Flights: The actual number of flights launched flew close air support because there were no secondary targets assigned by the ship and the TADC did not have any secondary targets to assign. Consequently the flight, after contacting either the TADC or TAC, was on target only a relatively short time. This seems to be an ideal situation, however the scheduling of these flights was such that many support flights left the target area at the same time. The loading for these flights was unusually light when compared with the normal loading usually carried. This was due primarily to the long distance between the target area and the carrier force, normally between 150 and 200 miles.

(5) Charts: The charts used by the Navy in this phase of close air support were the normal air navigation charts while the Air Force was using a gridded chart that we did not have. It was necessary to cause the TADC or TAC to repeat messages of location using latitudes and longitudes in order to locate the geographic sector where the support was needed.

(6) Targets selected: In many instances the targets selected were never actually sighted by the flight leader. It was necessary for the flight to expend external ordnance loads on areas and towns on the order of the TAC whether or not he had actually seen military targets.

(7) Front lines: In many instances the exact knowledge of where the front lines were was not known. There appeared to be little use made of marker panels, a necessity if pilots are not to attack friendly troops.

b. Inchon area:

(1) Liaison: The close air support rendered at Inchon was well planned in advance so that it was known by all concerned exactly how it was to be done.

(2) Coordination and scheduling: Coordination was handled through operations plans and various operations orders, consequently even the pilots knew what to expect from TADC. By Air Operations Orders, squadrons were aware of both primary and secondary missions which were planned well in advance. In scheduling flights, the flight leaders were briefed on secondary targets as well as for close air support. In all instances missions were carried out with a minimum delay.

(3) JOC and TADC: In every instance instructions were received from the TADC with little or no interference, thus enabling the flight to proceed on the mission assigned with little or no delay. The TADC had available to him 10 radio channels so that flights rendering support would not interfere with the reporting in and out net. With the large number of flights reporting in and out with the TADC, this net at times was crowded but that was the exception. Prior to a flight being assigned a secondary mission, a specific channel was assigned them. On a few occasions more than one flight was on one channel thus crowding it. However prior to the TADC moving ashore, communications were excellent.

(4) Flights: The number of flights of this squadron utilized in actual close air support was comparatively few, however normally the flights so utilized were able to stay in the target area a much longer time and were able to carry considerable more ordnance than those in the Pusan area. This enabled the air controller to pick out targets of more value than heretofore.

(5) Charts: The charts and maps used by the flight leaders and the air controllers were standardized so that targets could be given by coordinates, thus targets were located by the flight leaders quite rapidly.

(6) Front lines: Due to the small but compact area of the front lines, the problem of distinguishing targets close to and beyond the front lines was controlled completely by the TACP. Also panel markings were utilized when flights were assigned secondary missions.

2. The following are recommendations for the remedial action concerning the above criticisms:

a. The standardization of such items as training, communications phraseology, radio equipment, charts, weapons and even aviation fuels would accomplish much toward eliminating most of the above discrepancies.

(1) It would be advantageous to all services to train together for the mission of close air support. The good points of the three air services could be exploited so that one close air support doctrine would be the end result. Each of the service components would be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the others in all respects.

b. It is necessary that intelligence flows steadily between the Air Force, Army and Navy in order to perform close air support effectively. The last minute positions of friendly and enemy troops is a necessity along with known intentions, capabilities and limitations. This information would permit the scheduling of close air support flights to remain over the target area continuously.

c. The assignment to a ship or air group, of a shore tactical air controller fully equipped to handle all close support flights regardless of the origin of the flight.

N. D. HODSON

FIFTH OF FIVE CUTS, SIDE

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVG5/A16-3/A9-8/(dep)
Serial 078-50

CONFIDENTIAL

20 November 1950

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Close Air Support; Data concerning

Ref: (a) CTF 77 Conf disp 180214Z of Nov 1950
(b) CTF 77 Conf disp 190123Z of Nov 1950
(c) CTF 77 Conf disp 190454Z of Nov 1950

Encl: (1) Tabulated Data on Close Air Support of Carrier Air Group FIVE (Props)
(2) Tabulated Data on Close Air Support of Carrier Air Group FIVE (Jets)

1. The information requested by references (a), (b) and (c) is submitted as enclosures (1) and (2).

2. No detailed records were made regarding comments or controllers on these flights. Comments and controllers listed are as the individual pilots recalled them from memory or personal notes. If the actual TAC could not be recalled the RIO controller, ie Mellow, Lazarus, Wildwest, Devastate Able or Baker, is listed.

/s/ H. P. LANHAM
H. P. LANHAM

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PART III (Cont'd)

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS OF CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE (PROPS)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBCE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
7-26-50	129-57E 35-50N	0740	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed warehouse containing troops and supplies.	YONGANNI	
		0745	10 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MELLOW	Five (5) trucks destroyed.	TAEGU to TAEJON	
		1000	6 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 2 trucks and damaged 1.	YONGDONG	
		1015	7 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	BEAVER 1	Destroyed 2 trucks and damaged 1.	YOHJU - PUNGGI-	
		1300	4 AD-4	LCDR RAMSEY	MOSQUITO UNCLE	Destroyed 70% of YONGDONG, destroyed 1 truck, damaged 3 other villages and 1 RR bridge.	YONGDONG	Good Control and Communications. Too many A/C in area.
		1330	8 F4U-4B	LT SMITH	MELLOW	Troops concentrations attacked.	TAEJON	
		1615	8 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MELLOW	Napalmed CHONG-SAN, strafed troops.	YONGDONG CHONG-SAN	
7-28-50	125-37E 35-19N	0745	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed HANCHANG damaged YONGANNI, inflicting many casualties.	HANCHANG YONGANNI	Good Control, radio over loaded.
		0800	8 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MOSQUITO MIKE	1 tank, 1 field piece destroyed.	YONGDONG	

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
7-28-50		1045	6 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 1 truck, 1 half-track, 2 jeeps, 1 tank & 1 power station.	YONGDONG	Controller specified area for armed reconnaissance.
		1345	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Damaged 2 warehouses, 1 truck & jeep. Heavy troop casualties.	YONGDONG	Good control. Area crowded b support A/C.
		1345	8 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	MOSQUITO	Hit tanks & troops.	HAMCHANG	Damage unknown
		1630	8 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MELLOW	Destroyed 1 tank, 3 trucks. Damaged 1 tank, 4 trucks, 3 busses	NAMWON	
		1645	6 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 1 village & inflicted heavy troop casualties.	HAMCHANG	Successful mission.
7-29-50	125-14E 35-52N	0700	8 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MELLOW	Destroyed 2 power stations & burned 2 villages.	HADONG	
		0700	8 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Burned HADONG & 2 small villages. Destroyed 3 trucks damaged 1 highway bridge.	HADONG	Radio channel crowded. Good flight.
		1000	4 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 70% of village & destroyed 1 truck and damaged 1 truck.		Poor control Village was only target given.
		1000	8 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MOSQUITO	Destroyed 1 tank, 1 half-track. Damaged 1 bridge.	HADONG	

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
		1300	8 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MELLOW	Destroyed 4 trucks. Damaged 6 trucks & 2 bridges.	HADONG	
		1300	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 5 trucks. Damaged 5 trucks, 2 villages & 1 highway bridge.	SUNCHON HADONG	Good radio communications.
		1300	3 AD-4	LTJG WEST	MELLOW	Destroyed 1 jeep, 3 trucks. Damaged 6 trucks, 1 bridge, 1 village.	SUNCHON, KUAYE KOCHANG KOKSONG	Successful mission.
		1600	3 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 5 trucks & 1 tank. Damaged 1 field piece, 1 bridge, 1 village.	HADONG	Very good control & radio procedure.
		1600	8 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	MOSQUITO	Destroyed 4 vehicles. Bombed bridge.	HADONG	Several Air Controllers used.
8-5-50	127-54E 33-07N	1200	4 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MELLOW	Attacked CHINJU village.	CHINJU	
		1200	5 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Damaged 2 villages. Many troop casualties.	KORYSONG	Poor TAC
		1500	5 AD-4	LT LOGAN	MELLOW	Damaged SACHON & 1 highway bridge.	SACHON	
		1530	2 F4U-4B	LTJG DOWNS	MELLOW	Strafed & bombed troops.	TAEGU	
8-6-50	127-55E 33-32N	0630	12 F4U-4B	LT SMITH	MELLOW	Strafed troop concentrations near CHINJU & HYOPCHON.	CHINJU HYOPCHON	

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
		0630	7 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed large supply dump & inflicted troop casualties.	HAMHON SUCHON-NI SUNCHON	
		0930	4 AD-4	LTJG WEST	MELLOW PINEAPPLE - HORSERADISH	Attacked troops and villages.	SONJU - KORYUNG MAECHAN	
		0930	6 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MELLOW	Damaged bridges.	SANCHON - KOCHANG	
		1230	4 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 2 trucks, 1 jeep, 1 tank & damaged KUMCHON.	KUMCHON	Fair control - not enough targets.
		1530	7 AD-4	LTJG WEST	MELLOW MOSQUITO - JIG	Destroyed 3 trucks, 1 jeep & damaged 2 villages.	NAMJI-RI	
		1530	6 F4U-4B	LT JENNINGS	MOSQUITO FOX	Attacked troop concentrations in villages.	CHINJU	
8-9-50	124-54E 35-43N	1230	4 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	MOSQUITO	Destroyed 1 tank.	TAEGU	
8-16-50	130-11E 37-11N	1230	4 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Attacked troops in 2 villages.	CHONGHA KWAGCHONNI	Good flight.
		1230	8 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MELLOW	Destroyed 6 trucks & 3 power stations. Damaged 2 trucks.	TAEGU	
		1500	5 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 8 trucks, 1 jeep. Damaged 3 trucks, 1 village.	POHANG - HUNGHAE HAKCHON-DONG	Controller appeared inexperienced. Flight assisted in spotting targets & front lines

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBCE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
8-16-50	[illegible]	1530	7 F4U-4B	LT JENNINGS	MOSQUITO	Attacked troops.	POHANG-DONG PONGYANG	Air & Ground TACs.
		1730	4 F4U-4B	LTJG LUNCIE	MOSQUITO	Attacked troops.	POHANG-DONG PONGYANG	Air to Ground TACs.
		1730	3 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 3 trucks, damaged 2 trucks.	POHANG	Poor TAC
		1800	4 F4U-4B	LT SMITH	MOSQUITO DRAGONFLY	Burned supply and gasoline dump & 4 villages.	TAEGU	
8-26-50	130-47E 36-47N	0930	2 F4U-4B	LT HERRICK	MOSQUITO	Attacked troops, tanks and vehicles.	HAEJAN	Good TAC.
		1530	4 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	MOSQUITO	Attacked troops & supplies. Burned 3 trucks & fuel dump.	CHICHON-DONG	
		1530	6 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 10 trucks, 1 mortar position & 1 highway bridge.	HACHONDONG HANGHO-DONG PYONHANG-NI	Good TAC. Radio channel crowded.
9-1-50	124-57E 36-57N	1100	6 F4U-4B	LTJG BRYANT	MELLOW	Bombed HAMAN village.	HAMAN - TUKSONG	Emergency CAS call
		1315	7 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	MELLOW	Burned 2 villages, damaged 1 highway bridge.	TAEGU	
		1400	5 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 3 trucks & 3 villages with troops.	KAEPYODONG	
		1700	5 AD-4	LTJG WEST	MELLOW MOSQUITO - VAUDEVILLE	Destroyed 1 bridge & 3 buildings containing troops.	HAMAN - CHUGAM-NI	

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
9-2-50	125-13E 35-56N	0830	12 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MOSQUITO VAUDEVILLE	Attacked troops on ridge	SINBAN-NI	Good TAC.
		0830	5 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 4 trucks, attacked troops.	HYOPCHON	
		1130	4 AD-4	LCDR RAMSEY	MELLOW MOSQUITO MASTIFF	Destroyed 3 tanks, 7 trucks & 1 40MM gun. Damaged 4trucks.	HAPIN	Good TAC.
		1130	7 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MOSQUITO SPECIAL INSTRUCTION 14	Destroyed 10 trucks, & 3 tanks. Bombed troops.	CHINJU	Good control maintained.
		1430	6 AD-4	LT LOGAN	PICKLE BARREL	Destroyed 2 field pieces, damaged 4 villages.	CHUNGJU-NI	
		1430	10 F4U-4B	LCDR BARKER	MOSQUITO VAUDEVILLE	Attacked troops on ridge & in town.	CHIRYON-NI	Poor Communications.
9-3-50	124-01E 34-20N	1630	9 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MELLOW	Bombed KUNGJU	CHONGJU	Poor communication & weather.
		1630	5 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	MELLOW	Destroyed 6 warehouses.	KUNGJU	Crowded communications.
		1630	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MELLOW	Destroyed 4 warehouses, damaged 2 trucks.	SUICHONPO	Crowded communications.
		1645	6 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	MELLOW	Destroyed 2 tanks, damaged 15 field pieces, & 2 tanks. Strafed troops.	CHINGDONG-NI	Marine ground TAC

PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
9-15-50	124-12E 36-44N	0540	6 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	LAZARUS	Destroyed 1 truck & AA positions.	INCHON-SEOUL	Good TAC.
		0730	6 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	LAZARUS	Destroyed 1 ammo dump, 4 machine gun nests, and 20 trucks.	INCHON	
		1030	6 F4U-4B	LTJG MUNCIE	LAZARUS	Attacked supply dump. troops and vehicles.	KUNCHON-TAEJONG	
		1330	4 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	LAZARUS	Damaged 1 AA position, 1 gun emplacement. Strafed many troops.	INCHON	
		1500	6 F4U-4B	LCDR MARKER	LAZARUS	Bombed gun positions.	INCHON	
		1630	6 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	LAZARUS	Destroyed 1 gun position, strafed beach	INCHON	Control poor due to crowded circuit.
9-16-50	124-36E 36-36N	0730	6 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	LAZARUS	Strafed enemy troops.	INCHON	
9-18-50	124-32E 36-13N	1030	4 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	DEVASTATE ABLE	Burned 1 village, damaged highway bridge.	INCHON-SEOUL	
9-22-50	124-23E 36-24N	0730	4 F4U-4B	LT HERRICK	LAZARUS	Destroyed 8 AA positions. Burned 1 truck.	SEOUL HAN RIVER	
9-25-50	124-19E 36-45N	0740	6 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	DEVASTATE ABLE	Attacked troops & AA positions in SEOUL.	SEOUL	Well Done from Controller.
		0745	6 AD-4	LTJG WEST	DEVASTATE ABLE	Attacked troop concentrations.	SEOUL	
		1045	6 AD-4	LT LOGAN	DEVASTATE ABLE	Attacked AA positions.	SEOUL	

PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESUTLS	AREA	COMMENTS
9-27-50	124-44E 36-24N	0615	2 F4U-4B	LTJG ALBRIGHT	MOSQUITO WILDWEST	Destroyed 5 field pieces, 10 mortars. Killed 200 troops.	SUWON	
		0915	6 F4U-4B	LCDR ENGLISH	MOSQUITO WILDWEST	Destroyed 1 tank.	SUWON	
		1215	4 F4U-4B	LTJG LUNCIE	FOREST 14	Attacked troops & machine gun nests.	INCHON-SEOUL Hill #346	Good TAC
9-28-50	124-50E 36-42N	1345	5 F4U-4B	ENS WOOD	BUCCANEER 14	Attacked troops in village.	37°-13'N 126°-12'E	Good TAC. Troops surrendered.
9-30-50	124-31E 36-20N	1100	3 AD-4	ENS McLAIN	DEVASTATE ABLE	Destroyed many mortar positions.	UIJONGBU	Good control and radio procedure.
		1400	4 AD-4	LCDR HODSON	DEVASTATE ABLE	Attack enemy troops.	UIJONGBU	Good TAC.
10-13-50	130-07E 39-14N	0930	3 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	MOSQUITO GRANITE	Strafed enemy troops.	WONSAN	
11-7-50	128-55E 39-33N	0800	4 F4U-4B	LT SMITH	MOSQUITO HAMMER	Attacked troops on ridge.	ANJU	
		0800	5 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MOSQUITO HAMMER	Attacked enemy troops.	ANJU	Poor TAC.
		1100	4 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	HAMMER MOSQUITO HAMMER	Damaged 1 tank, 2 trucks.	PAKCHON	Good TAC. Radio crowded.
		1400	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER				Circled HUNGNAM for 1 hr. 45 min. no TAC.
		1400	8 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	WILDWEST MOSQUITO WILDWEST	Burned village & attacked troops.	SINANJU	

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
11-8-50	128-59E 39-34N	0630	6 F4U-4B	LT HERRICK	MOSQUITO SPECIAL	Burned villages in valley NE of YONGHUNG	YONGHUNG	Good TAC
		0645	4 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	DEVASTATE BAKER	Destroyed supply buildings.	YONGHUNG	
		0930	5 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	WILDWEST MOSQUITO WILDWEST	Attacked troops.	ANJU	Good flight in spite of poor TAC.
		0930	4 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	MOSQUITO HAMMER	Burned village and warehouses.	SINANJU KUNU-RI	
		0930	4 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN		Burned truck and village.	HAKUNOO-RI	No TAC. Followed a Marine Flight.
		1230	3 AD-4	LCDR HODSON		Attacked troops.	KUNU-RI	
		1230	6 F4U-4B	LTJG MUNCIE	MOSQUITO WILDWEST	Attacked troops.	KUNU-RI	
11-15-50	128-52E 39-28N	0825	2 F4U-4B	LCDR PITTMAN	DEVASTATE BAKER CIGAR 14	Attacked troops.	PUNGSAN	Good TAC.
		0825	2 AD-4	LTJG JACKSON	CIGAR 14	Attacked troops.	PYNGSAN	Good TAC.
		1145	2 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	DETRIMENT 14	Destroyed supply warehouses.	SONO-RI	Successful mission. Good TAC.
		1145	2 F4U-4B	LTJG ALBRIGHT		Destroyed supply warehouses.	SONO-RI	Successful mission. Good TAC.

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PART III (Cont'd)

(Encl (1) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT CBCE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
11-16-50	129-06E 35-56N	0645	4 F4U-4B	LTJG MUNCIE	CIGAR 14	Attacked troops.	KAPSAN	
		0645	3 AD-4	LTJG WEST	MOSQUITO GRADUAL GRADUAL 14	Destroyed 10 houses containing troops.	CHANGPYONG-NI	Good TAC.
		1325	2 AD-4	LTJG WEST	INTERLUDE 14	Attacked troops.	NUK-DONG	
		1325	4 F4U-4B	LTJG DARROW	MOSQUITO-DEVASTATE	Burned 4 villages.	IMDRY	Good TAC.
11-18-50	129-19E	1325	2 F4U-4B	LCDR MURPHY	SANDBLASTER 1 & 2	Burned village and strafed troops.	SINHYANG-DONG	Sandblaster 2 very poor TAC.
		1325	4 AD-4	LT GALLAGHER	MOSQUITO SANDBLASTER	Attacked enemy troops.	SINHYANG-	TAC inexperienced. Flight did most of its own target spotting.

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PART III (Conf'd)

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS OF CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE (JETS)

(Encl (2) to CVG-5 conf ltr ser 078-50)

DATE	1200 POINT OBOE	TAKE OFF TIME	NUMBER AND TYPE A/C	FLIGHT LEADER	CONTROLLER	RESULTS	AREA	COMMENTS
7-28-50	125-37E 35-19N	1530	7 F9F-3	LCDR LAMB	MELLOW	None	NAKTONG RIVER	Unable to contact Mellow control.
7-29-50	125-14E 35-52N	0615	8 F9F-3	LCDR DAVIDSON	MELLOW	Strafed troops and gun emplacements.	NAKTONG RIVER	Controller informed flight that circuits were overloaded. 4 A/C diverted to deep support, remaining division joined F-80 flight, although not in radio contact.
8-5-50	127-54E 33-07N	1100	8 F9F-3	LCDR POLLOCK	PICKLE BARREL	Burned supplies on road and in village.	CHEJU	Unable to contact specified TAC. Contacted Pickle Barrel after 15 min. Handled 4 A/C only. Good TAC.
9-1-50	124-57E 36-57N	1615	4 F9F-3	CDR LANHAM	MELLOW	None	KAEP-YONG	Unable to establish radio contact.
9-2-50	125-13E 35-56N	0700	4 F9F-3	CDR POLLOCK	MOSQUITO MASTIFF	Sank 3 barges.	YONGSANG	Waited 18 min for TAC to come on station. Good TAC once he arrived.

NOTE: During the period 26 July to 3 September approximately six other four plane missions scheduled for Close Air Support were aborted because they were unable to contact MELLOW CONTROL or were unsuccessful in finding a controller in the area. All of these missions proceeded on armed reconnaissance after wasting from 5 to 20 minutes trying to establish communications as briefed. Limited endurance of the jets prevented any further delay in attempting to establish radio contact.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-13
Serial: 065-51

22 September 19

[redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (CV-9)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group FIVE (18 August 1951 - 19 September 1951)

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 348.1

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the action report of USS ESSEX (CV-9).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 8/18	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/19	PILOTS 8/18	PILOTS 9/19
CVG-5 CDR M.U. BEEBE	None	None	None	1 Note #1	1
VF-51 LCDR E.M. BEAUCHAMP	F9F-2	16	9	24	22
VF-172 CDR M.E. BARNETT	F2H-2	19	14	27	26
VF-53 CDR H.J. TRUM, III	F4U-4B	16	16 3 Rep.	24	23
VF-54 CDR P.N. GRAY	AD-4 AD-4L	5 13	4 6	30 Note #2	28
VC-3 (Det) LT J.S. LAKE	F4U-5NL	3	3 1 Rep.	6	6
VC-11 (Det) LT M.R. MILLER	AD-4W	3	2	5	5
VC-35 (Det) LCDR F.F. BERTAGNA	AD-3N AD-4Q	1 2	1 1	6	5
VC-61 (Det) LT S.L. JAYNES	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4
		81(Note 3)	59	127	120

Note #1: The Air Group Commander flies regularly with VF-51 and VF-54. 2 LSOs, Admin., & Comm. Off not included.
Note #2: Includes Air Group Operations Officer.
Note #3: CVG-5 entered Combat Area with 75 aircraft.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b. Mission

The primary mission of Air Group FIVE during this reporting period was the support of United Nations ground forces. This mission was divided into two parts; i.e. the interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication and close air support of United Nations forces on the front lines. Whenever indicated by sightings or photographs sorties were sent against the enemy's supply build-up points. Corsairs were employed as spotters for Naval Gun Fire support along the east coast of Korea. The AEW Team was assigned to ASP coverage for the force. The night hecklers found a great number of transportation targets, as daylight movement was kept to a minimum by the enemy. The Photo Team performed daily missions of covering attacked targets for damage assessment and prospective targets for evaluation plus special photo coverage missions. One assignment of 12 F9F-2 and 12 F2H-2 fighter planes provided cover for a Fifth Air Force bombing marshaling yards in RASHIN which is located on the Korean coast about eighteen miles south of the Russian border.

The combat evaluation of the F2H aircraft has been assigned to Air Group FIVE. The only special mention considered necessary in this report is that the airplane is doing an admirable job under the capable direction of VF-172. An interim evaluation report has been submitted separately and repetition is not considered necessary. Further evaluation reports will be submitted separately as warranted.

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PART II: CHRONOLOGY

The short period in Yokosuka, Japan between 16 August and 18 Augus during which the ESSEX relieved the PRINCETON, was employed by the Ai Group in last minute preparations for its entry into combat. The war had changed considerably since Air Group FIVE left in November last year. Conferences with pilots from Air Group NINETEEN proved very beneficial in providing last minute information on force dispositions operating techniques and intelligence. The complement of aircraft to be operated on board dictated that the excess allowance in aircraft b left at Kisarazu airfield and kept in a standby status. Pilots were detached on Temporary Additional Duty orders and were available to fl aboard as needed. The departure of Air Group FIVE in USS ESSEX was as scheduled except for the threat of Hurricane "MARGE", which was reported heading north towards the Japanese Homeland. The course of the hurricane for the next three days was erratic and evasive maneuve were required to avoid it.

It had been almost two weeks since the pilots had flown and refres er operations on 21 August and 22 August were welcome. A full day's offensive operations were scheduled for 22 August but due to bad weather the operations were cancelled and the only flights launched were for Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Patrol.

On 21 August and 22 August conferences were held with pilots of Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO. On 23 August planes from Air Group FIVE made sorties against the Communists in Korea for the first time in over nine months. The flights were escorted by pilots from Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO to familiarize Air Group FIVE with the terrain and target disposition. This first day of combat marked the first aircraft and pilot loss. LTJG Leo FRANZ, USN of VF-53 was flying to the beach as the third plane of a three plane element. The flight proceeded under an overcast of about 1500'. As they approached the shor line the leader climbed his section through the overcast, but on brea ing out at 6000' LTJG FRANZ' Corsair was nowhere in sight. No trace has been found of the aircraft and the pilot is missing in action. Weather throughout the day was marginal to poor.

On 24 August Air Group FIVE launched their first major effort comprised of a total of 76 sorties the majority of which were assigned missions of reconnaissance. Targets of opportunity were hit along all roads in the assigned area. Five sorties were aborted, one of which was an AD-4 piloted by Ensign STRICKLAND, USN of VF-54. He experienc an engine failure immediately after take off and effected a safe wate landing. He was picked up by the ESSEX' helicopter and set down on the flight deck in less than five minutes, sustaining no injuries. At the end of the second day all pilots in the Air Group had their first combat behind them and the qualms of anticipation were considerably lessened. The photo missions returned with evidence that ther were good bridge targets on all of the major highways.

On 25 August 71 sorties were launched 30 of which were assigned bridges as their primary targets. The talley for the day was three bridges knocked out and four severely damaged. The excellence of the bombing heartened everyone and the spaces were rife with tales of the day's experiences.

[redacted]

On 26 August a shocking accident occurred before sunrise. An AD-3 piloted by LTJG SMITH of VC-35 was seen to burn in mid-air and then crash into the water about five minutes after being launched. The cause of the accident was undetermined. The aircraft sank immediatel and both LTJG SMITH and his aircrewman P. R. BALCH, ATAN presumably were killed. The day's operations continued and the sortie count after the last recovery was 94. For the first time contact was made with the TACC at the front and the Close Air Support missions comple their assignments receiving a well done from the controller for thei accuracy. A marked increase in daylight traffic of the enemy was not throughout the area. There was a general feeling of disappointment among the pilots because the ESSEX was scheduled to replenish on the following morning.

On 27 August the greatest single interest within the ship was mail from home. The first few days of combat had dragged, and it seemed as though the Air Group had been on the line for months. On the 28th all flights except one ASP flight of four aircraft were cancelled because of weather.

On 29 August, expecting targets to be plentiful, over a hundred sorties were launched. The results were not impressive. The Reds had gone back to moving during the hours of darkness. Early in the afternoon three representatives of the Joint Operations Center, Korea came aboard to brief the Air Group on liaison organization, ground forces general employment and disposition, and escape and evasion techniques.

On 30 August the capability of the enemy to rebuild and improvise bridges along the transportation lines was clear to every pilot. Each flight returned with reports that targets, notably bridges and by-passes, which had been crippled or destroyed three days previous were back in operation and passing considerable traffic. During the recovery of the night heckler flight Ensign B.J. KNOX, USNR, of VC-3 misjudged his altitude and inadvertantly ditched his F4U-5N on the down wind leg of his landing pattern. He was recovered shortly by USS ROGERS.

On 31 August targets were meager and scattered, and although 92 sorties were flown it seemed just a routine day of war. 1 September was spent in replenishing.

On 2 September 102 sorties were flown against bridges, transportation supply points, and in Close Air Support. LTJG R.A. BATEMAN had engine trouble on his way to the target. His aircraft caught fire an he was forced to bail out. He was not injured and was picked up near the coast by helicopter and taken to the USS PARKS (DD-884). By this time the pilots were getting more cagey in their assessment of the important features of the work and the risks involved. Not a day had gone by but what at least one plane had been hit by AA. The first tiger like approach was rapidly maturing. Several pilots had flown through their own bomb blasts and a more pronounced outlook on the point of survival was becoming prevalent.

On 3 September the fourth loss occurred when LT Frank SISTRUNK, USN, the Operations Officer of VF-54 was hit by AA while bombing a bridge. His plane was smoking as he pulled out of his run, and he headed toward the east coast and safety which lay about thirty miles away. Half way to the beach, at an altitude of about two thousand feet above the terrain his aircraft was seen to nose down in a steep dive and crash into the ground. The aircraft exploded on impact.

[redacted]

There was no evidence of his having parachuted to safety, and there had been no radio transmissions following the damage. He was therefore presumed dead and reported as killed in action. At approximately the same time Ensign Neil ARMSTRONG, of VF-51 saved his own life with a piece of exceptionally fast headwork. He had been attacking a target in very hilly country. While he was in his run he was hit by AA. He lost elevator control, but in a fraction of a second he rolled in all the back tab he could get. His aircraft, well loaded with ordnance, came so close to the ground that he sheared off two feet of his starboard wing on a power pole. By babying the stick and the trim tabs he was able to fly to friendly territory and to safety. The spin characteristics of the plane were such that a landing speed of over 170 knots would be necessary without positive elevator control which dictated a bail out. This was the first ejection seat bail out made by an Air Group FIVE pilot. ARMSTRONG ejected himself, cleared the seat, opened his chute and landed near K-3 without further incident.

Up until the second of September the Banshees had performed all assigned missions admirably, however, due to the catapult launchings with heavy loads, the supports for the catapult hooks began to crack. For this reason the aircraft were grounded for all flights except Combat Air Patrols for which they were launched without external ordnance or fuel in the tip tanks.

On 4 September death struck twice taking two pilots from one squadron. LTJG R.K. BRAMWELL, USN of VF-51 was hit by flak, the first burst seen in the area, and crashed immediately thereafter. This was considered strong indication that the gun emplacements in the area were automatically or electronically controlled. LTJG J. J. ASHFORD, USN, also of VF-51 on another flight failed to pull out from a rocket run on a truck. Both these aircraft exploded on impact and the pilots were reported as killed in action. The statistics were piling up on both sides of the ledger. The Air Group had destroyed seven bridges, ninety railroad cars, twenty five trucks, twenty five ox-carts, two hundred and fifty troops, and damaged about twice as many of each, the price being the lives of five pilots, one aircrewman and ten aircraft.

On 5 September the force retired to replenish, the BOXER relieved the BON HOMME RICHARD and the pilots of Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE had an opportunity to discuss the immediate operational problems.

On 6 September the Air Group was back over Korea with bridges as the primary targets. Of the thirty three bridge sorties flown four direct hits and nine near misses were scored leaving gratifying damage and destruction to the enemy supply lanes. For the second consecutive day troop concentrations of over two thousand men each were sighted and attacked.

On 7 September 91 sorties were flown. Transportation was hit hard in the form of trucks rail cars and carts. On one of the bridge hops Commander P.N. GRAY, skipper of VF-54 was hit by flak while making his run on a group of trucks surrounded by gun emplacements sending out intense and accurate AA. He managed to "nurse" his plane to the coast ditched and was picked up by the USS PC-703 and transferred to the USS PORTERFIELD (DD-682) without injury. Late in a strike hop Ensign E.R. HARRIS, of VF-53 was hit by small arms fire. His knee pad deflected the bullet, but shrapnel particles opened his hand, knee and neck. He returned to the force and landed on board, was immediately given treatment by DR BENNETT, the Air Group Flight Surgeon. The

[redacted]

wounds were not serious however and he was back to flight duty in a few days.

On 8 September the Banshees had part of the answer on the catapult hook trouble and were scheduled for armed reconnaissance, finding many targets of gun emplacements, troop bivouacs and transportation. Successful drops were made on two trains, one with eight cars and the other with twenty seven cars, all heavily loaded. The latter was left with its engine and ten of the cars destroyed. The Air Group lost one pilot LTJG J.B. PARSE, USN of VF-54. He had been napalming troops and machine gun nests. He left these targets, flew on to a bridge, and was making his first bombing run when his plane burst into flames, crashed and exploded. There was no indication that he had escaped the crash and was reported as killed in action. On the same hop LTJG P.L. WORKING of VF-53 was hit by flak and had to ditch his plane. The ditching was successful. When asked if anyone was on the way to his rescue the USS WEDDERBURN (DD-684) reported: "The ship is steaming, the helicopter is launched, the whaleboat is over the side, and supper is hot on the table".

On 9 September the force retired to replenish.

On 10 September 101 sorties were flown. During the launch of one of the Night Hecklers a flare dropped on the deck and ignited. The wind blew the flare toward the parked planes which were fully loaded and fueled. LTJG A. G. SZYMANSKI of VF-54 grabbed the flare by the chute shouds and threw it over the side, thus avoiding a possible disaster. The Night Hecklers found more targets than they could destroy. These consisted mostly of vehicles and supply points however. They dropped spans on two highway bridges in addition to attacking the vehicles. In the afternoon LTJG P. L. WORKING and his wingman attacked gun emplacements on the HODO PANAO peninsula which were shelling UN destroyers off the coast. They put the guns out of action and eased the destroyers' situation.

On 11 September 99 sorties were flown. The most lucrative targets of the day were trains, of which a total of five were attacked and destroyed, including 3 locomotives. After returning from a recco hop LTJG TREADWELL of VF-172 lost all brake-action while taxiing up the flight deck. Unable to maintain control, the aircraft eased into the catwalk and over the side. The pilot was recovered immediately.

On 12 September 99 sorties were flown. Several runs were made on trains but aborted at the last minute. The Reds are using trains and tunnel entrances as flak traps. The train waits just outside the tunnel. When the plane makes his run the train scoots into the tunnel for protection and AA batteries near the mouth of the tunnel get an excellent shot at the aircraft. LT F. J. PRENDERGAST of VF-54 was hit by small arms fire and wounded in the left knee. He returned to the ship and landed on board.

On 13 September the force retired to replenish. About 1000 orders were received to launch strikes and recco hops in the afternoon. In complying with this order a precedent was set because for the 1st time a carrier had completed full replenishment and also launched a major effort against the enemy on the same day. It was hoped that the enemy might be surprised and caught napping, but they were not. The strikes were only moderately successful and the precedent is not considered practical unless conditions on the beach urgently require support by Naval Air.

On 14 September 88 sorties were flown. The primary targets of the day were buildings and railroad cars. Twenty buildings, apparently filled with inflammable material were destroyed. A string of 50 box cars were rocketed and all but 15 of them were destroyed. During a catapult launch an AD-4W was damaged. The tail hook extended upon initial accelteration of the catapult. The launching bridle fouled on the arresting hook and wrapped around the horizontal stabilizer and elevator causing severe damage to the empennage. The aircraft vibrate so violently that it was impossible for LT B.E. O'BRIEN to maintain control and he was forced to ditch. Both he and his two crewman were rescued successfully.

On 15 September flight operations were curtailed by bad weather. 10 sorties were flown of which 8 were CAP and ASP and two were weather recco hops.

On 16 September 83 sorties were flown. These sorties inflicted the greatest damage to date, including a hangar full of ammunition, four locomotives damaged, three bridge spans dropped and over 200 troops killed. After completion of runs on a bridge target LTJG J.K. KELLER and LCDR I.B. OXLEY of VF-172 had a mid-air collision which damaged both aircraft but both returned to the force. KELLER's aircraft had limited aileron control and no flaps. He landed hook up, bounced over the barriers and crashed into the parked planes on the starboard bow. A gasoline fire ensued. Heroic performances of duty were the predominant factors in the fighting of the fire. The flight deck personnel and squadron personnel nearest the crash made courageou efforts to aid the people injured by the initial explosion. Taking no heed of personal safety they disarmed and removed ordnance loads and moved aircraft out of the danger zone. In spite of all efforts the toll of the crash was 3 dead, 2 missing and 14 injured. Four aircraft were destroyed and four received damage requiring overhaul.

On 17 September 63 sorties were flown. Only one catapult was used since the other was subjected to an undetermined amount of heat in the fire of the previous evening. The targets were not plentiful and attacks were limited to vehicular equipment and the usual bridges.

On 18 September the force retired to replenish. 29 sorties were flown most of which were bridge strikes.

On 19 September the final 84 sorties for this period were flown. Bridges, highway transportation and supply points were the primary targets. One AD-4L was lost after launching when the engine failed. The pilot LT A.N. BRYANT of VF-54 was rescued by helicopter. Following the last recovery the ESSEX retired from the force and steamed for Japan.

20 September: No flight operations.

21 September: Arrived Yokosuka, Japan for the first availability period.

III ORDNANCE

a. Machine Guns

There is a material shortage in Oldsmobile Feed Mechanisms for the Corsair and AD wing guns. At present there are no spares on the ship and the damaged or defective mechanisms are being repaired. This constitutes a drain on maintenance with an unsatisfactory performance of the guns in the air. The defective mechanisms are almost exclusively left hand feeds. There are a few of the old type Davis Feed Mechanisms on board but they were ordered unserviceable by OML-GV-8-51. Further shortage exists in spare parts kits for these guns. At present it is necessary to draw a new gun and cannibalize for parts. This is another sap on manpower since guns must be de-preserved prior to the use of the parts.

The cleaning facilities on the ESSEX are designed for .50 calibre weapons which makes gun cleaning a laborious process. The spare guns carried on board are for the F9F and the AD, and have no mount adaptors for the F4U-4B. As a result the gun mounts for the F4U-4B must be removed from the old guns and used on the new.

The firing circuits in the AD-4L have malfunctioned frequently, resulting in a five to fifteen second delay between the time the trigger is pulled and the time the gun fires. After exhaustive trouble shooting the cause of this malfunctioning has not been determined. The rear mounting brackets and charger retaining brackets in the outboard guns of the AD-4Ls have failed. RUDM's have been submitted on these defects and the brackets have been removed. This reduces the strafing effectiveness by two 20MM guns.

Gun jamming and faulty machine gun ammunition have not been a problem.

This ship does not have adequate ready service stowage space for 20MM belted ammunition. The spaces available are designed for .50 calibre which does not satisfy 20MM requirements.

The present rear charger mount on the F4U-4B is unsatisfactory. Many mounts can be moved so that the bolt stud will pass the charging lug. RUDAOs are being submitted.

b. Bombs

The hard tire trucks give their loads a rough ride over the arresting wires and barriers on the flight deck. They should be replaced by pneumatic tires.

The Aero-14 Bomb Rack is considered unsatisfactory. The rack will not stand the strain of 250# bombs when the wings are folded and are working in the wind. The Mark 55 Bomb Rack is recommended. It has proved entirely satisfactory on the five AD-4Ls on which installed.

A total 12 500# GP, 16 260# fragmentation and 10 napalm bombs have proved duds. No conclusive reason has been determined but the fact that the failures all occurred during a short period indicates a bad group of fuzes. During these t days several bombs were jettisoned on safe but exploded on impact. The arming wires were not brought back by the aircraft. Several VT fuzed bombs have exploded prematurely. Af release the bombs fell approximately 1000 feet and then exploded.

In three instances the Mark 51 Bomb Rack tail arming solonoid plunger has burred with use thus postively arming the tail fuzes of bombs prior to being armed by the pilot.

c. Rockets

Rocket difficulties in the F2H-2 and F9F-2 consisted of breaking of the pig tail connections at high speeds. The present pig tail will not stand the whipping caused at speed required in regular strafing or rocket runs. The best on th spot correction for this fault has been the taping of the pi tail to the fins of the rockets keeping them taut and preventing any movement due to air flow. This, however, is not a satisfactory fix for the problem. It is recommended that direct plug in electrical circuit in conjunction with the rocket launcher be considered.

d. Ordance expenditures for the operating period are as follows:

MUNITIONS	F9F	F2H	F4U	AD	TOTAL
2000# GP	0	0	0	47	47
1000# GP	0	0	35	423	458
500# GP	0	0	198	271	469
250# GP	34	0	464	1439	1937
100# GP	362	92	896	1021	2371
260# Frag	6	0	552	675	1233
350# DB	0	0	1	7	8
6.5" ATAR	288	181	10	20	499
5.0" HVAR	338	0	168	0	506
3.25" SH	0	0	6	30	36
NAPALM	0	0	133	289	422
20MM	96,417	53,990	113,020	61,565	324,993
Flares Mk 6	0	0	0	0	0
AN M12-INC	0	0	0	0	0
M-29 Clusters	0	0	12	19	31

[redacted]

IV DAMAGE *

a. Damage to Enemy

	Damaged	Destroyed
TANKS	1	2
TRUCKS	96	48
CARS	5	6
LOCOS	11	3
OXCARTS	40	60
HY BRIDGES	29	10#
SUPPLY DUMPS	8	1
FACTORY	1	
WAREHOUSES	8	5
BKS & BUILDINGS	107	70
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	13	28
MORTAR EMPLACEMENTS		3
LUMBER PILES	2	
HORSES		1
VILLAGES	1	
BOATS		5
POWER INSTALLATION		1
BUNKERS		1
RR YARDS	6	4
RR TUNNELS		1
RR TRACKS	8	15%
RR CARS	367	245
RR BRIDGES	52	21#
TROOPS KILLED		1072##
RR BYPASS	11	2**
HWY BYPASS	5	6**
HANGARS		3
FUEL DUMPS	2	2
DAMS		3
VAN	1	
COMMAND POST	1	

* These figures include only targets positively identified and the actual damage observed. Unobserved damage or unidentified targets were not tabulated.

\# Bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

% Damages where tracks are broken or cratered including bridge ramps and approaches.

** Includes river beds where fords have been built up.

530 observed troop casualties 542 estimated casualties.

[redacted]

VF-51

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
8-24-51	F9F-2	Frag Holes	Unknown
8-29-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
8-29-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-2-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM
9-2-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-2-51	"	Shrapnel Holes	Shrapnel
9-3-51	"	Elevator Cont. By Stick Rendered Inoperative	Unknown
9-3-51	"	A/C Burned Completely	
9-4-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre (Approx)
9-4-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-4-51	"	Presumed Fuel Sustem Ruptured Causing Fire	40 MM (presumed)
9-4-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-4-51	"	A/C Exploded with Pilot When	it hit Earth
9-4-51	"	A/C Exploded with Pilot When	it hit Earth
9-7-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre, A
9-16-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre

VF-172

8-21-51	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
8-30-51	"	Frag Holes	Unknown
8-30-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-11-51	"	Bullet Holes	Small Arms

VF-53

8-23-51	F4U-4B	Bomb Frag Holes	250# G.P.
8-24-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
8-25-51	"	Speed Ring Leading Edge	Ammo Link
8-25-51	"	Bullet Holes	Small Arms
8-29-51	"	Bullet Holes	27 Calibre
8-31-51	"	Flak & Bullet Holes	37MM 50 Calibre
8-31-51	"	Flak Holes	37MM
8-31-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre
9-2-51	"	A/C Burned After Losing Oil	
9-7-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre, A
9-8-51	"	Bomb Frag & Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-8-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre
9-8-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-8-51	"	A/C Ditched in Water	50 Calibre (Presumed)
9-10-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 & 30 Calibre

VF-54

8-21-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
8-23-51	AD-4L	Bomb Frag Holes	250# G.P.

C[redacted]

8-24-51	AD-4L	Controlled Land. In Water	
8-24-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre, A
8-25-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre, A
8-25-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre, A
8-25-51	"	Frag Holes	250# G.P.
8-26-51	AD-4Q	Plane Completely Disintegrated	
8-26-51	AD-4Q	Plane Exploded in Air	
8-26-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre, A
8-29-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	40MM-E
8-29-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	27 Calibre, K
8-29-51	"	Bullet Holes	40MM-E
8-29-51	"	Bullet Holes	27 Calibre, A
8-30-51	"	Bullet Holes	37 Calibre, E
8-30-51	"	Bullet Holes	27 Calibre
8-30-51	"	Bullet Holes	27 Calibre
8-39-51	"	Frag Holes	260# G.P.
8-30-51	"	Flak Holes	37MM-E
9-2-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 Calibre
9-3-51	AD-4L	A/C Completely Destroyed	Small Arms
9-3-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre
9-3-51	AD-4	Flak Holes	37MM
9-3-51	"	Frag Holes	260# G.P.
9-4-51	"	Flak Holes	37MM
9-4-51	AD-4L	Flak & Bullet Holes	37MM & 30 Cal.
9-6-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 & 22 Calibre, A
9-7-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
9-7-51	"	Frag Holes	37MM
9-7-51	"	Oil Leak thur small hole in Engine Cowling	50 Calibre
9-8-51	"	A/C Exploded in Air	Ground Fire
9-11-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
9-11-51	"	Bullet Holes & Flak Holes	20 & 37MM-E
9-11-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
9-12-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
9-12-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM-E
9-12-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM & 27 Calibre
9-12-51	AD-4Q	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre
9-16-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 Calibre
9-16-51	AD-3N	Bullet Holes	20MM
9-16-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM
9-16-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	250# G.P.-E, E
9-17-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM-E

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V PERSONNEL

a. Officer

With the present allowance of aircraft, the number of pilo assigned to each squadron is considered adequate for current operations. A firm requirement exists for a qualified ground ordnance officer capable of instructing pilots in bomb and f selection, competent in armament maintenance and qualified in supervision, direction and installation of ordnance. This re commendation was previously submitted and concurred with by Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

b. Enlisted

This Air Group deployed to WesPac with allowance of 606 enlisted personnel. This allowance includes the basic squad- ron's allowance and the composite squadron detachments. Reco mendations were previously made to increase the enlisted ordn rates after the Air Group's first cruise. This recommendatio was given consideration and the complement increased, however the requirement has been further increased by current operati

c. Casualties

The Air Group lost seven (7) pilots, one (1) aircrewman an four (4) flight deck crewman during the reporting period.

LTJG Eugene Leo FRANZ, 504418/1315, USNR, VF-53 Separated from flight leader in instrument weather; no further con- tact. Missing in Action.

LTJG Lorea Dickerson SMITH, 496608/1315, USNR, VC-35, BALCH, Phillip Wendall, ATAN, 325 36 20, USN, VC-35 Aircraft observed to burn and crash into sea approximately five minutes after take-off. Listed as dead.

LT Frank (n) SISTRUNK, 223752/1315, USNR, VF-54 Aircraft hit by anit-aircraft fire; crashed. Killed in Action.

LTJG Ross Kay BRAMWELL, 498061/1310. USN, VF-51 Aircraft hit by anit-aircraft fire; crashed. Killed in Action.

LTJG James Joseph ASHFORD, 447202/1310, USN, VF-51 Crashed while making run on truck; cause unknown. Killed in Actio

LTJG Joseph Buford PARSE, Jr., 506396/1315. USNR, VF-54 Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire; crashed. Killed in Action

[redacted]

During the recovery of aircraft, F2H Banshee bounced over the barriers and crashed into a group of planes spotted forward on the flight deck. The following casualties occurred:

LTJG John Kemp KELLER, 491960/1310, USN, VF-172, Listed as Dead.

STEWART, William James, ADC, 382 42 50, USNR, VF-54, Listed as Dead.

BARFIELD, Wade Hilton, AD3, 575 40 12, USN, VF-51. Listed as Dead.

NEIFER, Earl Kenneth, AOC, 311 70 90, USN, VF-51. Listed as Missing.

HARRELL, Charles Lamar, AA, 335 56 65, USN, VF-51. Listed as Missing.

[redacted]

VI OPERATIONS

a. Operations

This ends the first period for this Air Group in the operating area, which was characterized by the successful utilization of techniques developed prior to entering the operating area and the development of new techniques gathered from combat experience.

The F9F-2 and the F2H-2 jet aircraft were used exclusively on armed reconnaissance flights and day CAP. On August 25, 1951, 23 jet aircraft escorted Air Force heavy bombers on a high altitude bombing mission. This is believed to be the first time that naval jet aircraft have escorted Air Force planes over enemy territory during the Korean Campaign. A proposed jet escort doctrine with diagrams is submitted as enclosure (1) to this report. The jet photo unit from VC-61 has done an excellent job of Photo Reconnaissance and mapping. The F4U and AD, propellor aircraft were used for Close Air Support, interdiction strikes, Naval Gun Spot, and Anti-submarine Patrol.

The night fighters and night attack pilots have been scheduled for day missions so they can become familiar with the operating area over which they must operate at night.

With a large amount of North Korean supply movements being done at night because of the day interdiction mission it is felt that a night carrier operating in this area would be very effective.

The lack of adequate communication channels is definitely a handicap while conducting armed reconnaissance and interdiction strike missions. On these flights a large number of transmissions are necessary and assigned channels are over crowded.

On armed reconnaissance flights this Air Group has had the opportunity to use and evaluate three armed reconnaissance tactical dispositions consisting of two, three and four plane formations. The two plane section had been used most exclusively by the jet squadrons of Task Force 77 prior to arrival. Over a familiar route the two plane section is satisfactory. The low man weaves across the road and the adjacent area at 1000 to 1500 feet above the terrain and from 250 to 350 knots. The low man cannot navigate accurately or take notes if he maintains proper surveillance of the area for camouflaged targets. The number two man must therefore keep the low man in sight, navigate, take notes, be in a position to make attacks on targets pointed out by the low man and to supress AA positions. The two plane section could not be used of air opposi-

[redacted]

tion were present. The three plane armed reconnaissance is considered optimum if air opposition is not expected. The number one man functions exactly as in the two plane flight. The number two man's only responsibility is to keep the low man in sight and attack targets. The number three man flys slightly below and 45 degrees behind the number two man so he can easily keep both planes in sight. He navigates, takes notes and coordinates his attacks with the other two planes.

The four plane armed reconnaissance is slightly cumbersome but will be required when and if aerial opposition is imminen In this formation the duties of the one, two, and three man are the same as in a 3 plane flight. The four man acts as a lookout and takes station abreast the number three man and weaves to maintain position.

The Air Group RESCAP Doctrine is especially fitted to the current conditions under which the sorties are flown. It is assumed that the possibility of capture of a downed pilot in the ocean is extremely remote and his capture if downed over enemy territory is very probable. Air opposition is not an actual problem but must be considered as an imminent threat. On these assumptions the RESCAP Doctrine is best described by example:

(1) With a flight composition of eight aircraft one of which has been downed the flight leader maintains sufficient altitude to establish communications with a rescue agency. The remaining six aircraft are directed to orbit by section in three orbits each of which allows complete surveillance of a 120 degree sector from the position of the downed pilot. These circles are flown close enough to the downed pilot to keep him in sight, but not so close as to draw the attention of enemy ground forces to his position. From these circles enemy threats from any direction can be attacked and suppressed with a minimum loss of time. The position of the sections of planes in the circles are maintained so that one section keeps the downed pilot in sight at all times.

(2) With a flight composition of two aircraft one of which has been downed the airborne pilot has no choice but to alternately climb to altitude to establish communications with a rescue agency and dive to offer attack cover for the downed pilot. The individual situation must dicate the relative importance of the two needs in every case. As a rule of thimb it is believed more practical to get help as quickly as possible unless an immediate threat to the downed pilots safety is observed.

[redacted]

(3) For flights composed of three to seven aircraft the RECAP is flown to give maximum protection and minimum indication of the downed pilot's position. Terrain and enemy troop disposition must be considered in affording this protection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

VII MAINTENANCE

a. Conventional Maintenance

The low overhead on the hangar deck limits the areas where wing spreading and drop checks are possible to two areas, #3 Elevator and the after half of Bay 3.

The ship is not equipped to stow the volume of spare parts needed to conduct combat operations. The modification of the ship resulting in limited hangar space makes it difficult to get downed aircraft to the maintenance area quickly. Such delays result in reduced aircraft availability.

Support of the propellor squadron's maintenance program has been excellent. No outstanding supply shortages exist at this time.

b. Jet Maintenance

Considerable concern has arisen in the past over occasional surges in engine RPM during flight. These surges are frequently accompanied by momentary indications of fuel pump cutout, i.e., intermittent blinking of the fuel pump warning light. It has also been observed that the fuel pump warning light will come on momentarily with rapid advancing of the throttle control. Inasmuch as there is little or no information available to the squadrons on the routine maintenance of the Turbo Jet Control or the main fuel pumps, difficulty has been experienced in trouble shooting this type of discrepancy. Removal and cleaning of the high pressure fuel filter in the control seemed to help, but it did not eliminate the power surges at high power settings.

Operational and combat damage account for the major portion of the work load of the structures section. However, the presence of very capable and skilled personnel make loss of flight hours a minor problem.

The Banshee has proven satisfactory for operations from the CV-27A class carrier, but highly skilled airmanship must be used in landing with a pitching deck. There have been two instances of landing struts being pushed up through the wing sections. The Banshee has proven that it can absorb flak damage with the best of the fleet's aircraft, and it has an extremely tough engine. In two cases particles have passed through the engines doing considerable damage to the blades,

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but not causing undue vibration or engine stoppage. Failure of the fuselage supports of the catapult hook under stress of catapult launches with high loading have occurred in some of the aircraft. The Banshee tailhook has a tendency to hang on to the arresting gear when retracted. F2H service change #84 is considered the answer to this difficulty and recommended as a requirement for all F2H-2s working from carriers. The J34 engine is an easy power plant to replace. Working at a normal rate, a good crew can change an engine, turn it up and calibrate it in less than two hours. A serious hazard to flight deck personnel exists in flying parts of the catapult hold back rings at the time of launch. Occasionally they are picked up by jet blast and hurled with great force about the deck. It is recommended that a suitable retainer cover for these hold back rings be designed and issued to the fleet.

In the F9F faulty flapper valves in the hydraulic system were allowing hook bounce on landing. The redesigned valve and dashpot have eliminated this trouble. There is a shortage of parts for the installation of the AN/APG-30. VF-51 is experiencing considerable trouble with hook drops from the stinger position. This is attributed to the electrical circuits which are considered too complex and erratic to be practical. When the hook drops as the aircraft taxis forward, after landing, the Davis Barrier is usally engaged and damaged. This necessitates long delays in landing operations while the Davis Barrier tapes are re-rigged. To eliminate the problem of untimely hook drops VF-51 is grounding the hook raising circuit immediately below the holding relay. This is not a satisfactory answer, however, and a redesign of the control circuits is recommended.

Amplified reports of the details of jet maintenance problems and their present corrections are entered in the monthly Jet Information Bulletin.

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SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT	AVERAGE PER PILOT COMBAT FLIGHT
VF-51	624.5	28.2	17.5
VF-172	581.0	22.3	12.0
VF-53	1261.4	54.4	17.4
VF-54	1539.3	53.1	14.5
VC-3	220.9	44.2	13.4
VC-11	190.5	47.6	16.7
VC-35	217.7	43.5	14.2
VC-61	130.6	32.4	20.7
TOTALS	4760.9	41.9	17.0

FLIGHT SUMMARY BY SORTIES

A/C	F9F-2	F9F-2P	F2H-2	F4U-4B	F4U-5N	AD-4	AD-4N	AD-4W	TOTALS
SQD.	VF-51	VC-61	VF172	VF-53	VC-3	VF54	VC-35	VC-11	
CAS	---	----	---	124	2	123	4	---	253
NGF	---	----	---	6	2	---	---	---	8
STRIKE	---	----	---	256	27	253	12	---	548
CAP	72	----	126	11	2	---	---	---	211
RECCO	246	----	132	---	---	---	---	---	378
PHOTO	---	92	---	---	---	---	---	---	92
PHOTO ESCORT	58	----	39	---	---	---	---	---	97
ASP	---	----	---	6	4	50	25	67	152
NIGHT HECKLER	---	----	---	---	35	---	29	---	64
FLIGHT ESCORT	11	----	12	---	---	---	---	---	23
TOTAL	387	92	309	403	72	426	70	67	1826

M. U. BEEBE

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PROPOSED NAVY JET ESCORT OF AIR FORCE BOMBERS

1. The Navy Jet Tactics proposed for cover of Air Force Bomber aircraft is set forth below.

A. Enemy

(a) Superiority in number of aircraft.

(b) MIG-15 superior performance characteristics over F9F and F2H.

(c) Anticipate MIG-15 interception in strength over any target in North Korea.

(d) G.C.I. operational and effective.

(e) Air contact will be made over enemy territory.

(f) Enemy jet fighters will attack bombers as primary target

(g) Jet attacks will be made abaft the beam and generally within 045 degrees of line of flight.

(h) AA will be encountered enroute and over target effective to 25,000 feet.

B. Friendly Forces

(a) Superior tactics and teamwork.

(b) Bombers provide mutual air defense support with own armament.

(c) Effective range of bomber guns is 2500 feet.

(d) Tactical coordination impossible unless direct liaison between bomber and escort units possible.

2. Based on the above assumptions the following items should be considered in the planning and operational conduct of escort missions of Naval aircraft.

(a) Provide maximum available jet aircraft up to a factor of 1.5 escort plane per bomber.

(b) No escort missions be assigned unless a factor of 75% escort plane per bomber can be assigned and then only when known enemy aircraft defense and the target priority requires the calculated risk.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

(c) Bomber aircraft provide simplified rendezvous with jet aircraft. If at all practicable bombers should rendezvous with jets over or in the vicinity of the jet parent carrier/carrie G.C.I. will be of material assistance in effecting rendezvous particularly in bad weather.

(d) Bomber command provide Navy escort with detailed mission plan, i.e., rendezvous, approach course, evasive action, release altitude, retirement course etc. Close cover will remain with bombers throughout mission. Roving cover will be allowed tactical maneuverability within visual contact of base element unless engagement dictates otherwise.

(e) Operational limitations of jet escort dictates that safety of flight responsibility rests with the jet tactical coordinator.

3. Air Group FIVE escort tactics for the proposed type missions are derived basically from USF-73. There are many variations required due to the use of jet interceptors, however these variations do not deviate to the point that integration between Air Groups would cause complication. In order that the variations anticipated for escort missions be known the following escort tactics are set forth:

Base Element	30 Bombers
Escort (Low Cover)	12 Jets
Escort (Roving Cover)	12 Jets

[redacted]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

DECLASSIFIED
CVG5/A16-13/(cfc)
Serial 072-51

31 October 1951

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group FIVE (1 October 1951 - 31 October 1951)

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.1

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the Action Report of U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 10/1	OPERATIONAL A/C 10/31	PILOTS 10/1	PILOTS 10/31
CVG-5 CDR M. U. BEEBE	None	None	None	1*	1
VF-51 LCDR E. M. BEAUCHAMP	F9F-2	16	15	21	21
VF-172 CDR M. E. BARNETT	F2H-2	13	11	24	23
VF-53 CDR H. J. TRUM, III	F4U-4B	16	15	23	21
VF-54 CDR P. N. GRAY	AD-2 AD-4 AD-4L	1 8 6	3 8 6	28**	27
VC-3 (Det.) LT J. S. LAKE	F4U-5NL	3	3	5	5
VC-11 (Det.) LT M. R. MILLER	AD-4W	2	2	5	5
VC-35 (Det.) LCDR F. F. BERTAGNA	AD-3N AD-4Q AD-4NL	1 1	 3	5	5
VC-61 (Det.) LT S. L. JAYNES	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4
	TOTAL	70***	69	116	112

* The Air Group Commander flies regularly with VF-51 and VF-54.
** Includes Air Group Operations Officer.
*** CVG-5 entered combat area with 70 aircraft. 2 F2Hs and 1 AD4W were left ashore for replacement.

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[redacted]

[redacted]5A16-13/(gls)
Serial 072-51

31 October 1951

b. MISSION

The primary mission of Air Group FIVE during the reporting period remained the support of United Nations ground forces in Korea. This support was conducted in the form of interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication. The Close Air Support missions had been cancelled when the Air Group was in the port of Yokosuka, Japan. The problems of interdiction remained much the same, there being only two changes of note. The appearance of a greater amount of rail traffic developed rail-cutting as a routine operation, and an increase in Naval Gunfire Support spotters gave an opportunity to participate in this important work. Night Heckler Missions still proved that, by far, the greatest percentage of enemy transportation is moving during the hours of darkness. Photographic missions were flown daily and netted excellent results in the identification of camouflaged targets and damage assessment in addition to special missions. AEW and ASP missions provided constant protection against the possibility of enemy air or submarine action, although no contacts were made.

An active combat evaluation of the F2H aircraft is being pursued and two reports of the evaluation progress were submitted to CNO in accordance with instructions.

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PART II: CHRONOLOGY

The respite offered by the retirement of the ESSEX to the port of Yokosuka, Japan gave all hands an opportunity to reacquaint themselves with life ashore. During the ten day period, maximum use was made of rest camp facilities in the area. A total of three hundred enlisted men and fifty five officers were given an opportunity to use the rest camps. During the entire in-port period, maintenance and replenishing operations were conducted. Damaged aircraft were off-loaded and replacements taken aboard, or repaired to service status. Staff and Squadron Officers attended briefings and conferences at NavFE, FEAF, and Army GHQ where minor problems of communications, intelligence, logistics, and operations were discussed. (At the end of the ten days the Air Group was fitted with 73 aircraft of which 2 F2Hs and 1 AD4W were left ashore to be used for replacements as necessary). All hands were facing the coming operation with confidence and quite ready to resume life at sea.

Refresher operations were conducted on the way to the operating area, but inclement weather prevented combat operations on the first day the ESSEX rejoined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. The weather lifted during the night however, and offensive sorties were scheduled on the morning of 4 October.

On 4 October, Air Group FIVE launched its first effort for the reporting period. Forty-six (46) sorties were flown over Korea with the Banshees of VF-172 taking rail and supply targets under fire.

On 5 October, seventy-five (75) sorties were launched, the majority of which were interdiction flights. Additional emphasis had been placed on the effectiveness of rail cuts in place of bridge destruction in the case of easily by-passed crossing. Flights were ordered to crater tracks at regular intervals, thereby forcing the enemy to disperse his repair operations over a greater area. Corsair pilots led by Commander Herman J. TRUM, III, Commanding Officer of VF-53, flew a rescue Combat Air Patrol over a downed pilot from the BON HOMME RICHARD. In spite of very heavy and accurate fire from positions on the ground, the Corsairs succeeded in neutralizing the immediate area and a helicopter rescue was effected.

On 6 October, eighty-eight (88) sorties were flown. While attacking a bridge on the road west of KOWON, LTJG C. I. TEAGUE, USN, of VF-54 was hit by flak. His plane exploded in the air and then crsahed into the ground. There was no chance of survival and LTJG TEAGUE was listed as killed in action. LTJG Max MORRIS had the privilege of making the ESSEX's two thousandth catapult shot

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without an accident. Banshee and Panther fighters bombed and strafed two troop concentrations killing an estimated seventy troops.

On 7 October, eighty-seven (87) sorties were flown with the bombers and fighters assigned rail cutting missions and targets of opportunity. Four series of cuts were laid with a total of thirty-eight (38) cuts in all. Corsairs flew another rescue CAP mission over a downed South African Air Force pilot. Unfortunately, the pilot was not recovered.

On 8 October, the force retired to replenish.

On 9 October, eighty-one (81) sorties were flown. Banshee jets led by LCDR James B. CAIN, Executive Officer of VF-172, found one train with three live locomotives just after sunrise. The train was stopped by strafing and 100# bombs. Prop sorties later in the day and for two days following pummelled the train using it as a dump target when assigned targets were obscured by weather. The entire train was useless at the end of the attacks. During the day twenty-eight (28) rail cuts were sewed in two stretches of track each about three miles long.

On 10 October, eighty-four (84) sorties were flown. For the first time Night Hecklers were armed with napalm and found it to be an excellent weapon for night harrassing of the enemy truck convoys. Weather curtailed operations for a few hours in the late morning but all hops were flown on a later schedule. Having been hit by enemy ground fire, LT Sam CHESSMAN of VF-53 was forced to fly his Corsair to K-18 and land. The landing was made without incident, but CHESSMAN broke his leg when he slipped off the oil covered wing of his plane and was hospitalized.

On 11 October, eighty-four (84) sorties were flown again. Night Hecklers armed with napalm and bombs razed highways west of YANGDOK. Day flights were assigned supply points found in photographs from the day previous. Excellent results were observed.

On 12 October, the force retired to replenish. Sixty-one (61) bags of mail were waiting on the decks of the service force vessels, the biggest load of news from home to date.

On 13 October, nineteen (19) sorties were flown in spite of adverse weather conditions. Best targets of the afternoon were direct hits into the mouths of tunnels. On two instances the tunnels were closed off with land slides, and, in a third, a secondary explosion after the impact indicated that a locomotive hiding within had been hit. To further insure the stoppage of

hiding locomotives, rail cuts were made outside both ends of three tunnels with a total of seventeen (17) craters.

On 14 October, four (4) sorties were flown. Operations were then cancelled because of the fringe weather of Typhoon Ruth.

On 15 October, forty-five (45) sorties were flown with weather over the target area making offensive missions difficult. An excellent recovery of the last hop was made by LSOs who brought all the aircraft to safety in spite of equally winds and a violently pitching deck.

On 16 October, the weather lifted and eighty-six (86) sorties were flown. Assigned bridge targets, ADs and F4Us dropped spans on three (3) bridges and damaged six (6) others. Jet coverall flights and reconnaissance flights attacked rail targets and rolling stock with a total of two (2) locomotives damaged and sixteen (16) boxcars and gondolas destroyed. While searching the road near MAJON-NI, LCDR Irad Blair OXLEY, Operations Officer of VF-172, was hit with ground fire. Absence of radio transmission indicated that the pilot was hit. His aircraft dived and crashed into the ground. There was no possibility of escape and OXLEY was reported as killed in action. During the evening hops, Night Hecklers armed with napalm found four convoys on the highways west of YANGDOK. They napalmed, then strafed in the light of the fires. Following up with bombing runs, they accounted for an estimated twenty-five (25) trucks destroyed and many more damaged.

On 17 October, the force retired to replenish.

On 18 October, fifty-one (51) sorties were flown. Inclement weather began closing in in the afternnon. Bomber strikes and fighter sweeps hit targets of opportunity along rail rights of way and highways.

On 19 October, twenty-nine (29) sorties were flown, and a full replenishment operation was conducted in addition. Three trains were found by Night Heckler flights and effectively stopped before daylight. Day flights finished up the job leaving the trains severly damaged and the locomotives destroyed.

On 20 October, bad weather set in again but failed to cancel flight operations, and twenty-four (24) sorties were flown. Broken low cloud layers over the target areas made offensive missions largely ineffective.

On 21 October, marginal weather threatened most of the day but seventy-six (76) sorties were flown. Skyraider flights had good success against rail and bridge targets.

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LCDR Russell LECKLIDER, Executive Officer of VF-54, and a top bomber in the group scored direct hits on six bridges and with his flight succeeded in knocking spans from four (4) of them.

On 22 October, clear weather permitted seventy-seven (77) sorties to be flown. Jet coveralls and sweeps found two (2) trains and several supply points which they bombed and strafed, effectively stopping the locomotives for subsequent destruction by the props. One train, on an upgrade detached the last car, which rolled runaway down the hill. Both it and the main portion of the train were attacked and destroyed. Naval gunfire missions flown by LT N. E. CURRY and LTJG James R. FOSTER of VF-53 received a well done from ComCruDiv THREE for an outstanding job of gunfire spotting and neutralization of shore batteries which had taken the surface ships under fire.

On 23 October the force retired to replenish.

On 24 October, ninety-four (94) sorties were flown. Principal targets were bridges and sections of rail lines that had been spotted in use by the Night Hecklers. For the first time the Night Hecklers had found convoys of ammunition trucks on the highways and explosions followed good hits on at least ten (10) separate trucks. The AD and F4U flights sowed a total of twenty-five (25) rail breaks. In the afternoon an Air Force B-29 was followed and crippled by enemy aircraft. As the B-29 approached the east coast near WONSAN she called to the Navy for assistance. A rescue CAP was flown over the downed airmen after they had abandoned the aircraft. Naval small craft and destroyers recovered eight (8) of the eleven (11) men who had bailed out.

On 25 October, ninety-three (93) missions were flown. Photographs from the previous day indicated camouflaged targets along the highway west of YANGDOK. Excellent results were forthcoming when the camouflaged targets proved to be supply points, a dozen of which were left burning by the attacking aircraft. LTJG Robert DOSS, USN, of VF-172 experienced a cold shot from the catapult and his Banshee hit the water just ahead of the port bow. The aircraft was struck by the ship. DOSS was recovered quickly by the helicopter and suffered mild shock and bruises.

On 26 October, ninety-six (96) missions were flown, representing the biggest effort made by the Air Group for this period. Primary targets were rail breaks and bridges. Following two (2) runs from which LTJG William BURGESS of VF-54 scored direct hits dropping the span of a bridge, he returned to make a photo run and his aircraft was struck by groundfire. BURGESS headed for the Sea of Japan. As he neared the coast his engine stopped and he glided

to open water where he ditched. Rescue was made within range of the shore batteries by the USS CONWAY, DDE 507. LTJG Ed LANEY led rescue cover planes which engaged in thwarting fire from the beach which threatened the success of the rescue.

On 27 October the force retired to replenish.

On 28 October, seventy-three (73) missions were flown of which twenty (20) were a part of a coordinated strike against the enemy industrial targets at SONKHYON. Previous intelligence indicated intense and accurate flak and the possibility of enemy air opposition. The attack was carried out as follows. Jets and Corsairs assigned to the mission of ground fire suppression led off the dives on known gun emplacements. Immediately the ground fire was drawn to them the ADs assigned to bombing missions commenced their runs. Ground fire suppression was so effective that six (6) runs were made by the base element of which four (4) were bomb drops and two (2) were fire-bomb and napalm drops. Upon completion of the attack the strike group reformed and returned to the ship with the fighters flying cover. Of the aircraft launched on this mission none were hit with enemy fire. Later in the day while on a bridge assignment the F4U piloted by Ensign R. A. BATEMAN, USNR, of VF-53 was hit by flak. The burst came just under one wing and approximately ten (10) feet of the wing was destroyed. The aircraft began to gyrate violently and then dove to the ground and exploded on impact. No chance of survival was indicated and Ensign BATEMAN was listed as killed in action.

On 29 October, eighty-one (81) sorties were flown with rail cuts and bridges again the primary target for the day. One strike was scheduled to attack a strategic target located in the outskirts of the town of KAPSAN. One thousand pound bombs armed with VT fuzes obliterated the target consisting of sixteen (16) buildings.

On 30 October, eighty (80) sorties were flown against transportation targets. The harvest season had brought an increased amount of road traffic for the preceding three (3) days. This traffic in the form of trucks and carts drawn by beasts of burden afforded the communists excellent opportunity to smuggle supplies under the guise of fall crops. This opportunity was used by the enemy and attacks on carts and trucks brought secondary explosions and obvious oil and gas fires to indicate that military stores were in transit. The biggest number of rail cuts for a single day were made. Forty-three (43) cuts for this day and a total of over ninety (90) cuts for the past three (3) days.

On 31 October, the force retired to replenish. Following replenishment the ESSEX was relieved on station by USS BON HOMME RICHARD and the ESSEX proceeded to Yokosuka for maintenance, liberty and recreation.

31 October 1951

PART III: ORDNANCE

a. MACHINE GUNS

The ready ammunition lockers are not adequate for stowage of ready service ammunition. Belted ammunition is stacked in passageways and catwalks outside of stowage spaces. The present machine gun cleaning facilities are designed for 50 caliber machine guns. Conversion for 20MM use is being studied but space limitations are such that the problem is not easily resolved. Cleaning, oiling and handling has to be accomplished on the flight deck or hangar deck.

There are no spare part kits for 20MM guns. It is necessary to draw a new gun to replace parts which are broken. It takes six (6) man hours to depreserve new guns that are drawn. It takes another six (6) man hours to change the front mount adapter for the F4U-4B because all guns on board are equipped for the AD and F9F aircraft.

There is still a critical need for Oldsmobile feed mechanisms. At present it is necessary to repair the broken mechanisms or to scavenge feed mechanisms from downed aircraft. The only spare feed mechanisms aboard are the Davis type which were to be discarded in accordance with OML-GV-8-51. Nine out of ten of the faulty mechanisms are left-hand feed. All new feed mechanisms must be modified to fit the feed mechanism heaters which requires about four (4) man hours per feed mechanism.

After several incidents in which bombs were dropped in a safe condition because arming wires were being pulled from arming solenoids by the airstream at high speeds, the jet squadrons have adopted the policy of staying below 200 kts I.A.S., clear all surface units and energizing the arming circuits. This system has not been fully evaluated but indications are that it will solve the problem. The possibility of inadvertently releasing an armed bomb is realized and safety precautions have been stressed.

The gun chargers on the F4U-4B are unsatisfactory in that they cannot be charged or put in a safe position with any degree of certainty. An RUDAOE has been submitted and the F4U squadron has improvised a temporary installation to hold the charger more securely.

The 20MM machine guns on the ADs, F9Fs and F2Hs was excellent. There has been very little trouble with gun stoppages where installation of the New Oldsmobile gun feed mechanism has been accomplished. The F9F encountered some hydraulic failures which accounted for several stoppages.

PART III: ORDNANCE

b. BOMBS

Bomb skids are not suitable for pushing the length of the flight deck across arresting gear and barrier cables. It is felt that bomb skids should be equipped with pneumatic tires.

There is still a critical shortage of MK55 bomb racks on board. Once the MK55 racks have been fitted for use on a particular air foil it is difficult to convert for use on a different airplane making interchangeability undesirable.

The primary cause of hung-wing bombs on the F4U and AD aircraft has been a loose electrical plug connection between the wing and MK55 bomb racks. Although perfect fit is not obtained the electrical circuit will generally check but without a bomb attached. However when a bomb is installed the weight of the bomb will cause the electrical plug to pull out slightly and result in an unsatisfactory electrical connection. The F2Hs and ADs with the Aero 14A bomb rack have had a similar trouble when the Aero 14A rack was not properly secured to the wing and caused a poor electrical circuit resulting hung bombs.

On the AD aircraft there were two cases in which the ejector foot assembly and cartridge retainers in the bomb ejectors were lost when the cartridges were fired. A 1000# and 2000# bomb were carried on the center stations in these cases. The cause for these losses was the failure of the bomb ejector piston retaining key. A contributory factor to this key breakage was the tendency of the bomb ejector key clamp assembly to become deformed. This clamp assembly is checked each time the ejector is loaded. No spare keys or clamp assemblies are available on board which necessitates obtaining these parts from new complete bomb ejector units.

c. ROCKETS

Several cases have occurred in which the locking pins in the pigtail connections have failed when inserted in the igniter, resulting in a disconnected pigtail in flight and a hung rocket. It was found necessary to exercise extreme care while plugging in rockets to avoid damaging these pins.

The rocket pigtails continue to break even though they were taped to the rocket fin and the weak links were reinforced by taping arming wire splints. It is believed that the firing blast from the adjacent rocket plus the high slipstream speed contributes appreciably to the pigtail failure.

[redacted]

d. Ordnance expenditures for the operating period are as follows:

MUNITIONS	F9F	F2H	F4U	AD	TOTAL
2000# GP				117	117
1000# GP				735	735
500# GP			233	140	473
250# GP			871	2237	3108
100# GP	631	562	659	491	2343
260# Frag			172	226	398
350# DB				10	10
6.5" ATAR		96	88	156	340
5.0" HVAR		60	457	121	638
3.25" SH				71	71
NAPALM			11	45	56
20MM	49,299	79,736	90,340	69,125	288,500
AN M12-INC				59	59

[redacted]

PART IV: DAMAGE*

DAMAGE TO ENEMY	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
TANKS	1	
TRUCKS	45	
LOCOS	11	8
OXCARTS		23
HWY BRIDGES	4#	
SUPPLY DUMPS	3	2
FACTORIES		1
WAREHOUSES	11	
BKS & BUILDINGS	19	102
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	16	19
VILLAGES		1
BOATS	3	6
RR YARDS	10	
RR TUNNELS	4	
RR TRACKS		557%
RR CARS	166	31
RR BRIDGES	10	23
TROOPS KILLED		384##
RR BY-PASSES	2	10**
FUEL DUMPS		1
VANS	2	2
COMMAND POSTS	1	

* These figures include only targets positively identified and the actual damage observed. Unobserved damage or unidentified targets are not tabulated.

\# Bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

% Damages where tracks are broken or cratered are counted as rail cuts.

** Includes river beds where fords have been built up.

295 observed casualties and 89 estimated casualties based on dispatch reports from the ground forces in Korea.

[redacted]

b. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

VF-51

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
10-6-51	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	Small Arms, 38 cal.
10-20-51	F9F-2	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-22-51	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-24-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7 MM
10-25-51	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	20MM
10-26-51	F9F-2	Flak Holes	37MM
10-26-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 cal rifle

VF-53

10-5-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-6-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM
10-6-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
10-7-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-9-51	"	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-9-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-9-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-9-51	"	Ruptured #8 cylinder and push rod	50 cal.
10-9-51	"	Bullet penetrated exhaust stack	50 cal.
10-9-51	"	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-21-51	"	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-21-51	"	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-25-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
10-28-51	"	Plane crashed	37MM
10-29-51	"	Ruptured hydraulic line to landing gear	30 cal.

VF-54

10-4-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM
10-6-51	AD-4	Loss of A/C due to AA fire	Tracers high explosives time fuzed.
10-9-51	AD-4L	Shell Holes	High explosive.
10-9-51	"	Frag Holes	High explosive
10-18-51	AD-4N	Severed wing flap	Armor piercing projectile
10-18-51	AD-4Q	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-18-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	Armor piercing projectile
10-24-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal.- A
10-24-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	Unknown
10-24-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal.- A
10-24-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal.-A

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[redacted]

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b. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

VF-54 Cont'd

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
10-24-51	AD-4L	Flak Holes	37MM - F
10-25-51	AD-4	Flak Holes	90MM - F
10-25-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal - A
10-26-51	AD-4	Oil lines & engine damaged	37MM - F
10-26-51	AD-4NL	Flak Holes	37MM - E
10-28-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
10-28-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
10-26-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal - A
10-29-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal - A
10-29-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 & 50 cal - A
10-29-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM - A
10-30-51	AD-4	Frag & Bullet Holes	Unknown-E, 50 cal-A
10-30-51	AD-4	Flak Holes	Flak
10-30-51	AD-4	Port spar cap broken at hinge of port stub wing	Unknown - E

VF-172

10-4-51	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. 20MM - EF
10-5-51	"	Bullet Holes	20MM - E
10-11-51	"	Stbd electrical coaxial cables and radio	50 cal - I
10-16-51	"	Planes destroyed	Unknown
10-22-51	"	Bullet Holes	30 cal.- A

[redacted]

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PART V: PERSONNEL

a. OFFICER

A pilot factor of 1.5 for all squadrons is considered essential upon deployment. The attrition during the first two (2) operating periods has reduced the factor in two (2) squadrons to 1.3 and each of the other squadrons has lost pilots. It is believed that with a factor of 1.5 a squadron can complete a normal combat tour without replacements. At ComAirPac's dispatch request, CO, U.S.S. ESSEX made the following recommendations to CTF 77: "On basis of 2 Jet and 2 Prop squadrons 1.5 pilot factor recommended both types. 5 pilots for 3 plane and 6 pilots for 4 plane composite units. Present photo requirements make 6 pilots for 3 planes very desirable."

There remains a need for a qualified ground ordnance officer on the CVG staff. Previous recommendations have been submitted. The present operations require that a qualified ground maintenance officer be assigned to each squadron in order to attain the highest availability. Fighter Squadron FIFTY THREE is the only squadron in the Group that has not been assigned a ground maintenance officer.

b. ENLISTED

Difficulties have been encountered in operating with an on-board count below authorized allowance. The following is a break-down of the enlisted personnel status as to losses by transfers and discharges under current directives for the past month and the anticipated losses for the month of NOVEMBER:

SQUADRON	ALLOWANCE	ON BOARD	OCTOBER LOSSES	ANTICIPATED LOSSES
CVG-5	17	16	0	0
VF-51	119	114	4	3
VF-53	109	106	0	2
VF-54	132	124	3	7
VF-172	140	121	0	5
VC-3	30*	30	0	0
VC-11	28*	28	0	1
VC-35	43*	43	0	0
VC-61	20*	20	0	0
TOTALS	638	602	7	18

* This assumes the on board count for Composite Squadrons to be the allowance.

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PART V: PERSONNEL

c. MORALE

Under the present heavy workload of continuous operations, the performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention.

d. CASUALTIES

The Air Group lost four (4) pilots during the reporting period as follows:

LTJG Cordice Isaac TEAGUE, 465417/1310, USN, VF-54. Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire during recovery from dive bombing run, crashed in flames. Killed in Action.

LCDR Irad Blair OXLEY, 165618/1310, USN, VF-172. Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire on Armed Recco flight. Exploded upon impact with ground. Killed in Action.

LTJG Samuel Richard CHESSMAN, 521324/1310, USN, VF-53. Received broken leg upon disembarking from damaged aircraft. Transferred to U.S.S. CONSOLATION.

ENS Richard Allen BATEMAN, 538138/1325, USNR, VF-53. Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire during glide bombing run, crashed and burned. Killed in Action.

e. READY ROOMS

As a result of the inadequate Ready Room situation a study was made of space and facilities to meet the demands of a fourth Ready Room. Ready 2, previously located in the forward end of the wardroom, was moved into the wardroom lounge, compartment A-212L. The movement of teletype, inter-communication unit, telephone, status board, etc., was accomplished without necessity of alterations. The end result was an adequate Ready Room which accommodates 27 pilots and has relieved the congested situation of two squadrons sharing Ready Room 4. The wardroom lounge in turn was moved to the space previously designated Ready Room 2 without undue interference with messing and the general concensus of opinion of officers is that it has advantages over the previous arrangement. The interest of the ship in accomplishing the move in exact conformance with the design suggested and the expeditious accomplishment of the work involved is worthy of special mention.

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PART VI: OPERATIONS

This ends the second period for Air Group FIVE in the operating area, which was characterized by several changes in the methods of carrying out the primary mission, the interdiction of the enemy transportation system. During the first period in the operating area, key bridges were considered primary targets. During the second period rail breaking of main rail arteries was included as a target for interdiction. It is felt that by breaking rails away from town and AA emplacements that more damage could be inflicted to the enemy without exposure of strike group to intense AA. The enemy is still able to rebuild bridges and rail breaks in a surprisingly short period of time.

On 28 October 1951, a special strike mission was flown against an important supply center near KAPSAN, Korea. The strike was led by CCVG-5, and was composed of 4 F2H, 8 F4U, 8 AD of CVG-5 and 4 F9F, 8 F4U and 8 AD of CVG-15. The jets preceded the strike group in the attack, strafing and rocketing known AA positions, and were followed by the Corsairs armed with VT bombs for flak suppression. The AD elements armed with 1000#, 250#, napalm and incendiaries followed the Corsairs and bombed specifically assigned targets of warehouses and barrack areas. The evaluation of post strike photographs showed that 35% of the target completely destroyed, which is considered excellent for the number of aircraft involved. The tactics used were basically those of WWII. Although intense AA fire was encountered no aircraft were shot down although six runs were made. After each run a complete rendezvous of the strike group was made and the target approached from a different direction.

The F9F and F2H aircraft were used exclusively for fighter sweeps, armed reconnaissance and day CAP.

For Combat Air Patrol air controllers have been requested to give a 3-5 mile lateral offset followed by a pursuit curve intercept with a straight-away of one to two miles on low speed targets (below 250 knots). This provides jet interceptors with a tactical advantage over the prop fighters and attack airplanes without the hazard of pulling in front of the bogies as has happended consistantly when planning the intercept for the beam or ahead of the beam attack position. Furthermore, when bogies altitude information is poor (the rule rather than the exception), the CAP is better able to search through a greater altitude differential between 10 and 2 o'clock. It is not unusual for the CAP to be vectored at 20,000 feet for a bogie of unknown altitude and for the CAP to sight the bogie at 2,000 to 4,000 feet. It is extremely difficult to search directly below and/or behind in the F9F and F2H.

31 October 1951

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PART VI: OPERATIONS

The four (4) pilot photo team from VC-61 remained on top for total missions per pilot. The detachment had excellent results and added greatly to the success of the mission.

The detachment from VC-11 continued to fly the Anti-Sub Patrol for the defense of the task group without incident.

The F4U4Bs were used for Naval Gun Fire Spot, Strike Missions, Weather Recco and a few CAP flights. The AD-4s were used for strike missions and Anti-Sub Patrol escorts. The F4U and AD bombing accuracy improved considerably during this period.

Long delay fuzes, 8 to 15 seconds, were used several times during this period with very effective results. It allowed the pilots to make drops at a minimum altitude and a slower air speed, resulting in greater damage per bomb dropped. These low level drops were made in open country as well as in mountainous terrain.

Over-crowded communication channels still remain a handicap under the present operating conditions. A request has been made to CTF-77 for the assignment of a separate air tactical channel.

Both jet squadrons are convinced of the value of carrying 100 or 250 pound bombs instead of rockets. Rocket targets have been almost non-existent since arriving in the Korean Area in August. Bombing accuracy improved steadily and the total destruction and damage results was gratifying.

The bombing, strafing and rocket attacks with the Banshee are made from altitudes of eight to twelve thousand feet, in dives of forty to sixty degrees. This procedure results in better accuracy with bombs and rockets, more effective strafing due to impact angle and time on target and, with simultaneous runs from various directions, affords AA protection by dividing the fire and reduces the enemy's overall firing time to a minimum.

The night detachments on board did an outstanding job during this period. The night hecklers found lucrative targets on the early morning flights that resulted in strike flights being diverted to help destroy enemy trains during the day.

All Night Heckler missions were conducted in two plane sections. Various tactical procedureswere evaluated and tactics employed by this team were the result of compromise. The state of the weather, of course, was an all important factor. On clear nights it was practicable to break the section into single plane units, each plane harassing the enemy individually. The two planes stayed within five to ten miles of each other. Contact was maintained by spotting of bomb blasts and flare drops, previously arranged

rendezvous points, and visual navigation. The planes, under these conditions, were able to assist one another at all times. In case of inclement weather, all the above listed means of maintaining contact broke down, and it was essential that the section remain intact.

The only way to do this over land is to fly in standard tactical formation, all lights off. Although this was not found too difficult for the wingman, in so doing he lost his ability to navigate and search for targets.

The night detachments on board are evaluating a method of recovery of aircraft on a black night with little or no horizon. It is believed that a dangerous situation exists using the break-up procedure outlined in current USF publications, beginning when the section passes close aboard the starboard side and continuing until the 180° turn to the downwind leg is completed. The wingman at night must immediately go from flying a contact wing position to instrument flying with the ever present possibility of vertigo at a very low altitude. During the first period in combat the VFN detachment aboard lost an F4U under such conditions.

To alleviate or eliminate this situation, the following procedures are recommended.

a. Sections should maintain a race track pattern along the ship's heading. Break-up should be made in level flight going downwind at a minimum altitude of 500 feet using a twenty second interval. Using this procedure, each pilot has an opportunity to remain oriented with the lights of the duty carrier and plane guard; it also gives each pilot an opportunity to prepare for his approach with ample time to set up for instrument flight prior to going to the 300 feet required at the normal break-up point. By starting the turn to the downwind leg close ahead, no confusion exists as to the position of the carrier or to the plane guard destroyer which is used as a turning reference. (See next page for diagram).

b. Time involed using the above procedures compares favorably with the standard procedures recommended by current USF's.


1200 FOOT
SQUADRON ORBIT
800 FOOT
BREAK-UP CIRCLE
300 FOOT
PATTERN ENTRY
PLANE GUARD
WIND
PLANE GUARD
20 SECOND INTERVAL
SINGLE AIR CRAFT

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

a. JET MAINTENANCE

F2H-2 maintenance offered no serious problems for the reporting period. One aircraft sustained a hit from a .50 caliber bullet in the rudder cable coupling assembly which resulted in the aircraft being AOG for a period of ten days. Equipment for repairing the damaged cables was not available. F2H-2 catapult hook difficulties has been reported by separate correspondence.

It is evident from experience in attempting structural repairs that high shear rivet facilities and heat treating ovens for small parts should be installed on aircraft carriers. Such equipment would facilitiate repair thereby eliminating the importance of delay intransport of spare parts or replacement aircraft.

F9F-2 maintenance problems were confined to two instances. Fuel contamination was discovered in one aircraft following a flight during which the fuel low boost warning light indicated fuel bypass of the low pressure fuel filter. The filter was removed and found clogged with an unknown substance. After cleaning the filter and conducting a half-hour turn-up the aircraft flew an hour and half test hop successfully. The aircraft was then kept on deck for about a week after which a turn-up was not satisfactory, the engine RPM being restricted to 15%. Investigation revealed the fuel pressurizing and shut-off cock badly corroded. The fuel cell was opened and found to contain large amounts of the same unknown contaminating substance. The upper main fuel pump and the turbo-jet control were corroded and not functioning properly. All fuel control units were replaced by new units and the engine checked carefully. A sample of the contaminated fuel was analyzed by ComServPac and the report stated that the sample contained 115/145 AvGas and salt water. It further stated that the salt water contained organic matter similar to that normally found in bottoms of shore aqua systems using salt water displacement.

A flame-out occurred (the first that VF-51 has experienced) at twenty thousand feet during an acceleration from 84% to 97%. Apparently it was caused by the sticking of the barometric control. To eliminate recurrence a check of the barometric control unit was placed on the thirty hour check list. It is believed that the failure was caused by the poor lubricating qualities of 115/145 octane gasoline with 3% lube oil and by the infrequent use of the barometric unit since the majority of flights are conducted at altitudes less than 10,000 feet.

[redacted]

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

b. CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE

A great deal of maintenance on propeller driven aircraft was accomplished on the flight deck. This increased the speed of repair making it possible to fly the repaired aircraft on subsequent launches the same day.

A critical shortage of vacuum relief valves (P/N R-82-CV-VS-13361) for the F4U-5NL developed early in the period and two aircraft were AOG for seventeen days until replacement parts arrived. This AOG situation was alleviated by the use of F4U-4Bs as night hecklers, but is not recommended as a general practice.

c. GENERAL

The handling of current fleet aircraft on board CV 27A conversions is constantly threatened by extremely small clearances both with the overhead on the hangar deck and with other aircraft since parking in minimum space is an absolute necessity. Hangar deck and flight deck crashes must be minimuzed by constant training of the men involved in handling aircraft.

Flak and ground fire damage accounted for approximately forty per-cent of the maintenance work done during the operating period.

Except for the above mentioned parts there were no critical shortages. This was due to the cooperation and efficiency of the Aviation Supply Office on board. Those parts of which future shortage is indicated by past usage data have been ordered.

[redacted]

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

d. SPECIAL STARTING PROCEDURE FOR JET AIRCRAFT

On 5 October 1951, 2 F2H-2 aircraft were forced to land at K-18 for tail hook repairs. No facilities were available for starting the aircraft, after completion of repairs were available at K-18. An AD-4Q that had been adapted for just this occasion, as described below, was dispatched to K-18 from the ship on the morning of 6 October 1951, to start the F2H-2s. The pilot and crewman of the AD-4Q were briefed with all pertinent instructions as below. A normal start of both F2H-2s was made. The pilot of the AD-4Q stated that no apparent overload was placed upon his electrical system. Pilots of the F2H-2s stated that the power source was adequate for a good jet start. Investigation of all portions of the adapter assembly showed no indication of overheating. The procedure and material required are as follows:

(1) INSTALLATION PROCEDURE

a. Remove main DC Buss.
b. Construct, from 1/8" copper plate, a new main DC buss ½" longer than the original. Drill one ¼" hole in extended portion of buss.
c. From 3' of AWG 2/0 cotton covered rubber insulated cable, manufacture 2 cables, with terminal lugs, 14" long. Manufacture 2 cables, with terminal lugs, 4" long,
d. Manufacture a standoff bracket providing 1" clearance to hold AN-2552-3A receptacle, to be mounted on starbaord side of A/C just aft of station 96.000 and mounting shelf, utilizing present access plate mounting bolts.
e. Install insulating material under desired mounting of brackets manufactured in step d.
f. Install AN-2552-3A receptacle on bracket.
g. Mount bracket and receptacle on insulating material.
h. Install two 14" cables, manufacture in step c, between end of main DC buss, manufactured in step b, and center pin of AN-2552-3A receptacle.
i. Install DC buss (steps b & h) in place of DC buss removed in step a.
j. Install two 4" cables, manufactured in step c, between large end pin of receptacle and frame of aircraft.

4D

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

d. SPECIAL STARTING PROCEDURE FOR JET AIRCRAFT

(2) MATERIAL REQUIRED

a. One AN-2552-3A receptacle.
b. Copper plate 1" x 6" x 1/8".
c. Sheet aluminum 2½" x 12" x 1/16".
d. 36" AWG # 2/0 DCC rubber insulated wire.
e. 8 solder terminal lugs to fit AWG # 2/0 wire.
f. 4 8/32 7/16" bolts and nuts.
g. 1 ¼/24 ½" bolt and nut.
h. 1 sheet 1/16" insulating material 4" x 6".

(3) USAGE PROCEDURE

a. AD-4Q engine idling.
b. All switches in Jet "OFF".
c. Install jumper cable between receptacle in AD-4Q right "Hell hole" and jet starting receptacle in jet aircraft.
d. Jet pilot turns battery switch ON and gives "4Q" pilot "Thumbs-Up".
e. "4Q" pilot turns "OFF" battery switch and "revvs-up" engine to 2000RPM - gives jet pilot "Thumbs-Up".
f. Jet pilot turns "ON" start switch and utilizes normal starting procedures - gives "4Q" pilot "Cut" after start is made.



Code

1. Receptacle AN 2552-3A
2. 1/16" sheet insulation
3. Mounting brackets
4. Jet starting cable AN-2551E15
5. Jet starting cable 27A conversion
6. 49A1A7 Jet starting receptacle

Encl. (1)

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBAT HRS. THIS PERIOD	AVER. COMBAT SORTIES P/PILOT THIS PERIOD	AVER. COMBAT HRS. P/PILOT THIS PERIOD
VF-51	456.8	12.3	21.7
VF-172	446.6	12.5	20.7
VF-53	971.7	14.4	44.2
VF-54	1032.3	12.7	38.2
VC-3	166.9	11.0	33.4
VC-11	147.2	10.0	29.2
VC-35	210.3	13.6	42.1
VC-61	120.8	18.5	30.2
TOTALS	3552.6	13.1	32.5

FLIGHT SUMMARY BY SORTIES

A/C	F9F-2	F9F-2P	F2H-2	F4U-4B	F4U-5NL	AD-4	AD-4W	AD-4N	TOTALS
SQD	VF-51	VC-61	VF172	VF-53	VC-3	VF54	VC-11	VC-35	
NGF				62		6			68
STRIKE				240	13	312		7	572
CAP	97		66	8					171
RECCO	103		164						267
FIGHTER SWEEPS	20		12						32
PHOTO		74							74
PHOTO ESCORT	47		29						76
ASP							48		48
ASP ESCORT						20	2	26	48
WEATHER RECCO				2	2			2	6
NIGHT HECKLER					39			31	70
TOTAL	267	74	271	312	54	338	50	66	1432

[redacted]

M. U. BEEBE

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[redacted]
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-13/(cfc)
Serial 081-51

14 December 1951

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group FIVE (12 November 1951-14 December 1951)

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.1
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the Action Report of U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) and the division of data between calendar months is shown in compliance with reference (b).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 11/12	OPERATIONAL A/C 12/14	PILOTS 11/12	PILOTS 12/14
CVG-5	None	None	None	1*	1*
CDR M. U. BEEBE					
VF-51	F9F-2	16	17	21	21
LCDR E. M. BEAUCHAMP					
VF-172	F2H-2	13	15	22	22
CDR M. E. BARNETT					
VF-53	F4U-4B	17	16	21	21
CDR H. J. TRUM, III					
VF-54	AD-2	5	3	27**	25
CDR P. N. GRAY	AD-4	7	7		
	AD-4L	5	3		
	AD-Q	-	2		
VC-3 (Det. "B")					
LT J. S. LAKE***	F4U-5NL	3	2	5	5
LCDR J. F. DOHERTY					
VC-11 (Det. "B")	AD-4W	2	2	5	5
LT M. R. MILLER					
VC-35 (Det. "B")	AD-4NL	3	3	5	5
LCDR F. F. BERTAGNA					
VC-61 (Det.)	F9F-2P	2	3	4	4
LT S. L. JAYNES	TOTAL	73#	73	111	109

* The Air Group Commander flies regularly with VF-51 and VF-54.
** Includes the Air Group Operations Officer.
*** LCDR J.F. DOHERTY relieved LT J.S. LAKE as OinC of the VC-3 Detachment on 1 December 1951.
# CVG-5 entered the combat area with 73 aircraft. 2 F2H-2s were left ashore undergoing maintenance.

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b. MISSION

The mission of Air Group FIVE during the reporting period remained the support of United Nations ground forces in Korea. This support was conducted by an interdiction program consisting of strikes and harassing attacks against the enemy lines of communication. About mid-way through the operating period Close Air Support missions were ordered to maintain pilot proficiency, but they did not comprise a major portion of the support offered. The continued rail-cutting operations proved highly successful in temporarily closing transportation lines. Flights of Naval Gunfire Spotters were called for more frequently as the operation progressed. Night Heckler flights again found the preponderance of transport. Cease Fire Talks towards the end of the month marked an increase of traffic along the roads during the daylight hours. Photographic flights proved valuable in the assessment of damage and the spotting of prospective targets. In the latter use they increased in value as camouflage was less affective due to trees bared and snows covered the enemy-held land. AEW and ASP flights provided constant protection against the possibility of enemy air or submarine attack, although no contacts were made.

The combat evaluation of the F2H-2 aircraft continued. However, no air to air evaluation has yet been possible.

PART II: CHRONOLOGY

While in port personnel were encouraged to utilize the facilities at the various rest-camps, and fifty per-cent of the enlisted men and the officers were able to take advantage of these camps. Conferences were held with NavFE, FEAF and Army GHQ during which suggestions were offered to alter the VHF channelization in order to provide greater inter-service communication in the operating area. Prior to leaving Yokosuka Air Group FIVE took steps to provide cold weather equipment and up-to-the-minute education of personnel. On 12 November ESSEX departed Yokosuka for the operating area.

On 13 November, Air Group FIVE conducted refresher exercises as USS ESSEX steamed into the Sea of Japan. Sixty (60) sorties were flown.

On 14 November, bad weather precluded further training operations.

On 15 November, six (6) pre-dawn sorties were flown by the VC Detachment pilots. Operations for the rest of the day were cancelled because of weather. To make use of the non flyable weather the Force retired to replenish.

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On 16 November, the bad weather improved during the afternoon permitting the Air Group to fly thirty-four (34) of the scheduled eighty-two (82) sorties.

On 17 November, the weather cleared and eighty-two (82) sorties were flown of which the greater portion were bridge strikes. Eleven (11) bridges were attacked and eight (8) of them were left with at least one (1) span dropped. LT W. A. BRYANT, Jr., of VF-54 in an AD-4 crashed immediately after take-off. The aircraft fell off to the right and crashed into the water, cart-wheeling and breaking up on impact. USS ESSEX's helicopter arrived over plane seconds later. BRYANT, apparently only semi-conscious, did not enter the rescue sling properly. As he was hoisted to the helicopter he slipped from the sling and dropped about forty (40) feet into the water. He floated face down for a few seconds and then sank beneath the waves. Though every effort was made by a motor whale boat in the vicinity and the helicopter, his rescue was not effected.

On 18 November, seventy-seven (77) sorties were flown with bridges as the primary target along the Communist rail and truck lines. Bad weather over the target forced many of the aircraft to weather alternates to conduct rail-cutting operations instead. A total of fifty-six (56) cuts were made that day.

On 19 November, eighty-four (84) sorties were flown. The same targets as on the 18th were schedule and all primary bridge targets were destroyed.

On 20 November, the Force retired to replenish.

On 21 November, eight-six (86) sorties were flown. This was the first day in over two months that Air Group FIVE had flown missions of Close Air Support. Good results were reported by the ground forces supported, and pilots looked forward to more of this interesting work. During the afternoon LT B. C. PRUITT, of VF-53 was attacking a pair of trucks on the road southeast of WONSAN when his plane was hit by small arms fire. The aircraft began to smoke and lose power. LT PRUITT was able to fly to WONSAN harbor where he bailed out about a half mile off YODO Island. He was picked up unhurt by LSMR 404 and returned to USS ESSEX the day following.

On 22 November, with marginal weather throughout the day, thirty (30) sorties were flown. Of eighteen (18) sorties flown against bridge targets over half diverted to weather alternates but the results still amounted to three (3) bridges knocked out and four (4) others severely damaged. This being Thanksgiving Day, the respite offered by the weather was appreciated by pilots and crewmen

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alike. Air Group FIVE shared the pleasure of playing host to seven (7) front line troops who were invited on board for the holiday.

On 23 November, bad weather set in in earnest. The first snows of winter flecked the flight deck, and the thermometer plunged to below-freezing to stay there for the next four (4) days. On 24, 25, 26 November no sorties were flown as ESSEX plowed through continuing high seas and contrary winds. Replenishing was completed in spite of the weather.

On 27 November, the weather cleared after dawn and sixty-four (64) sorties were flown. Close Air Support flights received a "Well Done" from the troops at the front. Bridge strikes diverted due to weather and strikes were made against rail lines and transportation. Just before noon LTJG E. B. HALE of VF-54 experienced a failure of a MK55 bomb release mechanism. The bomb-fin carried away in the slip-stream allowing the tail fuze to arm. In fear of an explosion caused by extremely turbulent air, LTJG HALE elected to bail out near a destroyer off WONSAN Harbor rather than attempt to fly the aircraft to friendly territory. His partially inflated life-raft was observed from the air, but HALE disappeared soon after entering the water. A thorough search by a destroyer using a whaleboat was negative. The condition of the sea and the freezing temperature made it a certainty that he did not survive. He is listed as dead.

On 28 November, eighty-one (81) sorties were flown. Most of these were against bridges. The pilots reported without exception that foot traffic and cart traffic had increased a hundred fold over preceding days. Most of this traffic was headed west and south from WONSAN, and was believed a direct result of the Peace Talk news issued from PANMUNJON.

On 29 November, eighty-two (82) sorties were flown. Reconnaissance flights again reported people moving by the hundreds towards the south and west, mostly on foot. The days operations yielded four (4) bridges and forty (40) odd rail cuts.

On 30 November, the Force retired to replenish.

The operating period extended beyond the end of the calendar month, so the narrative continues.

On 1 December, eighty-five (85) missions were flown. Thirty-three (33) rail cuts were made by the morning flights and twenty six (26) more were made by others in the afternoon. LT N. E. CURRY of VF-53 was attacking targets in the WONSAN area when his F4U was hit by ground fire. He was forced to ditch and was safely

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recovered by Fleet Tug ABNAKI. On the same flight ENSIGN E. C. GARRETT, also of VF-53, received damage from ground fire and ditched his plane in WONSAN Harbor. He was recovered safely by USS McGINTY (DE365).

On 2 December, eighty-nine (89) sorties were flown. Rail cutting was again the primary mission of the days operations. The bad weather that had held up operations during the latter half of November had now cleared and operations were conducted on schedule for the remainder of the operating period. About 1000, LTJG R. S. DONOVAN of VC-3, Detachment Baker, experienced power failure immediately after take-off and was forced to ditch his F4U-5NL. He jettisoned his belly tank and one 500# bomb, but was unable to drop his wing ordnance. He was picked up by USS ESSEX helicopter and returned uninjured to the ship in a few minutes.

On 3 December, eighty-eight (88) sorties were flown, the majority of which were sent to cut rails. Forty-five (45) cuts were made. In addition good targets were found along the highways between WONSAN and YANGDOK. Thirteen (13) trucks were destroyed and a like number damaged.

On 4 December, the Force retired to replenish.

On 5 December, seventy-five (75) sorties were flown. Pilots from Air Task Group ONE reported on board for conferences and familiarization flights with Air Group FIVE. Late in the afternoon, having been forced to fly his AD-4L to K-18 after it was hit with flak, LTJG L. A. AHRENDTS of VF-54 found that he could not maintain aileron control at speeds under 130 knots. As he landed, his aircraft got out of control, ran off the runway and crashed into four (4) parked aircraft. An explosion and fire ensued from which AHRENDTS received minor face burns.

On 6 December, seventy-eight (78) sorties were flown. Fifty-six (56) cuts were made and fourteen (14) buildings damaged. Intelligence reports were received stating the effectiveness of the rail-cutting program.

On 7 December, eighty (80) sorties were flown. Pilots of Air Task Group ONE were included in the scheduled operations. They were assigned a variety of missions in the next few days in order to familiarize them with the operating procedures and areas of responsibility of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN.

On 8 December, the Force retired to replenish.

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On 9 December, ninety-two (92) sorties were flown. Forty-one (41) cuts were made. The majority of the flights found good targets in supply points and rail targets. Six (6) buildings were left afire and thirteen (13) boxcars were destroyed by bombing. Throughout the week's operations, each day had yielded at least two (2) or three (3) bridges knocked out in addition to the rail cuts, but photo-coverage showed that a string of cuts along a track was taking the enemy longer to repair than a by-pass or bridge. During the day two (2) pilots from VF-54 were forced to ditch their F-2s in WONSAN Harbor. LT P. J. O'MALLEY was hit by AA fire which ignited his 20MM ammunition while making rail cutting runs near HUNGNAM. The damaged area of the wing was of such proportions that a bail-out was indicated until the fire went out and he ditched successfully. He was recovered by USS EVANSVILLE (PF-70). In the same area CDR M. U. BEEBE sustained damage from ground fire again in the 20MM ammunition cans. A fire ensued but died out and he proceeded with his wingman, LT F. J. PRENDERGAST, to WONSAN. While awaiting the remainder of the flight LT PRENDERGAST experienced engine failure from loss of oil. He ditched successfully and was recovered uninjured by USS McGINTY (DE-365).

On 10 December, ninety (90) sorties were flown. This was the last day that the pilots from Air Task Group ONE flew as part of Air Group FIVE flights. USS VALLEY FORGE had joined the task force. Sixty-nine (69) rail cuts were made in railroad tracks. This was the best day to date. In the past six (6) operating days a total of three hundred and seven (307) cuts had been made by pilots of Air Group FIVE. When added to the by-passes and bridges knocked out and approaches damaged, the total rose to over three hundred and twenty (320) places that had to be repaired by the enemy before they could move their transport.

On 11 December, eighty (80) sorties were flown. Sixty-nine (69) cuts were made again. This was the last operating day of the reporting period.

On 12 December, the Force retired to replenish. Following replenishment, USS ESSEX was relieved of her duties and in company with an escorting force departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN for the port of Yokosuka, Japan.

On 13 December, enroute to Yokosuka.

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PART III ORDNANCE

a. MACHINE GUNS

During this operating period, crushed or frayed electrical leads for the gun heater thermostat control have been found in several F9F-2 aircraft. This damage probably occurs during the removal or replacement of the guns and could be prevented by shortening the leads, thereby eliminating slack wire. Since the proper functioning of gun heaters is absolutely essential during cold weather operations, and because of such discrepancies in the gun heater circuit, VF-51 has included a test of this circuit during every 30 hour check. This test is made by turning on the battery switch and then actuating the termostat control by placing a damp compress cooled by CO^2 or any other practical means, on the thermostat diaphragm. If the system is functioning properly, all four heaters should be hot within 30 seconds.

VF-172 has experienced a few gun stoppages because of broken links in the ammo feed belt. The ammunition cans on the F2H-2 are deep, which throws a heavy strain on the feeder mechanism and links as well. It is possible that firing in rough air tumbles the ammunition in the can and caused breakage of the links.

The Air Group has experienced several cases of muzzle explosions in the barrel of the 20MM guns. Four of these explosions occurred on the same day. The explosions are believed to be a result of faulty HEI ammunition. Reports have been submitted.

A limited amount of cold weather lubricants prescribed in OP 1910 were obtained from a BuOrd representative who visited the ship. All procedures outlined in OP 1910 were carried out on the guns in two (2) AD aircraft and their performance was excellent. The cold weather performance of guns not completely winterized has been poor. The following materials have been ordered but have not been delivered and it is felt that acceptable 20MM performance is impossible without them.

1. Lubricating Oil SPEC NRL U51
2. Lubricating Oil Preservative SPEC B51
3. Solenoid Lubricating Oil SPEC S75
4. Relubrication Kit, Feed Mechanism AN-M2

20MM rear socket assemblies now used on the F4U-4B were declared obsolete by AMO-OAK dispatch 291559Z of October 1951. Although obsolete, non-availability of replacements make it necessary to to continue use of these assemblies on the 20MM.

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AMO-OAK has been requested to retain this type assembly in stock and that it be made available for issue until such time as replacements are available.

b. BOMBS

The jet squadrons adopted the practice of arming bombs immediately after passing the force screen with airspeed held below 200 knots. This has been done in order to keep the air stream from pulling the arming wires out of the arming solenoid and has been successful.

Failure of the MK 55 racks to release at the proper time when 250 pound General Purpose Bombs are used has occurred with a frequency that has been unacceptable. Some bombs have released after pull out while others have to be thrown off by violent maneuvers of the aircraft. No sure method of freeing the hung bomb, or safetying it once an attempt to release it had been made, was found. Hung bombs were dropped during the return to the force, during the landing approach, and on landing even though all switches had been placed in the safe positions. It is believed that a modification of the sway braces as suggested by the BUORD representative might solve this problem. Marine squadrons operating ashore in Korea have tried this modification with a resultant 90% reduction in hung bombs. Further information on this modification will be submitted when available.

During this same period of operations, one bomb was dropped from each of two different aircraft being catapulted. Although an improved sway brace might prevent this, a positive safety would be a much more certain means of preventing premature drops. The rack does not have any such safety device at present.

One (1) bomb vane on a 250# GP bomb came loose and the rotation armed the tail fuze. The pilot of the AD was unable to drop the wing bomb and due to existing orders that hung armed bombs cannot be landed aboard or at airfields the aircraft was abandoned.

c. ROCKETS

Few rockets were used during this period resulting in no comment.

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d. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

MUNITIONS	F9F-2 NOV*	F9F-2 DEC*	F9F-2 TOTAL	F2H-2 NOV	F2H-2 DEC	F2H-2 TOTAL	F4U-4B & F4U-5N NOV	F4U-4B & F4U-5N DEC	F4U-4B & F4U-5N TOTAL
2000# GP									
1000# GP									
500# GP					16	16	158	150	308
250# GP	124	360	484	185	327	512	342	568	910
100# GP	104	84	188	118	16	134	278	309	587
260# FRAG	16		16				136	38	174
350# DB									
5" ATAR					16	16			
5" HVAR							149		149
3.25 SH									
NAPALM							336#		336#
FLARES MK6									
20MM AMMO	12908	30179	43087	36400	47247	83647	22225	29140	51365

MUNITIONS	AD-4 & AD-4NL NOV	AD-4 & AD-4NL DEC	AD-4 & AD-4NL TOTAL	TOTALS NOV	TOTALS DEC	TOTALS TOTAL**
2000# GP	44	3	47	44	3	47
1000# GP	310	353	663	310	353	663
500# GP	29	9	38	187	175	362
250# GP	904	1018	1922	1555	2273	3828
100# GP		184	184	500	593	1093
260# FRAG	155	22	177	307	60	367
350# DB	8	8	16	8	8	16
5" ATAR					16	16
5" HVAR				149		149
3.25 SH	16	24	40	16	24	40
NAPALM	1404#	940#	2344#	1740#	940#	2680#
FLARES MK6	4		4	4		4
20MM AMMO	13550	22751	36301	85083	129317	214400

* PERIOD FROM NOV 12 - NOV 30
DEC 1 - DEC 14

** TOTALS FROM NOV 12 - DEC 14 (OPERATING PERIOD)

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PART IV: DAMAGE*

a. DAMAGED TO ENEMY

	DAMAGED		DESTROYED	
	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC
TANKS	1	2		
TRUCKS	15	51	17	61
CARS	-	3	1	2
LOCOMOTIVES	4	6	1	6
OXCARTS	7	12	16	57
HIGHWAY BRIDGES	2	1	3#	-
SUPPLY DUMPS	4	1	20	5
WAREHOUSES	4	16	9	2
BARRACKS & BUILDINGS	24	80	39	106
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	2	7	13	16
LUMBER PILES	10	-	-	1
WAGONS	8	1	-	1
BUNKERS	1		-	
RAILROAD TRACKS CUTS	-	-	366%	540
RAILROAD CARS	57	112	17	22
RAILROAD BRIDGES	8	26	24	15
TROOPS KILLED	-	-	193	246
RAILROAD BY-PASSES	2	7	18	16
HIGHWAY BY-PASSES	-	2	1	-
FUEL DUMPS	2	-	-	8
CRANE	1	1	-	-
HIGHWAYS CRATERED	1		-	
OBSERVATION POSTS	1		1	
FACTORIES	-	6	-	2
BOATS	-	1	-	11

* These figures include only targets positively identified and the actual damage observed. Unobserved damage or unidentified targets are not tabulated.

Bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

% Damages where tracks are broken or cratered are counted as rail cuts.

NOTE: NOVEMBER COLUMN 12 NOV - 30 NOV
DECEMBER COLUMN 1 DEC - 14 DEC

[redacted]

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b. DAMAGED TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 12 - 30 NOVEMBER 1951

VF-53

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
11-16-51	F4U-4B	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-17-51	F4U-4B	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-21-51	F4U-4B	Engine caught fire due to small arms fire. Plane abandoned over water.	Small arms fire
11-21-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
11-22-51	F4U-4B	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-22-51	F4U-4B	Frag Holes	Unknown

VF-54

11-17-51	AD-2	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-17-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-17-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
11-17-51	AD-4	Plane ditched in water after take-off	
11-19-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-19-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	Unknown
11-21-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	20MM A
11-21-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
11-21-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 & 50 cal. A
11-21-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
11-21-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
11-21-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
11-27-51	AD-4L	Fire broke out in accessory section which burned until plane crashed	20MM TAE
11-28-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
11-28-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A

VF-172

11-17-51	F2H-2	Frag Holes	88MM EF
11-27-51	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. BALL

DAMAGED TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 14 DECEMBER 1951

VF-51

12-2-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes, Hydraulic line cut	30 cal.
12-2-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal.

[redacted]

b. DAMAGED TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 14 DECEMBER (Cont'd)

VF-51(Cont'd)

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
12-3-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes and Rudder Cable damaged	12.7MM
12-5-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	20MM AP
12-7-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM
12-7-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM A
12-9-51	F9F-2	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-9-51	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-11-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. T

VF-53

12-1-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-1-51	F4U-4B	Fire in cockpit. Plane ditched in ocean	20MM
12-1-51	F4U-4B	Oil leak in engine. Engine began to cut out. Plane ditched in ocean	50 cal.
12-2-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-3-51	F4U-4B	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-3-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-3-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	20MM
12-3-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-6-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-9-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	20MM
12-11-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.

VF-54

12-1-51	AD-4	Flak Holes	37MM
12-1-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 & 50 cal. A
12-1-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-1-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-1-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM A
12-2-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-3-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-3-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-3-51	AD-2	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-5-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-5-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-6-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-6-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown

b. DAMAGED TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 14 DECEMBER (Cont'd)

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
		VF-54 (Cont'd)	
12-6-51	AD-4L	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-7-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-7-51	AD-4	Frag Holes	Unknown
12-9-51	AD-4NL	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-9-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	20MM HE
12-9-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-9-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-9-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 & 50 cal. A
12-9-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	20MM HE
12-9-51	AD-2	Bullet Holes	20MM HE
12-10-51	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-10-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
12-10-51	AD-4	Minor damage and holes in fuselage	Unknown
12-11-51	AD-4L	Flak Holes	Unknown AA
		VF-172	
12-7-51	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
12-10-51	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-10-51	F2H-2	Bomb Fragment cut hole through switch	Unknown
12-11-51	F2H-2	Holes in nose cap	Unknown

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PART V: PERSONNEL

a. OFFICER

No Comments

b. ENLISTED

The following is a schedule of the losses which will be incurred due to discharges under current directives:

SQUADRON	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
CVG-5	-	-	1	-
VF-51	5	-	2	2
VF-172	3	4	-	1
VF-53	3	-	-	-
VF-54	4	1	-	-
VC-3	1	-	-	-
VC-11	4	-	-	-
VC-35	-	-	-	-
VC-61	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	20	5	3	3

c. CASUALTIES

The Air Group lost two (2) pilots during the reporting period as follows:

LT William Arnold BRYANT, Jr., 442481/1310, USN, VF-54. 17 November 1951. Plane crashed into sea on take-off. Pilot apparently dazed and did not unbuckle chest strap, inflate life vest or enter helicopter sling properly. Crew unable to pull him into helicopter and pilot slipped out of sling from about forty (40) feet and sank from sight shortly after striking water. Listed as dead.

LTJG Eugene Brewer HALE, 506261/1315, USNR, VF-54. 27 November 1951. After successful bail-out, pilot disappeared from view shortly after landing in water. Search proved fruitless except for partially inflated life raft located by destroyer. Water extremely cold and choppy. Listed as dead.

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PART IV: OPERATIONS

The third period for Carrier Air Group FIVE in the operating area ends without any major change to previous operating procedures used in the first two periods in the Korean Area.

The major effort has still been the interdiction of enemy lines of communication. A few Close Air Support missions were flown during this period in support of the U.N. troops along the East central battle line.

Photo missions have been cut down considerably because of the fewer daylight hours.

The F9F's and F2H's were used in group coordinated attacks and were assigned flak suppression missions in direct support of AD and F4U bridge strikes. Four to six 100# VT fuzed general purpose bombs were carried per jet aircraft. Six jets supported six AD and six F4U on these flights. The F4U's were also used for flak suppression paving the way for the AD with heavy bombs to hit the target. The jets and F4U's bombed and strafed pre-briefed AA positions immediately prior to the AD attack. The jets were launched 15 minutes after the prop strike group and rendezvous was affected enroute.

The jet squadrons were also assigned rail cutting missions. Four 250# GP bombs with .01 second delay fuzes were used on the F9F. The F2H's carried two 250# GPs plus two 100# GPs or four 100# GPs fuzed with .01 second delay. Twenty degree glides with dive brakes extended and bombs released at 800 to 1000 feet above the track at 300 to 330 knots resulted in high percentage of cuts. After expending all bombs the flight reconnoitered a specified route in the time available.

The 100# GP bomb is not considered an adequate bomb for rail cutting. The 250# GP bomb is an excellent general purpose bomb for current operations and is very affective on rail cutting missions.

Recently hostile aircraft have been reported operating in the WONSAN area. The F4U squadron while operating with attack bombers on rail cutting missions has incorporated the practice of placing two F4Us over the target area to act as CAP.

With the water temperature lowering each day the pilots of the Air Group have resorted to emersion suits on practically all flights. One pilot bailed out over WONSAN Bay without an emersion suit. The air temperature was approximately 65° and the

water 58 degrees. Although the pilot was in the water only three minutes he became so numb that he could not climb the ladder of the ship that picked him up and had to be helped aboard.

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

a. CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE

ComAirPac F4U Aircraft Technical Bulletin No. 6 (BuAer Change 449 (Gun Heater Change)) has been incorporated in all aircraft in this squadron. In the limited time of operation, this change has proven extremely successful and its value to operations far overcedes the time necessary to make the change.

b. JET MAINTENANCE

The most serious problem encountered during the reporting period for VF-51 was that of surging engines. The surging occurred in eleven instances in varying degrees fluctuating 10% to 15% in the most extreme cases. Trouble of this nature is indicated by rough engine operation and uneven acceleration with a minor condition invariably becoming serious after four or five flights if allowed to continue. The cause has been attributed to fouling of one or more of three wire-coil type filters. These filters are located in the servo bleed, isolating valve, and stall pressure valve in the main fuel pumps. If surging occurs while operating in the normal fuel system, the servo bleed filter or isolating valve filter is at fault, while stall pressure valve filter clogging produces a surge while operating in the emergency fuel system. Cleaning these filters has invariably eliminated surging tendencies. In an effort to preclude further filter clogging, additional seals were installed on the top and bottom of the low pressure fuel filter sleeve to prevent possible by-passing of impurity carrying fuel. No conclusive results have been noted to date. As a result of the engine surging, every 30 hour check includes a turn-up with pressure gauges installed on the fuel pumps. Any indication of a surge requires the cleaning of the filters which is also accomplished on every 60 hour inspection.

Although extreme care is exercised, the removal of these filters in some instances has resulted in damage to their seating seals which are unobtainable at present through regular supply channels. This has become increasingly serious since a by-passed filter due to a faulty seal causes surging equivalent to that resulting from a fouled filter and there is an extreme shortage of replacement pumps in the area.

The malfunction of the barometric controls section of the TJC causing an over-rich fuel supply as reported in the previous Action Reports has re-occurred, resulting in over-speeding to 102% in one instance and very rough acceleration characteristics in several other cases checked at from 20,000 to 30,000 feet altitude. Inspection and lubrication of the aneroid valve shaft has been placed on the 30 hour check sheet which should alleviate the difficulty. Innerliner life has been noticeably shortened since commencing carrier operations. At present, the innerliners are discarded because of excessive metal erosion after an average life of seventy hours although ceramic coated innerliners are being used. The possibility of innerliner life being affected by the corrosive action of salt spray in the atmosphere is suggested.

FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

A/C TYPE	F9F-2		F9F-2P		F2H-2		F4U-4B		F4U-5NL		AD-4		AD-4NL		AD-4W		TOTALS		
SQUADRON	VF-51		VC-61		VF-172		VF-53		VC-3		VF-54		VC-35		VC-11				
MONTH	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	NOV	DEC	TOT.
CAS							6				6						12		12
STRIKE							120	130	2	4	118	123	2	2			242	259	501
CAP	68	48			52	60											120	108	228
RECCO	42	99			65	92			12	4				4			119	199	318
PHOTO			11	32													11	32	43
PHOTO ESCORT	6	25			5	16											11	41	52
ASP													1	3	18	16	19	19	38
ASP ESCORT									1		7	8	10	10			18	18	36
NGF							20	20									20	20	40
NIGHT HECKLER RADAR									16	17			14	17			30	34	64
COUNTER FIGHTER													4				4	-	4
SWEEP	12	4			6	4											18	8	26
TOTALS	128	176	11	32	128	172	146	150	31	25	131	131	31	36	18	16	624	738	

TOTAL PER PERIOD	304	43	300	296	56	262	67	34	1362

NOTE: PERIOD COVERED 12 NOV 1951 - 14 DEC 1951
NOVEMBER COLUMN FOR PERIOD 12 - 30 NOV
DECEMBER COLUMN FOR PERIOD 1 - 14 DEC

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SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS NOV	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS DEC	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT NOV	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT DEC	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIE PER PILOT NOV	AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIE PER PILOT DEC	AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIE PER PILOT TOTAL
VF-51	195.2	307.9	503.1	9.0	14.3	23.3	5.7	8.0	13.7
VF-172	227.7	285.4	513.1	10.4	13.0	23.4	5.7	7.8	13.5
VF-53	431.3	465.8	897.1	20.5	23.3	43.8	6.8	7.4	14.2
VF-54	389.1	406.2	795.3	15.5	16.3	31.8	5.2	5.6	10.8
VC-3	91.6	79.8	171.4	18.3	16.0	34.3	4.7	5.0	9.7
VC-11	52.4	49.3	101.7	10.5	9.9	20.4	3.8	3.4	7.2
VC-35	93.0	112.8	205.8	18.6	22.6	41.2	6.2	7.4	13.6
VC-61	15.9	51.6	67.5	4.0	8.9	12.9	2.8	8.2	11.0
TOTAL AVER	1496.2	1758.8	3255	13.4	15.5	28.9	5.1	6.6	11.7

M. U. BEEBE

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-13/(gls)
Serial 06-52

2 February 1952

[redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group FIVE (26 December 1951 - 1 February 1952).

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.1
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the Action Report of U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) and the division of data between calendar months is shown in compliance with reference (b).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 12/26	OPERATIONAL A/C 2/1	PILOTS 12/26	PILOTS 2/1
CVG-5 CDR M. U. BEEBE	None	None	None	1*	1*
VF-51 CDR E. M. BEAUCHAMP	F9F-2	16	13	21	19
VF-172 CDR M. E. BARNETT	F2H-2	14	15	22	21
VF-53 CDR H. J. TRUMI III	F4U-4B	16	14	20	20
VF-54 CDR P. N. GRAY	AD-2 AD-3 AD-4 AD-4L AD-4Q	4 5 4 3 1	1 3 3 1 1	28**	25**
VC-3 (Unit "B") LCDR J. F. DOHERTY	F4U-5NL	3	3	5	5
VC-11 LT M. R. MILLER	AD-4W	2	2	5	5
VC-35 LCDR F. F. BERTAGNA	AD-4NL	3	3	5	5
VC-61 LT S. L. JAYNES	F9F-2P F2H-2P	3	2 2	4	4
	TOTAL	74	63	111	105

* The Air Group Commander flies regularly with VF-51 and VF-54.
** Includes the Air Group Operations Officer.

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b. MISSION

The primary mission of Air Group FIVE during the reporting period remained the support of United Nations ground forces in Korea. This support was primarily an interdiction program for destruction of enemy lines of communication. The problem of interdiction has become more difficult however, as a result of the increased accuracy and intensity of enemy anti-aircraft fire. Night Heckler Missions have proven again that by far the greatest percentage of enemy transportation was moving during the hours of darkness.

Photographic missions have been flown daily and netted excellent results in the identification of camouflaged targets and damage assessment in addition to special missions. AEW and ASP missions provided constant protection against the possibility of enemy air or submarine action, although no contacts were made.

PART II: CHRONOLOGY

15-25 December - In port period at Yokosuka. While in port personnel were encouraged to utilize the recreational facilities available in the immediate area and to utilize the rest camp billets. Approximately 50% of enlisted men and officers were able to take advantage of these camps. Five basketball games and two boxing smokers were held during this period. ComFairJap sent a representative to the USS ESSEX to show a training film and explain the fitting and modification of the new MK III Anti-Exposure Suit. All Parachute Riggers, Squadron Survival Officers and pilots of Carrier Air Group FIVE attended this lecture and training film.

All available and urgently needed survival equipment for cold weather operations was procured while in port. This included fifty-three (53) MK III Anti-Exposure Suits and accessories, ten (10) new droppable wing rack mounted survival kits, and one hundred sixteen (116) insulated boots for all Air Group pilots. LT C. C. JONES and LT C. C. COFFEY, helicopter pilots, who have done an outstanding job, were relieved by LT G. J. JOHNSON and TIERNEY, H. (n), ALC(AP).

On 26 December Carrier Air Group FIVE, aboard the USS ESSEX, departed Yokosuka, Japan at 0600 for it's fourth combat cruise against the North Korean Communists and their Chinese allies.

26-28 December - Underway to the operating area. Due to rough seas, no flights were scheduled. Replenishing was accomplished on the 28th.

29 December - Carrier Air Group FIVE went back into action again. 89 sorties were flown, 73 rail cuts were accomplished, four buildings and three railroad bridges destroyed.

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30 December - 88 Sorties flown. The Hecklers burned nine trucks and destroyed sixteen buildings and two heavily loaded oxcarts. A new high in rail cuts was established when 121 were chalked up for the day. Other accomplishments of the day were 12 trucks, 25 buildings, 3 oxcarts, ten troops, one bridge and 1 locomotive destroyed.

31 December - Replenishing day. No air operations.

1 January - 99 Sorties were flown. The first day of the new year brought another outstanding score: seventy-three rail cuts, 2 trucks, 3 oxcarts, 3 bridges and one locomotive destroyed.

2 January - 100 Sorties were flown. 10 gun positions destroyed, 21 trucks, 47 rail cuts, 4 bridges, one highway overpass, one camouflaged tank and one jeep.

3 January - 97 Sorties were flown. The big noise was the destruction of an ammo dump. 57 rail cuts, 6 bridges, 5 by-passes, 2 oxcarts, 15 buildings, 4 trucks and one boxcar destroyed. A very serious but unavoidable accident occurred today. A Banshee landed and taxied forward to the spot. When the engines were shut down, one of the 20mm guns fired a high explosive round which hit a Panther (F9F) and exploded, injuring 5 men. This accident was due to an ear broken off the breach block lock and a leak in the compressed air system of the 20mm gun. Four of the men were on the "not serious" list and one was seriously injured. A shrapnel from the 20mm projectile severed the spinal cord.

4 January - Replenishing.

5 January - 89 Sorties were flown. 5 trucks, 69 rail cuts, 5 bridges, 18 red troops, 24 gun positions, and 7 buildings were destroyed.

6 January - 89 Sorties were flown. 37 rail cuts, 10 trucks, 5 bridges, 2 by-passes, 10 buildings, one gun position, one oil tank and a supply dump were destroyed.

Ensign RICHELTON of VF-51 flying a Panther on a rail cut recco mission when hit by flak, went into a shallow glide from which he never recovered, and crashed into a hillside.

LT ZENNER of VF-54 was hit in the canopy of his AD. He received an eye and facial injuries from the shattered glass from the canopy, but made it back to the force. The nature of the eye injury required special treatment and he was transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka.

7 January - Replenishing.

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8 January - 86 Sorties. Despite the weather closing in from the north a good day was recorded. 57 rail cuts, 10 buildings, 2 bridges, 5 by-passes, 2 warehouses and sundry small targets were destroyed.

9 January - 89 Sorties were flown. Old man weather made this day of operations doubly difficult, although an excellent score was recorded. This included 38 rail cuts, 26 buildings, 5 bridges, one locomotive and seven cars, 4 by-passes, 4 trucks, 15 gun positions, 120 enemy troops, 2 jeeps and 4 oxcarts destroyed.

ENS KELLEY of VF-54 flying an AD was seen trailing smoke following an attack on a bridge, was advised to bail out, but before he could clear the plane it rolled over and went straight in and exploded. ENS KELLEY was not seen to leave the cockpit.

10 January - Another replenishing day.

11 January - 56 Sorties were flown. Due to very heavy weather, some flights were cancelled and others were shortened. In spite of this, a good score was posted. 18 rail cuts, one by-pass, 3 oxcarts, 106 enemy troops killed and an estimate of 100 wounded, and 2 buildings destroyed.

ENS GOLLER of VF-54 flying an AD made a normal take-off, pulled up to the right, flew for about 3 minutes, then made a slow right turn, lost altitude and spiralled until he hit the water. Two helicopters and a DD went to the scene immediately and searched the area with negative results. The cause of the accident is unexplained and a board of investigation was convened..

12 January - 89 Sorties. This day brought a heavy toll in enemy territory. The tally shows 55 rail cuts, 3 locomotives and 4 boxcars which exploded, 7 by-passes, 5 trucks, 1 jeep and 8 oxcarts destroyed. Other major damage inflicted.

Captain RODEE relieved Captain WHELLOCK whose orders take him to ComAirPac. Captain RODEE is no stranger to CVG-5. While the Air Group was in combat aboard U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE in 1950, CAPT RODEE was Chief-of-Staff to CarDivTHREE.

13 January - 89 Sorties were flown. A troop occupied town was the special target of the day. 7 fires were started and 20 buildings destroyed. A supply dump was spotted and 8 separate fires were started. 90 rail cuts, 3 bridges, 7 by-passes, one relay station, 2 oxcarts, 2 trucks, 2 revetments, 12 buildings, and a stockpile of supplies destroyed.

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14 January - Replenishing.

15 January - 83 Sorties. The normal amount of damage was inflict during the day. The gun on an AD exploded on firing, causing some damage to the wing. However a friendly field was reached without incident, and the pilot was uninjured. 38 rail cuts, 8 gun positions, 3 buildings, 1 by-pass, 2 bridges, 8 enemy troops, 4 oxcarts, and a locomotive were destroyed during the day's operations. LT PRENDERGAST of VF-54 in an AD picked up some flak and began throwing off smoke, and immediately headed for the sea, which he reached safely. He made a good water landing, inflated his life raft and was picked up by a destroyer in less than 5 minutes after leaving the plane.

16 January - 85 Sorties were flown. The big prize for the day was a locomotive and an ammunition train destroyed. Other accomplishments for the day include 40 rail cuts, 2 trucks, 3 bridges, 1 building, 3 oxcarts, all destroyed. Also a sub station was left blazing.

17 January - Due to uncertain weather, replenishing was the order of the day.

18 January - 77 Sorties. A concentration of attacks on railroad track demolished 1500 yds of track between Wonsan and Kowon. 6 buildings, 8 railroad cars badly damaged, 1 destroyed, four bridges, 25 gun emplacements, 2 trucks, 25 enemy troops, and one supply dump were destroyed. Also 4 fires were started in camouflaged supply piles.

19 January - 79 Sorties. Due to heavy weather, missions were directed against secondary targets. In spite of the turbulence, snow flurries and low ceiling, the day was relatively successful.

A turn table was destroyed and round house badly damaged, 53 rail cuts, 3 gun emplacements, 2 trucks, 4 buildings, 33 enemy troops, and 16 oxcarts were destroyed. 4 fires were started in supply dumps, and 8 stacks of oil drums were destroyed. The 1500 yds of rail track torn up was extended to 4000 yds during the day's operations. Major McCOLLOM, Air Force pilot with VF-172, while flying an F2H (Banshee) was hit by AA.in the middle of his run. A long tongue of flame suddenly appeared behind his plane and the run ended in an explosion as his plane crashed into the ground. He was not seen to leave the cockpit.

20 January - Replenishing.

21 January - 99 Sorties. Weather conditions again necessitated diverting strikes to secondary targets but a heavy toll was inflicted upon the enemy.

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Three locomotives, one small train, 4 box cars, 1 rail by-pass, 53 rail cuts, 2 buildings, 4 railroad bridges, 2 trucks, 4 wagons, 2 warehouses, 1 gun position, 4 oxcarts, 1 truck shed and 10 troops were destroyed. Supplies and oil stowage fires were started and damage to a transformer station was accomplished.

22 January - 93 Sorties. Commander P. N. GRAY, squadron commander of VF-54, was hit by flak and was fortunate in reaching the sea, where he ditched and was rescued by a destroyer. LTJG John ABBOT of VF-53, flying an F4U was hit by AA on his fourth bomb run and headed for the water. The plane was afire and he was advised to bail out. He rolled the plane over and parachuted into the water. He was rescued by helicopter. LTJG E. V. LANEY, in attempting to drop a raft to the helicopter aircrewman who put ABBOT in the sling and remained in the water, had the raft foul up on the tail of his Corsair and he was forced to make a crash landing on the beach. After evading enemy gunfire and being chased into the water, he was picked up by helicopter receiving protection from accompanying planes which strafed enemy positions. The aircrewman from ROCHESTER was also successfully retrieved, making a total of 3 rescues for the ROCHESTER helicopter pilot.

The toll in damaged and destroyed targets was heavy against the enemy during the day. Fifty-one rail cuts, 7 buildings, 3 bridges and 2 by-passes were destroyed; 16 troops were killed and 4 trucks and 4 gun positions destroyed. Three camouflaged locomotives, which had been spotted by photo pilots from the day before, were badly damaged. Other major damage was inflicted upon train cars, buildings, and bridges.

23 January - 84 Sorties. Photo pilots located 7 locomotives in a marshalling yard, which were chosen as the main objective of the day. 21 rail cuts and 1500 yards of track were destroyed. One relay station was fired and appeared to explode. 3 buildings, 2 supply dumps, 2 bridges, 2 trucks and one by-pass were destroyed. The big prize for the day was 2 locomotives destroyed and 4 damaged, 10 rail cars destroyed and 19 damaged.

24 January - Replenishing.

25 January - Flight operations were cancelled, due to rough seas.

26 January - 83 Sorties. The major targets for the day were trains. One locomotive was destroyed and 5 badly damaged. 14 train cars were destroyed and 54 damaged. 55 rail cuts, were made. 2 gun positions, 4 trucks, 3 houses, 3 bridges, 1 by-pass and 9 buildings were destroyed. In a troop billeting area, 20 huts were destroyed and 40 damaged. At a supply point, 9 buildings were destroyed. 26 buildings were badly damaged, most of which were in a "Commie" Headquarters area. One relay station was bombed and left ablaze producing much fireworks. A huge fuel fire was ignited.

LTJG L. R. CHESHIRE of VF-51 flying an F9F was the victim of a fatal accident. On his second run on a camouflaged locomotive, his plane was hit by AA and he headed for Wonsan Bay. His plane was on fire but he made a perfect let down for ditching near a destroyer. Suddenly, his ejection seat left the plane, which was almost on the water. The destroyer was at the scene immediately and despite a thorough search of the area LTJG CHESHIRE was not recovered.

27 January - 87 Sorties. In spite of the heavy weather closing in, a successful day of operations was accomplished.

Lieutenant R. L. HUGHES of VC-3 was hit during an early morning heckler mission and was forced to land at a friendly field south of the bombline.

The bad news carried to the enemy during the day included; 51 rail cuts, the destruction of one locomotive and 29 boxcars, two gun positions, 1 transformer, 9 buildings, 4 bridges, 2 by-passes, 2 trucks and 4 oxcarts. A relay station was also badly damaged.

28 January - Replenishing.

29 January - 77 Sorties. 57 rail cuts, 2 locomotives and 8 boxcars were destroyed. Six cars badly damaged. 6 trucks were destroyed and 4 badly damaged. 4 supply piles were destroyed. 17 enemy troops were killed. Two gun emplacements were silenced.

30 January - 67 Sorties. Due to the limited number of airplanes, two large strikes were scheduled in place of three smaller ones.

In the first strike CDR P. N. GRAY, Commanding Officer of Fitron FIFTY-FOUR, flying an AD was hit by flak, which damaged his propeller and he was forced to make his third ditching in Wonsan Harbor. He was quickly recovered by the U.S.S. TWINING. The score for the day showed 52 rail cuts, 1 locomotive destroyed and 1 badly damaged, 3 cars destroyed and 21 badly damaged, 5 buildings destroyed, a marshalling yard repair building badly damaged, 2 relay station and three trucks damaged. Twenty-nine enemy troops were killed.

31 January - 96 Sorties. This day marked the thirty-seventh day out of port. A heavy toll was inflicted upon the enemy during this day, the last before a rest period in Japan. The damage inflicted included 74 rail cuts, 16 buildings destroyed. Three bridges destroyed and 2 railroad bridge approaches cratered, 3 trucks destroyed; one large barracks destroyed, 4 oxcarts and 2 gun positions destroyed, and an estimated 58 enemy troops killed on strafing runs. This concluded a period in which intensive destruction was wrought upon enemy installations, transportation and communication systems, supplies and troops.

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PART III. ORDNANCE

a. 20MM GUNS

The performance of the 20MM gun throughout the Air Group has been excellent. The maintenance procedures as outlined in OP 1910 are being used and have proven effective. Operating temperatures have been as low as 30° below zero with no ill effects upon the operation of the 20MM guns. The cold weather lubricants have made a marked increase in the operating efficiency.

Breakage of breech block locks, breech block slides, and magazine slide back plate screws has occurred in some 20MM guns installed on the F9F-2 which have fired 8 to 10 thousand rounds. However, replacing breech block locks and slides after every 25 thousand rounds and making routine checks after every 6 hundred was held stoppages to a minimum. Four extra guns were maintained in a ready state by both jet squadrons to replace broken guns in returning aircraft on short notice. Four additional guns were maintained to permit exchanging of an entire gun assembly on the flight deck when guns were due for routine check. This procedure permitted work to be done on the guns on the hangar deck or in a sheltered armory away from the cold weather.

One accidental firing of an F2H-2 20MM gun on the flight deck occurred as a result of a broken breech block locking sear partially jamming the gun before the locking sear had been engaged and after a failure of air pressure while taxiing out of the arresting gear after an arrested landing.

A new type plastic muzzle cover is now being used to eliminate moisture entering the muzzle. An appreciable decrease in broken gun parts has been noted. Stress on short bursts of fire rather than extended firing has helped decrease gun troubles.

b. BOMBS

Considerable trouble has been encountered with the MK 55 bomb rack during cold weather operations. Moisture collects in the release solenoid and freezes with a resultant inoperative rack and hung bomb. This malfunction was especially prevalent the first flight after a non-operating day and occurred most frequently in racks mounted on the starboard wing where the openings on the rack were up when the wings were folded. This problem has been solved by cleaning the release solenoid plunger and lubricating the core of the solenoid with cold weather grease prescribed in OML GV18-51 for feed mechanism lubrication and the other moving parts of the rack with E-51 gun oil. It was found that hung bombs caused by frozen release solenoids could be dropped by keeping the electrical circuit to the rack closed up to two minutes thereby generating heat in the solenoid to melt the ice.

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b. BOMBS (Cont'd)

VT fuzes have been used on 2000 pound G.P. bombs for flak suppression missions. The T-91 fuze has given excellent results but the T-90 fuze has not performed satisfactorily.

Sway braces for the MK 55 bomb rack installed on the F9F-2, after being modified have given satisfactory service under heavy usage of the 250 pound G.P. bomb. The modification consisted of welding pieces of stock shaped to the curvature of the 250 pound G.P. bomb to the original sway braces, thereby producing a longer, more effective sway brace.

The Aero 14 A bomb and rocket launcher installed on the F2H-2 is moderately satisfactory. Repeated difficulty was experienced in releasing 500 pound G.P. bombs at high speeds. Most failures were at speeds of 375 to 450 knots. No bombs were returned to the ship but as high as 20% of those carried would release only at slower speeds. It was found that the bomb could usually be released in a run if a slight negative "G" force was applied at the moment of release. It appears that the releasing solenoid might not be strong enough to properly release 500 pound bombs at high speeds. All launchers were checked for releasing action on deck and were found to function normally before and after each flight.

c. ROCKETS

Rocket pigtails still break but to lessen this trouble on the F2H-2 an added bracket was built and installed on the four outboard launchers with notches to ship the pigtail after the pigtail was plugged in.

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d. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

MUNITIONS	F9F-2 DEC	F9F-2 JAN	F9F-2 TOTAL	F2H-2 DEC	F2H-2 JAN	F2H-2 TOTAL	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL DEC	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL JAN	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL TOTAL
2000# GP									
1000# GP									
500# GP		8	8		106	106		143	143
250# GP	95	798	893	96	592	688	45	226	271
100# GP		329	329				160	1447	1607
260# FRAG		134	134				79	625	704
350# DB					138	138		485	485
5" HVAR								7	7
5" ATAR					344	344	8	8	16
3.25 SH					256	256		8	8
NAPALM #								24	24
20MM AMMO	6335	65930	72265	10530	128593	139123	10470	101130	111600
500# SAP								5	5
11.75 ROCK								5	5

MUNITIONS	AD-4 & AD-4NL DEC	AD-4 & AD-4NL JAN	AD-4 & AD-4NL TOTAL	TOTALS DEC	TOTALS JAN	TOTALS TOTAL
2000# GP		152	152		152	152
1000# GP	99	809	908	99	952	1051
500# GP	8	12	20	53	352	405
250# GP	278	2627	2905	629	5464	6093
100# GP		475	475	79	1429	1508
260# FRAG	10		10	10	757	767
350# DB		23	23		30	30
5" HVAR				8	360	368
5" ATAR					264	264
3.25 SH	5	83	88	5	107	112
NAPALM #	240	1716	1956	240	2460	2700
FL RES MK6		4	4		4	4
20MM AMMO	5965	61860	67825	33300	357513	390813
500# SAP					5	5
11.75 ROCK					5	5

# Denotes pounds of Napalm Powder

DEC COLUMN FOR THE PERIOD 26 - 31 DEC 1951
JAN COLUMN FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 31 JAN 1952

[redacted]

[redacted]

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PART IV. DAMAGE*

a. DAMAGE TO ENEMY

	DAMAGED			DESTROYED		
	DEC	JAN	TOTAL	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
TANKS	-	7	7	-	2	2
TRUCKS	9	134	143	18	100	118
AUTOMOBILES	-	7	7	-	3	3
LOCMOTIVES	-	26	26	1	16	17
OXCARTS	-	31	31	5	68	73
HIGHWAY BRIDGES	-	8	8	-	2#	2
HIGHWAY BY-PASSES	-	4	4	-	1	1
HIGHWAY CULVERTS	-	-	-	-	2	2
SUPPLY DUMPS	-	28	28	-	12	12
WAREHOUSES	-	6	6	-	5	5
BARRACKS & BUILDINGS	20	244	264	29	198	227
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	3	51	54	-	20	20
LUMBER PILES	-	1	1	-	-	-
BOATS	1	25	26	3	5	8
BUNKERS	-	2	2	-	8	8
RAILROAD TRACK CUTS	-	44	44	202%	1374	1576
RAILROAD CARS	-	181	181	-	88	88
RAILROAD BRIDGES	3	39	42	4	32	36
RAILROAD BY-PASSES	2	20	22	-	32	32
RAILROAD TURNTABLES	-	3	3	-	3	3
RAILROAD TUNNELS	-	4	4	-	-	-
TROOPS KILLED	-	-	-	10	569	579
CRANES	-	1	1	-	-	-
OBSERVATION POSTS	-	1	1	-	1	1
FACTORIES	-	-	-	-	1	1
AMMO DUMPS	-	-	-	-	1	1
POWER INSTALLATIONS	-	7	7	-	3	3

* These figures include only targets positively identified and the actual damaged observed. Unobserved damage or unidentified targets are not tabulated.

Bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

% Damages where tracks are broken or cratered are counted as rail cuts.

NOTE: DECEMBER COLUMN 26 DEC - 31 DEC
JANUARY COLUMN 1 JAN - 31 JAN

[redacted]

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PART IV. DAMAGE

b. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 28 - 31 DECEMBER 1951

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
		VF-51	
12-29-51	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
		VF-53	
12-30-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
12-30-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	20MM
12-30-51	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
12-30-51	F4U-4B	Flak Holes	Unknown
		VF-54	
12-29-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
12-30-51	AD-3	Flak Holes	37MM I
12-30-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. I
12-30-51	AD-4L	Flak Holes	37MM T
12-30-51	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A

VF-51

DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 JANUARY 1952

1-1-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM A
1-2-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM D
1-2-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	Unknown
1-3-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	20MM
1-5-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	40MM
1-6-52	F9F-2	Plane crashed to earth. Exploded on impact.	Unknown Auto
1-11-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	8MM A
1-13-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	30 cal. D
1-15-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	9MM A
1-15-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	9MM A
1-19-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM D
1-19-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	20MM T
1-22-52	F9F-2B	Bullet Holes	20MM T
1-26-52	F9F-2	Plane crashed with Pilot. Believed projectile hit main fuel line to engine.	Unknown
1-27-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM A
1-27-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	25 cal. A & Bomb Blast
1-29-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM A
1-29-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM A

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DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 JANUARY 1952

VF-53

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
1-2-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-2-52	F4U-4B	Bullet and Shrapnel Holes	30 & 50 cal. & Shrapnel
1-6-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-6-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-6-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-6-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-8-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-9-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
1-11-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	50 cal.
1-13-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-21-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-22-52	F4U-4B	Pilot bailed out due to fire in cockpit. Plane crashed.	20MM
1-22-52	F4U-4B	Pilot attempted to drop raft to helicopter crewman in water. Raft caught in tail of A/C. Plane crashed on beach.	
1-22-52	F4U-4B	A/C exploded and crashed in water.	
1-27-52	F4U-5NL	Flak Holes	37MM
1-29-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	20MM

VF-54

1-5-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-5-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-5-52	AD-3	Flak Holes	37MM T
1-6-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-6-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-6-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	20MM A
1-8-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-8-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-8-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-9-52	AD-3	Flak Holes	37 MM T
1-9-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-9-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-9-52	AD-3	Plane burst in flames and crashed with pilot.	
1-11-52	AD-4L	Flak Holes	37MM T
1-11-52	AD-2	Plane crashed with pilot three minutes after take-off.	
1-12-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-12-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A

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DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 JANUARY 1952

VF-54

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
1-13-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-13-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	20MM
1-13-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-13-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-15-52	AD-4NL	Bullet exploded in feed mechanism starting small fire.	20MM
1-15-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-15-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-15-52	AD-3	A/C hit in engine resulting in complete loss of oil. Controlled landing made in Wonsan Harbor.	Unknown
1-16-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-16-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-16-52	AD-4L	Dents in Starboard wing	30 cal. A
1-16-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-16-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-18-52	AD-4	Flak Holes	37MM F
1-21-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-21-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-21-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-21-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-21-52	AD-4	Shell hit engine and exploded on contact. Plane ditched.	20MM E
1-22-52	AD-3	Plane ditched in water	Unknown
1-23-52	AD-4	Flak Holes	37MM E
1-26-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	50 cal. A
1-27-52	AD-4L	Bullet Holes	20MM A
1-27-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-30-52	AD-2	Plane ditched in water	

VF-172

1-2-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
1-3-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-6-52	F2H-2	Flak Holes	88MM
1-6-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	20MM E
1-9-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	88MM & 30 cal. A
1-9-52	F2H-2	Flak Holes	40MM E
1-9-52	F2H-2	Warped aileron and large dent when HVAR went off.	HVAR
1-12-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM

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DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 JANUARY 1952

VF-172

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
1-12-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM
1-15-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
1-19-52	F2H-2	Plane burst into flames and crashed with pilot. Exploded upon impact.	Unknown
1-21-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM
1-21-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM
1-26-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM
1-27-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	12.7MM

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PART V. PERSONNEL

a. OFFICER

At the end of four (4) periods of operations in the combat area, the pilot factor of 1.5 for squadrons deployed is believed to be realistic in view of the losses sustained and the average number of sorties required by current operating plans. At this point, additional losses would in all probability necessitate the requirement of replacement pilots, which would be considered undesirable in view of the time required to integrate new pilots into the teams of the squadrons. It is strongly recommended that the 1.5 pilot factor remain in effect for all squadrons in order that sustained operational committments may be met.

The following is a breakdown of combat pilot casualties suffered by Air Group during the period 22 August 1951 to 31 January 1952:

	NUMBER PILOTS DEPLOYED	ON-BOARD 31 JAN 1952	CASUALTIES
CVG-5 Staff	2	2	0
VF-51	24	19	5
VF-172	27	21*	5
VF-53	24	20**	3
VF-54	29	24%	8
VC-3	6	5#	0
VC-11	5	5	0
VC-35	6	5	1
VC-61	4	4	0
TOTAL	127	105	22

* One (1) officer transferred for discharge.
** One (1) officer ATAD FASRon SEVEN, San Diego.
% Three (3) replacement pilots report in December 1951.
# Change of teams effected with five (5) reporting.

b. ENLISTED

No Comments

c. CASUALTIES

The Air Group suffered the following casualties during this reporting period:

ENS Glen Howard RICKELTON, 527838/1315, USNR, VF-51. Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire during strafing run, crashed and burned. Killed in action on 6 January 1952.

[redacted]

c. CASUALTIES (Cont'd)

LT Harold J. ZENNER, 413993/1310, USN, VF-54.
Wounded on 6 January 1952 when enemy anti-aircraft fire shattered the canopy of his aircraft. Fragments of metal and plexiglass penetrated his right eye. Transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka.

ENS Raymond Gene KELLY, 508187/1315, USNR, VF-54.
Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire, plane nosed over in near vertical dive, crashed and exploded. Killed in action on 9 January 1952.

LTJG Joseph Henry GOLLNER, 521481/1310, USN, VF-54.
Following normal take-off, plane jettisoned one 1000 pound bomb, then climbed to an estimated 900 feet. Made three shallow right turns, the last turn steepening into a nose down spiral, and then crashed. Two helicopters conducted fruitless search. Killed on 11 January 1952.

Major Francis Norman McCOLLOM, 6386A, USAF, VF-172.
Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire during strafing run, crashed and burned. Killed in action on 19 January 1952.

LTJG Leonard Ray CHESHIRE, 496751/1315, USNR, VF-51.
Aircraft hit by anti-aircraft fire. During ditching process in Wonsan Harbor, ejection seat actuated at about 100 to 200 feet. Search proved fruitless. Killed on 26 January 1952.

d. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The strenuous operations currently conducted impose tremendous demands upon flying personnel. The concept of World War II operations when Task Forces cruised continually, seeking-out the enemy and, then, making all-out efforts in strikes against his forces and installations for periods of short duration does not hold in the Korean Theatre. Due to the lack of enemy opposition off the coast of Korea, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN is able to remain continuously within striking range of enemy forces and installations; thus, the Navy's air war can be, and is, carried to the enemy almost at will and persistently.

Current operating plans require each carrier with embarked Air Group to remain with Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN for a period of about 30 days, and with an availability period in port of 10 days. U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) departed Yokosuka on 26 December 1951 and joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN on 28 December 1951. On 29 December, air operations were commenced for the fourth operating period. During this period, the tell-tale effects of fatigue began to show its marks after 20 days. The last

d. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

day of operations ended on 31 January 1952 after 37 days out of port and "combat fatigue" was apparent in varying degrees among a percentage of the pilots.

The average number of sorties for the Air Group for the period 22 August 1951 to 31 January 1952 is 56 sorties per pilot, with Fighter Squadron FIFTY THREE averaging 66 sorties per pilot.

In view of the above, an operation period of 21 days, with 6 days in port and 4 days enroute, is believed to be optimum. The negative effect of longer periods are considered to have detrimental affects, both physical and psychological, on the flying personnel, with a high probability of many being grounded.

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PART VI. OPERATIONS

The fourth combat period for Carrier Air Group FIVE in the operating area ends with the major effort being placed on interdiction of enemy lines of communication.

Operating procedures of the Air Group have not changed to any great extent but the methods of conducting the interdiction program have been revised since this Air Group first entered the combat area last August. The rail cutting program has been continued throughout this period but instead of cutting track over a wide area, the concept has been to make concentrated breaks in one section of track for several miles. It is believed that by this method the enemy will be unable to make repairs readily. The effectiveness of this program is exemplified by the fact that no rail traffic has moved over the target route, Kowen to Wonsan, since the program was initiated 18 January.

Key bridges and by-passes were also assigned as primary targets on the east-west rail routes along with the eastern railroad. Bridge targets are heavily protected by anti-aircraft emplacements. The group has continued to use the coordinated attacks for flak suppression on these targets with excellent results.

Two F2H-2P photo aircraft were ordered to this group during the operating period and were found to be a great improvement over the F9F-2P because of the types of cameras installed. The F2H-2P has one (1) K-38 camera with a 36 inch focal length and two (2) K-17s, one with a 12 inch focal length and one with a 6 inch focal length. The F9F-2P has two (2) K-17s with 12 inch focal length.

Fighter Squadron FIFTY FOUR installed a K-17 camera with a 24 inch focal length in a wing package on the AD aircraft and has obtained excellent results for target assessment. This camera is a great improvement over the K-25 which is most generally used for this type of work. A report of construction and installation of the K-17 camera package is being submitted by separate correspondence.

[redacted]

FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

A/C TYPE	F9F-2		F2H-2P F9F-2P		F2H-2		F4U-4B		F4U-5NL		AD-4		AD-4NL		AD-4W		TOTALS		
SQUADRON	VF-51		VC-61		VF-172		VF-53		VC-3		VF-54		VC-35		VC-11				
MONTH	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
STRIKE		48				71	35	340				33 319					68	778	846
CAP	12	165			12	140											24	305	329
RECCO	24	193			20	175											44	368	412
PHOTO			8	*24 63													8	87	95
PHOTO ESCORT	4	35			4	47											8	82	90
ASP														2 72			2	72	74
ASP ESCORT								6		4		38	2	24			2	72	74
NGF							4	32				4					4	36	40
HECKLER									3	33			5	27			8	60	68
FIGHTER SWEEP					4												4		4
FIGHTER ESCORT								2										2	2
WEATHER RECCO										2								2	2
SPECIAL MISSION														2				2	2
TOTALS	40	441	8	87	40	433	39	380	3	39	34	361	7	53	2	72	172	1867	
TOTAL FOR COMBAT PER	481		95		473		419		42		395		60		74			2039	

* F2H-2P PHOTO PLANE

NOTE: COMBAT PERIOD COVERED 26 DEC 1951 - 31 JAN 1952

DEC COLUMN FOR PERIOD 26 - 31 DEC 1951
JAN COLUMN FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 JAN 1952

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SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS DEC	JAN	TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT DEC	JAN	TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIE PER PILOT DEC	JAN	TOTAL
VF-51	59.6	678.4	738.0	2.9	34.0	36.9	2.0	22.0	24.0
VF-172	62.9	734.8	797.7	3.0	35.0	38.0	1.9	21.5	23.4
VF-53	111.7	1098.9	1210.6	5.6	54.9	60.5	1.9	19.0	20.9
VF-54	97.3	1038.7	1136.0	3.5	41.9	45.4	1.21	15.8	17.0
VC-3	8.5	101.9	110.4	1.7	20.4	22.1	.6	7.8	8.4
VC-11	2.9	155.3	158.2	.6	31.0	31.6	.2	14.2	14.4
VC-35	19.2	169.2	188.4	4.8	33.8	38.6	1.8	13.2	15.0
VC-61	11.9	87.6	99.5	3.0	21.9	24.9	2.0	15.8	17.8
TOTAL AVER	374.0	4064.8	4438.8	3.0	34.2	37.2	1.4	16.2	17.6

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2 February 1952

PART VII. MAINTENANCE

a. CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE

No Comments

b. JET MAINTENANCE

Although all TJ-C1 barometric unit aneroid shafts in F9F-2s were closely inspected and oiled prior to commencing operations on 28 December, many instances of aneroid shaft seizure continued to occur. After fifteen days of operating, all shafts were inspected and four were found to be frozen. Engines again have been checked, all shafts removed, cleaned, and coated with Molybdenum Disulfide No. 2. Sufficient time has not elapsed since the Molycoat has been applied and accurate information as to its ability to prevent re-occurrence of the difficulties is not yet available. Pump surging as reported in the last action report has been virtually eliminated by careful and punctual cleaning of the fuel pump filters. However, the lack of replacement seals and filters is beginning to cause internal leaks which eventually will necessitate pump replacement.

PART VIII. MATERIAL

The first AOG items to be requisitioned for F9F-2s since commencing combat operations occurred during this period. The lack of adequate support to the parent supply agency aboard has resulted in depleting the reserve stocks, causing serious shortages in many items. AOG stub requisitions submitted this period are:

Damper, shimmy	R82-HL-A-14096
Unit, ignition #1	R85-GLA1-3400-1
Motor	R17-M-3196-50
Amplifier, master compass	R88-A-499

Other items for F9F-2s that are considered critical include:

Tip Tanks, Right & Left	R82-GR-132860
Pumps, fuel	R85-BPD-368005-BU,BL
Seal	R85-BPD-368532
Seal	R85-BPD-361608
Filter assembly	R85-BPD-368559
Stabilizer assembly	R82-GR-130938
Ring, packing	R85-BPD-316-S-14

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PART VIII. MATERIAL

For the F2H-2s, the lack of main landing gear wheels is becoming critical. At present seven (7) wheels are approaching the safety limits and, if new wheels are not received in the near future, it is likely that the F2H-2s will become AOG.

Due to the large number of hits by anti-aircraft fire, and the type of repair necessary to repair the damage, lack of the more common metal extrusions is becoming apparent. No extrusions common to the F2H-2s are in stock at present and it is recommended that a stock of extrusions be maintained aboard ship such that more structural repairs can be accomplished thereby reducing the number of structural replacements necessary.

M. U. BELBE

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

CVG5/A16-13/(cfc)
Serial 08-52

12 March 1952

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group FIVE (21 February 1952 - 5 March 1952)

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.1
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the Action Report of U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) and the division of data between calendar months is shown in compliance with reference (b).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 2/21	OPERATIONAL A/C 3/4	PILOTS 2/21	PILOTS 3/4
CVG-5	None	None	None	1*	1*
CDR M. U. BEEBE					
VF-51	F9F-2	13	13	18	18
CDR E. M. BEAUCHAMP					
VF-172	F2H-2	15	15	20	20
CDR M. E. BARNETT					
VF-53	F4U-4B	14	14	19	18
CDR H. J. TRUM, III					
VF-54	AD-2	1	1	24**	24**
CDR P. N. GRAY	AD-3	3	9		
	AD-4	3	1		
	AD-4L	1	1		
	AD-4Q	1	1		
VC-3 (Unit "B")	F4U-5NL	3	3	4	4
LCDR J. F. DOHERTY					
VC-11 (Unit "B")	AD-4W	2	2	5	5
LCDR M. R. MILLER					
VC-35 (Unit "B")	AD-4NL	3	3	5	5
LCDR F. F. BERTAGNA					
VC-61 (Unit "B")	F9F-2P	2	2	4	4
LT S. L. JAYNES	F2H-2P	2	-	—	—
	TOTAL	63	65	100	99

* The Air Group Commander flies regularly with VF-51 and VF-54.
** Includes the Air Group Operations Officer.

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b. MISSION

The primary mission of Air Group FIVE during the reporting period was the support of United Nations ground forces in Korea. This support was primarily an interdiction program for the destruction of enemy lines of communication.

Anti-Submarine and Combat Air Patrols were maintained during all daylight hours over our own forces when weather conditions permitted.

PART II: CHRONOLOGY

While in port personnel were encouraged to utilize the facilities at the various rest-camps, and over fifty percent of the enlisted men and officers were able to take advantage of these camps.

On 18 February, departed Yokosuka for the operating area.

On 19 February, the Air Group conducted refresher training operations. Thirty-three (33) sorties were flown.

On 20 February, forty-five (45) training sorties were flown.

On 21 February, the Air Group flew eighty-five (85) combat sorties. LTJG F. S. JUTRAS, VF-54, was shot down by anti-aircraft fire while making a bombing run in an AD-4. He was able to make a controlled water landing and was picked up by a destroyer almost immediately. LTJG JUTRAS received a strained back. LTJG F. G. GERGEN, VF-53, was killed when his F4U crashed into the sea shortly after entering a snow storm while escorting a battle damaged AD. During the day, the Air Group cut railroad tracks in 33 places, 6 trucks were destroyed, 11 buildings destroyed, 1 barracks area burned, 25 railroad cars destroyed and 25 were damaged.

On 22 February, the group flew eight-one (81) sorties and lost one aircraft. LT W. B. MUNCIE, VF-54, lost oil pressure shortly after take-off and was unable to return to the ship. The plane lost power and LT MUNCIE made a water landing. He was recovered uninjured by a helicopter within 3 minutes after entering the water. During the day, 52 rail cuts were made, 6 buildings destroyed and 1 bridge badly damaged.

On 23 February, seventy-one (71) sorties were flown. Thirty (30) small boats were destroyed and 3 damaged, 5 trucks and 8 oxcarts were reported as destroyed, 17 rail cuts were made and 2 bridges were inoperative.

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On 24 February, the force retired to replenish.

On 25 February, the group flew seventy-seven (77) sorties. The early morning hecklers located a train of 45 cars and 2 locomotives. Morning strike groups were diverted to the train and the final report read: 40 cars destroyed, 2 locomotives destroyed and 5 cars heavily damaged. Railroad tracks were cut in 15 places, 2 trucks were set on fire, 13 buildings were left burning and 1 warehouse was set on fire.

On 26 February, foul weather was encountered and the force retired to replenish.

On 27 February, the group flew eighty-seven (87) sorties. The days' tally showed 82 small boats destroyed and 63 damaged, 24 boats ranging from 40 feet to 80 feet were destroyed and 3 damaged. Seven (7) trucks received heavy damage, 18 buildings were set on fire, 4 bridges were knocked out and railroad tracks were cut in 27 places.

On 28 February, weather conditions caused diversion of the planes from primary targets; however, eighty-five (85) sorties were flown. Railroad tracks were cut in 25 places, 11 trucks were destroyed and 4 damaged. Thirty-two (32) small boats were destroyed and 25 were badly damaged. Thirty-eight (38) buildings were set on fire.

On 29 February, the group flew eighty-six (86) sorties. The early morning hecklers stopped a train of 14 cars and 2 locomotives and the morning strike groups were diverted to this target. Both locomotives and 14 cars were listed as destroyed. A third locomotive was stopped in a different area and received heavy damage. Two (2) trucks and one (1) 100 foot power schooner were destroyed. Fourteen (14) small boats were destroyed and 49 were listed as heavily damaged. Railroad tracks were cut in 15 places and one (1) by-pass was made inoperative.

On 1 March, the force retired to replenish.

On 2 March, the group flew eighty-nine (89) sorties. One railroad bridge was knocked down, one locomotive was heavily damaged and 7 buidlings were set on fire. Eight (8) trucks and 19 boats were destroyed. One (1) supply dump was attacked and left burning.

On 3 March, foul weather conditions prevented operations.

On 4 March, the pilots of Air Group FIVE flew their last day of combat for the cruise with a total of 71 sorties. Fifty-seven (57) cuts were made in railroad tracks, 20 small boats were destroyed and 52 damaged. One (1) locomotive was attacked and left heavily damaged and one railroad by-pass was made inoperative.

On 5 March, the force retired to replenish and aircraft were transferred to the USS VALLEY FORGE and USS ANTIETAM. USS ESSEX headed south out of the Sea of Japan for the United States via Yokosuka.

PART III: ORDNANCE

a. 20MM GUNS

During the past operating period, functioning of all ordnance equipment has been satisfactory. Some erratic firing in a few instances is believed to be caused by weakened feeder mechanisms. A tentative remedy for this defect is the checking of the feeder mechanisms with a torque wrench after 2500 rounds of firing and at any other time when a weakness is suspected. If a feeder mechanism will not give at least 85% of the required tension, it is replaced.

b. BOMBS

In compliance with CTF-77's restricted dispatch Ø1133ØZ of January 1952, a thorough winterization treatment was given all MK 55 bomb racks. A policy of heating solenoids for one and one-half to two minutes during each flight was adopted in the F9F squadron.

c. ROCKETS

Rocket pigtails continue to break on jet type aircraft.

d. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

MUNITIONS	F9F-2 FEB	F9F-2 MAR	F9F-2 TOTAL	F2H-2 FEB	F2H-2 MAR	F2H-2 TOTAL
2000# GP						
1000# GP						
500# GP	8	-	8	40	-	40
250# GP	250	80	330	208	96	304
100# GP	116	70	186	111	48	159
260# FRAG	28		28			
350 DB						
5" HVAR				32	16	48
5" ATAR				126	36	162
3.25 SH						
NAPALM #						
20MM AMMO	24340	12420	36760	37330	11700	49030
FLARES MK6						

MUNITIONS	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL FEB	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL MAR	F4U-4B & F4U-5NL TOTAL	AD-4 & AD-4NL FEB	AD-4 & AD-4NL MAR	AD-4 & AD-4NL TOTAL
2000# GP				9	25	34
1000# GP	30	24	54	299	29	328
500# GP	73	2	75			
250# GP	453	152	605	846	150	996
100# GP	202	63	265	290	100	390
260# FRAG	60		60			
350 DB	4	1	5	11	2	13
5" HVAR						
5" ATAR						
3.25 SH	15	14	29	37	6	43
NAPALM #	420	230	650	1300	1050	2350
20MM AMMO	28480	13605	42085	20220	5975	26195
FLARES MK6				4	4	8

MUNITIONS	TOTALS FEB	TOTALS MAR	TOTALS TOTAL
2000# GP	9	25	34
1000# GP	329	53	382
500# GP	121	2	123
250# GP	1757	478	2235
100# GP	719	281	1000
260# FRAG	88		88
350 DB	15	3	18
5" HVAR	32	16	48
5" ATAR	126	36	162
3.25 SH	52	20	72
NAPALM #	1720#	1280#	3000#
20MM AMMO	110370	43700	154070
FLARES MK6	4	4	8

# Denotes pounds of Napalm Powder

FEB COLUMN 23 FEB - 29 FEB
MAR COLUMN 1 MAR - 5 MAR

PART IV. DAMAGE

a. DAMAGE TO ENEMY

	DAMAGED			DESTROYED		
	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	FEB	MAR	TOTAL
TANKS	-	4	4	1	-	1
TRUCKS	17	9	26	30	5	35
CARS	2		2	-	-	-
LOCOMOTIVES	10	2	12	3	1	4
OXCARTS	8	23	31	14	3	17
HIGHWAY BRIDGES	3	-	3	-	-	-
SUPPLY DUMPS	4	4	8	6	1	7
FACTORIES	2	-	2	-	-	-
WAREHOUSES	-	-	-	3	-	3
BARRACKS & BUILDINGS	74	20	94	98	59	157
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	3	-	3	5	2	7
OXEN	-	-	-	3	3	6
VILLAGES	1	-	1	-	-	-
BOATS & SAMPANS	209	90	299	239	40	279
POWER INSTALLATIONS	-	-	-	1	-	1
BUNKERS & REVETMENTS	-	-	-	24	-	24
RAILROAD YARDS	1	-	1	1	-	1
RAILROAD TRACKS	14 bends	9	23	208 cuts	79	287
RAILROAD CARS	46	4	50	45	4	49
RAILROAD BRIDGES	6	2	8	2	-	2
TROOPS KILLED	-	-	-	83	70	153
RAILROAD BY-PASSES	1	1	2	1	-	1
COMMAND POST	1	-	1	-	-	-
TRANSFORMER STATION	-	1	1	-	1	1

NOTE: FEB COLUMN 23 FEB - 29 FEB
MAR COLUMN 1 MAR - 5 MAR

[redacted]

PART IV: DAMAGE

b. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

VF-51

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
2-22-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	12.7MM A-T
2-28-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	12.7MM D
2-28-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	7MM
2-28-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	7MM
2-28-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	12.7 & 7MM
3-2-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	20MM D
3-2-52	F9F-2	Flak Holes	7MM
3-4-52	F9F-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. D

VF-53

2-21-52	F4U-4B	Plane plunged into sea, pilot lost.	
2-22-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.
2-28-52	F4U-4B	Bullet Holes	30 cal.

VF-54

2-21-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-21-52	AD-2	Flak Holes	37MM E
2-21-52	AD-4L	Flak Holes	20MM I
2-21-52	AD-3	Flak Holes	20MM E
2-22-52	AD-4	Plane lost at sea, pilot rescued. Plane ditched in water due to loss of oil pressure.	
2-22-52	AD-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-25-52	AD-4NL	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-25-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-27-52	AD-4NL	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-27-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-27-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-27-52	AD-4	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-28-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-28-52	AD-3	Flak Holes	20MM
2-28-52	AD-4NL	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-28-52	AD-4NL	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-29-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-29-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
3-2-52	AD-3	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A

VF-172

2-21-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A
2-27-52	F2H-2	Bullet Holes	30 cal. A

PART V: PERSONNEL

a. GENERAL

In February, there was an outbreak of an apparently virus type respiratory, upper respiratory, and gastro-intestinal epidemic. A considerable number of the pilots were grounded and many enlisted men were admitted to the sick list or were turned-in to their own bunk. This was probably due in part to the fatigue of the entire Air Group after having worked long hours for six (6) months.

The venereal disease rate has been about 1/3 for this group and cruise as compared to previous ships and cruises. This is particularly due to an all-out effort to get the "word" to the crew and officers.

The problem of combat fatigue has been a reality in this Air Group in the last two months of operation and, at the end of the fourth period which lasted for forty (40) days, about 90% of the pilots were showing varying degrees of combat fatigue. Three (3) pilots were admitted and sedated heavily for 3 days while 4 others were grounded for 2 to 4 days and mildly sedated. Numerous other pilots were under close observation because of symptoms of combat fatigue, but were able to keep flying. Several of the enlisted men were admitted with anxiety reaction and others were assigned to less dangerous jobs and mildly sedated during the fourth tour.

b. CASUALTIES

The following casualties were suffered by the Air Group during this reporting period:

LTJG Francis Gene GERGEN, 496802/1315, USNR, VF-53.
While escorting flak damaged aircraft to friendly field, entered snow storm suddenly at an altitude of about 500 ft. Commenced 180° reversal, and went into steep bank and crashed into the sea in an inverted position. Killed on 21 February 1952.

LTJG Francis S. JUTRAS, 505293/1315, USN, VF-54.
Received strained back after ditching an AD which was hit by anti-aircraft fire on 21 February 1952.

FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

SQUADRON	VF-51		VC-61		VF-172		VF-53		VC-3		VF-54		VC-11		VC-35		TOTALS		
A/C TYPE	F9F-2		F2H-2P F9F-2P		F2H-2		F4U-4B		F4U-5NL		AD-4		AD-4W		AD-4NL				
MONTH	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	FEB	MAR	TOTAL
CAP	49	15			47	17											96	32	128
RECCO	55	23			61	22											116	45	161
PHOTO			28	6													28	6	34
PHOTO																			
ESCORT	12	2			16	4											28	6	34
STRIKE	14						109	32			107	25					230	57	287
ASP													17	4			17	4	21
ASP																			
ESCORT							1		2		2	1			12	3	17	4	21
HECKLER									10	2					12	2	22	4	26
NGF							2										2		2
TOTAL	130	40	28	6	124	43	112	32	12	2	109	26	17	4	24	5	556	158	714
TOTALS FOR COMBAT PER.	170		34		167		144		14		135		21		29		714		

NOTE: COMBAT PERIOD COVERED 23 FEB 1952 - 5 MAR 1952

FEB COLUMN FOR PERIOD 23 FEB - 29 FEB 1952
MAR COLUMN FOR PERIOD 1 MAR - 5 MAR 1952

SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBAT HOURS FEB	MAR	TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT HOUR PER PILOT FEB	MAR	TOTAL	AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIE PER PILOT FEB	MAR	TOTAL
VF-51	201.0	62.0	263.0	11.1	3.4	13.8	6.7	2.2	8.9
VF-172	213.4	64.7	278.1	10.7	3.2	13.9	7.0	2.2	9.2
VF-53	331.8	94.7	426.5	18.4	5.2	23.6	6.2	1.8	8.0
VF-54	313.4	79.3	392.7	13.1	3.1	16.2	4.6	1.1	5.7
VC-35	60.0	12.7	72.7	12.0	2.5	14.5	4.4	1.0	5.4
VC-3	36.6	6.0	42.6	12.7	1.5	14.2	3.3	.5	3.8
VC-11	44.1	14.8	58.9	8.8	3.0	11.8	3.4	1.0	4.4
VC-61	22.3	8.4	30.7	5.5	2.1	7.6	4.0	1.5	5.5
TOTAL AVER	1222.6	342.6	1565.2	11.5	3.0	14.5	4.9	1.4	6.3

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VG5/A16-13/(cfc)
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12 March 1952

PART VI: OPERATIONS

The fifth combat period for Carrier Air Group FIVE in the Korean operating area has just been completed. The group flew 9 combat operating days during this period with a total of 544 offensive and 170 defensive missions.

Operating procedures of the Air Group have not changed since the last report was submitted.

To summarize the Air Group operations for the combat tour commencing 23 August 1951 until 5 March 1952 the following figures are given:

Total Combat Operating Days	94
Average Combat Sortie per pilot for Air Group	66.8
Average Combat Flight Hour per prop pilot	178.4
Average Combat Flight Hour per jet pilot	116.4
Total Pilot Casualties	24
Combat Casualties	13
Operational Casualties	5
Injured	6

PART VII: MAINTENANCE

a. No comments.

PART VIII: MATERIAL

a. No comments.

H.J. TRUM, III,
Acting.

[redacted]

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