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UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954 (U)

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FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

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
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- a. U.S. Army Forces Far East Military History Section.
UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, dated 20 March 1954. Regraded "Unclassified," May 1979, Case #790821.
- b. U.S. Army Forces Far East Military History Section.
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AFFE GC-OT 350.05 AG

19 September 1956

SUBJECT: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64 (AFFE), UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954 (U)

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1. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64 AFFE, "UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954" (U), is a study that analyzes and evaluates the UN partisan campaign in Korea with the objective of determining ways to improve the conduct of guerilla warfare in the future. The study has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. The study is in detail and analyzes numerous actions. The information gathered is of value in that it points out difficulties that were encountered in the organizing, equipping, and supervising of the activities of the forces as were used. The data gathered can be used to supplement information already available to planners or to cause planners to review present concepts.

3. Distribution of this study may be made at the discretion of the Operations Research Office, Washington, D. C. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear) imposes no restriction on such distribution.

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WORKING PAPER

This is a working paper of members of the technical staff of the AFFE group that was completed under ORO Study 23.8.


It is the objective of the study to analyze and evaluate the UN partisan campaign in Korea in order to point up ways by which the Army may improve its conduct of guerrilla warfare in the future. This paper, ORO-T-64(AFFE), deals with all aspects of the study. The findings and analysis of this paper are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

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
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Frontispiece—Based on islands off the west coast of North Korea following the UN retreat from the Yalu, the partisans conducted most of their actions in nearby areas of the mainland. The map shows where the actions occurred during the period December 1951 to March 1953.



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Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64(AFFE)

Published June 1956

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UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954 (U)

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OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
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
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The authors are particularly appreciative for the services of Major Harold E. Cahill and Major Leo H. Eberhardt. These officers assisted in the study as a full-time assignment, Major Cahill for 5 months, and Major Eberhardt for 4 months. Their operational experience and technical knowledge were of great value in furthering the study.

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FOREWORD

The episode of the Korean partisan campaign described and analyzed here is revealing for its implications as to what the Army should be prepared to do when situations such as the sudden emergence of 10,000 friendly partisans are thrust on it. Outbreak of even a limited war in the Far East could well involve a repetition on a larger scale of what happened in Korea.

This study was undertaken because The Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence and the staff of Army Forces Far East were interested in having the Army's first experience with Oriental partisans in dealing with a Communist enemy subjected to a detailed objective analysis.

The reader should not expect a full examination of all aspects of CCRAK (Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea), since the study team did not begin its work until after operations had halted in 1953, and since the subject under investigation was deliberately limited to the guerrilla warfare activities of the partisans.

C. DARWIN STOLZENBACH
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PROBLEM

To analyze and evaluate the UN partisan campaign in Korea in order to point up ways by which the Army may improve its conduct of guerrilla warfare in the future.

FACTS

When the US Eighth Army retreated from the Yalu in late 1950 it swept with it some 6000 to 10,000 Korean irregulars who declared their willingness to fight on the side of the US. Most of these irregulars fled to friendly-held islands or mainland territory along the Korean coast. The decision was made to attempt to employ them as guerrillas, and for 3 years these guerrillas—later renamed partisans—were trained, supported, and directed by the US Army.

DISCUSSION

The US Eighth Army assumed control of the partisans in early 1951 at a time when the war was still active and fluid, and assigned them a mission to establish a resistance net in North Korea that would support regular forces in an anticipated offensive to liberate all or part of North Korea. Another major UN offensive, however, was not to occur. By the end of 1951 it was apparent to all that the primary UN objectives were to maintain the status quo along the existing MLR and to negotiate peace. In the interim the original (covert) mission of the partisans seemed to have been lost sight of and they were permitted and even encouraged to develop a pattern of loosely coordinated small-scale harassing operations against the enemy coastal flanks—a pattern that was to continue until the cease-fire in 1953.

At the end of 1951 direction of the partisan operations was shifted from the theater G3 to the theater G2 in order to ensure coordination of all behind-the-lines activities. In the fall of 1952 an attempt was made to increase the strength of partisan forces fourfold. This continued until the spring of 1953, when it was abruptly halted.

The status of the partisans never had been clarified. Finally, in early 1954, the UN Command acquiesced to ROK Government insistence that the remaining partisans (by then reduced from a peak strength of nearly 23,000 to about 12,000) be inducted into the ROK Army. With this development the US Army's first experience in employing partisans against a Communist enemy was ended.

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SUMMARY

In October 1953 an ORO team was sent to the Far East to examine the record of this operation. The team had access to the files of the Far East Command insofar as they pertained directly to the partisan campaign, and had as well the opportunity of interviewing US and Korean personnel who had participated.

The team discovered that most partisan operations were conducted by small groups from disparate units scattered through a number of close-in island bases. US control was largely exercised by issuing or withholding logistic support—in effect by using supply as an incentive or sanction for operations. The majority of operations were not observed by US personnel, and no means for evaluating partisan effectiveness were developed. Even the reported (i.e., un-evaluated) data indicated low utilization of partisan personnel.

Actually, two concepts of employing the partisans were explicit or implicit in US direction of the effort. At first they were to have an essentially preparatory role, developing a covert resistance net pending the time when regular forces might move forward. Later they were permitted and encouraged to conduct a pattern of basically overt commando-type operations.

The situation as it developed did not promise a high pay-off from the partisans under either of these alternative concepts; yet the choice is significant, as may be seen from a simple array of expected pay-offs in each case:

EXPECTED PAY-OFF FROM PARTISAN ACTIVITY

Role	Situation A—limited objectives and stabilized situations	Situation B—complete victory and fluid situation
1. OVERT: actual operations behind enemy lines directed against personnel, material, or LofCs.	Pay-off insignificant owing to enhanced opportunities for enemy security controls.	Pay-off insignificant if emphasis is on overt loosely controlled activity in areas of peripheral importance.
2. COVERT: preparatory mission pending forward movement of regular forces.	Pay-off practically zero except for intelligence obtained.	Pay-off potentially high if guerrillas effectively trained (as demonstrated in World War II on both sides.)

From this array it is clear that even when faced with an actual situation A (which is always associated with the possibility of situation B), alternative 2—the COVERT role for partisans—is preferable to alternative 1, since only by this means can significant pay-off be achieved in any event.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The decision to employ the Korean partisans in a guerrilla warfare role and the initial mission assigned them were sound.

2. Although the partisan campaign had some measurable results the pay-off did not represent a significant contribution to the attainment of the ultimate UN objectives.

3. The cost of supporting the partisans can be crudely estimated at some \$100 million, and the cost of using some 200 US Army personnel over a 3-year period.

4. The partisan forces were never ready to carry out their original mission. Instead, by 1953 the US Army was employing them in a manner that held no promise of contributing significantly to the outcome of the UN campaign, that precluded their being used in a tactically effective support role had the course of the war required it, and that posed serious problems with respect to their ultimate disposition.

5. The opportunity for the partisans to make a substantial contribution to the UN effort was severely limited by the underlying conditions of the whole Korean War. These included (a) the cross-cultural situation in which the US Army was operating, (b) the lack of training and experience in guerrilla warfare on the part of both Korean and US personnel, (c) the character of the enemy's rear-area controls, and (d) the limits placed by UN objectives on Eighth Army military operations.

6. Although Army doctrine concerning guerrilla warfare was not explicit with respect to what to do in a limited-war situation such as that existing in Korea, much of it was applicable. Specifically, applicable doctrine existed on such matters as provision of incentives, status of partisans, and organizational arrangements, but it was apparently ignored or neglected.

7. The ineffectual use of the guerrillas in Korea reflects an apparent failure to correlate UN objectives properly, the limited capabilities of guerrilla forces in general and of the Koreans in particular, and the various adverse conditions that militated against their profitable employment.

8. During the period from May 1951 to the cease-fire in July 1953 the partisans reported some 4445 actions. These were distributed by type as follows, where "other activities" includes attacks on communication facilities and distribution of psywar leaflets. Intelligence reports, a by-product of many of the actions, are not included.

Type of action	Percentage of total actions	Type of action	Percentage of total actions
Attacks on enemy troops	49.3	Attacks on supplies and storage	5.1
Attacks on transports	13.1	Attacks on tactical administration	4.3
Intelligence activities	10.6	Naval-gunfire adjustment	4.3
Attacks on civil administration	7.9	Other activities	5.4

SUMMARY

9. Claims for material captured or destroyed and casualties inflicted are open to question. The figures for casualties inflicted probably are 3 to 10 times too high, and further, many of the killed and wounded were civilians. However, the data on claims for the 12 months ending July 1953 are as follows:

Category	Number	Category	Number
Casualties inflicted (Mar 51 to Jul 53)	69,000	Boats	195
Weapons	5,000	Bridges	80
Ammunition, cases	2,000	Railroad track, ft	495
Vehicles	2,700	Food, tons	3,800
Buildings	2,200	Farm animals	2,400

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All Army officers, particularly those of field grade or above, should be given more indoctrination in the principles of guerrilla warfare and the conditions under which they apply.
2. Consideration should be given to expanding Army doctrine on guerrilla warfare to cover more explicitly operations in limited wars.
3. In addition to their general training in guerrilla warfare Army personnel assigned to work with foreign nationals in guerrilla operations should be given special training in the language, habits, customs, culture, etc., of the nationals with whom they are to work.

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UN PARTISAN WARFARE IN KOREA, 1951-1954

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SETTING*

UN partisan warfare in Korea was conducted under unusual circumstances, which affected the possible uses, tactics, and effects of partisan forces. The influence of these factors cannot be measured, but their importance was affirmed by observers and participants of the campaign and became increasingly obvious in the course of this study. They should be emphasized at the outset as basic conditions of the partisan campaign largely beyond the control of the local military command. These factors are (a) the cross-cultural situation in which the US Army operated, (b) the levels of training and experience in available US personnel, (c) the character of the enemy's rear-area controls, and (d) the limits placed on UN objectives and Eighth Army military operations.

Cross-Cultural Situation

The partisan forces, composed of North Koreans who had escaped to UN territory, were products of a culture that is extremely different from the American, and extremely different from the cultures about which Americans have considerable reliable or systematic knowledge. What is more, those Americans selected to deal with the partisans were not particularly knowledgeable about Korea and the Koreans. This unfamiliarity with Korean culture was considered a serious handicap by many of the US personnel involved in the campaign. It was especially obvious in the case of language but also obvious in the case of less easily definable qualities of psychology and modes of behavior.

Such a handicap is serious in partisan warfare of the sort undertaken in Korea. Partisans are not organized regular troops; in this instance they were not even the remnants of regular troops. Control over them had to be exercised largely by persuasion and example, on the premise that their activities were voluntary and the traditional procedures of organized military discipline did not apply. This called for intimate understanding of the partisans on the part of those in positions of outside direction, supervision, and advice. Nevertheless, American officers and men in such positions were obliged to try to influence alien groups whom they did not know, with whom they could not communicate with accuracy or ease, and whose thoughts and actions they often found mysterious and unpredictable. Such a situation weakened the Army's ability to control the partisans for the accomplishment of UN purposes. (Apps A, B, C, and E.)

Training and Experience of US Personnel

Closely related to the lack of preparation of US personnel for the cross-cultural situation was the general scarcity of guerrilla warfare training or experience in the personnel available. The organizational arrangements established for the partisan campaign required a majority of the US personnel to

*The entire text is an abridgment of the material presented in detail in the appendices.

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perform headquarters' duties of administration, supply, communications, and the like that could be performed adequately by officers and men with conventional US Army backgrounds. Command- or operating-level duties, on the other hand, were extremely important and required considerable familiarity with the principles and methods of guerrilla warfare. A sufficient number of specialized personnel with the necessary qualifications were not generally available until late in the campaign and this fact limited what was or could be accomplished in the effort.

Enemy Rear-Area Controls

The enemy against whom the partisan forces were employed was Communist in theory and practice. He attempted to maintain totalitarian control of the territory he possessed and his techniques for doing so were well developed. Although it is not unlikely that a great deal of dissatisfaction with the regime existed in North Korea, the enemy's close supervision over the population was such that the expression of dissatisfaction in action or behavior tended to be risky and futile. He was thus in position to take both preventive and punitive action against dissident elements in general. Moreover, because of his own knowledge and experience in paramilitary warfare, he was probably unusually adept at countermeasures to guerrilla activity. In view of the opportunity to establish Communist rule in North Korea for almost 5 years before the outbreak of the war, the enemy was undoubtedly a formidable opponent in respect to partisan warfare.¹

The main effect of such capabilities in the enemy would presumably be to limit the success of the partisans in creating, maintaining, or broadening their base in popular support; to restrict the types of operations that the partisans could undertake; to increase the difficulties of operating; and to reduce the likelihood or significance of results. (Apps A, B, and C.)

Limits on UN Objectives and Eighth Army Operations

During the last 2 years of the Korean War the major UN objective in Korea was the achievement of a cease-fire. The Eighth Army mission became active defense of positions held in the general area of the 38th Parallel; full-scale prosecution of the war became a secondary possibility, and both sides settled down to limited-objective warfare along a comparatively static front. This situation was bound to affect the partisan campaign in several important ways:

(a) The static military situation all but obviated perhaps the most important use of behind-the-lines irregulars in modern warfare; i.e., the prospect that the partisans could be employed as an auxiliary force in direct conjunction with conventional military operations.

(b) Because it relaxed pressure on the enemy's front, the development of a static MLR enabled him to bolster his coastal and rear-area zone defenses and to strengthen his security measures generally. This factor, together with the application of Communist techniques of control, may have been largely responsible for the fact that the scope of partisan operations remained confined to relatively small and minor portions of North Korea throughout the war. (Apps A, B, and C.)

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(c) It is likely that the limited character of UN military objectives, once it became apparent, reduced the operating incentives and morale of many of the partisans. After the cease-fire negotiations were under way UN aims could be interpreted as implying that no attempt would be made on the battlefield to liberate North Korea by conquest. To the extent, therefore, that the partisans were strongly motivated patriots for whom a united non-Communist Korea was a deeply felt goal, their hopes and expectations must have deteriorated (App D). The extent to which partisan operating incentives were associated with these particular goals is known only indirectly, and by inference. It is assumed, however, that behind-the-lines partisan activity is hazardous and requires strong incentives, the more so because it is voluntary. If such incentives were weakened by the partisans' disappointment in their UN allies on the one hand and by a reduction in their expectations for the future on the other, it would hardly be surprising if their potential was seriously affected.

Though largely beyond the control of local military command, these background factors played an important part in shaping the partisan campaign. Their combined effect tended to limit the capability of the US Army to wage partisan warfare in Korea and to reduce the potential gains from partisan operations. In these respects the conditions of the Korean War did not favor the traditional pattern of guerrilla operations with which the US Army is familiar.

ROLE OF THE ARMY

The decision to organize, support, and direct large partisan forces for overt combat activities in the enemy rear called for (a) formulation of objectives, policies, and plans for the employment of those forces in accordance with their capabilities and with the command's over-all mission in Korea; (b) establishment of organizational arrangements that would maximize realization of the objectives set; and (c) definition of the status of these irregular forces in relation to the US Army on the one hand and to the ROK civil and military authorities on the other. These steps, of course, are prerequisites to successful partisan operations. They require early attention on the part of employers of partisan forces, but they also require periodic adjustment and modification as altering circumstances dictate. This memorandum, therefore, is primarily concerned with the dynamic aspects of the UN Command's solution to these questions.

Command Objectives

Eighth Army was faced quite unexpectedly and without significant preparation with the decision as to whether and how to use partisan forces on a large scale. The forces appeared in the space of a few weeks as semiorganized and partly armed bands of pro-UN irregulars, some 10,000 strong, escaping from enemy territory after the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) reconquest of North Korea. Thousands made a fighting retreat to the coastlines, whence they took refuge on friendly-held islands; others crossed to the UN side of the MLR. They represented themselves as willing and eager to resume combat operations behind enemy lines if provided arms and supplies, and Eighth Army decided to support and direct them (App A).

At the time of this decision the CCF offensive had been checked and Eighth Army had counterattacked. The chief military prospect, therefore, was intense combat, and there was every expectation at military levels that another general UN offensive would be mounted.

The decision to utilize the partisans was clearly associated with this expectation. The partisans were to prepare for tactical interdiction and harassment of the enemy rear in direct conjunction with a large-scale Eighth Army offensive. In the manner indicated by unconventional warfare doctrine² they were to establish themselves behind enemy lines, ready to act when needed as an auxiliary arm of the regular forces.

The cease-fire negotiations intervened and the anticipated offensive did not materialize. Indeed, the possibility of it materializing gradually receded as hope increased that an acceptable armistice could be negotiated and as the enemy build-up of front-line defenses raised the force requirements for such an offensive. Finally, toward the end of the war, the probability that such an offensive would occur seemed negligible.

None of the evidence canvassed shows a general reappraisal of objectives for the partisan forces in latter 1951 (when the basic change in the character of the war became apparent), either by Eighth Army, which directed the partisans until December 1951, or by the theater agencies, which assumed responsibility thereafter. Without an over-all plan the partisans developed a pattern of loosely coordinated small-scale shallow-penetration raids, nearly all launched from islands on which they were secure, and nearly all in coastal sectors of minor military significance in Hwanghae Province (Apps A and B).

If such a pattern of operations reflected a distinct mission, it seems to have been tacitly accepted rather than authorized specifically by higher command. When in early 1953 detailed over-all plans for partisan warfare were finally formulated, the primary goal was stated as that of tying down as many enemy troops as possible in rear-area security activities.³ The methods to be employed in order to accomplish this objective were, in the main, the very methods the partisans had been employing. They were merely to be spread to more strategic areas of North Korea. In terms of the command's over-all mission such operations would presumably have value if they helped maintain strong military pressure against the enemy during the armistice talks (Apps A, B, and E).

Between the early 1951 objective and the early 1953 plans is a 2-year period in which objectives were not explicit and the partisans constituted at best a strategic weapon employed in general harassment of the enemy rear. Yet in the fall of 1952 top-level decisions were made to quadruple the partisan forces to a planned peak of 40,000 men. The expansion was abruptly halted in the spring of 1953, long before the peak was attained but not before the recruiting program undertaken in South Korea had enrolled, by questionable methods, thousands of Koreans of questionable motivation (App B).*

In retrospect the decisions to quadruple partisan strength could not have been based on a realistic appraisal of the relation between Korean circumstances, partisan capabilities, and the command's broad objectives; the measures taken to expand the forces suggest a serious lack of appreciation of the role and nature of incentives in guerrilla warfare personnel. When the partisan campaign was reevaluated in the spring of 1953 and considerable attention was given to these

* Documented through interviews with various 8240 Army Unit personnel October 53 and January 54.

questions, steps were immediately taken to stabilize the size of the force, prune its personnel, and improve controls.⁴ Together with the formulation of concrete plans, these actions represented a complete reversal of previous procedure and intent with respect to the campaign (Apps B and C).

Organizational Arrangements

The partisan operations with which this study is concerned were first organized under a special division of G3, Eighth Army.⁵ At the end of 1951, however, control was shifted directly from G3 Eighth Army to G2 theater.⁶ The principal motive for the shift of control to G2 theater seems to have concerned partisan operations only incidentally. By this time the original (covert) mission of the partisans was tacitly forgotten, and the changed pattern of their operations (harassment) appeared to have been interfering with (and to have been of less importance than) other behind-the-lines activities. Hence the decision to centralize all unconventional warfare activities associated with the Korean War in a single headquarters at theater level.

Besides creating a single theater headquarters for unconventional warfare activities the reorganization called for staff direction of those activities by G2. In this respect the reorganization was at variance with the arrangements proposed in Army doctrine, as expressed in FM 31-21 and based on World War II experience. That doctrine holds that unconventional warfare activities, including guerrilla operations, should be directed by a distinct special staff, rather than by G2 and G3 (App A). ✓

In view of what the partisans were encouraged and permitted to do in Korea during most of 1952 and 1953, primary integration with G2 in contravention of standard doctrine does not appear inappropriate. However, had the original mission of the partisans been continued in fact, such departure from the FM 31-21 organizational doctrine would not only have been unnecessary, it would actually have been undesirable. Under such circumstances partisan activity would have necessarily emphasized carefully planned covert-type operations related to the operational plans of Eighth Army, which could easily have been coordinated with behind-the-lines intelligence activities through normal staff procedures.

Status of Partisans

Experience with irregular forces shows that their status during and after hostilities can be a serious problem and one that therefore requires urgent attention on the part of their employers. In Korea, where the political aspects of the conflict were especially prominent at military levels, the relation of the partisans to the US Army and to the ROK Government proved to be a troublesome matter, largely because the question had been left unresolved. The vagueness of the partisans' status prior to the cease-fire affected not only the US Army's relations with the ROK Government but also the operating incentives of the partisans themselves.

From the US Army's standpoint the partisans were alien irregulars who had voluntarily placed themselves under its control. They were combat forces, but they were inducted into no army and no general oath was required of them. The actions incorporating them into the UN military effort were taken unilaterally and without defining a legal or military status acceptable to ROK author-

ities. Individual service records, of the sort that would register participation in the campaign and thus assure recognition of contributions to the UN cause, were not maintained. Even when the recruiting campaign of late 1952 and 1953 enrolled thousands of South Koreans subject to ROK civil jurisdiction, the status of the new personnel was not clearly defined. Not until friction with ROK authorities over the recruiting program became serious and the question of post-armistice disposition of the partisans became imminent were the necessary steps taken to clarify and regularize partisan status. By this time such a clarification required high-level negotiations with the ROK Government, negotiations that were beset with considerable difficulty.

ROK authorities were ultimately given a measure of influence in administrative (though not operational) matters, and they agreed to recognize the partisans as members of a special combat force under the US Army.⁷ There does not appear to have been any reason why this was not done at the outset of the campaign, nor does it appear that operational effectiveness would have been jeopardized. It is much more likely that the ambiguity of status had a deleterious effect on the ability of US personnel to control the partisans, and on the nature of partisan motivations (Apps C and D). After it had become clear that UN objectives were limited the partisans had little reason to hope for the liberation of their homes in North Korea. In the south, where they were officially unrecognized (except perhaps as lawless and not necessarily loyal elements), they had a good reason to be apprehensive about their future. It would seem that any substitute for the incentive of liberation would have required at least their acceptance by the ROK Government and assurances from it about their treatment when demobilized. The acceptance and assurances were not forthcoming at a time when they might have had a bearing on operations; and they were not forthcoming in time to prevent the desertion of thousands of partisans when faced with the loss of their cause and imminent draft into the ROK Army (App D).

With the incentive of liberation made inoperative by policy considerations and considerations of honor and prestige negated by the ambiguity of their status, why did the partisans operate at all? One answer is that they operated from secure bases in UN territory, where they could live approximately normal civilian lives. They had developed a pattern of operations that involved sporadic rather than continuous hazard, and in which casualties sustained were not excessive. Another is that their standard of living, which depended on booty and on US supply grants, was well above that of ROK soldiers or civilians. Indeed, since supply grants varied with the US officers' estimates of each unit's accomplishments, it appears that the partisans came to be motivated chiefly by the prospect of material reward. In guerrilla warfare experience, material reward is considered an unreliable incentive at best, and, although it has a place in operational arrangements, excessive reliance on it is considered inadvisable (App B).

PARTISAN OPERATIONS

The partisan forces varied in strength from 6000 to 7000 men in the spring of 1951 to more than 22,000 in the spring of 1953. They were organized in units of varying size and designation, each under its own leaders, and usually each with

one or more US officers and men assigned as advisers and staff aides. Each unit tended to be a separate entity, with over-all leadership and direction provided by superior US headquarters.

These units were based on friendly-held islands off the coasts of North Korea, principally along the periphery of Hwanghae Province in the west. Each unit was assigned operating areas on the mainland and attempted to maintain some bases in these areas, but in general the interior-based partisans constituted a small fraction of the total at any given time. Unlike traditional guerrilla forces, therefore, these partisans were situated in friendly territory in which they were comparatively secure and to which the patron forces had direct access (Apps B, C, and D).

Combat Actions

Between May 1951 and the cease-fire in July 1953, the partisans reported 4445 individual actions. The average number of actions increased from 101 per month in 1951 to 221 per month in the period January 1952 to April 1953. During the last months of the war, as the cease-fire approached, this figure dropped to 161 per month.

Nearly all actions took place in western and southern Hwanghae, the area within closest striking distance of the islands on which most of the partisans were based. Ninety-three and seven-tenths percent of all the actions reported were in this area. Only 5 percent of the actions took place in the coastal areas to the north, and only 1.3 percent took place on the east coast. The relative geographical distribution of these actions is shown in Fig. 1.

Analysis of the location of these actions shows that even those that appear to have taken place in noncoastal areas, such as those in the YC and BT grid squares in Fig. 2, were concentrated near the coast. Moreover, the concentration of actions in western and southern Hwanghae increased rather than decreased as the campaign continued. This is especially significant because this concentration occurred in spite of the desire expressed to spread the effort to broader and more important parts of North Korea.

The main types of actions conducted, in order of frequency, were attacks on enemy troops (49.3 percent), attacks on vehicles and transport facilities (13.1 percent), intelligence actions (10.6 percent), attacks on civil administration facilities and personnel (7.9 percent), attacks on supply and storage facilities (5.1 percent), attacks on tactical installations (4.3 percent), and naval gunfire adjustment (4.3 percent). During the campaign the relative proportion of attacks on enemy troops increased, as did attacks on civil administration and intelligence actions. Attacks on tactical installations, supplies and storage, and naval gunfire adjustment declined, while the relative number of attacks on transport remained approximately the same.

Partisans tended to operate in fairly small groups. According to reports for the period May 1952 to July 1953, 92 percent of the actions were conducted by groups of 50 men or less and 74 percent were conducted by groups of 25 or less. Only 2.5 percent were conducted by groups of more than 100 men. A study of actions reported for six selected months showed that attacks on enemy troops and tactical installations tended to employ more men than other types of actions (Apps A, B, C, and D).

A special analysis was made of approximately 600 actions that took place in three separate months—of these, 22 percent were ambushes of enemy troops




Fig. 1—Percentages of Partisan Actions by Grid Squares, May 1951 to July 1953

or vehicles, 34 percent were meeting engagements with enemy troops, and 44 percent were raids of various types. It was found that ambushes of enemy troops produced twice as many casualties in the attacking group per partisan as meeting engagements with enemy troops, and that ambushes with mines increased casualties from 25 to 50 percent over ambushes without mines. It was also found that small groups of partisans were relatively more successful in terms of casualties inflicted per partisan, with the most successful being the 1- to 5-man groups and the least successful the very large groups (App E).




Fig. 2—Actions in Internal Hwanghae Grids YC and BT, March 1952 to June 1953*

A direct comparison of the activities of interior-based as against island-based partisan groups was possible only for 4 months (April, May, June, and July) of 1953. According to the reports interior-based partisans conducted ten times as many actions per man as were conducted by the remainder of the force. This comparison does not, however, allow for island-based partisans not utilized in operations, and perhaps merely corroborates the reports that the rate of utilization was low. Interior-based operating groups tended to be somewhat smaller than island-based groups, and directed a larger proportion of their actions against civil administration and transport targets (Apps A, B, and C).

In addition to the island- and interior-based actions a small number of airborne operations were conducted. Between March 1951 and April 1953 a total of 40 teams, consisting of 389 men in all, were air-dropped in 12 separate

operations. The mission of nine operations was to sabotage rail and highway traffic; the mission of three was to establish guerrilla bases. The operations apparently failed and most of the men were lost, but the dearth of after-action data does not permit productive analysis of the causes of failure (Apps A, B, and E).

Two other types of activity were conducted as by-products of the partisans' behind-the-lines operations: an undetermined quantity of intelligence data was collected and submitted to UN forces; and a large number of psychological warfare leaflets, some specially designed, were distributed in enemy territory.

Results

The partisan actions produced three main types of measurable results: casualties were inflicted, materiel was captured or destroyed, and the enemy was caused to employ troops in counterpartisan security activities.

Between March 1951 and the cease-fire in July 1953 partisans reported that they inflicted 69,084 casualties. This figure includes only those casualties claimed as a result of direct partisan action, and does not include casualties claimed as a result of air strikes or naval gunfire called for by partisans (App E). Casualties claimed per action averaged 15.5 for the period May 1951 to July 1953. However, the average declined from 19.2 per action in 1951, to 14.5 in 1952 and early 1953, and then to 9.6 after April 1953. Regular figures on casualties sustained by partisans were available only for 1952 and 1953. For this period, however, the exchange ratio was 15.3 casualties inflicted per casualty sustained in 1952 and early 1953, and 10.5 for the last 4 months of the campaign (Apps A, B, and C).

These casualty claims are unevaluated and their reliability is questionable. It is well known that battle casualties in general have often been overestimated—because of duplication arising from the “fog of battle,” because of exaggeration due to the emotional impact of battle, because of desires to inflate the measures of success in battle, etc. Studies in World War II and in Korea on tank casualty claims have revealed a persistent overestimation for both air and ground forces by factors of 7 to 9, for example, and personnel casualties inflicted have frequently been inflated by a factor of 3.⁸ No studies are available that have developed the pattern of exaggeration (if any) for partisan-type actions, but given the complexity of partisan actions and specific motivations toward inflated claims, the casualties reported by the Korean partisans are probably high. Based on battle experience this might be on the order of factors from 3 to 10. Discounting at these ratios would reduce the number of casualties inflicted by partisans to 7000 to 23,000, with 15,000 as the median figure.

Partisans also reported destroying or capturing a large variety and quantity of enemy materiel. In the period June 1952 to June 1953, for example, they captured or destroyed approximately 5000 weapons, 460,000 rounds and 2000 cases of ammunition, 2700 vehicles, 2400 farm animals, 3800 tons of food, 2200 military and civilian buildings, 195 boats, 80 bridges, and 495 feet of railroad track. About half the weapons, nearly half the ammunition, one-third of the animals, and 5 percent of the food were reported as captured, the balance as destroyed. These figures may be subject to some such discounting factor as that used above with respect to casualties.

A third type of measurable result of partisan operations was the redeployment of enemy troops, which was the chief objective of the last stages of the partisan campaign. Analysis has shown that enemy coastal and zonal forces

in western Korea (the operating area of most partisans) did increase during the war, and at a rate greater than the increase in general rear-area reserves. In the months immediately following the period of most rapid increase in partisan activity—late 1952—enemy west coastal defense strength increased sharply. Furthermore, the increase in partisan strength in late 1952 was followed by additional increases in enemy coastal defense forces, at a moment when the enemy might have anticipated a further acceleration of partisan activity. Between October 1951 and July 1953 the total increase of enemy troops apparently engaged in coastal and/or zonal defense in the west amounted to more than 125,000 men (App E).

The extent to which the partisan campaign was a contributory cause of this increase in enemy security forces cannot, of course, be determined conclusively. If troop augmentations north of the city of Pyongyang are eliminated as unlikely to have been caused by partisan activity, the enemy troop increase is only about 48,000 men. The latter figure is still generous since it includes troop increases outside the main operating areas. If enemy troops in the coastal and/or zonal defense in Hwanghae west and south of Sariwon are considered (covering the major operating areas), the net increase was something over 20,000 men.

On the basis of the foregoing, together with the timing of the enemy troop increases, it is conceivable that between 20,000 and 50,000 enemy troops were redeployed and that partisan activity was a major contributory cause of the redeployment.

COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTISAN CAMPAIGN

The partisan campaign consumed resources that might have been employed in alternative uses, but it also accomplished results that might not have been achieved without it. What did the US "spend" to gain those results, and what was their military value to the command in Korea?

Cost

Partisan forces are normally expected to be self-sustaining to a considerable degree, and Eighth Army's initial policy was one of frugality in furnishing arms and equipment. This policy was abandoned, however, and the partisan forces ultimately became almost completely dependent on UN forces for logistical support. Since the partisans were based on friendly-held islands to which UN forces, with command of air and sea, had comparatively easy access, this dependence did not prove to be a serious problem. The evidence at hand does not show that partisans generally experienced shortages of food, weapons, ammunition, or transport. As guerrillas, they were probably unusually well supported.*

The chief logistical problem appears to have been supply control. In late 1951 issue of supplies was ad hoc, without provision for accountability. A series of attempts was made in 1952 to regularize this situation and finally an arrangement was instituted that was a compromise between unsupervised ad hoc issue

*Except for the greater part of 1951, during which Eighth Army policy was that of keeping partisan supply at a minimum, partly as an incentive for the partisans to raid the mainland for supplies, partly as a result of the exigencies of the total military situation at that time.

under blanket authorizations and standard table-of-allowance (TA) methods. This apparently met the situation reasonably well (Apps A, B, and C).

A second problem with respect to supply involved the practice of using supply grants to the partisans as a sanction. Supplies issued to partisans were more or less generous according to US regimental commanders' and advisers' estimates of the unit's effectiveness in operations. These estimates had to be based on partisan reports of operations conducted and results obtained, which the US officers (who rarely accompanied the partisans) were not in position to evaluate adequately. Excessive reliance on supply grants as a control in the absence of objective means for evaluating actions provided partisans with an incentive to pad their head counts and to exaggerate or falsify after-action reports. The practice in Korea was almost certainly wasteful, and, to the extent that it led to more effective reports rather than more effective actions, increased the costs to the US without commensurate gain (App B).

The cost of this operation included the cost of maintaining some 200 to 300 US military personnel plus the direct out-of-pocket cost of materiel and supplies furnished the partisans. No complete or systematic analysis is available as to direct costs; however, estimates of the costs of supplies, equipment, and some services were obtained for 1952 and 1953. These estimates cover the major costs of the effort and, although not complete, probably suffice to provide a rough order of magnitude.

According to these estimates the UN partisan campaign cost \$21 million in 1952 and \$71.5 million in 1953. The 1952 estimate includes the cost of food and other supplies obtained from theater headquarter's organizations, and the cost of boat procurement and repair. The 1953 estimate includes in addition vehicle operation and building maintenance costs—about \$280,000 of the total. It also covers the calendar year and therefore includes items issued but not used; i.e., items turned in after the cease-fire or at the time of demobilization. Not all of the estimated 1953 cost should be attributed to the partisan campaign, therefore, but it is not possible to say what proportion that represented.

On the basis of these estimates it is highly unlikely that the partisan campaign cost less than \$50 million or more than \$150 million. Most probably the cost was between \$75 million and \$125 million. For 30 months of operations this would amount to \$2.5 to \$4 million per month. If we assume an average of 10,000 partisans this means that the campaign cost about \$250 to \$400 per partisan per month (App C).

Effectiveness

What contribution did partisan operations make to the UN war effort in Korea? Although the initial objectives were primarily aimed at employment of partisans in direct conjunction with a major UN offensive, that offensive did not materialize, with the results that the partisans merely conducted various types of harassing actions during the remainder of the war. It is the effect of these actions that is in question.

The most important point to note in this connection is that the location of partisan operations seriously limited their possible influence. As a target area for harassing the enemy, western and southern Hwanghae was not especially promising. The area lies west of the important approaches north and south and was bypassed by the principal battles of the war. It is predominantly

agricultural and has little industry. With the possible exception of the large food-producing basin just west of Sariwon, the most important military feature was the Pyongyang-Sariwon-Kaesong railroad and highway—one of the two major lines connecting Manchuria with the combat area. This MSR, however, remained some distance east of the main arena of partisan operations.

The types of partisan actions conducted were largely casualty-producing in nature, inflicting a large number of casualties (even when discounted for overestimation or exaggeration) in proportion to the forces employed. These casualties included, however, (a) military personnel engaged in secondary missions such as coastal or area defense; (b) quasi-military personnel such as home guards, whose value to the enemy was presumably limited; and (c) large numbers of civilians. They were also casualties inflicted on an enemy who considered manpower as "cheap." It is likely, therefore, that the casualties inflicted had no great significance outside the immediate area of operations and that their harassment value was not great (Apps B and C).

Attacks on transport, supply, and tactical installations, which may have had genuine military significance, were relatively few. They produced a good deal of materiel loss to the enemy according to reports, but it is difficult to evaluate the effect of this loss. In view of the lack of major targets in the operating areas, however, it is improbable that these actions constituted a serious threat to the enemy.

The airborne missions, all of which were apparently unsuccessful, cannot be viewed as even potentially significant, since they were essentially aimed at interdicting enemy LofCs. Effective interdiction requires the capability of cutting supply routes on a virtually continuous basis, which does not appear to have been possible under the circumstances. In any event the Air Force was making a major effort in this direction, and on a scale that dwarfed any attempts the partisans could possibly make (App B).

Incidental activities of the partisans, such as psychological warfare, intelligence, or even the partial defense of a number of off-shore islands that UN forces desired to keep in friendly hands, may have been valuable activities but it is not possible to assess their significance from the evidence available.

There is good evidence that the enemy took countermeasures with respect to partisan activities, among which was the possible diversion of troops. Analysis of this factor indicates that partisan activities may have brought about the diversion of from 20,000 to 50,000 enemy troops. It is probable, however, that these were not first-line troops. In the prevailing military situation their loss to the enemy MLR forces could hardly have been serious.

In short, on the basis of the evidence available in this study, it appears that the partisan campaign did not represent a significant contribution to the UN war effort in Korea. If the effects actually achieved by the partisans were all that were desired, then it is at least possible that this result could have been achieved more economically by having the partisans carry out their commando-type coastal raids as regular units of the ROK military establishment. In such a case the problems of discipline and status certainly would have been solved more satisfactorily and the number of US personnel involved would have been significantly smaller. For example, it is conceivable that had the partisans been organized as ROK Marines, a battalion or two (strength 1500 to 2000) might have conducted the 200 ten-men (average) missions per month reported

by the partisans during periods of high activity. On the basis of KMAG policies a US advisory staff of four to six would probably have been sufficient to handle the operational liaison needed.*

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

From the preceding analysis it appears that the lack of success in the Korean guerrilla campaign can be attributed to two factors: (a) a set of conditions that was not conducive to effective guerrilla operations, and (b) inadequate application of established principles and doctrine concerning warfare in general and guerrilla operations in particular to the situation imposed by the adverse conditions. The lessons will be discussed briefly under three headings: (a) the relation between objective, means, and attendant conditions, (b) the importance of doctrine, and (c) doctrine for use of partisans in limited-warfare situations.

Relation between Objective, Means, and Attendant Conditions

Perhaps the most important point to stress is that in partisan warfare, no less than in regular warfare, effectiveness depends on the relation between the capabilities of the instrument, the circumstances in which it is used, and the ends for which it is employed. Each of these factors is capable of changing independently, and each affects the others. The command that fails to make realistic assessments of these relations, not only initially but on a continuing basis, cannot be sure that at any given moment it is using the appropriate resources in the appropriate manner in the appropriate situation—"appropriate" in this case being whatever tends to maximize the realization of the command's broad objectives.

In Korea conditions beyond the control of the Army imposed drastic limitations on guerrilla capabilities. The local command was deficient in personnel of the requisite background for organizing and directing irregular forces of the size contemplated; the totalitarian enemy was well protected against underground resistance, and even more against overt operations in his home territory; and policy limitations produced a static situation that seriously reduced the potential value of the partisans, gave the enemy special advantages in countermeasures, and weakened the operating incentives of the partisans themselves.

Confronting these conditions the command's rational alternatives were (a) to accommodate its decisions to the existing conditions, (b) to take compensatory steps to modify the effect of the conditions, or (c) some measure of both. Apparently it did none.

Faced with a serious deficiency of experienced US personnel, the command could have kept the size of the force within controllable bounds or invoked the assistance of ROK Army personnel.

Faced with an enemy whose rear-area security was strong, the command could have settled for operations on a smaller and more selective scale, with greater emphasis on covert than on overt aspects. Great expectations about

*This was the considered opinion of a number of field-grade officers who participated in the campaign and who were interviewed in the course of this study.

the feasibility of independent overt partisan operations on a large scale over most of North Korea would have been justified only if enemy controls had deteriorated badly.

Faced with a relatively stabilized military situation plus restrictions on military action and limited objectives—both imposed by national policy decisions—the command would have been well advised to reconsider the purposes for which the partisans were being utilized, allowing for the effect of the situation on partisan capabilities on the one hand, and the significance of partisan operations as contributions to ultimate UN objectives on the other.

Importance of Doctrine

It is believed that these considerations did not receive adequate attention in the partisan campaign because certain important aspects of established guerrilla warfare doctrine and experience were overlooked or neglected. The question of what doctrine is applicable in any given circumstance is, of course, one of the important prerogatives of command. Doctrine is, however, a carefully considered distillation of past Army experience, and as such should not be disregarded lightly. Although there were many unusual circumstances pertaining to the situation in Korea that had a bearing on the conduct of guerrilla operations there, it does not appear that any of these circumstances warranted the scant regard (as inferred from actions taken or not taken by the command) for the following prerequisites to successful exploitation of partisan forces:

- (a) That the forces be assigned a mission appropriate to the situation.
- (b) That the mission be clearly stated and plans and operational directives necessary for its accomplishment be issued to the forces.
- (c) That the forces be adequately motivated toward accomplishing the mission.
- (d) That the forces be capable of accomplishing the mission.
- (e) That the forces be directed by personnel with means for controlling and evaluating their performance of the mission.
- (f) That the ensuing operations be closely coordinated with the mission and operations of regular forces for maximum effect.

All these conditions are fundamental points in general military doctrine, but some of them—e.g., the need for adequate motivation—are especially important in connection with guerrilla operations. Had the command given due consideration to them it seems likely that a different course of action would have been taken with respect to the partisans.

Suggested Doctrine for Use of Partisans in Limited Warfare Situations

Despite the lack of success in the partisan campaign it does not follow that the initial decision to support and direct the partisans was ill taken or that the partisan campaign in Korea should have been halted. The mission assigned to the partisans at the inception of the campaign in early 1951 was preparation for tactical employment in direct conjunction with regular-force operations. This was not the mission performed nor was it that assigned in early 1953, which concentrated on defense of the guerrilla-held islands, harassing operations, and reconnaissance activities. It is believed that the first mission was a sound one and that it should have been adhered to throughout the campaign

despite the development of conditions that militated against effective use of guerrilla forces and that reduced the probability of eventual pay-off.

Normally, irregular forces operating behind enemy lines are considered strategically on the defensive and incapable of decisive action until coordinated in space and time with strong regular forces preferably on the offensive. During the "pre-D-day" period emphasis is placed on underground organization and preparation for such tactical employment. Large-scale and indiscriminate overt operations before regular forces are in position to exploit their effects are discouraged as premature; they alert the enemy to his own vulnerabilities and to the strength, location, and capabilities of the partisans; and they can easily result in the loss or waste of organizational assets. In this sense partisan forces retain valuable capabilities by being saved, and lose capabilities rapidly by being used excessively. As between a reserve partisan potential and immediate exploitation the choice and timing therefore require careful decisions. This would be especially true against a totalitarian enemy (App D).

When, as in Europe in 1943 and 1944 or in Korea in early 1951, a major friendly offensive is anticipated, the appropriate decision is relatively clear and a two-phase campaign—covert preparation and overt operations—can be clearly defined. Difficulty arises, however, in a limited-war situation where an offensive is improbable. When this situation arose in Korea the tacit decision was made in terms of immediate exploitation of the partisans as an independent harassing force. Without supplanting the weakened incentives of partisans in such a situation, without careful appraisal of the limits imposed on opportunities and results, without developing means of good control and evaluation, the forces were expanded and a high level of overt activity was encouraged. These operations could hardly have been a potent threat to the enemy, and their harassment value could hardly have helped bring much pressure on the enemy in the cease-fire negotiations. Furthermore, had they continued their pattern of shallow-penetration coastal harassment raids, the partisans would have had little additional strategic value if the cease-fire talks had not been successful. In retrospect, therefore, the actual mission of the partisans appears to have been inappropriate.

The importance of the alternative role proposed for the partisans lies in the greater potential capability they might have developed under a different concept. Had the situation been treated throughout as a preparatory preoffensive situation (as it was, for example, in the build-up and strengthening of ROK forces), a smaller and potentially more effective guerrilla force might have been organized that could have been a valuable asset had the cease-fire negotiations broken down and the character of the war changed. Its units would have been held in reserve, strategically situated, pending utilization in connection with tactical operations. Actual operations would have been infrequent but carefully planned with a view to improving and testing partisan effectiveness and without expectation of significant material damage to the enemy. In the interests of quality rather than quantity attention would have been given to incentives, discipline, and the abilities of individual partisans. Since the force would have been oriented toward tactical use, direction and planning would have been associated with operations rather than intelligence.

As events transpired, of course, such a force in Korea would have been held in reserve with no direct pay-off for the obvious reason that the character

of the war did not change and the negotiations finally succeeded. The force would have represented an investment without return. Such investments, however, are often justified in military campaigns in the same sense as any other weapons build-up, on grounds that the command must prepare for a number of eventualities and contingencies, not all of which will come to pass. In Korea, in view of the nature of the situation, the forces, and their effects, this alternative was preferable to that implicit in the operations conducted. Indeed, until it can be shown that other uses of partisans are feasible and profitable in limited-warfare situations (whether or not they are considered as preludes to a full-scale offensive), the preparatory mission would seem to have first claim on the attention of the command.

This argument on doctrine for the use of partisans in a limited-warfare situation may be summarized as follows. As a criterion it is postulated that partisan action to be considered successful must produce a discernible and important influence (military or political) in the outcome of the battle, campaign, or war that cannot be obtained by the use of regular military forces at comparable or less cost. On the basis of the best interpretation that can be placed on the Korean partisan campaign this criterion was not met. Furthermore, the kind of circumstances that prevailed in Korea from 1951 to 1953 was such as to practically preclude realization of this criterion. That this conclusion was not reached by the command during the Korean War is at least explainable on the basis that Korea represented a new experience for the Army in many important aspects and the prevailing doctrine of the Army did not reflect these new aspects. Certainly, therefore, an augmentation of doctrine to include the lessons derived from any new experience can be calculated to place future commanders in a better position to make optimum decisions if the experience is in any way repeated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In most important respects current guerrilla warfare doctrine appears to have been applicable to the circumstances of the Korean conflict. However, it appears that some of the principles embodied in FM 31-21 were either not appreciated by the Army personnel concerned with Korean partisans or the applicability of these principles to Korea was not recognized. This is true even of certain principles that are not peculiar to guerrilla warfare—such as those pertaining to the relations between mission, situation, and capability of forces. Decisions on these matters tend to be made at relatively high levels and there is a need, therefore, that key command and staff officers have sufficient awareness of the doctrine to perceive its applicability. Specifically, the Korean experience reveals a need for all Army officers, particularly those of field grade and above, to receive a greater degree of indoctrination regarding the principles of guerrilla warfare and the conditions under which they apply.

2. Despite its general applicability current Army doctrine for guerrilla warfare appears to be lacking with respect to specific guidance for a situation in which the fighting may be restricted either as to objectives, geographical area, means, or all three and in which there may be little probability of liberating the homeland of the partisan forces available. When such conditions as

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these prevail the pay-off from overt guerrilla operations will tend to be small. In the light of this analysis of Korean experience it appears that if guerrillas are to be used at all in a limited-warfare situation, the most appropriate mission for them is primarily that of preparation for tactical employment in direct support of regular combat forces when the limitations are removed. FM 31-21 should point out the severe limitations imposed on guerrilla capabilities by the two main elements associated with this type of limited war; i.e., that the motivation induced by the hope for liberation may be denied the guerrillas and that the enemy's opportunity for rear-area security is greatly enhanced.

3. One of the main sources of difficulty in conducting the partisan campaign in Korea stems from the fact that US personnel lacked both thorough knowledge of guerrilla warfare operations and experience in dealing with foreign personnel of a culture unlike their own. It would be a formidable problem for the Army to attempt the training of guerrilla warfare specialists in all possible alien cultures. However, a considerable advance over the situation that pertained in Korea will have been achieved if there exists a cadre of officers and men who have had actual experience in directing or training foreign personnel and have thereby acquired a basic understanding of the importance of intercultural relations. Obviously in peacetime the opportunities for providing such experience are limited. One possible way, however, would be the assignment of special forces personnel to foreign advisory units such as MAGs.

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Appendix A


FIRST PERIOD: JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 1951

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INTRODUCTION

This appendix will examine the first broad phase of the UN partisan campaign in Korea—the period from January to November 1951. This was a period of fluid warfare, followed by the initial stabilization of the front. It is assumed that the stabilization of the front in this period was regarded as a temporary condition until it became apparent that the cease-fire negotiations would be protracted. The prime military consideration, therefore, was intense combat or the immediate possibility of intense combat.

In this as in other periods the military significance of partisan activities was a function of the prevailing situation, the command objectives, the means employed, and the results obtained. The general political-military situation is outlined in the first section of this appendix; Eighth Army's objectives in the situation with reference to the partisan effort are described in the second section; the organization, personnel, and logistics furnished to implement those objectives are described in the next three sections; and the results—i.e., the operations conducted—are reviewed in the final section.

POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

The UN partisan campaign with which this study is concerned was precipitated by the military events of late 1950. During the fall of 1950 UN forces had launched a major offensive that crushed the North Korean People's Army and carried as far north as the Yalu River. This drive was followed, in November 1950, by the full-scale intervention of CCF. By January 1951 the CCF offensive had driven the UN Army back below the 38th Parallel. Not until late in January was the CCF attack checked, and were UN forces again able to resume the offensive.* These events are illustrated in Fig. A1.

While friendly troops were sweeping northward, and before the CCF intervention, anti-Communist underground groups in North Korea had surfaced. The subsequent UN retreat from the Yalu, therefore, left them exposed to enemy reprisals. Many of them fled or went into hiding. Among them were thousands who, semiorganized and partly armed, were able to make a fighting retreat to the coast lines, whence they escaped to friendly-held islands.¹ They came to the attention of Eighth Army in mid-January 1951, and steps were taken to organize and support them.

During early 1951 a relatively fluid battlefield obtained, and there was every expectation at military levels that another general UN offensive would be mounted. By mid-March UN forces had reentered Seoul and less than 2

* See App E for a detailed chronology of the Korean War.




Fig. A1—Military Background of Partisan Campaign

- ① 26 Nov 50—Full-scale intervention of CCF
- ② 15 Jan 51—Establishment of Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, G3, Eighth Army
- ③ 15 Feb 51—Activation of WILLIAM ABLE BASE at Paengnyong-do, to support, train, and direct west coast partisans
- ④ 15 Apr 51—Transfer of east coast partisans from ROK Army to Attrition Section, and activation of KIRKLAND BASE
- ⑤ 5 May 51—Reorganization of Attrition Section as Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU, under operational control of G3, Eighth Army
- ⑥ 10 Jul 51—Beginning of cease-fire negotiations
- ⑦ 10 Dec 51—Merger of FEC/LD (K) and Miscellaneous Group, shifting control of partisan activities to theater level under G2
- ⑧ 1 Oct 52—Initiation of program to expand partisan forces
- ⑨ 5 Oct 52—Redesignation of CCRAK as 8242 AU, and assumption by CCRAK of operational control of FEC/LD (K)
- ⑩ 12 Jan 53—CINCFE directive calling for plans for partisan employment in 1953
- ⑪ 20 Apr 53—Beginning of "Little Switch," exchange of sick and wounded prisoners
- ⑫ 12 Jun 53—Evacuation by partisans of islands north of 38th Parallel

weeks later had again reached the 38th Parallel. In April the enemy undertook a new offensive that pushed the UN south of the 38th Parallel but failed to retake Seoul. After this failure the Communist forces fell back, and the front gradually stabilized in the general area of the 38th Parallel.

In early July cease-fire talks were begun at Kaesong. By the end of the month an agenda was agreed on, and negotiations appeared to progress. There was, of course, no assurance that an immediate cease-fire would eventuate from the negotiations, and in fact the talks were broken off in late August. When the talks were resumed at the end of October the rapid progress made toward reaching agreement on a cease-fire line encouraged the hope that an acceptable truce could be negotiated. By the end of November it was clear that UN military objectives were confined to active defense of the general positions held, and the possibility of all-out prosecution of the war was regarded as unlikely.

This, then, was the general military situation that set the stage for the UN partisan campaign of January to December 1951 and determined, in large measure, the uses to which Eighth Army proposed to put the large force of irregulars that had suddenly come into its hands.

COMMAND OBJECTIVES

The decision to support and direct the large number of pro-UN irregulars who emerged in early 1951 was made when the chief military prospect was a major Eighth Army counterattack and when there was a strong likelihood that another general UN offensive would develop. It is not surprising, therefore, that Eighth Army's first plans for the partisan forces envisaged their ultimate employment in connection with a large-scale front-line assault. This was to remain the only explicit over-all command objective with respect to the partisans for nearly two years, and long after it had become evident that the likelihood of another general UN offensive was remote.

The first plans were developed by the Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, G3, which was assigned responsibility for the partisan effort. The first of these set forth a two-phase program, based on traditional concepts of guerrilla warfare.

The first phase envisaged the training of partisan cadres on the secure island bases available. These cadres were then to be sent back behind enemy lines to form cell units that could organize other local dissidents. It was also anticipated that they would be able to gather intelligence and perform sabotage missions of a covert nature. The second phase of the plan contemplated the use of these partisans in conjunction with a UN offensive to the north in the spring of 1951. The interior partisan cells were to be sufficiently well organized by that time so that when supplied on a large scale they could expand into a strong force in support of the regular UN effort.²

Two types of units were conceived—a "base unit" and a "mobile unit." The base units were to train partisans and stage attacks from island bases and be capable of infiltrating men to the enemy rear. The mobile units were to operate on the mainland behind the lines and be capable of supporting themselves in the interior. In addition, plans called for a rear-echelon base at Pusan for training special airborne sabotage agents and also liaison officers for coordinating partisan elements with Eighth Army tactical units.³

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✓ The partisan command supplemented this concept from time to time during the spring of 1951 with additional instructions to officers in the field. It was emphasized that interior missions should be assigned where partisans were familiar with the area in which they were to operate, and that they should be expected to arm themselves chiefly with enemy weapons. Moreover the partisans were to be patriotically motivated, not "political minded," and willing to carry on with a minimum of supply and comforts, and without pay. They were also to bring in captured enemy materiel to substantiate their claims.⁴

✓ The assumption that another UN offensive would occur was explicit in the command's "Operational Plan Number One." It was anticipated that the enemy would withdraw at least to the 39th Parallel when attacked by I Corps and that he would not attempt to defend a line south of that point. Hence, when the offensive occurred, the plan called for Task Force WILLIAM ABLE (west coast partisans) to seize the Hwanghae Peninsula west of a north-south line from Chaeryong-gang through the eastern edge of the Hwanghae Reservoir to the eastern edge of Haeju. This plan is illustrated in Fig. A2. Action was to be directed toward disrupting the enemy withdrawal along the Sariwon-Kunchon Road. One partisan unit operating from the island of Kyodong-do was to secure the Yonan area. Other groups were to be airdropped in north-central Korea.⁵

This plan was further considered at WILLIAM ABLE BASE. It was hoped that, beginning on 27 Feb 51, units would be infiltrated to the enemy rear until all were operating on the mainland. They were to set up CPs, control their immediate areas of operation, send out intelligence, and wait for the order to take Hwanghae and strike at the withdrawing enemy forces.⁶

When the east coast partisan unit KIRKLAND was organized in late April 1951 the initial concept was for a mobile base unit. Figure A3 shows the partisan bases during this period. Partisan units were to be infiltrated to the enemy rear by land or boat and then controlled by mobile radio units operating as close to the lines as possible, where the range of vhf radio could be maximized. The partisan mission was that of intelligence and sabotage against enemy MSRs beyond the reach of UN naval gunfire. Here too it was at first assumed that the partisans would be coordinated with a UN offensive in the spring. The first KIRKLAND operation was planned in support of an attack by ROK Army I and III Corps in early June.⁷ After this operation, however, KIRKLAND objectives were limited to occasional raids and intelligence gathering by small units operating from the islands of Sol-som and Nan-do.⁸

No other plans embodying broad comprehensive objectives emanated from higher headquarters while the partisans were under Eighth Army. Apart from occasional directives on special missions, operational planning seems to have been left largely in the hands of the field unit commanders and the partisan leaders. In April and June some emphasis was placed on locating targets for the Navy and for JOC, the latter to have priority on targets such as boats under repair or stalled trains that might remain in an area for some time.⁹

Attention was also given to psychological warfare. One of the early campaigns was directed at terrorizing the enemy by having the partisans drop "Leopard's Claw" leaflets at the scene of operations.¹⁰ Later in the year the psywar effort was given a new twist toward the black propaganda side. Calling cards, presumed to have originated in North Korea and blaming instances of destruction on Chinese bands, were to be carried in.¹¹

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


Fig. A2—Operational Plan One

Numbered areas indicate the number of partisans in each area presumed to be operating on the mainland at this time. Larger shaded areas represent proposed areas from which partisans were to stage guerrilla operations when the general offensive occurred.

During the last half of 1951 there was no general reappraisal of the partisan effort in the light of the armistice negotiations. Several days before the truce talks began on 10 July, some cognizance of the probable consequences was taken by the command. KIRKLAND was requested to get two advance groups with radios on the mainland as soon as possible, as it was believed that this would be impossible once a cease-fire went into effect. This mission—the establishment of a covert intelligence net—was given top priority since Eighth Army was interested in the continuance of intelligence from operational areas.¹²

This interesting precaution relative to a cease-fire, however, did not mean cessation or reduction of further partisan offensive operations. In fact, LEOPARD Command planned in September to extend partisan activity as far north as possible. One partisan unit—Donkey 15—was to secure its base on Taehwa-do (XD 3965), and two others—Donkeys 14 and 16—were to operate from Ae-do (XD 9080) (see Fig. A3). It was hoped to establish bases on the mainland from which partisans could strike at the enemy road net in the Chongju (XD 9095) area. For this purpose three-man mine-laying teams were to be organized and sent against the MSRs.¹³ Later, in October, it was also planned to seize Sinmi-do, a northern island close to the enemy shore line near the Sonchon-Chongju MSR.¹⁴

As can be noted from the foregoing, initial planning for the partisans was premised on using them in the manner indicated by the experience of World War II. A covert net of interior cells that could attract and organize all dissidents behind the enemy lines was to be established in preparation for a kind of D-Day, when the new offensive should begin. Then in conjunction with this UN attack the partisan units were to rise up, secure their local areas, and interdict and harass the retreating enemy. After July, however, the probability of another general offensive became more and more remote, as policy became firmly directed toward achieving a cease-fire along the prevailing status quo. Meanwhile, the partisans were encouraged to undertake the kind of harassment activities that were to characterize the effort for the balance of the campaign.

ORGANIZATION

The decision to support and control large partisan forces for overt combat activities in the enemy rear called for the establishment of an organization that could perform the necessary headquarters functions. Both the headquarters and the operating-level organizations during the initial period are described in this section.

Headquarters Organization

On 15 Jan 51 an Attrition Section was organized under Miscellaneous Division, G3, to handle partisan affairs. Two days later the commander of the new section conferred in Tokyo on coordinating Eighth Army organization in unconventional warfare with theater-level agencies.¹⁵ Figure A4 indicates the organization as of this date.

Initially its commander conceived of an attrition section headquarters as a combined or joint command, feeling that this would be best fitted to conduct unconventional warfare.¹⁶ Figure A5 indicates the type of command organization




Fig. A3—Location of Partisan Units, August 1951

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considered. This concept, representing all the services involved, was never implemented. In fact this partisan effort was never commanded by a truly joint headquarters.

In view of the offensive objectives planned originally for the west coast partisans the decision to place them under direct Eighth Army control appears to have been appropriate. Partisan operations contemplated at this time could perhaps have been most effectively coordinated with regular tactical units by Eighth Army Headquarters.




Fig. A4—Organization of Attrition Section, January 1951

--- Staff coordination

FEC/LG: Far East Command Liaison Group, a G2, GHQ, agency responsible for coordinating unconventional warfare with the activities of other agencies and services.

Figure A6 shows the first organizational change at the command level. On 5 May 51 the Attrition Section as such was dissolved and then reactivated as the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU. The chief cause given for the change was that Eighth Army SOP required that staff sections remain just that, whereas G3's Attrition Section was engaged in operations. Hence a request was made through Eighth Army to GHQ, FEC, for a regular table of distribution and equipment (TDE).¹⁷

While partisan operations were being conducted under Eighth Army, organizational changes that were to affect the partisan effort were taking place at theater level. Coordination between the partisans and the sometimes conflicting and separate activities of other services and agencies had been felt necessary for some time. During the first half of 1951 conferences were conducted by the Far East Command Liaison Group (FEC/LG), G2, GHQ, and attended by representatives of Eighth Army's partisan command. By July steps were taken to fix responsibility for all behind-the-lines activity in a single headquarters.

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On 26 July FEC/LG was made a regular TD unit—the 8240 AU. On the same date, the Far East Command Liaison Detachment [FEC/LD (K)], 8240 AU, was formed under FEC/LG to operate in Korea.¹⁸ FEC/LD (K) was at first engaged primarily in intelligence activities and had no immediate effect on the partisan effort, which remained for the time being under control of Eighth




Fig. A5—Proposed Organization of Attrition Warfare Headquarters

US Army, 13	ROK Army, 4
US Navy, 8	ROK Navy, 4
US Air Force, 4	ROK Marines, 2
Total Strength, 35 Officers	

Army's 8086 AU. By 10 Dec 51, however, the partisans were transferred from Eighth Army to direct control by FEC. This was accomplished when the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU, was absorbed into FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, the latter then under operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ.¹⁹ From this time on, partisan operations represented but one side of a broader command organization directed from theater level.

One other development occurring in early December was the establishment of the single headquarters for coordinating all covert, clandestine, and related

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


Fig. A6—Organization of Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) Miscellaneous Group, May 1951

--- Staff coordination




Fig. A7—Organization of Guerrilla Section, Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea) [FEC/LD(K)], December 1951

--- Staff coordination

FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, was not concerned with partisans only. This unit consisted of two sections in addition to the headquarters staff—a guerrilla section and an intelligence section, the latter of which was separated from the partisan effort as such.

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activities in Korea. This unit, the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), 8240 AU, was activated on 10 December and assigned to FEC/LG, 8240 AU, under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ.²⁰ Although CCRAK did not receive its first TD until the following February²¹ staff members were in Korea early in December 1951. The new organizational structure bringing the partisans under a theater-level agency as illustrated by Fig. A7.

Thus after nearly 11 months of operations under Eighth Army the partisans were shifted to an agency whose parent unit operated from theater level in Tokyo. Eighth Army retained some staff responsibility for the partisans, but the occasions for its exercise were rare in the ensuing months of the war.

The change of partisan control to theater level was not inconsistent with Army doctrine as it had by then been developed in the Army manual on "The Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare."²² It was, however, also a shift of control to G2 agencies. It is interesting to note in this connection that Army doctrine as expressed in this manual holds that World War II experience indicates that unconventional warfare activities should not be placed under the exclusive control of either G2 or G3 staff sections, recommending instead that a special staff section at theater level should be created for this purpose.

Operating-Level Organization

Other changes in organization during 1951 took place at the operational level. By mid-February three operational units had been formed—WILLIAM ABLE BASE on Paengnyong-do, BAKER SECTION for airborne training and special missions near Pusan, and Task Force REDWING, a special American-led ROK Marine Company to be used for intelligence, sabotage, and commando-type operations. Headquarters remained at Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) MAIN in Taegu, and the supply section was set up at EUSAK REAR in Pusan. The west coast base at WILLIAM ABLE was devoted to the training of partisan cadres in intelligence, communications, and demolitions, with emphasis on the latter.

At first, the partisan "regiments" identified themselves by place names, but by March, at the same time that WILLIAM ABLE BASE was recorded as LEOPARD, the partisan units had assumed the name of "donkey" by number. This, however, was not true of the partisans in the east coast operation at KIRKLAND, a much smaller effort that retained unit names rather than numbers. Figure A8 shows how the organization at the operational level had developed by late spring, 1951; this structure remained virtually unchanged for the balance of the year.

PERSONNEL

US Personnel

By 10 Feb 51, 20 officers and 12 enlisted men had been assigned to the Attrition Section set up under the Miscellaneous Division, G3, Eighth Army (see Table A1). At EUSAK MAIN three officers and two enlisted men staffed




Fig. A8—Organization of Partisan Operating-Level Units, July 1951

Table A1

REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH FIGURES FOR THE 8086 ARMY UNIT, 1951^a

Rank or grade	10 Feb 51	5 May 51		21 Jul 51	30 Nov 51
		Authorized	Assigned		
Colonel	2 ^b	1	1	0	0
Lt colonel	1	1	1	2	2
Major	3 ^b	2	1	0	7
Captain	4	8	7	7	1
1st lieutenant	8	10	9	12	11
2d lieutenant	2	7	2	0	2
Warrant officer	0	0	0	0	0
Total officers	20	29	21	21	23
M/sergeant (E7)	1	5	5	5	3
Sergeant first class (E6)	1	8	3	3	5
Sergeant (E5)	3	10	7	11	8
Corporal (E4)	6	10	7	11	17
Private first class (E3)	1	10	7	10	11
Private (E2)	0	5	8	2	2
Private (E1)	0	5	0	2	0
Total EM	12	53	37	44	46
Total all personnel	32	82	58	65	69

^aExcept for the February figures, all strengths were taken from 8086 AU morning reports; February figures were taken from the Command Report.²³

^bOne colonel and two majors assigned initially by the US Marine Corps were recalled to Camp McGill, Japan, on 23 Feb 51.

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the command. The rest of the assigned personnel were attached to EUSAK REAR at Pusan, pending further assignment to either BAKER SECTION for supply duties at that point or to the initial base unit WILLIAM ABLE at the island of Paengnyong-do.²³

Available records reveal little about the source of these men. Some, apparently, were from the Miscellaneous Division, G3. A number were Rangers and others were taken from the pipeline. One officer was British. Not much can be determined from the records about the background, specialized training, or other qualifications of either the UN or partisan personnel during the period the partisans were supported by Eighth Army.

On 5 May 51, when the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU, was activated, the UN partisan command received its first authorized TD. This TD called for a strength of 29 officers and 53 enlisted men.²⁴ Actually only 21 officers and 37 enlisted men were assigned to the 8086 AU at this time—a strength that, as can be seen in Table A1, did not vary greatly for the balance of the period the partisans were under Eighth Army.

A fair proportion of airborne Rangers were assigned during 1951, although only a few of these were actually placed with the airborne training unit. They were sent to the other partisan units in the spring of 1951, when command planning anticipated a general UN offensive. These men were considered well equipped to train the partisans and plan amphibious operations, and it was then the intention of the command to send experienced US personnel with the partisans behind the enemy lines when the offensive was begun.²⁵

The number of officers and enlisted men assigned to LEOPARD BASE—the largest by far of the operational units—indicates that much of the personnel was engaged in staff and housekeeping duties rather than as advisers with the partisans. In August this unit had only 23 officers and men (see Fig. A9) in support of more than 7000 partisans in an area stretching from Inchon to the Yalu River.²⁶

Very few men were assigned at any time in 1951 to KIRKLAND, the east coast unit organized in late April. Initially only two officers and two enlisted men were with this unit,²⁷ and the record indicates that very few more US personnel were sent to KIRKLAND later. This unit had steadily lost its partisans through enemy action and desertion until only a handful were left by the end of 1951.

Partisans

Judging from the names adopted by the early regiments it would appear that the majority of the partisans were from Hwanghae Province, chiefly the western section. Some, however, were from areas farther north—near Pyongyang and Chongju. These early regimental names are reflected in the organization report of 5 March from WILLIAM ABLE BASE on Paengnyong-do as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

WILLIAM ABLE BASE

Hwanghae group	Pyongnam group	Pyonbuk group
Sinchon Regt	Pyongyang Regt	Aedo-dong Regt
Changyon Regt		
Kuwol Regt		
Haeju Regt		
Kyomipo Regt		

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Some information on the origin of the partisans can also be pieced together from 8240 AU and 8086 AU records and from interviews with the partisans by an AFPE military history unit²⁸ and by the ORO study team. A number of the partisan leaders seem to have had a long anti-Communist background, and some served as chiefs or members of local security forces that were created when the UN troops swept north to the Yalu in the fall of 1950. Once committed openly




Fig. A9—Organization and Personnel of LEOPARD Command, August 1951

TASK FORCE PERRY, with headquarters on Kyodong-do, comprised the so-called Donkey 5 area stretching from Kanghwa-do on the east to Yongpyong-do on the west. This was the nucleus of what became WOLFPACK BASE by 1952. LEOPARD BASE headquarters was on Paengnyong-do.

to the UN cause it became necessary for these people to evacuate their home communities and move south or west to friendly-held islands after the UN retreat. It was the only way that they could escape enemy reprisals.

The leader of Donkey 1, first unit to go back on the mainland to generate more partisans in early March, was a former merchant from Choryong. Another leader, who ultimately organized Donkey 13 in 1952, had a hand in setting up several of the early donkeys and was a former orchard grower from Sinchon. The first leader of Donkey 4 had a military background and organized his unit from partisans from the Haeju area. Donkey 11—nicknamed the “students”—was led by a student-teacher and contained about 450 youths, largely from the Ongjin Peninsula.

Other leaders had diverse backgrounds, though few had any previous military experience. An exception was the leader of Donkey 15, a Manchurian-educated teacher from Sinuiju who appears to have organized his unit out of anti-Communist youth in the Chongju area while on an intelligence mission for the ROK Army. This unit represents the northernmost source of partisans. Donkey 5, on the other hand, which had a strength of 1106 men by August, had its leader and men from the Ongjin area, some from below the 38th Parallel. Little is revealed about the source of the east coast partisans except for statements that most were from the Wonsan Harbor area.

Partisan morale appears to have been quite good in 1951. The evidence indicates, however, that few of the partisans had any military training and most of them were young, in the age group between 17 and 26. They appear to have been drawn essentially from student groups, anti-Communist youth organizations, white-collar workers, and landowning families. Most of the leaders were basically politicians. A few had been Japanese-trained soldiers, however, and others seem to have built up good staffs.

No comprehensive roster or personnel files appear to have been kept until late in 1953, long after the expansion program of 1952 and subsequent discharges and desertions had substantially altered the composition of partisan ranks. The 1953 data, like those discussed in the preceding paragraphs, also indicate that most of the partisans originated in the western half of Hwanghae Province.

LOGISTICS

One of the first—though probably not the most difficult—of the early Eighth Army problems with respect to the partisans was that of supply. Although the first partisans were partly organized and had already been active during their exodus from the mainland, they were ill-armed and short of ammunition, food, and other supplies. It was reported, for example, that they had only 1000 weapons and extremely little ammunition and that many were starving.²⁹ During the first month or two of 1951, therefore, large quantities of food, clothing, weapons, and ammunition were sent to the offshore islands on which the partisans had taken refuge.

Once the initial demands had been met, supply to the partisan forces was determined by (a) Eighth Army policies with respect to logistical support for the effort; (b) the capacity of the partisans to live off the enemy, the country, and sympathetic inhabitants; and (c) the physical location of the partisans.

The initial Eighth Army policy, and expectation, was that the partisans would require little continuous logistical support, once basic requirements in equipment had been met. It was assumed that the partisans could and should be able to capture a large proportion of the military goods they needed and that they would be able to find food for themselves. As noted previously,³⁰ frugality in Eighth Army supply policies was also considered necessary in order to increase operational incentives.

There is no reliable means of determining whether this Eighth Army policy was consistent with the capabilities of the early partisans. Some of the groups, at least, were able to sustain themselves in the interior for several weeks or even months before returning to the island bases.³¹ It became evident during the first half of 1951, however, that most of them could not. This may have been

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due to strengthened enemy security measures, the relative poverty of operating areas, large numbers of partisans operating in a relatively small area, or even operational deficiencies of the partisans themselves. In any event Eighth Army began to furnish increasing quantities of goods, and the initial policy of frugality was largely abandoned by the end of the year. Indeed, before the end of the year Eighth Army rice issue to the partisans was increased beyond subsistence levels and became a sort of payment.*

The fact that the partisans proved to be less self-supporting than Eighth Army had initially hoped did not become a very serious problem, however. Since they were based on friendly-held islands to which the UN forces, with command of air and sea, had direct access, the partisans could be supplied mainly by boat. In emergencies, moreover, it was possible to supply by air, using the beach at one of the main island bases as a landing strip. Ordinarily, of course, partisan forces operating behind enemy lines have to be supplied, if at all, by expensive and difficult airdrops. Eighth Army had less difficulty in getting supplies to the partisans than is usually the case in operations of this kind.

Information concerning the amount of supplies furnished to the partisans is incomplete for this period. One available report covers the period from 23 Jan to 6 Jun 51, and lists the Class I, II, III, IV, and V supplies furnished from EUSAK REAR to the three partisan units.³² Figure A10 illustrates the relative amounts of each that were furnished; Table A2 gives the actual quantities. No comparable report exists for the remainder of 1951.

Weapons were among the most important items that had to be furnished to the partisans. A February 1951 estimate gives the number of weapons possessed by partisans as approximately 1000.²⁹ Between the end of January and the first week of June Eighth Army supplied 1707 additional weapons. Between mid-February and 31 July the partisans captured 762 weapons.³³ These three figures account for 3469 of the 4000 weapons that partisans were said to possess in July 1951.³⁴ A large number of the weapons originally possessed and presumably also a large number of those captured were assorted enemy weapons. Of those furnished by Eighth Army, 747 were various Russian and Japanese weapons. It is possible that the nature of the weapons and their variety created a difficult ammunition-procurement problem during the year, but this cannot be determined from the evidence at hand.

It is interesting to note that in July 1951, when the partisans reportedly possessed about 4000 weapons, the mobilized force numbered over 7000 persons. Whether the gap between numbers of personnel and numbers of weapons remained as large during the remainder of the period was impossible to discover, but it is assumed that the gradual abandonment of Eighth Army's frugality policy brought the two figures closer together.

Food was another major item of supply. Between the end of January and the first week of June, the partisans were furnished 801 tons of rice, presumably over and above the Class I supplies listed in Table A2. Assuming a 4½-month period this averages 178 tons per month. Assuming an average of 4500 partisans during the period—which can only be a rough estimate—this would provide 80 lb of rice per man per month. This appears to have been ample,

*The partisan practice was to barter or sell excess rice for side dishes and needed supplies on the Korean market.

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and it suggests that the Eighth Army policy of frugality was not strictly applied, at least to rice, even during the first half of 1951. In comparison with the amount furnished by Eighth Army the quantity of food reported captured by partisans was negligible. Between 15 March and 30 September, a period of 6½ months, 1011




Fig. A10—Proportion of Classes of Supplies Furnished by EUSAK REAR, 23 January to 6 June 1951


Table A2
SUPPLY BY EUSAK REAR, 23 JANUARY TO 6 JUNE 1951
(Short tons)

Class of supply ^a	LEOPARD	KIRKLAND	BAKER	Total	Percentage of total
I	227.00	5.50	2.50	235.00	23.60
II, IV	83.88	26.95	14.17	125.00	12.55
III	490.00	27.00	4.23	521.23	52.35
V	77.04	35.15	2.21	114.40	11.49
Total	877.92	94.60	23.11	995.63	99.99
Percentage of total	88.18	9.50	2.32	100.00	—

^aClass I—rations; Class II—clothing and equipment; Class III—fuel and lubricants; Class IV—construction and fortification materials; Class V—ammunition and explosives.

bags of food were captured.³⁵ Assuming 100-lb bags and an average of 4500 partisans, this amounts to less than 3½ lb per man per month.

The available evidence points to the conclusion, then, that the UN partisans were heavily dependent on Eighth Army for logistical support during 1951 in spite of initial Eighth Army policies with respect to supply. There is no evidence that permits a reasonable estimate of the cost of the supplies provided



during this period, but it may be assumed that the quantity of supplies furnished was smaller than that for later periods, when supply was regularized on a larger scale.

OPERATIONS

It has been mentioned that the UN partisans materialized suddenly, at a time when Eighth Army was attempting to recover from the drastic retreat from the Yalu. During the first months of 1951, therefore, considerable attention had to be given to matters of organization, training, supply, and general preparation for their possible employment in conjunction with Eighth Army offensive plans. The partisans were encouraged to form distinct units under their own leaders; training programs were instituted, especially for demolition operations; food and clothing were issued; and limited amounts of arms and ammunition were distributed. As rapidly as they could be readied as combat-effective groups, partisans were assigned operating areas on the mainland. According to Eighth Army plans they were to establish bases there, contact other dissidents, begin to collect and communicate intelligence, and proceed to harass the enemy.³⁰

It has also been mentioned that early Eighth Army planning with respect to the partisans was predicated on the assumption that large numbers could and would operate from mobile bases deep in the interior. Some of the early groups were probably able to live off the enemy and sympathetic villagers for weeks or even months at a time before returning to their island bases.³¹ The pattern of operations later in 1951, however, suggests that there was less capability in this regard than Eighth Army officers had initially hoped. The number of mobilized and armed partisans had grown from 1000 in February to over 4000 in July,³⁷ but most of them evidently operated on the mainland for comparatively short periods of time. Most of the partisan activity by mid-1951 apparently consisted of commando-type shallow-penetration hit-and-run raids launched from the islands.³⁴ This operational pattern became more pronounced in the course of the year and developed as the chief feature of the partisan campaign in Korea during most of the next 2 years.

Operating Areas

The preponderance of partisan actions took place in western and southern Hwanghae Province, the area from which most of the partisans had been evacuated and the area within closest striking distance of the islands where they took refuge.

Figure A11 shows the general geographical distribution, by grid squares, of all partisan actions reported between May and December 1951; Table A3 shows the corresponding distribution on a monthly basis. Nearly 97 percent of the actions took place in western Korea, with only 3.1 percent on the east coast. Fully 86 percent of the actions took place in the grid squares constituting the general Hwanghae area. Moreover, this extremely high concentration of activity in Hwanghae, with relatively little activity in coastal areas in the north and almost none on the east coast, is fairly consistent throughout the period.






Fig. A11—Percentages of Actions by Grid Squares, May to November 1951



The most significant shift in this geographical pattern involves actions taking place in the grid squares (YC and BT) containing the major noncoastal areas of Hwanghae. As Table A4 shows, the ratio of these internal to total Hwanghae actions shows a distinct downward tendency throughout the period

Table A3
ACTION BY GRID SQUARES, MAY TO NOVEMBER 1951

Month	No. of actions	Percentages in grid squares ^a													Percentage	
		YC	YC	YB	YD	BS	XB	BT	XD	XE	DU	DT	CU	CT	Hwang-hae	East coast
May	69	35	39	6	—	12	—	7	1	—	—	—	—	—	99	0
June	79	46	18	13	—	8	3	4	6	—	4	—	—	—	92	4
July	71	27	24	11	8	4	3	3	13	3	4	—	—	—	72	4
August	94	34	21	16	—	3	4	2	12	3	2	2	—	—	80	4
September	101	37	22	7	3	16	2	5	5	1	—	3	—	—	89	3
October	114	39	16	14	4	9	8	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	94	0
November	100	38	11	13	—	7	2	4	10	3	1	2	2	2	80	7
May-Nov	628	36.7	20.5	12.4	2.2	8.4	3.3	4.8	6.7	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.3	0.3	86.1	3.1

^aSee App E for numbers of actions in grid squares.

Table A4
HWANGHAE PROVINCE ACTIONS,
MAY TO NOVEMBER 1951

Month	Percentage of total actions		Ratio: internal to total, Hwanghae
	Hwanghae	Internal grids YC and BT	
May	99	46	0.46
June	92	22	0.24
July	72	27	0.38
August	80	23	0.29
September	89	27	0.30
October	94	24	0.26
November	80	15	0.19

covered. This is consistent with the point that early partisan groups may have conducted more interior-based actions than was the case in later periods of 1951. Figure A12 shows the actual locations of the YC and BT actions, plotted to the first easterly and the first northerly coordinates.*

Types of Action

Between May and December the UN partisans conducted approximately 685 individual actions. The after-action reports for the period rarely specify

*It should be noted that after-action reports for this period do not identify specific actions as island- or interior-based.



the planned objective for the particular action, but they describe briefly what happened. In these terms these actions have been categorized as follows:

(a) Attacks on enemy troops (including quasi-military personnel, excluding attacks on tactical installations or positions and excluding attacks on troops in vehicles).

(b) Attacks on tactical installations (bunkers, trenches, emplacements, CPs, and the like).




Fig. A12—Actions in Internal Hwanghae Grids YC and BT, May to November 1951

(c) Attacks on transport and transport facilities (e.g., carts and vehicles as well as roads, rails, and bridges).

(d) Attacks on supplies and storage facilities (e.g., food dumps, ammunition dumps, and warehouses).

(e) Attacks on civil administration (including police stations and police contingents and including Communist Party facilities and personnel).

(f) Intelligence activities (including reconnaissance, patrols, and escorting of agents, but excluding the furnishing of target information).

(g) Observation for naval gunfire (including fire adjustment but excluding the furnishing of target locations).

(h) Other activities, of which the most important were attacks on communication facilities and equipment, attacks on whole villages, naval engagements with armed junks, and distribution of psywar materials.



The relative frequencies with which these types of actions were reported in the period are illustrated in Fig. A13 and Table A5. Figure A13 shows the relative frequencies for all actions reported during the period. Table A5 shows the relative frequencies tabulated by months.

Table A5
ACTIONS BY TYPES, MAY TO NOVEMBER 1951^a

Month	No. of actions	Percentages of actions ^b							
		Enemy troops	Tactical installations	Transport	Supplies and storage	Civil administration	Intelligence	Naval gunfire observation	Other
May	77	52	—	21	10	1	1	8	6
June	72	47	8	18	10	3	1	7	4
July	83	25	23	29	6	6	1	6	4
August	75	63	1	11	15	1	3	7	7
September	127	65	1	4	4	—	1	22	3
October	118	64	2	7	11	2	—	9	6
November	132	33	14	5	13	2	—	30	2
May-Nov	684	52.1	6.7	11.3	9.2	1.9	0.8	13.8	4.2

^aDiscrepancies in number of actions between Tables A3 and A5 are due to the occasional failure of after-action reports to record the types of information required for the particular tables.

^bFor numbers of actions by type see App E.




Fig. A13—Types of Partisan Action, 1 May to 1 December 1951

It is apparent that attacks on enemy troops constituted by far the most frequent type of action. These actions, among which have been included attacks on quasi-military groups such as home-defense or home-guard contingents, amounted to 52 percent of the actions during the period. The next most frequent type of action consisted of observation for naval gunfire, nearly 14 percent of



the actions. Other types of action, in order of frequency, were attacks on transport (11.3 percent), attacks on supply installations (9.2 percent), attacks on tactical installations (6.7 percent), attacks on civil administration (1.9 percent), and intelligence actions (0.8 percent). Only 4.2 percent of the actions were placed in the miscellaneous category.

Within the period May to November 1951 the most striking fluctuations in relative frequencies occurred with respect to attacks on tactical installations, transport, and naval gunfire observation. The percentage of attacks on tactical installations, which over-all amounted to less than 7 percent of the actions, increased sharply to 23 percent of actions in July and 14 percent of actions in

Table A6
CASUALTIES CLAIMED BY PARTISANS, MAY TO NOVEMBER 1951

Month	KIA	WIA	POWs	Total	No. of actions ^a	Casualties per action
May	633	406	75	1,114	77	14.5
June	874	117	23	1,014	79	12.8
July	614	90	71	775	83	9.3
August	659	56	49	764	94	8.1
September	1816	828	94	2,738	127	21.6
October	2664	2744	60	5,468	118 ^a	46.3
November	1835	568	13	2,416	132	20.1 ^b
Total	9095	4809	385	14,289	710	—
Monthly avg	1299	687	55	2,041	101	—
Percentage	63.6	33.7	2.7	100.0	—	—

^aOne week's reports not available in October.

^bBut 19.2 if the number of actions for October is extrapolated.

November. Attack on transport was the second most numerous type of action in the first half of the period but declined markedly thereafter. At the same time naval gunfire observation increased in relative frequency and became, in the last half of the period, the second most numerous type of action. The remainder of the types of actions were relatively constant throughout the period.

Results

According to available after-action reports, partisans inflicted 14,289 casualties between 1 May and 1 Dec 51. A further report for the period 15 Mar to 30 Apr 51 claims an additional 709 casualties inflicted, so that the total casualties inflicted between January and December 1951 may be somewhat over 15,000. Table A6 lists these casualty claims, broken down by KIA, WIA, and POWs. It should be noted that these figures purport to include only casualties inflicted by direct partisan action and do not include casualties claimed as a result of air strikes and naval gunfire called for by partisans. It should further be noted that the claims include military, quasi-military, and civilian casualties. Finally, and most important, it should also be noted that these casualty claims are unevaluated and that their reliability is unknown. In view of the unsupervised nature of partisan activity, the reliability of all claims is suspect.



Figure A14 compares the claimed casualties with the number of partisan actions each month. Over the entire period, partisans reported 19.2 casualties inflicted per action, which was greatly in excess of partisan casualties sustained.³³




Fig. A14—Relation of Casualties Inflicted by Partisans to Number of Partisan Actions

--- Connect points for which data are not available

Major items of materiel captured or destroyed in the course of partisan operations between 15 March and 30 September (6½ months) are listed in Table A7. It is evident that arms, ammunition, and food were items most often captured—on the order of 1½ weapons, 45 rounds of ammunition, and 2 bags of food per action.* If approximately 80 attacks on transport and transport facilities are estimated to have been made during the period, the transportation equipment claimed to have been destroyed is significant: 160 carts and trucks, 28 boats, 49 bridges, 12 tunnels, and 22 railroad sections.

Airborne Operations³⁸

In spite of the stress on the possibility of airborne action in the early Eighth Army plans, only two such operations were carried out in 1951.

The first airborne action (Virginia I) was directed at an enemy MSR. Four US paratroopers and 19 or 20 Koreans were airdropped in the vicinity of Hyong-ni (CT 9875) on 15 Mar 51, but failed to accomplish their mission. All but five of the team members were captured or lost. The second action (Spitfire) took place in the latter part of June 1951. In this action an advance party of three US and British personnel and two Koreans, followed a week later by an additional two UN and nine Koreans, were airdropped at Karyoju-ri (CT 2792). This operation also failed to accomplish its mission—that of establishing a guerrilla base behind enemy lines—but all personnel were able to exfiltrate safely, some after a month in the interior.

*Assuming 710 actions.



With the exception of these operations BAKER SECTION was primarily concerned with training during 1951. It is possible that further airborne operations would have been conducted in this period if (a) the first two had appeared to be successful, (b) the opportunities had appeared to be profitable in terms of tactical reward, and (c) the personnel had been considered to be well trained. In any event the role of airborne operations in this period was not significant.

Table A7

MATERIEL CAPTURED AND DESTROYED BY PARTISANS, MARCH TO SEPTEMBER 1951^a

Materiel	15 Mar-30 Apr	1-31 May	1-29 Jun	30 Jun-31 Jul	Aug	Sep	Total
Captured							
Small arms	194	92	196	104	78	58	721
MGs	14	19	55	—	1	3	93
Ammo (rds)	—	6200	7500	12	8173	120	22,005
Grenades	—	64	84	—	45	40	233
Arty pieces	—	6	—	—	—	—	6
Boats	10	13	3	3	—	—	29
Rice (bags)	—	—	600	34	98	96	828
Other food (bags)	—	—	24	—	83	76	183
Destroyed							
Supply trucks	14	13	6	—	7	—	40
Supply carts	26	13	8	27	5	41	120
Boats	—	—	11	—	1	16	28
Bridges	—	9	9	13	5	1	37
RR bridges	—	—	2	7	2	1	12
Tunnels	3	1	1	4	2	1	12
Telephone poles	—	36	10	—	1	—	47
RR sections	—	5	13	—	4	—	22
OPs	12	—	—	8	6	—	26
Ammo dumps	—	4	1	—	—	1	6
Supply dumps	—	3	1	—	—	—	4
CPs	5	—	—	—	—	—	5

^aFrom daily and weekly after-action reports and Operations Tabulation, Task Force WILLIAM ABLE, 8240 AU Files.

Enemy Countermeasures

Evidence of enemy counteraction to partisan operations during this period is difficult to assess. Some of the partisan-held islands were attacked; a few were taken.³⁹ Partisans reported that special counter guerrilla forces had been established in some areas.⁴⁰ Area security and coastal-defense strength in general was increased, but it is not known whether this was a reaction to partisan activities.

Figure A15 compares partisan strength, number of partisan actions, and number of enemy troops apparently engaged in rear-area defense on the west coast of Korea (where most of the partisan activity took place) for months for which data were available. A sharp increase in enemy strength took place from July to September 1951, but it does not appear to have been caused by changes in the intensity of partisan activity. It is conceivable, however, that the increase

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was a reaction to the change in the structure of types of partisan actions, in particular to the increase in raids on tactical installations and the sustained pressure against transport (see Table A5). It is also interesting to note that the build-up in coastal strength preceded the enemy attacks on partisan-held islands near the Yalu Estuary in the fall of 1951. These possibilities do not, however, permit a conclusive answer to the question. The evidence at hand does not show whether partisan activities induced the enemy to redeploy significant numbers of troops in this period.




Fig. A15—Relation of Enemy West Coast Defense Strength to Number of Partisan Actions and Partisan Strength

--- Connect points for which data are not available

o Estimates

Military Significance

What contribution did partisan activities make to the UN war effort during the period January to November 1951? As previously mentioned, the initial Eighth Army objectives with respect to the partisans who came under its command in early 1951 were primarily aimed at their employment in connection with a large-scale UN offensive. That offensive did not materialize, with the result that partisans merely continued to conduct various types of harassing activities instead. It is with reference to these activities, therefore, that the partisan contribution must be assessed.

The most important point to note in this connection is that the geographical configuration of partisan operations seriously limited their possible influence. As a target area for partisan activities western and southern Hwanghae was not especially promising. The area lies west of the critical approaches north and south and was bypassed by the principal actions of the war. It is agricultural rather than industrial. The most important military feature of the province, with the possible exception of the large food-producing basin west of Sariwon, was the Pyongyang-Sariwon-Kaesong railroad and highway. This was one of the two lines connecting Manchuria with the combat area and was thus a major supply route. It was one of the principal objectives of early Eighth Army plans

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for employing the partisans, but it was east of the main arena of the operations that were actually conducted.*

Thus employment of the partisans as a significant force in connection with a tactical offensive required a capacity that the partisans did not demonstrate during this period—a capacity to operate deep in the Hwanghae interior, above all in the area of the MSR. Even the secondary objectives stated—small-scale attrition or harassing activities—were probably better served by interior actions than by the coastal activity that comprised the great bulk of operations.

As for the military significance of the types of action conducted, it has been shown that the majority of actions were casualty-producing in nature. According to reports casualties inflicted were high, but they included (a) military personnel engaged in secondary missions such as coastal or area defense, (b) quasi-military personnel whose value was presumably limited, and (c) large numbers of civilians. They were, furthermore, casualties inflicted on an enemy who apparently considered manpower as cheap. Consequently even if the casualty claims are accepted at face value it is likely that they had no great significance outside the immediate area of operations.

Other types of actions such as attacks on transport, supply, and tactical installations may have been more important, but it is difficult to evaluate their effects. Since no marked enemy reaction is discernible and in view of the lack of major targets in the operating areas, it is not probable that partisan activities in west and south Hwanghae (the great bulk of the actions) constituted a serious threat to the enemy in this period.

This analysis does not take into account the value of intelligence functions performed by the partisans incidental to their overt operations, or whatever value they may have had as a defensive force for islands on which the UN command maintained radar and other installations. Some of these functions, especially the furnishing of target information for air strikes or naval gunfire, may have indirectly produced a considerable number of casualties and a considerable amount of damage and destruction of enemy facilities, though it is not possible from the data at hand to establish this.⁴¹

The performance of these two functions—behind-the-lines intelligence and defense of island installations—did not require the organization and support of a specifically partisan effort, of course, but there may have been real value in the partisan contribution to them.

*For a general account of the military features of Hwanghae Province see CHQ/FEC Terrain Study No. 6.⁴¹

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38. Command Reports, op. cit., Bk 4, Pt 4, Annex K, Mar, Apr, Jun 51.
39. Ibid., Annex K, Nov 51.
40. Ibid., Apr, May, Jun 51.
41. Geographic Branch, Theater Intelligence Div, GHQ, FEC, MIS, G/S, "Northern Korea," Terrain Study No. 6.

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Appendix B

SECOND PERIOD: DECEMBER 1951 TO APRIL 1953

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POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

As suggested in App A it had been apparent by late 1951 that the truce negotiations would be protracted, and that during the course of the talks the UN forces would be confined to active defense of positions already held. So long as no abrupt failure of the negotiations occurred, a UN attempt to end the Korean War on the battlefield was considered unlikely.

The major objective of a cease-fire was pursued consistently during this period. In 1952 the talks became further prolonged over the question of prisoner exchange until, in early December, India's plan on the prisoner issue was accepted by the UN. This, however, did not mean a cessation of hostilities or an end to negotiation. It was not until April 1953, after the enemy had agreed to voluntary repatriation of prisoners and arrangements were made for immediate exchange of the sick and wounded, that real hope of an early truce was again aroused.

During this period of time, from December 1951 to April 1953, one of the more important features of UN military activity was the Air Force interdiction campaign. In 1952 the Air Force rarely flew less than 4000 sorties monthly against enemy transport and supply, and in the peak month—May—flew more than 9500. Nevertheless this campaign failed to prevent the enemy build-up of men and materiel. He was able to dig in elaborately along the MLR and increase both his front-line strength and rear-area reserves. Thus the requirements in men and materiel for a successful UN offensive became greater and greater, a fact that undoubtedly affected Eighth Army planning.

In respect to the partisan effort the most significant aspect of this situation was the stabilization of the MLR. This gave the enemy advantages and capabilities he might not have enjoyed if confronted with a fluid battle front. Not only were the UN forces not in a position to exploit fully whatever could be done by partisan activity, but the enemy had every opportunity in this static situation to maintain tight rear-area security in strategic areas. Even in the less strategic coastal areas the enemy could deploy sufficient forces to keep the island-based partisans under steady pressure.

The military stalemate permitted the enemy to exploit more fully an additional advantage relative to his rear-area security. This was the Communist political organization in North Korea. The Communists had been in control of the area since 1945, during which time they could track down and eliminate dissidents in the manner typical of Red policy the world around. Reports of some partisan leaders concerning their prewar anti-Communist activities indicate clearly that much Communist attention was directed toward tightening local political organization. Enemy countermeasures against partisans trying to operate behind the lines were undoubtedly enhanced by this factor.

One other consideration relevant to partisan activity appears to have resulted from the general situation in this period. The partisans in time could no longer entertain as hopefully their initial expectations of a victorious return to their home communities in North Korea. Although no evidence was found that this consideration affected partisan morale seriously during 1952, the improbability of realizing this goal might have affected partisan incentive by the end of the period. The partisans, in effect, were becoming homeless wards of the UN forces.

COMMAND OBJECTIVES

By 10 Dec 51, when the partisans were absorbed under FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, a theater-level agency, the probability of using partisans in direct support of a general UN offensive was distinctly remote. Nevertheless the unit records indicate no over-all reassessment of partisan objectives at this time. Rather there appears to have been a tacit acceptance by the new command of the pattern of activity developed while the partisans were under Eighth Army, and it can be deduced that the intended objective was harassment of the enemy by the types of operation previously conducted. In practice this meant that most decisions were left in the hands of the UN advisers and partisan leaders, although specific missions were assigned by headquarters from time to time.

Among these missions were the defense of island bases,*¹ the development of interior units, discovery and destruction of enemy radar sites,² and assistance in the recovery of downed UN airmen and escaped POWs.³ More emphasis was also placed on psychological warfare, and a special section for this purpose was organized under FEC/LD (K) toward the end of 1952. In fact an extensive leaflet, word-of-mouth, and sabotage campaign had been planned against the enemy's spot tax on grain during the harvest season of the same year. Then, in the first 4 months of 1953, a leaflet campaign to increase defection among North Korean fishermen, farmers, students, and draftees was planned. Leaflets were to have been both airdropped and distributed behind enemy lines by the partisans.⁴

In addition a number of airborne missions were planned and assigned in 1952 and early 1953. Of these, 8 out of 10 launched were interdiction operations, and the other 2 were intended primarily to establish contact with reportedly friendly elements for the purpose of setting up guerrilla bases in the enemy rear. The use of partisans to interdict enemy supply routes and communications, in fact, had been suggested as an experiment from the DA level in mid-1952,⁵ several months after a number had been tried.

During the fall of 1952 a concerted effort was made to increase partisan offensive activity. At this time decisions were made by the theater command to expand partisan strength by an intensive recruiting program. It was planned to double strength to 20,000 men by 15 Mar 53, and to redouble to 40,000 by 15 Jul 53. The immediate command objectives at the time the decisions were made cannot be determined from the unit records available to this study but can only be deduced from the general restatement of purpose reflected in formal plans that were developed in early 1953.

*Following effective enemy action against the west coast island bases in late 1951, the Navy expressed a lack of confidence in the partisans in respect to strategic island bases. As a result the Navy was given this responsibility by early 1952, a development welcomed by the partisan command in the realization that the islands could not be held without strong naval or air support.

On 12 Jan 53 Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), requested three plans for partisan operations during the year.⁶ The plans were to cover two phases, one from 28 Jan to 15 Mar and the other from 15 Mar to 15 Sep 53. Plan Phase I and Plan Phase IIA were to be based on the assumption that Eighth Army would remain on active defense. Plan Phase IIB was to assume that a general UN offensive would occur by late summer. All three plans were to be submitted between 23 Jan and 23 Feb 53.

A plan for Phase I was prepared and received interim approval from G2, AFFE, by 28 January, pending further staff study. Stated missions included the following:

- [1] Continue present harassment of enemy through normal operations [;]... increase... attacks by interior units particularly aimed at disruption of military units [;]... priority for area of operations... Hwanghae Province and such other areas as weather conditions permit.
- [2] Attack on order with all combat effectives to harass, contain maximum enemy troops in coastal areas, interrupt communications [;]... institute the maximum interdiction program for all rail and highway MSR's. Direct maximum effort at destruction of bridges and tunnels.
- [3] Employ normal guerrilla and partisan tactics directed at support of EUSAK.
- [4] Plan for dispatch of airborne units on order against terrain features to hamper and delay any major enemy operation.*7

Even before interim approval had been obtained for Plan Phase I, concern was expressed by CINCFE about a possible enemy offensive before mid-March. It was anticipated that this enemy attack would occur along a line south from Kaesong to recapture Seoul.⁸ By 3 February CINCFE had directed that partisan operations in support of Eighth Army be intensified.⁹ Two days later CCRAK implemented this directive by issuing Annex II to Plan Phase I. This annex assigned the following immediate missions should an enemy offensive be initiated:¹⁰

- [1] Increase harassment by implementing Phase I, Partisan Operation Plan, 28 Jan 53, which has received interim G-2 approval. This will include hit-and-run raids, small-scale ambush, sabotage, and destruction.
- [2] Continue defense of Kanghwa-do and Kyodong-do.
- [3] Increase reconnaissance activities with emphasis on movement of enemy units.

In addition to these missions, which had been outlined by CINCFE, CCRAK requested that specific efforts be made toward the destruction of locomotives in the Haeju area, particularly from Haeju to Sariwon and from Haeju west to Chwiya-ri.

A plan for Phase IIA covering the period 15 March to 15 September was drafted and forwarded to G2, AFFE, by 10 Feb 53. Partisan missions stated in this plan were in general no different from those assigned in Plan Phase I, the only essential departure being a much more extended area of operations.¹¹ It was hoped that as the weather improved the partisans on both coasts would be able to strike farther and farther north. Of particular interest was a proposed extension of the east coast operational area. Previously, the east coast partisans had been restricted by policy to the narrow strip of coast running from the MLR north to Wonsan. Then, as the unit expanded vastly in strength during the fall of 1952, permission was granted to extend its activity as far

*This plan also had concurrence of G3, AFFE, by 31 Jan 53, and of G3, EUSAK, by 27 Feb 53.

north as the Tumen River, a decision reflected in an operational-level plan before the end of the year.¹² Figure B1 illustrates the operational planning for Phase IIA. The detailed missions assigned the partisans are reproduced in App E.

A draft plan for Phase IIB based on the assumption of a general UN offensive in 1953 was submitted by 22 February, and copies for comment were sent to G2, AFFE, and Eighth Army. There was no difference between Plans IIA and IIB insofar as the general mission assigned the partisans was concerned, in spite of the fact that one plan presupposed active defense by Eighth Army and the other a general UN offensive.

A number of special projects were also planned by the partisan command in the first 4 months of 1953. These included projects for the penetration of POW camps, the recruiting of partisans in Manchuria and Sakhalin, assassination of Communist officials, the capture of an enemy MIG aircraft, and the use of Chinese partisans for sabotage operations in the Sinuiju-Antung complex. Practically all these were dropped by April, either as unrealistically conceived or for lack of specific intelligence on the operation planned.¹³

During the long period December 1951 to April 1953 there appear to be two significant points to be made about the partisan command objectives. First, there was a tacit acceptance of the pattern of partisan activity established in 1951 rather than a general reappraisal of the effort in the light of a changing political-military situation. Second, after the decisions made in the fall-winter of 1952-1953 to extend the partisan operational area and to increase partisan strength, there was a formal restatement of command objectives. These, however, again accepted on a broader scale the prevailing pattern of activity.

ORGANIZATION

Headquarters Organization

Perhaps the most significant organizational change in respect to the partisans occurred toward the end of the first period discussed in this study. This was the transfer of the partisans on 10 Dec 51 from Eighth Army to direct command by a theater-level agency, FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU. This unit was under the operational control of FEC/LG, 8240 AU, which in turn was responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ, FEC.

At about the same time another theater-level organization, CCRAK, 8240 AU, also under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ, FEC, was established in Korea. CCRAK was to be responsible for coordinating all behind-the-lines activities of various services and agencies. For an interim period it was assigned to FEC/LG in Tokyo.

The next major organizational change did not occur until 27 Sep 52 and is illustrated by Fig. B2. At this time CCRAK was redesignated as the 8242 AU and was relieved of assignment to FEC/LG. Simultaneously CCRAK was given operational control of FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU. After this, FEC/LG, as a part of theater G2, was to exercise staff supervision and to provide administrative and logistical support for CCRAK.¹⁴ This organizational change took place at about the same time that the decision was made to expand partisan strength.




Fig. B1—Operational Areas Plan for Phase IIA

Areas of Priority for Partisan Operations

a. Priorities will be assigned to areas as indicated below:

- (1) West Coast: Circular area from CHONJU (XD9095) on the North, to KANGDONG (BU4837) on the East, to KYOMIPO (YC3090) on the South.
- (2) East Coast: The HUNGNAM-PANDOK-KOJO Complex, extending in a circular area from HONGWON (DY1032) on the North, to YANGDOK (BU9744) on the West, to the coast line ten (10) miles South of KOJO (DU0311) on the South.
- (3) Hwanghae Province: East to line SINGYE (BT8664) – KUMCHON (BT8026).

b. North HAMGYONG Province, northern half of South HAMGYONG Province and CHAKANG Province, except for coastal operations, will remain covert until ordered overt by CG, AFFE.

Order for Selection of Target Priorities within Area Priorities

- a. General disruption in rear areas by inflicting maximum casualties, thereby causing the enemy to employ a maximum number of troops in counterpartisan operations.
- b. Capture of prisoners of war and documents.
- c. Destruction of logistical supplies, with priority on POL products and ammunition.
- d. Destruction of wire communications.
- e. Destruction of MSR's during the rainy season.

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The emergence of CCRAK as the unit in charge of partisans was the final wartime answer by FEC to the problem of organization for unconventional warfare. It was, in effect, a single theater-level agency for the coordination and direction of certain intelligence and related behind-the-lines activities in support of combat operations. This included, of course, partisan activities.




Fig. B2—Headquarters Organization, October 1952

--- Staff coordination

One further organizational change was made in 1952, although this did not materially affect the structure in Korea. This came about as the result of the activation of AFFE, and the establishment by CINCFE of a Joint Headquarters and Joint Staff. On 15 Dec 52, CINCFE designated the Commanding General, AFFE, as his executive agent for the conduct of theater covert, clandestine, and related activities in support of combat operations. FEC/LG, 8240 AU, was redesignated as Support Group, 8240 AU, at this time, and a Special Operations Division (SOD) was organized in G2, AFFE. SOD, with the 8240 AU, provided administrative and logistical support and maintained staff responsibility for CCRAK.¹⁵ The new command line is shown in Fig. B3.

Operating-Level Organization

Other changes in organization occurred at the operational level between late 1951 and April 1953. One change was made almost simultaneously with the transfer of the partisans from G3 Eighth Army to FEC/LD (K). This was the division of the west coast island area into two separate commands, a decision considered necessary for administrative and logistical reasons since mid-1951. One command, Operation WOLFPACK, was to operate east of the Ongjin Peninsula; LEOPARD Command was confined to the area west and north of that point. The individual partisan units in the WOLFPACK area were

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called "wolfpacks" by number rather than donkeys as they had been while under LEOPARD BASE. Figure B4 represents the organizational structure at the operating level at the beginning of 1952.

Strengths were built up and more partisan-led units were added during the first 9 months of 1952, especially in the LEOPARD and WOLFPACK areas, but there were no further organizational changes at the regimental level. Below this level each of the west coast partisan units had their own staffs, including




Fig. B3—Headquarters Organization, December 1952

--- Staff coordination

Although the Letter of Instructions was issued at this time, AFFE was not actually set up until early in 1953.

an S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5.* The American advisers with the units had the task of assisting these staffs in planning operations, but the units remained administratively independent under the partisan leadership.

In late November 1952, a month or so after the program to expand partisan strength was under way, it was decided to redesignate each of the partisan units and the command as well. The partisan section of FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, was given the title of "United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea" (UNPFK), and each of the major area commands became "regiments." LEOPARD became the 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment (PIR), WOLFPACK was redesignated as the 2d PIR, and Task Force SCANNON (formerly KIRKLAND) became the 3d PIR.

*The S5 staff sections in the partisan units usually reported directly to the partisan leader and were charged with maintaining internal military discipline.

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A number of the partisans who had been given airborne training by BAKER SECTION became the cadre for a greatly expanded airborne unit designated as the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment (PAIR). Provision was also made at this time to divide the west coast areas further. By April 1953 a 5th PIR was created in the area that had been known as WOLFPACK WEST, and a 6th PIR in the area called LEOPARD NORTH.




Fig. B4—Organization of Partisan Operating-Level Units, January 1952

Within each of the major area or regimental commands the partisan units were to be reported by number as "battalions" rather than as donkeys or wolfpacks. This change was made on the ground that it would give the theater command and the DA better understanding of the operation. Actually the old code names were retained within the units for morale purposes, and the partisans continued to call themselves donkeys or wolfpacks.¹⁶ The new designations of all units and the organizational structure are shown in Fig. B5, which represents the partisan commands in April 1953, the highest point of organizational development at the operational level. Between December 1951 and April 1953 the partisan organization had been expanded into a series of complex regimental units, each with its headquarters complement of American personnel. Figures B6 and B7 show the strengths and dispositions of partisan units as of January 1952 and February 1953. As illustrated, the partisans continually reported a part of their strength based on the mainland. In July 1952 LEOPARD (later 1st PIR) claimed about one-third of its strength of over 3000 men on the mainland, and, in the week of 8 to 14 Feb 53, from the records of which Fig. B9 was compiled, reported 1618 of its 6929 partisans in interior units. KIRKLAND and WOLFPACK had a much smaller proportion of their personnel in interior units during 1952. In February 1953 these units (then the 3d and 2d PIRs) reported none at all.

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


Fig. B5—Organization of Partisan Operating-Level Units, April 1953

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


Fig. B6—Strength and Disposition of Partisan Units, January 1952

The larger figure in partisan unit "boxes" by location represents the number of partisans reported in a specific unit; the smaller figure, the number of US advisers with the unit.



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


Fig. B7—Strength and Disposition of Partisan Units, February 1953

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PERSONNEL

US Personnel

FEC/LD (K)'s TD at the time that it absorbed the 8086 AU called for 65 officers and 111 enlisted men.¹⁷ This TD remained virtually unchanged until the fall of 1952.

During 1952 the actual monthly strength of FEC/LD (K) averaged about 66 officers and 128 enlisted men. Not all of the FEC/LD (K) personnel, however, were directly engaged in the partisan effort. The monthly breakdown in 1952 is given in Table B1.*

Table B1
MONTHLY STRENGTH OF FEC/LD (K), 1952

Month	Partisan operations		Intelligence operations		Serving both		Total	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
January	20	23	9	12	36	63	65	98
February	21	34	11	13	37	80	69	127
March	25	32	22	20	22	69	69	121
April	20	31	22	26	28	68	70	125
May	22	37	20	25	20	79	62	141
June	20	34	26	30	17	68	63	132
July	19	29	24	32	14	66	57	127
September	24	34	21	35	16	59	61	128
October	28	31	24	39	13	59	65	129
November	31	38	33	38	17	73	81	149
Average	23	32	21	27	22	68	66	128

Not all the personnel assigned to partisan operations were with operating units. The monthly average of those actually with operating units is given in the accompanying tabulation. It is also to be noted that not all the personnel with these operating units served directly with the partisans as advisers. Each of these units had its headquarters establishment, including the commanding officer, staff, radio operators, and housekeeping personnel.

Area command	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
LEOPARD	9	16	25
WOLFPACK	7	8	15
KIRKLAND	4	6	10
Total	20	30	50

If only the partisan side of FEC/LD (K) is considered, the average strength of US personnel assigned during most of 1952 was approximately the same as

*Figures taken from personnel rosters, FEC/LD(K); no rosters were available for the months of August and December.



that assigned by Eighth Army in 1951. The FEC/LD (K) average was about 23 officers and 32 enlisted men, whereas the average assigned by Eighth Army in 1951 was about 21 officers and 35 enlisted men. It must be remembered, however, that part of the FEC/LD (K) headquarters overhead serving both the partisan and intelligence sections should be added to the above figures for 1952 for a true comparison.

The number of Americans directly involved in the partisan effort was about 10.6 per 1000 partisans at the beginning of this period in late 1951. By May 1952 this had dropped off to 8.1, and the relative number of Americans to partisans steadily declined during the balance of the year. In November the low point of 4.9 per 1000 was reached as the partisan expansion program began to pick up momentum. The relative number of Americans increased again in 1953 as a result of augmented TDs for FEC/LD (K). These ratios are illustrated in Fig. B8.




Fig. B8—US Personnel per 1000 Partisans

Until December 1951 the figures include all US personnel in 8086 AU; from December 1951 on, the figures include only those FEC/LD (K) personnel assigned to the partisan section.

As already mentioned the total number of US personnel assigned to the partisans changed little until the fall of 1952. Then, after the decision was made to double partisan strength, a TD increase of an additional 30 officers and 45 enlisted men was approved for FEC/LD (K).¹⁸ Most of this additional personnel was intended for the partisan section.

It was also in this period, the late fall of 1952, that FEC was offered specialized personnel for partisan operations. In response to this offer, which was made by the Special Forces Division, OCPW, DA,¹⁹ AFFE requested 60 officers and 15 enlisted men. These Special Forces graduates, who were to arrive between March and May 1953, were to include 5 majors and 55 company-grade officers, each with an MOS 31542 (Special Forces, Infantry). The 15 enlisted men were to be preferably in grades E-4 through E-7 and with an MOS 31745 (Special Forces, Rifleman).²⁰

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As partisan strength continued to increase, a further enlarged TD was prepared for FEC/LD (K) in January 1953. This TD was calculated to provide 18 officers and 37 enlisted men for each of six projected partisan regiments, and 11 officers and 17 enlisted men for the Partisan Operations Section at Seoul headquarters. Total FEC/LD (K) strength was then to be 193 officers and 449 enlisted men. The planned TD, which would assign more than half the unit strength to partisan operations, is shown in Table B2.

Table B2
PLANNED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION
FOR FEC/LD (K), JANUARY 1953^a

Officers ^b		Enlisted men ^c	
Rank	No.	Rank	No.
Colonel	2	E-7	19
Lt colonel	11	E-6	152
Major	18	E-5	135
Captain	92	E-4	103
Lieutenant	66	E-3	40
Warrant officer	4	—	—
Total	193	—	449

^aA total of 119 officers and 239 enlisted men to be assigned to partisan operations.

^bOfficers with MOS prefix of 3 (Special Forces), 61; officers with MOS prefix of 7 (Airborne), 9.

^cEnlisted men with MOS prefix of 3 (Special Forces), 63; enlisted men with MOS prefix of 7 (Airborne), 11.

This TD, although not finally approved until the following August, nevertheless governed the assignment of new personnel prior to that date. As planned in January, the partisan advisers were to be selected from Special Forces personnel, and other personnel were to be selected from the pipeline.* The general sources of US personnel for FEC/LD (K) during this period are indicated in Fig. B9.

In the fall of 1952 an advanced course in covert, clandestine, and related activities was initiated by the theater G2. When they began to arrive in the spring of 1953 the Special Forces graduates were also given this course.²¹

Opinions on the value of this advanced intelligence course vary, but most officers interviewed during this study were critical. The most common complaint was that the training failed to present an accurate picture of partisan operations in Korea. Men expressing this viewpoint stated that they were given little factual information and were led to believe that they would be operating with partisans deep behind the enemy lines in North Korea. It appears that considerations of security in this highly classified operation presented serious difficulties in conducting this course.

*Interview with officer in charge, Partisan Operations Section, FEC/LD(K), October 1953.

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More interest was expressed in partisan operations from DA level by March 1953. Officers from Special Forces at Ft Bragg and from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) visited FEC to learn local requirements for Special Forces training.²² Among other requests, OCAFF inquired




Fig. B9—Flow Chart Indicating Sources of US Personnel

about the training guidance offered in FM 31-21. CINCFE made the following observations:

Training guidance and operational concepts contained in FM 31-21 are considered adequate for guerrilla operations. However, in the pending revision careful consideration should be given to experiences gained from operations in the FEC, as well as other Communist-controlled countries in which American military personnel are so readily identifiable by physical, racial, and linguistic characteristics. These factors limit the application of basic concepts in this manual.

Revision should take into consideration the basic premise that in this theater only indigenous personnel can operate safely behind enemy lines except under (currently non-existent) ideal conditions. Our experience indicates that U/W operations under existing conditions can and often must be mounted and conducted from friendly-held bases: island, floating, or rear-area bases.

Training suggestions forwarded to OCAFF also included more emphasis on amphibious operations, leading of indigenous personnel, sabotage without special equipment, tactical air control, adjustment of naval gunfire, and demolitions.

In summary the following points are worth noting in respect to the US personnel assigned to partisan operations. First, the ratio of US personnel to partisan strength fluctuated considerably during this period. In fact the ratio was at its lowest point during the peak operational months. Second, only toward the end of the period were personnel trained specifically for duty with partisans finally sent to FEC. Third, theater comments on the Army doctrine expressed in FM 31-21 reflected an emphasis on the unique situation in Korea, which ap-

peared to impose special requirements for the training of US personnel to work with partisans in the Far East.

Partisans

During the first 9 months of 1952 there was little change in the composition of partisan forces. Strength, however, increased in this period from an estimated 6000 in January to 8175 in September. Almost all this increase occurred in the two west coast units, LEOPARD and WOLFPACK, where there appeared to be no problem of recruiting additional personnel. In February 1952, for example, there were more than 42,000 North Korean refugees on islands of the WOLFPACK area alone.

In the fall of 1952 decisions were made to more than quadruple partisan strength. As a result of this program LEOPARD strength more than doubled and WOLFPACK almost doubled by the end of the year. KIRKLAND showed the sharpest increase of all, from about 275 partisans to 1589 during the last 3 months of the year. During the first 4 months of 1953 the expansion program was further accelerated and partisan strength continued to climb. Representative strengths based on monthly averages for this period are shown in Table B3.

As partisan strength expanded in late 1952 the increase appears to have brought with it a change in the composition and character of the personnel. Many were recruited in South Korea by methods that left much to be desired. Recruiters said to have numbered more than 600 at one time traveled around South Korea promising pay, clothing, and other benefits for joining the partisans. In some cases, money was allegedly taken by the recruiters in return for partisan identifications that enabled the holder to escape the ROK Army draft. Not only were many undesirables brought into the effort, but desertions and other problems of morale became commonplace.*

The 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment (PIR), which received most of the recruits picked up in South Korea, experienced 30 desertions in the 20 days prior to 15 Dec 52,²³ a rate that increased substantially before April 1953. Others were weeded out and were periodically discharged as physically or otherwise unfit. In fact as early as 11 Nov 52 the commander of the 3d PIR commented to FEC/LD (K) headquarters that "it appears that we are not dealing with a group of fervent patriots or even brigands, but a group, particularly the newer recruits, who have accepted duty with the irregular forces as a lesser evil to being drafted into the ROK Army." He went on to request that materials for the partisan troop information and education (TIE) program then being contemplated at Seoul be forwarded to his unit.²⁴

The TIE program, intended to help with the morale problem and to orient the new recruits, did not begin until early 1953. In January a school for training partisans in TIE and psychological warfare was established under FEC/LD (K). Some of the graduates of this school subsequently returned to their units for TIE duties.²⁵

As a part of this TIE program a periodical called Partisan and a text on psychological warfare were published. Both were written by the partisans themselves. All this was directed toward better esprit de corps and discipline, and ultimately some of the partisan units set up their own TIE sections to advance this program further.²⁵

*Interviews with various 8240 AU personnel, October 1953 and January 1954.

Hence the long period covered in this appendix resulted in both a great increase in the number of partisan personnel and a change in the composition of partisan ranks. Until the fall of 1952 strength remained relatively constant. Then there was a sharp increase between October 1952 and April 1953. Many of the new personnel brought in under the expansion program appear to have lacked the incentives of the older cadre, and this added to the problem of morale.

Table B3
MONTHLY AVERAGES OF PARTISAN STRENGTH

Month	1st ^a PIR	2d ^b PIR	3d ^c PIR	5th ^d PIR	6th ^e PIR	1st ^f PAIR	Total
1952							
January	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,000 ^g
April	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,000 ^g
July	3200	4100	275	—	—	—	7,575
August	3350	4100	275	—	—	—	7,725
September	3800	4100	275	—	—	—	8,175
October	4600	4100	275	—	—	—	8,975
November	6000	7000	1150	—	—	—	14,150
December	7002	7645	1589	—	—	—	16,236
1953							
January	7628	7737	2503	—	—	527	18,395
February	6654	7927	3574	—	—	336	18,491
March	7139	8080	4182	—	—	624	20,025
April	5165	5335	4578	2871	2304	1132	21,385

^aFormerly Operation LEOPARD; redesignated November 1952.

^bFormerly Operation WOLFPACK; redesignated November 1952.

^cFormerly Operation KIRKLAND; redesignated November 1952.

^dFormerly 2d PIR area known as WOLFPACK WEST; activated April.

^eFormerly 1st PIR area known as LEOPARD NORTH; activated April.

^fActivated as an airborne unit in early 1953.

^gEstimated strengths.

LOGISTICS

Partisan supply during this period presented two major problems: one was the question of regularizing supply procedures for an unconventional warfare unit and the other was the use of supply to control the partisan effort itself.

When the partisan forces were brought under FEC/LD (K) in December 1951 they inherited the supply system already serving this unit. The authority for this system had been established by a GHQ, FEC, letter (LS-51)²⁶ in which it was directed that FEC/LD (K) be supplied without regard for regular TOE or other authority. It also provided that further accountability in respect to the reissue of such supply would not be required and that records would not be kept unless so directed by the CG, FEC.* This letter was used as a supply authority until rescinded on 25 Mar 52, shortly after a table of allowances (TA 80-8240-1) was established for certain FEC/LD (K) expenditures.

*This directive was intended to prevent highly classified activities of G2, FEC, from being compromised by the requisitioning of materiel through regular supply channels.

At the same time that LS-51 was rescinded another letter (LS-52) was issued by GHQ, FEC.²⁷ LS-52 directed that normal supply for FEC/LD (K) be requisitioned under the TA but also provided that, on the approval of the CG, FEC, emergency issue could be made pending the preparation and approval of a Class IV Project.* Officers were cautioned, however, to attempt to safeguard the best interests of the government in the issue of nonexpendable equipment.

As an interim measure the partisans were supplied under LS-52, but, as noted, FEC/LD (K) was obliged to submit a Class IV Project to the DA [CCRAK was by this time in operational control of FEC/LD (K)].²⁹ This bill of materials required many months to prepare. It was not submitted until 18 Nov 52 and was not approved by the DA until early in 1953. Meanwhile the great increase in partisan strength meant that further supply authority would be necessary. Change 1 to the Class IV Project was therefore submitted for approval.† Table B4 shows the additional supplies requested under the revised Class IV Project and also indicates the supply on hand in CCRAK as of 31 Oct 52.

After January 1953 another effort was made to regularize logistical procedures for partisan operations. In early February the DA requested that a complete TA be prepared.³⁰ Many difficulties were encountered, however, in trying to draft a TA for an unconventional warfare organization, and up to the time of the cease-fire it had not yet been submitted for approval. One of the major problems was that FEC/LD (K) units were not of uniform strength and in addition did not have identical missions. Meanwhile the partisans continued to be supplied under the Class IV Project.

Records maintained by CCRAK provide the only available figures on the approximate cost of the partisan effort for the calendar year 1952. These figures, which only cover supplies furnished to the partisans, and which do not include certain costs for housekeeping and other expenditures, are broken down in Table B5. Unit records reveal few complaints about supply in 1952 except in regard to adequate boat transportation. Analysis of data on the number of craft relative to operational effectiveness, however, shows nothing conclusive on this question. Some units seem at times to have had more boats than needed for the types and number of operations conducted; other units may sometimes have been in short supply. Boat loss through operations, storms, and occasional inept seamanship was a recurrent problem. Actual funds expended for boat procurement and maintenance during 1952 can be noted in Table B5.

*"Project requirements represent those supplies not included in normal allowances but which are necessary to complete a specific task. . . Project requirements normally are considered as referring only to Class IV supplies. Project requirements do not include initial equipment or normal maintenance for troops. Occasionally, they may provide for supplies pertaining to other classes, such as specially packed or special rations; fixed guns, fire-control equipment, and ammunition and mines for harbor defenses; liquid and solid fuels; or even complete sets of equipment for type organizations. An approved project requirement is one which has been authorized by the Department of the Army for supply, including necessary procurement. . . Project requirements may originate in a theater, or they may be included as part of the Department of the Army plan for a specific operation. . . Class IV supplies consist of supplies and equipment, except Air Force supplies, for which allowances are not prescribed or which are not otherwise classified. Examples: construction and fortification materials. Classes I, II, III, and V items may be subject to Class IV issue when issued in excess of prescribed allowances or for purposes not regularly authorized."²⁸

†In the General Information Sheet preceding the bill of materials of Change 1 to Class IV Project it is stated that Change 1 was computed as follows: "a. Based upon standards prescribed in FM 101-10, T/O&E 7-37N, and in Ltr; Hq, ROK Army, File KAG-4905, Subject; Quartermaster, Individual and Organizational Clothing and Equipment authorized ROKA Personnel. b. Expendable supplies are computed on a yearly allowance for each item listed. c. Nonexpendable supplies are computed on the basis of past experience, as a Table of Allowances for an unconventional warfare unit, with resupply as prescribed in current Department of the Army Supply Catalogs and combat replacement factors for the Korean Theater of Operations."

Table B4

MAJOR LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS^a

Item	Required	On hand in	Item	Required	On hand in
	15 Jul 53	CCRAK 31 Oct 52		15 Jul 53	CCRAK 31 Oct 52
Weapons			Vehicles		
Rifles, M1	31,500	7978	Trk, 1/4-ton	227	55
Rifles, BAR	1,094	406	Trk, 3/4-ton	52	28
Carbines	5,249	1646	Trk, 2 1/2-ton	303	34
MGs, .30-cal, 1917	321	45	Trk, 4-ton wrecker	8	0
MGs, .30-cal, 1919	645	341	Trk, 2 1/2-ton shop	12	0
Mortars, 60-mm	112	90	Tlr, 1/4-ton	96	27
Mortars, 81-mm	181	55	Tlr, wtr, 250-gal	59	5
Recoilless rifles, 57-mm	133	13	Tlr, 1-ton	45	14
Recoilless rifles, 75-mm	79	7	Signal		
Launchers, rkt, 2.36-in.	493	116	Rad sets, AN/GRC-9	432	132
Guns, submach, .45-cal	1,149	298	Rad sets, AN/GRC-26	8	3
MGs, .50-cal	433	48	Rad sets, SCR-188	24	3
Light Arty pieces	30	0	Rad sets, SCR-300	1500	235
Ammunition (quarterly requirements)			Rad sets, SCR-399	6	3
Cart., .30-cal	41,860,000	—	Rad sets, SCR-499	4	4
Cart., .30-cal carbine	1,552,000	—	Rad sets, SCR-536	1810	60
Cart., .45-cal	135,000	—	SB, BD 71	60	10
Cart., .50-cal	740,000	—	SB, BD 72	40	3
Shells, 60-mm	253,300	—	SB, 18/GT	60	0
Shells, 81-mm	842,100	—	TP, EE-8	500	204
Cart., 57-mm (RR)	41,500	—	TP, TP-9	60	6
Cart., 75-mm (RR)	16,700	—	TT, EE-98	20	4
Rockets, 2.36-in.	16,700	—	Transmitters, BC 610	8	4
Grenades, hand	114,500	—	Trailers, K52	12	3
Shelter			Code practice equip	11	0
Tents, squad	795	137	Converters, M209	205	64
Liners, squad-tent	420	0	Boats		
Tents, Hosp-ward	14	0	Japanese fishing boats	58	27
Tents, CP M-42	45	5	Sampan (sail)	136	55
Tents, pyramidal	52	0	Sampan (engine-driven)	101	31
Tarpaulins, 20 x 40	160	2	Q-boats	10	10
Bldg, prefab., 20 x 54	312	44	FS (fast freight)	2	2
			LCMs	8	4
			Rice (tons monthly) ^b	2085	

^aRepresents only major items required. Complete requirements are included in Change 2 Class IV Project: ARMY-KCZ-CCRAK-GEN-009-52-OP. Figures depict stock level to be maintained plus replacement factors.

^bExclusive of that required for barter.

Many native craft were captured, purchased, or rented by the partisans themselves. Others, particularly the heavier boats, were procured with US funds, and in addition engines were provided for a number of native junks and sampans. LCMs, LCVPs, and engineer-type assault boats were also supplied from time to time. The number, types, and estimated average capacity of the boats on hand in January 1953 are listed in Table E12, App E.

Table B5
LOGISTICS COSTS, 1952

Cost	Amount
From FEC/LG	\$ 20,000.00
From CCRAK and FEC/LD (K)	
Rice and other food	8,226,373.00
Other supplies	12,703,589.00
Boats and boat repair	225,000.00
Total	\$21,174,962.00

Table B6
SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO FEC/LD (K),
DECEMBER 1951 TO JULY 1952^a

Weapon	No.	Weapon	No.
Pistols		Mortars	
.38-cal	123	60-mm	33
.45-cal	331	81-mm	20
Rifles, M1	6363	Recoilless rifles	
Carbines		57-mm	9
M1	174	75-mm	6
M2	481	Rocket launchers	
SMGs, .45-cal	305	2.36-in.	24
BARs, .30-cal	386	3.5-in.	26
LMGs, .30-cal	65	Grenade launchers	331
MGs, .50-cal	26		

^aRequisitioned by, and apparently issued to, FEC/LD (K) under LS-51 and 80-8240-1 TA.

The number and types of weapons supplied to FEC/LD (K) between December 1951 and July 1952 are given in Table B6. When compared with partisan strength at the time and discounted for weapons probably furnished other sections of FEC/LD (K), this flow of supply appears to have been adequate.

As can be noted in Table B5 rice constituted one of the larger items of expenditure during 1952. It had become the mode of partisan payment* and was supplied ultimately on a basis of one 100-lb bag per man per month. Distribution was handled initially by the US regimental commander, who supplied it to

*In this regard the following statement is of interest: "We feed them rice. Each unit has a supply strength of so much rice. This is increased or decreased according to the success of the unit. The unit retains its loot and sells it wherever possible. There is no other pay as such."³¹

the partisan leaders according to their unit head count. The partisan leader was then expected to manage his rice supply so that supplementary foods (side dishes of meat, fish, vegetables, etc.) and other needed items could be obtained by bartering the surplus. This presented a problem for the partisan leaders. The price of rice was lowest during the harvest season and then tended to increase to as much as four times the harvest price in other periods of the year. With a constant amount of rice to trade, the supplementary side dishes and other items might be reduced as much as 75 percent. Hence the partisans were confronted with a fluctuating living standard as the price of rice rose and fell.

The US regimental commander, on the other hand, had a twofold problem in respect to the distribution of rice and other supplies to the partisans. First he had to try to get an accurate muster, a problem that appears to have been aggravated by the rapid increase in partisan strength in the fall of 1952; and second he had to use his supply as a sanction for operational success or failure. Getting an accurate muster was not simple, particularly with the west coast LEOPARD (1st PIR) unit, which continually reported large numbers of personnel in interior units on the mainland. In such cases the US advisers could scarcely check on the head count in the interior, and furthermore advisers were not with every partisan unit on the islands. As a result the partisan leader's count often had to be accepted at face value. How scrupulous the partisan leaders were in reporting their head counts is a matter of conjecture, but both the incentive and the opportunity for padding the rolls were often present.

As mentioned, the US commander also had to attempt to apply the theory that supply is one of the more effective means of controlling and directing a partisan effort. It might be noted that nearly all operations were small-sized raids unobserved by US personnel. Yet, although he had few ways of checking the partisan after-action reports, the US commander was required to judge partisan effectiveness for the purpose of allocating supplies. In the absence of better criteria he might threaten to withhold supplies if the number of operations or claimed casualties declined. At other times a partisan leader might be rewarded for reported successes by being permitted to increase his head count, thus allowing him to receive more supplies. To what extent this resulted in exaggerated or falsified operational reports cannot be determined, but the incentive was there, especially in late 1952 and in 1953 as partisan strength was expanding and the supply situation improved. Thus partisan supply posed twin difficulties at the operational level, both of which had a bearing on policy. It was not always possible to get an accurate head count, which was the basic yardstick for supply distribution, and there was always the risk that pressure for more partisan activity might result in unreliable operational reports.

In summing up, two points appear to stand out. First, although the machinery used to supply the partisans appeared to meet the situation reasonably well, none of the methods adopted seem to have been satisfactory to the DA. Second, the partisan command attempted a policy of using supply as a sanction without adequate means of evaluating operations.

OPERATIONS

It has been established that by the end of 1951 the political-military context all but precluded the possibility that the partisan force would be used as a



significant tactical instrument in direct conjunction with a front-line effort. Throughout the long period of truce-seeking, to the time the truce became imminent in the spring of 1953, the UN partisans constituted at best a strategic weapon employed in general harassment of the enemy. At first by tacit acceptance, and ultimately by deliberate recognition, their primary mission became that of tying down enemy troops in secondary-area security activities.

The strength of the organized partisan force more than tripled during this period—from about 6000 in late 1951 to about 20,000 by the spring of 1953. In keeping with this, and with the increased support provided, the number of reported actions per month more than doubled over the previous period, and the highest levels of partisan activity of the war were attained.

The geographical distribution of these actions and the frequencies of the various types, as compared with those of the first period, will be described in this section. Since after-action reports for 1952 and 1953 are rather detailed and systematic, something also can be said about the sizes and tactics of the actions. Finally, the reported results will be examined in terms of their possible military significance.

Operating Areas

Perhaps the most noteworthy fact about the location of partisan actions during the December 1951 to March 1953 period (Period 2) is that the great expansion of the force and the increased number of actions did not seriously affect the relative geographical distribution. Figure B10 and Table B7 show the distribution of actions in Period 2 by grid squares. Of the 3055 actions for which locations were recorded nearly 99 percent took place in western Korea, which is an increase of 2 percent over Period 1. Only 1.2 percent, as compared with 3.1 percent in the first period, took place on the east coast. Moreover 93.4 percent of the actions in Period 2, as against 86.1 percent in Period 1, were reported in the grid squares covering the general Hwanghae area. Actions in the three northernmost grid squares on the west coast, which comprised 10.5 percent in Period 1, amounted to only 5.7 percent of the actions in this period. In relative terms the geographical picture was one of concentration rather than expansion of effort, with the overwhelming bulk of the actions still in the west and south Hwanghae coastal areas.

Table B7 shows some interesting fluctuations in the geographical pattern during the period. Almost all the activity reported on the east coast, for instance, occurred in the early spring of 1952 and was not after that a significant constituent of the geographical pattern. Actions in the BS grid square—the area closest to the US I Corps left flank—were frequent in the first half of the period but decreased substantially during the second. At the same time, the percentage of actions in the YD grid square, which contains Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, increased somewhat in the latter half of the period.

The percentage of actions occurring in the noncoastal grid squares of Hwanghae Province (YC and BT) is given monthly in Table B8, together with the percentage of all actions in Hwanghae. The ratio of internal Hwanghae actions to total Hwanghae actions continued the downward trend observed in the first period. After May 1952, however, the ratio increased to almost 1 in 3 and remained comparatively stable throughout the period. This proportion, if it were taken as an accurate measure of the number of interior-based actions,






Fig. B10—Percentage of Actions by Grid Squares, December 1951 to March 1953





Table B7
ACTIONS BY GRID SQUARES, DECEMBER 1951 TO MARCH 1953

Month	No. of actions	Percentages in grid squares												Percentages in:			
		XC	YC	YB	YD	BS	XB	BT	XD	XE	DU	DT	CU	CT	Hwang-hae	East coast	
1951																	
December	44	30	23	18	0 ^a	5	7	7	2	0	0	0	0	9	0	90	9
1952																	
January ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
February ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March	25	24	8	8	0	36	4	4	0	0	4	8	4	0	84	16	
April	57	28	11	25	0	21	0	4	0	0	4	5	2	0	89	11	
May	103	10	17	33	0	20	0	9	1	0	7	2	1	0	89	10	
June	172	34	16	12	1	26	1	8	1	0	1	0	0	0	97	1	
July	262	19	23	20	2	22	0	10	3	0	0	0	0	0	94	0	
August	326	21	23	27	0	17	1	4	4	2	0	0	0	0	93	0	
September	361	31	23	19	1	16	2	3	4	0	0	1	0	0	94	1	
October	271	33	22	23	2	15	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	95	0	
November	408	36	22	26	1	11	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	97	0	
December	304	32	28	27	3	6	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	96	0	
1953																	
January	257	44	20	21	4	1	6	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	92	0	
February	221	47	26	15	5	1	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	95	0	
March	244	47	31	4	2	7	4	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	93	0	
Dec 51-																	
Mar 53	3055	32.3	22.8	20.5	1.7	12.4	2.4	3.0	3.2	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.3	0	93.4	1.2	

^aZero equals less than 0.5 percent.

^bData not available.

Table B8
HWANGHAE PROVINCE ACTIONS,
DECEMBER 1951 TO MARCH 1953

Month	Percentage of total actions		Ratio: internal to total Hwanghae
	Hwanghae	Internal grids YC and BT	
1951			
December	90	30	0.33
1952			
January ^a	—	—	—
February ^a	—	—	—
March	84	12	0.14
April	89	15	0.17
May	89	26	0.29
June	97	24	0.25
July	94	33	0.35
August	93	27	0.29
September	94	26	0.28
October	95	23	0.24
November	97	22	0.23
December	96	29	0.30
1953			
January	92	20	0.22
February	95	28	0.29
March	93	31	0.33

^aData not available.



would be most significant, but such a deduction would be unwarranted. The actual locations of individual actions reported in the two grid squares are shown in Fig. B11. Locations were plotted to the first easterly and northerly coordinates reported. Judging from the locations plotted most of the actions were not in the deep interior and could easily have been island-based.




Fig. B11—Actions in Internal Hwanghae Grids YC and BT, March to December 1952

The actual number of interior-based (nonamphibious) actions cannot be determined because the after-action reports for the period do not identify individual actions as island- or interior-based except sporadically. The impressionistic data available in command reports and in interviews, however, indicate that most of the actions in this period were amphibious attacks. The geographical distribution presented above is quite consistent with this, but further proof is not available.

Types of Action

More than 3000 individual actions were recorded in the available after-action reports covering virtually all but 2 months of the period. Figure B12 shows the over-all frequencies of the main types of action recorded, as compared with their frequencies in the previous period. Table B9 gives the rela-



tive monthly frequencies. The main types of actions in Period 2 compared with Period 1 are shown in order of their frequency in the accompanying tabulation.

Types of action	Period 1, %	Period 2, %
Enemy troops	52.1	48.5
Intelligence	0.8	14.3
Transport	11.3	12.8
Civil administration	1.9	9.9
Supply and storage	9.2	4.5
Tactical installations	6.7	4.1
Naval-gunfire observation	13.8	2.2
Other	4.2	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0

The foregoing percentages show that the major changes in relative frequency between Periods 1 and 2 occurred with respect to intelligence actions, attacks on civil administration, and naval-gunfire adjustment. The intelligence




Fig. B12—Types of Partisan Action for Periods 1 and 2

□ Period 1 ■ Period 2

actions, which consisted of tactical patrols and contacts with internal units, became the second most frequent type of action, which was only 14 percent of the total number. Attacks on civil-administration facilities and personnel increased from under 2 percent to nearly 10 percent of the total. This increase



was especially marked in the latter portion of the period. Naval-gunfire-observation activities decreased in relative frequency, from nearly 14 percent in Period 1 to slightly more than 2 percent in Period 2.

The relative number of attacks on transport facilities and vehicles remained substantially the same over-all, although it fluctuated within Period 2,

Table B9
ACTIONS BY TYPES, DECEMBER 1951 TO MARCH 1953^a

Month	No. of actions	Percentages of actions							
		Enemy troops	Tactical installations	Transport	Supplies and storage	Civil administration	Intelligence	Naval gunfire observation	Other
1951									
December	41	73	2	5	10	—	—	5	5
1952									
January ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
February ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March	29	48	—	—	—	—	31	10	10
April	52	52	4	4	—	2	19	13	6
May	105	37	5	5	3	4	31	9	7
June	193	41	3	10	5	4	34	5	3
July	250	42	2	12	2	5	10	6	17
August	293	51	6	10	3	7	17	—	6
September	337	44	5	11	1	9	26	—	4
October	277	47	5	8	6	7	17	1	9
November	384	51	1	17	5	12	8	—	5
December	293	50	6	15	5	13	4	1	5
1953									
January	249	51	3	16	5	11	5	2	4
February	211	46	5	13	8	18	8	1	6
March	243	42	2	19	5	14	7	1	10
Dec 51- Mar 53	2955	48.5	4.1	12.8	4.5	9.9	14.3	2.2	3.7

^aDiscrepancies in number of actions between Tables B7 and B9 are due to failure of the after-action reports to include the particular type of information in all cases.

^bData not available.

increasing toward the end of the period. The relative number of attacks on supply and storage facilities dropped from 9 percent in Period 1 to 4.5 percent in Period 2, and in Period 2 was highest in the fall and winter of 1952-1953. The relative number of attacks on enemy troops and on tactical installations decreased somewhat as compared with Period 1.

With several exceptions, then, the considerable increase in the general level of partisan activity that took place in 1952 did not produce significant changes in the types of activity conducted, and it is possible to conclude that the magnitude of the effort increased without materially altering its direction. The fact that attacks on enemy troops remained the primary type of activity (constituting half the number of actions reported) should not be taken as an accurate indication of intended priorities, however. The troop actions included intercepts by the enemy and accidental encounters—not always sought or initi-

ated by the partisans—as well as preplanned raids. A study of 385 attacks on enemy troops in 3 months of this period, for example, shows that meeting engagements accounted for 56 percent of the actions, whereas raids and ambushes accounted for 25 and 19 percent, respectively.




Fig. B13—Percentages of Partisan Actions of Various Strengths for Period 2

Table B10
FREQUENCY OF ACTIONS BY SIZE OF OPERATING GROUP,
MAY 1952 TO MARCH 1953

Month	No. of actions ^a	Percentage of actions by size of partisan group:					
		1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-200	Over 200
1952							
May	72	32	36	21	3	4	4
June	106	57	28	7	3	1	5
July	237	47	33	14	3	2	0
August	322	49	30	14	5	1	0
September	239	34	37	18	1	3	1
October	269	32	36	23	5	3	0
November	381	40	36	18	4	2	0
December	283	41	29	23	4	2	0
1953							
January	240	43	36	14	5	1	0
February	208	44	38	13	3	1	1
March	235	35	32	20	9	3	1
May 52- Mar 53	2592	39.3	32.4	21.1	4.7	1.8	0.7

^aFor which the size of the operating group is reported; percentages are taken of this figure rather than of the total number of actions.

Sizes of Operating Groups

From May 1952 on, after-action reports show the number of partisan participants in each action with fair regularity. Figure B13 illustrates the over-all percentages of actions by size of the partisan group involved, and Table B10 presents the monthly percentages.

Most of the actions, it can be observed, were conducted by small groups. Of the 2592 actions in the period for which size data could be collected, nearly 93 percent were actions involving less than 50 partisans. Slightly more than 71 percent involved less than 25 partisans. Nearly 40 percent were conducted by groups of from 1 to 10 men, but groups of 51 or more men participated in only 7.2 percent of the actions. In view of the difficulties associated with operations behind enemy lines, especially in terms of security and mobility, it is hardly surprising that small groups were preferred.

Particular types of action showed somewhat different size patterns. Table B11 gives the size characteristics of the various types of actions conducted in

Table B11
TYPES OF ACTION BY SIZE OF OPERATING GROUP^a

Types of action	No. of actions	Percentage of actions by size of partisan group:						Total
		1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-200	Over 200	
Enemy troops	750	31	34	24	7	2	1	99
Tactical installations	64	15	38	23	19	2	2	99
Transport	242	49	38	11	1	1	0	100
Supplies and storage	71	53	37	6	2	2	0	100
Civil administration	163	39	39	18	3	1	0	100
Intelligence	111	58	32	5	4	1	0	100
Total	1401	38	36	19	5	1	1	100

^aBased on data for June, September, November, and December 1952; and January and February 1953.

6 months of this period. The group size most frequently used in attacks on enemy troops and on tactical installations was from 11 to 25 partisans, but in other types of action groups of 1 to 10 partisans were most frequent. The chief deviations from the general pattern were in attacks on tactical installations, in which groups of more than 50 were used relatively often, and in attacks on supply and storage facilities and intelligence actions, in which groups of more than 25 were seldom employed. No evidence was found to indicate whether the sizes of operating groups in this period were appreciably different from those in the first period. There is, moreover, no evidence to show what policies governed the question of optimum size of groups for the various types of activity performed.

Tactics

A detailed analysis was made of 669 actions in 3 months of this period—15 Jul to 15 Aug 52; 15 Sep to 15 Oct 52; and 1 to 31 Jan 53—in order to form an impression of the tactics employed by partisans and to ascertain if possible the relation between types of action, sizes of operating groups, tactics employed, and results obtained. A full account of the analysis appears later in App E, but some of the main conclusions will be presented here.

Of the 669 actions reported, 358 (54 percent) were attacks on enemy troops, 87 (13 percent) were attacks on transport, 76 (11 percent) were attacks on tactical installations, and 74 (11 percent) were attacks on civil administration. The remaining 74 actions fell into a variety of other categories, each containing insufficient data for fruitful analysis. As to sizes, 34 percent of the actions involved groups of 1 to 10 partisans, 40 percent involved groups of 11 to 25

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partisans, 21 percent involved groups of 26 to 50, 5 percent involved groups of 51 to 100, and less than 1 percent involved groups of more than 100.

Three "tactics" occurred in sufficient number for analysis. These were (a) the meeting engagement—defined as collision between opposing forces while both are moving to contact, and before either can execute a preplanned attack or defense; (b) the raid—a planned attack, usually on a stationary objective, but without intention of holding territory invaded; and (c) the ambush—a tactical trap by concealed troops, with the purpose of taking the enemy completely by surprise.

Of the 595 actions that could be studied profitably, 22 percent were ambushes of enemy troops or vehicles, 34 percent were meeting engagements with enemy troops, and 44 percent were raids. Of the three main tactics employed, it was found that the ambush was the largest producer of enemy casualties per partisan participant. On the average, ambushes of enemy troops were twice as efficient in this respect as meeting engagements with enemy troops. Ambushes with mines increased casualties from 25 to 50 percent over ambushes without mines.

In general it was also found that small groups of partisans were relatively more successful in terms of number of casualties inflicted per partisan, the most successful being the 1- to 5-man group. This group inflicted more than twice the number of casualties per partisan than any of the larger groups. As casualty producers, the very large groups were in general the least efficient.

In 203 actions for which sufficient information on the strength of enemy forces was reported—all of them attacks on enemy troops—it was reported that partisan groups were usually outnumbered by almost 2 to 1. The ratio of opposing to friendly force varied from 1.67 for raids, to 1.88 for meeting engagements, to 2.05 for ambushes; the over-all ratio was 1.87. The smaller the size of the partisan group, of course, the greater the probability that any enemy force it encounters will outnumber it, but it is surprising that partisans undertook so many actions at their own initiative in which they were outnumbered so heavily and regularly. If the estimates are correct they forsook, or were required to forsake, one of the policies usually considered important in guerrilla warfare—that of striking the enemy at places and times and situations in which he is the weaker—and yet were not penalized by failing to inflict heavy casualties.

Certain features of partisan operations suggest that it was desirable for partisans to be armed with automatic weapons to the maximum extent. These features were: (a) they operated in rather small groups; (b) they were usually heavily outnumbered; (c) more than half the actions were fire fights with enemy troops; (d) of these a very large number were meeting engagements in which it is probable that the element of surprise was not always a partisan advantage; and (e) ambushes and raids were relied on for best casualty performance. Unfortunately the after-action reports do not show what weapons were actually used by partisans in specific actions, so that it is not possible to ascertain relative success with different armament patterns.*

* US personnel who participated in partisan actions and who were interviewed during this study indicated a strong preference for the M2 carbine as individual armament in this type of operation. Its light weight, ease of handling, and high rate of fire were factors noted in its favor.

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Airborne Operations

As noted in App A only two airborne operations were conducted during Period 1. In Period 2, however, 10 airborne actions were launched.* In all, 38 teams totaling 349 men were involved. Eight of the actions were attempts to sabotage enemy rail or highway traffic and two were attempts to secure guerrilla bases in the enemy rear. Figure B14 shows the target areas, dates, number of men, and type of mission for the airborne actions reported from 1951 to 1953.

In early 1952 four teams were airdropped in three separate operations (3 to 6 in Fig. B14). Three of the teams were lost immediately. One, the 16-man Mustang IV team (4), succeeded in cutting railroad track and harassing enemy installations for about 6 days before its members were captured or killed.

Further efforts were made to attack enemy supply routes from the fall of 1952 to the spring of 1953. In the last two Mustang operations (7 and 8), each of the teams reported the destruction of a train, after which no further word was received. The Jesse James teams (9 to 11) were presumed killed or captured before they could become operational. The Boxer teams (13 to 16), which were to attack traffic along the northeastern coast in coordination with Navy action, may have caused some damage but none is definitely known. The teams dropped in the Rabbit operation (18 and 19) were lost immediately, so that it is not even known that they landed safely. Not one member of the above teams is known to have exfiltrated.

The two missions intended to establish interior bases were Green Dragon (12) and Hurricane (17). The Hurricane team, apparently compromised, was lost soon after being dropped. Green Dragon, the largest airborne operation mounted, was able to maintain sporadic radio contact for 6 months but under suspicious circumstances. Dropped on 25 Jan 53, the team did not establish radio contact with headquarters until early March. By that time it had been reduced from 97 to 31 men, either by desertion or enemy action. In late April the team reported that five downed US airmen were with the unit, and additional supplies and men (56 or 57) were dropped. An attempt was then made to rescue the US airmen by a "snatch" pickup, but the pickup aircraft was met by intense AA fire at the rendezvous location and did not proceed with the mission. Although communication was maintained thereafter, by the time of the cease-fire it was generally assumed that the operation had been thoroughly compromised at an early stage. None of the partisans involved ever returned, nor did any of the five US airmen appear in the prisoner exchanges.

In this period, then, more extensive efforts were made to conduct airborne actions, but without discernible success. In most cases there is no information whatsoever as to what happened, although it is possible that some teams were able to operate for a time. Two points, however, might be made about the airborne operations. First, in view of the military situation precluding full exploitation of interdiction attempts by regular forces, and also the fact that such

* This figure is somewhat arbitrary since it was difficult to classify some operations bearing the same code name. For purposes of this report, therefore, Mustang's III, IV, VII, and VIII, Green Dragon, and Hurricane were each considered separate missions. Mustang's V and VI, however, were considered as a single operation. Jesse James, Boxer, and Rabbit, each composed of more than one team, were also considered single operations.




Fig. B14—Airborne Operations, 1951 to 1953

KEY TO NUMBERED POINTS IN FIG. B14

Point	Code name	Date	No. of men	No. of teams	Mission
①	Virginia I	15 Mar 51	24	1	Sabotage of rail and highway traffic
②	Spitfire	18 Jun 51	16	1	Establish a guerrilla base
③	Mustang III	22 Jan 52	19	1	Sabotage of rail traffic
④	Mustang IV	16 Mar 52	16	1	Sabotage of rail traffic
⑤	Mustang V	14 May 52	20	2	Sabotage of rail and highway traffic
⑥	Mustang VI				
⑦	Mustang VII	31 Oct 52	5	1	Sabotage of rail and highway traffic
⑧	Mustang VIII	31 Oct 52	6	1	Sabotage of rail and highway traffic
⑨	Jesse James I	30 Dec 52	10	3	Sabotage of rail and highway traffic
⑩	Jesse James II	28 Dec 52	10	—	
⑪	Jesse James III	28 Dec 52	10	—	
⑫	Green Dragon	25 Jan 52 } [?]	97 ^a	1	Establish a guerrilla base from which to stage interior operations
⑬	Boxer I	7 Feb 53	12	4	Sabotage of rail traffic on east coast in conjunction with TF 95.2
⑭	Boxer II	7 Feb 53	12	—	
⑮	Boxer III	9 Feb 53	12	—	
⑯	Boxer IV	11 Feb 53	12	—	
⑰	Hurricane	31 Mar 53	5	1	Establish a guerrilla base
⑱	Rabbit I	1 Apr 53	40	23	Sabotage rail traffic
⑲	Rabbit II	6 Apr 53	6	—	
	Total		389	40	

^aBetween late April and 19 May 1953, 56 or 57 more partisans sent in on this operation.

operations were infinitesimal in scope relative to the Air Force effort, these decisions to use partisans against enemy supply routes in airborne operations appears to have been futile and callous. However, on the available evidence the apparent failure of attempted operations does not seem to have precluded entirely the possibility of establishing basically covert bases for possible future guerrilla activity.

Results

As described in App A, partisan operations in the first period achieved three types of measurable results: casualties were inflicted, materiel was captured and destroyed, and the enemy was caused to employ troops in counter-partisan activities. A similar but rather more complete analysis is possible for Period 2.




Fig. B15—Relation of Casualties Inflicted by Partisans to Number of Partisan Actions

--- Connect points for which data are not available

Casualties. From December 1951 to March 1952, partisans claimed to have inflicted 48,623 casualties as a direct result of their operations. This is a rate of 15.2 casualties inflicted per casualty sustained for the 3189 partisan casualties reported. For 12 months of the period, in which the total number of actions is almost complete, this is also a rate of 14.5 casualties inflicted per action. Figure B15 shows the number of casualties inflicted as compared with the number of actions; Table B12 presents the monthly casualty claims; Table B13 presents the monthly ratios of casualties inflicted per casualty sustained.*

*Casualty data are taken from weekly and monthly reports.

In general the number of casualties claimed per action in Period 2 was lower than in Period 1. In the first half of Period 2 the claims per action were below average, and in the second half of the period they were above average, but except for March 1953 they did not reach the average figure of 19.2 reported in Period 1.

Table B12

CASUALTIES CLAIMED BY PARTISANS, DECEMBER 1951 TO MARCH 1953

Month	KIA	WIA	POWs	Total	No. of actions ^a	Casualties per action
1951						
December	1,017	445	0	1,462	44 ^b	— ^b
1952						
January	627	1417	36	2,080	— ^c	— ^c
February	342	759	18	1,119	— ^c	— ^c
March	151	40	8	199	29	6.9
April	314	66	31	411	57	7.2
May	649	417	48	1,114	105 ^d	10.6
June	2,049	393	60	2,502	193 ^d	— ^d
July	2,256	509	106	2,871	262	10.9
August	1,664	470	55	2,189	326	6.7
September	2,739	521	56	3,316	361	9.2
October	4,281	776	53	5,110	277	18.4
November	5,987	767	31	6,785	408	16.6
December	4,667	907	24	5,598	304	18.4
1953						
January	3,408	844	1	4,253	257	16.5
February	3,639	508	13	4,160	221	18.8
March	4,679	763	12	5,454	244	22.3
Total	38,469	9602	552	48,623	3088	14.5 ^e
Monthly avg	2,404	600	35	3,039	221	—
Percentage	79.1	19.7	1.1	99.9	—	—

^aThe number of actions each month is taken from Tables B7 and B9, in which actions are recorded by location and by type. Numbers in the two tables differ for each month depending on data included in individual reports; here, the larger figure of the two is used in each case.

^bAction reports for 2 weeks not available.

^cData not available.

^dAction reports for 1 week not available.

^eFor 12 months for which number of actions is approximately complete.

The ratio of casualties inflicted to casualties sustained varied from a little less than 6 to a little more than 23 to 1. The higher figures tended to be in the latter months of the period, but they fluctuated considerably and did not correspond closely to the number of casualties per action. Finally, it will be noticed that the ratio of claimed KIA to claimed WIA was approximately 4 to 1 in this period, as compared with a ratio of less than 2 to 1 in Period 1. No clear reason can be found for the difference in these ratios.

It is interesting to note, however, that both ratios are higher than those claimed for front-line action by regular Eighth Army forces. In Period 2 the ratio of claimed KIA to WIA by Eighth Army front-line forces was 1.3 to 1.³²

The higher ratio of KIA to WIA claimed for partisan actions might be attributable to differences in reporting policies or to differences in the character of the operating situations. Whether the first is significant cannot be determined, since not much is known about reporting policies. As to the second, however, several important considerations apply. Nearly all partisan actions took place in twilight, night, or dawn conditions, and opportunities for postchecking results were limited, especially in hit-and-run-type actions. Even apart from questions

Table B13
RATIO OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED TO CASUALTIES
SUSTAINED, DECEMBER 1951 TO MARCH 1953

Month	Casualties inflicted	Casualties sustained	Ratio
1951			
December	1,462	256	5.71
1952			
January	2,080	176	11.82
February	1,119	88	12.72
March	199	31	6.42
April	411	29	14.17
May	1,114	64	17.41
June	2,502	168	14.89
July	2,871	297	9.67
August	2,189	259	8.45
September	3,316	209	15.87
October	5,110	220	23.23
November	6,785	321	21.14
December	5,598	286	19.57
1953			
January	4,253	286	14.87
February	4,160	189	22.01
March	5,454	310	17.59
Total	48,623	3189	15.25

of incentives and reporting policies these factors would seriously affect the accuracy of estimates, and the ratio claimed might be completely erroneous. On the other hand it is probable that a majority of partisan actions involved close-in combat with important elements of surprise on the partisan side. This type of action might reasonably be expected to produce a relatively high KIA to WIA ratio as compared with most front-line action.

Materiel. Only 10 months' records were analyzed to ascertain the rate of direct capture and destruction of materiel reported for this period. Table B14 gives the over-all totals for June 1952 to March 1953 for selected types of materiel. Large quantities of weapons, ammunition, food, and livestock were both captured and destroyed; large numbers of buildings, vehicles, boats, and bridges were reported destroyed. These figures do not include materiel loss to the enemy claimed as a result of airstrikes and naval bombardments on targets located by partisans, which may have been as great or greater than that claimed as a result of direct partisan action.

The partisans fell far short of capturing enough ammunition for the weapons captured. Nearly all captured weapons were small arms, and nearly all captured ammunition was small-arms ammunition, but the number of small-arms rounds captured was only about 70 per small arm captured. If nearly half the captured weapons were enemy or foreign materiel, as seems likely, this suggests that the partisan command either had to rely on other nonstandard sources for ammunition for these weapons or had to discount their importance in the effort.*

Table B14
MATERIEL REPORTED CAPTURED OR DESTROYED,
JUNE 1952 TO MARCH 1953
(After-action reports)

Item ^a	Captured	Destroyed	Total	Monthly avg	No. per action ^b	Percentage captured
Small arms	2,092	1,246	3,388	334	1.17	62.7
Crew-served weapons	180	150	330	33	1.17	54.5
Ammunition						
Rounds	189,327	249,761	439,088	43,909	153.90	43.1
Cases	217	1,307	1,524	152	0.53	14.2
Vehicles	31	2,391	2,422	242	0.85	12.8
Boats	51	123	174	17	0.06	29.3
Livestock	597	1,631	2,228	223	0.78	26.8
Food, tons	51.7	3,499.2	3,550.9	355	1.24	14.6
Buildings	—	1,979	1,973	198	0.69	—
Bridges	—	69	69	7	0.02	—

^aSmall arms—rifles, carbines, pistols.
Crew-served weapons—machine guns, automatic rifles, mortars, guns.
Ammunition—weapons rounds, hand grenades, mines.
Vehicles—trucks, locomotives, carts, bicycles.
Boats—junks, sampans, motorboats.
Livestock—oxen, horses, cows.
Food—rice, grain, flour, beans, salt, side dishes.
Buildings—houses, barracks, warehouses, bunkers, air-raid shelters, police stations, mills.

^bFor 2843 actions (see Table B12).

Similarly the amount of food captured (mostly rice) was not a significant contribution to partisan food requirements. Enough was captured to furnish 10,000 partisans with only 1 lb each per month.

Livestock was probably a key item of capture for the partisans since it was an additional source of income. They were able to sell the animals on the Korean market for the equivalent of \$167 US per head (assuming the official exchange rate).³³ Sixty animals per month therefore represented \$10,000 per month in goods that partisans might wish to obtain on the Korean market.

With the exception of livestock, then, and perhaps boats, it does not appear that the partisans gained much from the materiel they captured rather than destroyed. The denial to the enemy of material both captured and destroyed was

*Special effort was made by Eighth Army to procure foreign or enemy ammunition for partisan distribution.

probably much more significant. Had it been destroyed, of course, the loss to the enemy would have been as great.

In quantities reported the materiel claims provide a rough indication of the results obtained from types of actions other than the fire fights with enemy troops, which were principally casualty-producing. Vehicle and livestock claims, for example, resulted principally from attacks on transport. The close correspondence (nearly 1 to 1) between the number of livestock and the number of vehicles claimed to have been captured and destroyed reflects the relative numbers encountered in actions of this type. The livestock were usually oxen, and the vehicles were usually oxcarts. Again, most food and ammunition claims resulted from attacks on transport or on supply installations, whereas destruction of buildings resulted principally from attacks on tactical installations and civil-administration facilities.

Table B15
MATERIEL CLAIMS, PERIODS 1 AND 2^a

Kind	Per month		Per action	
	1	2	1	2
Captured only				
Weapons	125	227	1.42	0.80
Ammunition, rounds	3421	18,932	38.7	66.4
Food, tons	7.8	5.2	0.09	0.02
Destroyed only				
Vehicles	24.6	239	0.28	0.84
Bridges	7.5	7.0	0.09	0.02
Captured or destroyed				
Boats	8.8	17.0	0.09	0.06

^aBased on Tables A7 and B14.

Compared with Period 1 the volume of materiel reported captured or destroyed in Period 2 appears to be considerable. For those items for which comparable figures are available, however, the increase is not general. Table B15 presents a comparison of materiel claims in the two periods, by month and by action.

It will be observed that the number of weapons and tons of food captured per action dropped considerably, perhaps in reaction to changes in UN supply policies with respect to these items.* The increase in the amount of ammunition captured per action may have been due to the desire to procure enemy ammunition for non-US weapons. The number of vehicles destroyed increased from nearly 3 to more than 8 per 10 actions. Since the relative number of attacks on transport was approximately the same in the two periods, the increase is not attributable to a disproportionate increase in the relevant type of action. It may be, however, that the enemy's growing practice of moving supplies (especially food) in oxcart convoys was responsible for a larger number of vehicle

*Some US officers apparently preferred to have the partisans armed with US weapons, particularly in view of the mission of island defense, and also because of the assured supply of ammunition.

destructions per attack.* These explanations may or may not be valid, but in any event it does not appear that the comparative figures demonstrate anything with respect to operational efficiency in the two periods.

Redeployment of Troops. There is good evidence that during this period the enemy increased coastal and zonal security forces in the areas of greatest partisan activity. Figures B16 and B17 show the disposition of enemy forces in the relevant areas for October 1951 and October 1952, and Fig. B18 shows the relation throughout the period between enemy west coast defense strength, partisan strength, and the number of partisan actions.

In October 1951, as illustrated in Fig. B16, enemy coastal and/or zonal defense forces in the west—where nearly all partisan actions occurred—consisted of the North Korean (NK) I and IV Corps, with a combined strength of 77,700 troops. (The CCF 40th Army in the vicinity of Sariwon probably had other primary missions.)

By October 1952 the NK IV Corps (43,300 troops) was assigned to the defense of most of the Hwanghae coast. Assuming that the NK 9 Brig 81st AU and CCF 42d, 63d, and 64th Armies were also primarily concerned with coastal and/or zonal security, the total enemy defense force in the Hwanghae and adjacent areas was 160,300. This represents an increase of 82,600 troops. As Fig. B18 shows, nearly the whole of this increase took place between July and October 1952. (Figure B18 shows the number of enemy troops accepted by G2, and there may be a time lag between this and the actual distribution in the areas reported.) This increase immediately follows the sharp increase in number of partisan actions that began in June but precedes the large increase in the size of the partisan forces. Therefore the expansion of partisan forces could hardly have been a factor in inducing the enemy to increase his security forces in the area, but it is not unlikely that the intensification of partisan activity was an important contributory cause of the increase.

It should be noted that the foregoing analysis does not cover any build-up in quasi-military or police forces in the areas concerned and does not include east coast areas, where few partisan operations took place.

Military Significance

The period from December 1951 to March 1953 has been characterized as a period in which the chief UN military objective was active defense of MLR positions pending the achievement of a negotiated settlement with the enemy. In this period the partisans were controlled by theater-level agencies, who at first accepted and then reaffirmed objectives of the partisan campaign that were implicit in late 1951 operations. The two major developments in the partisan effort during the period—the decision to expand the force to 40,000 men and the development of comprehensive operational plans—appeared only to enlarge the intended scope of the campaign. So far as can be deduced from the evidence available, command expected the partisans to continue to harass the enemy rear in order to cause him to divert troops to rear-area security activities.

It seems likely that best implementation of such an objective would have required partisans to invade areas other than those of west and south Hwanghae.

* This is pointed out in various command reports during this period.




Fig. B16—Enemy Coastal Forces, October 1951






Fig. B17—Enemy Coastal Forces, October 1952



No military force can ignore the threat implicit in enemy harassment of its rear, even on a small scale, but the diversion of effort to cope with such harassment is not likely to be great unless the actual or potential damage is serious. To force such diversion a few attacks on MSR's, for example, may be worth hundreds of attacks on quasi-military home-guard patrols. In partisan warfare, therefore, where the object is to cause diversion of enemy troops, it is important to attack areas not only in which the enemy is vulnerable but in which available targets are important. In these terms, west and south Hwanghae were of limited strategic value, and it seems improbable that the enemy could have been seriously injured by partisan activities there.




Fig. B18—Relation of Enemy West Coast Defense Strength to Number of Partisan Actions and Partisan Strength

--- Connect points for which data are not available
 o Estimates

It is possible that when the decisions were made to expand the partisan forces in the fall of 1952 high-level authorities anticipated a serious attempt to spread partisan activities to other parts of North Korea, but this cannot be determined from the evidence available.²⁵ It is abundantly clear, however, that by early 1953, when comprehensive operational plans were formulated, operating units were directed (albeit with no evident appraisal of partisan capabilities) to conduct, or prepare to conduct, operations against the enemy in nearly all areas in North Korea. Presumably it was expected that this would help carry out the plan to cause maximum diversion of enemy troops.



Whatever the intention, the evidence presented above shows that partisan operations during this period were concentrated, to an even greater extent than in Period 1, in the same areas as before. The frequency with which partisans conducted various types of actions was not significantly different, with about half the actions consisting of attacks on enemy troops and quasi-military forces. Any difference in the military worth of partisan activities in the two periods, then, probably follows from the great increase in the scale of activity rather than from its location or type. The number of actions reported increased from about 100 per month in the first period to about 220 per month in the second. (The increase, it should be remembered, occurred before the sharp rise in the size of the partisan force.) This greater level of activity was accompanied by large increases in casualty claims, materiel claims, and estimated enemy west coast defense strength.

Partisans reported more than 3000 individual actions during this period, claiming more than 48,600 casualties inflicted and a large amount of materiel captured or destroyed. The results reported were not proportional to the increased number of actions, in general, but they may have caused part of the increase in enemy west coast defense that has been described above. This, as noted, was an increase of 82,600 troops (more than 100 percent) in the Hwanghae and nearby areas, which took place after the large rise in the number of partisan actions.

These figures, however, are the most optimistic that can be reported. The reliability of casualty and materiel claims is unknown, and many of the US officers who were associated with the partisans feel they should be discounted.* At any rate they are subject to the same qualifications as to military significance that were discussed in App A. Moreover not all the augmentation of enemy west coast defense strength can safely be attributed to partisan operations. A portion of it was no doubt "normal" build-up that would have occurred (even in the absence of partisan activities) whenever the enemy felt that more pressing troop requirements had been met.† A portion also took place in areas adjacent to the partisans' main operating areas and can be attributed to partisan activities only on the assumption that the enemy feared expansion of the effort to such areas. In view of these considerations the value of the harassing activities undertaken in this period may not have been great.

In fact, in respect to the latter part of the period—that covered by Plan Phase I during which CINCFE had requested greater partisan activity due to an anticipated enemy attack—it was the feeling of the command that the partisans were not capable of the mission assigned.

*Interviews with various 8240 AU personnel during October 1952 and January 1953.

†See App E on the relation between the increase of west coast defense forces and the increase in total rear-area reserves.

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Appendix C

THIRD PERIOD: APRIL TO JULY 1953

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POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

Toward the end of April 1953, after the "Little Switch" exchange of sick and wounded prisoners began, a cease-fire agreement appeared highly probable. Only friction with the ROK Government over the truce terms seemed to block the final settlement. On 6 June President Rhee declared the truce conditions unacceptable. A few weeks later ROK officials permitted some 25,000 North Korean prisoners to escape from UN prison camps. This incident threatened the success of the negotiations, but on 8 July the enemy agreed to proceed with the talks after assurances from the UN Command that such incidents would not recur. Finally on 27 July the truce was signed and a cease-fire went into effect.

During this brief period UN military forces continued on active defense. Pressure was maintained against the enemy line, but offensive planning was deemphasized and greater attention was given to postwar questions. The most extensive military action in the period occurred in mid-June. At that time the Communists launched their largest offensive in 2 years against South Korean troops on the east-central front.

The imminence of a cease-fire during this period emphasized certain problems with respect to the partisan effort. As suggested previously the partisans had virtually become wards of the UN forces; clarification of their legal status had not been accomplished prior to this time and now seriously affected both partisan morale and relations with ROK authorities. The question of postwar disposition of the partisan forces made such a clarification imperative.

Meanwhile partisan operations against the enemy were continued until the cease-fire. The enemy advantages described in App B, however, continued to prevail: the static MLR and the improbability of a UN offensive still permitted him to maintain tight rear-area security, and the UN forces were less prepared than before to exploit fully partisan activity in enemy rear areas.

COMMAND OBJECTIVES

The missions set forth for the partisans in Plan Phase IIA, discussed in App B, in general continued in effect during this period. There were, however, modifications in command objectives owing to several factors. First, because of assurances by Eighth Army that a UN offensive would not occur within the Phase II period, Plan IIB, which was predicted on this possibility, was dropped.¹ Second, Plan IIA had to be modified owing to a decision on 16 April to cut partisan strength to less than 20,000 by July. And, third, the command was faced with new requirements because of the increasing probability of an early cease-fire.



The decision to limit partisan strength was made after a change in the key positions of command. In early April 1953 new commanding officers were assigned to CCRAK, FEC/LD (K), and the partisan section of FEC/LD (K). After this shift in personnel a reappraisal of the partisan effort was made. Whereas it had been assumed earlier in the year that there would be no interference with the expansion program, the ensuing months had been marked by increasing friction between the ROK Government and the partisan command. The view was expressed in late March that President Rhee would permit recruiting to continue on recommendation of CINCFE,² but this was no longer considered desirable by the new partisan command. Other considerations apart from ROK Government pressure, particularly the question of efficient utilization of the partisan forces and the problem of postarmistice disposition of so many partisans, were also influential. On 16 April the order was issued to cease recruiting and to weed undesirable elements from partisan units.³

This intention to stabilize partisan strength brought about a major revision of Plan Phase IIA, which was finalized, republished, and placed in effect by 15 May. Although somewhat more comprehensive and specific than the old draft of 10 February, its chief objectives remained those of tying down the maximum number of enemy troops in coastal areas, harassing to cause the greatest possible number of enemy casualties, capturing POWs and documents, and protecting Eighth Army's left flank by defense of Kanghwa-do and Kyodong-do. Missions assigned the individual regiments, on the other hand, appear to have been based on a less sanguine view of partisan capabilities than had been taken previously.

Although the key objectives of the revised plan were not greatly altered the 10 February plan had assumed that partisan strength would increase to 40,000 by 15 July. The revision, even though it was assumed there would be no armistice during Phase IIA, held that a static strength of about 20,000 would prevail throughout the period. Also, whereas the early plan assumed that the ROK Government would permit recruitment in South Korea up to the full projected strength, it now stated that only qualified volunteers from the enemy-held mainland would be acceptable.

Other problems associated with the probability of an early truce also arose in April. Among these were the questions of island evacuation, post-truce operational plans, and the legal status of the partisans should their disposition become necessary.

The armistice document being drafted called for the evacuation within 5 days of west coast islands north and west of the provincial boundary of Hwanghae and Kyonggi-do, with the exception of Paengnyong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do. A conference was therefore held between the UN partisan command and the Navy in late April to determine immediate requirements in the event of a cease-fire. The major problem centered around the lack of adequate water supply on islands available for relocating partisans and refugees then north of the 38th Parallel.⁴

Regimental commanders affected by the evacuation submitted their estimates of needed water lift, and reconnaissance of islands suitable for the relocation was made during May and early June. By 12 June an order had been drafted to begin the first evacuation.⁵ Appendix E, Sec 8, shows the magnitude of the logistical problem involved in this order. The prolongation of the truce

negotiations, however, forced a reconsideration of the evacuation program, and by 18 June small operating groups were ordered to reoccupy key islands.⁶

The probability of a cease-fire during this period also influenced the emphasis in operational planning. Various "stay-behind" plans were initiated for posttruce contingencies. No Caucasians were to be left behind in evacuated areas following a truce, but suitable cache sites for weapons and other equipment for partisan use were to be found. Groups of partisans from each regiment, their number dependent on the terrain to be occupied, were to be selected and trained in interdiction, sabotage, psychological warfare, and other guerrilla techniques.⁷ They were to remain as a potential action force in enemy rear areas.

By mid-May, in fact, it was reported that current planning was directed toward changing the partisan effort into a covert operation.⁸ One such project, coded Beehive, was to have been launched in May. It called for the training of 124 partisans of the 2d PIR, who were to be sent into the Yonbaek-gun area. There they were to remain dormant until the cease-fire and to attempt to infiltrate key civil and military offices, develop their underground organization, and be prepared to disrupt the civil and military administration in the area.⁹ Later, on the last day of the war, another such project was initiated. Coded as Camel this plan called for a similar number of partisans from the 2d PIR to infiltrate into the same general area as Beehive and for the same purpose.¹⁰

One further plan illustrative of the emphasis toward covert-type operations was in draft form at the operational level by 20 July. This called for the organization of a Special Task Group within the 1st PAIR. The mission was to plan and implement short-term overt and long-term covert activities during the current and postarmistice periods. Proposed operations were to include:

- (a) abduction of key personnel;
- (b) overt and covert strategic sabotage;
- (c) political eliminations;
- (d) raids to procure technical data and equipment;
- (e) raids to neutralize hard-to-get targets, i.e., radar stations;
- (f) rescue operations;
- (g) special ambushes; and
- (h) subversive activities.

The Special Task Group was to use the 1st PAIR as a cover, and the initial cadre of 300 men was to be selected from this regiment.¹¹

One further problem arising from the imminent cease-fire received increasing attention during this period. This was the determination of partisan status with the ROK Government in respect both to continuing operations and ultimate disposition. This problem involved serious efforts toward achieving a workable agreement with the ROK Government, a matter that is treated in greater detail in following sections of this appendix.

Hence in this period modifications of command objectives were brought about as a result of the imminence of a cease-fire and the change in the UN partisan command. Although operations were continued under a somewhat modified Plan Phase IIA, a stronger effort was made to place covert groups on the enemy mainland in hope of retaining interior assets during the armistice period. At the same time a reassessment of the partisan program in the light

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of ROK Government friction and ultimate disposition of forces was made. In addition the need to evacuate certain islands further complicated command objectives owing to the day-to-day uncertainty of a truce.

ORGANIZATION

Headquarters Organization

The headquarters organization developed by early 1953 remained unchanged throughout this period. However, considerable thought was given to reorganization in the light of the forthcoming cease-fire, especially in terms of smoothing relations with the ROK Government. Within a few months after the truce important organizational changes were made.

In the interest of establishing a better relation with the ROK Government ROK authorities were given a voice in the control of the partisans. By agreement effective 16 Aug 53 the 8250 ROK AU was formed and given responsibility for partisan administration, personnel policy, awards, and disciplinary measures.¹² Operational control of the partisan forces, however, was retained by FEC/LD (K).

Late in the following month FEC/LD (K) was reorganized. The former partisan section of FEC/LD (K) was established as the UN Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK). As a separate unit UNPIK was devoted solely to the control and support of the partisans.

Still another major organizational change was made during the early fall of 1953. CCRAK, 8242 AU, in Korea, was dissolved and then reorganized in Japan as the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East (CCRAFE), 8177 AU. At the same time a new unit, the AFFE Coordinating Detachment, 8078 AU, was organized to represent CCRAFE in Korea. All these organizational changes are shown in Fig. C1.

Operating-Level Organization

Few significant changes occurred in the operating-level organizations prior to the cease-fire. The 5th PIR was phased out as a separate entity and the 6th PIR was shifted south to the island of Yongyu-do. An important new departure in operating-level organization, however, was the proposed Special Task Group within the 1st PAIR. The organizational structure for this unit is illustrated in Fig. C2.

PERSONNEL

US Personnel

As noted in App B, FEC/LD (K) began to fill spaces during 1953 in accordance with a TD drafted in January but not approved until 28 August. This TD called for a total of 193 officers and 448 enlisted men. By May, however, when partisan strength reached its peak, only 110 officers had been assigned, 66 of whom were in the partisan section. Table C1 shows the number of US personnel in the partisan section of FEC/LD (K) relative to partisan strength as of 12 May.¹³

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The number of US personnel in the partisan section in May was about the same as the average strength of all of FEC/LD (K) during 1952. This figure of about 200 remained relatively constant for most of this period and constituted the approximate American strength retained in UNPIK after the cease-fire. As




Fig. C1—Headquarters Organization, September 1953

--- Staff coordination

can be noted in Fig. C3 the number of US personnel per 1000 partisans stood at 9.3 in early May and then climbed to 13.0 in July as partisan strength was gradually cut back.

The Special Forces graduates requested from Ft Bragg earlier in the year were finally assigned to the partisan section of FEC/LD (K) during March, April, and May. These 60 officers and 15 enlisted men, however, failed to bring the unit up to authorized strength and another request was submitted on 13 Jun 53. This requisition called for an additional 74 officers and 42 enlisted men from Special Forces to be assigned during the remainder of 1953.




Fig. C2—Organization of Special Task Group
Total: Officers—18; EM—28

Table C1

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF US AND PARTISAN PERSONNEL

Unit	Officers	Enlisted men	Total	Partisans
Hq, UNPFK, Seoul	9	8	17	—
1st PIR, Paengnyong-do	13	27	40	5,601
2d PIR, Kanghwa-do	8	24	32	4,204
3d PIR, Sokcho-ri	11	21	32	4,793
5th PIR, Yongpyong-do	8	26	34	3,010
6th PIR, Cho-do	10	17	27	3,001
1st PAIR, Seoul	7	11	18	1,533
Total	66	134	200	22,142

CCRAFE staff officers ultimately had the following comment to make in respect to the Special Forces training at Ft Bragg:

- (a) Far East requirements were not considered in teaching the course.
- (b) Not enough attention had been given in the initial selection of candidates particularly in respect to temperamental, psychological, and intellectual factors.
- (c) Not enough time had been spent on small-boat, foreign-weapons, or supply training.
- (d) Not enough time had been spent on area or organizational training. Graduates should have been better versed in Korean weather and terrain and in the organization of the CCF, NKA, and FEC/LD (K). It was also noted that a high percentage of the personnel sent to FEC failed the theater map-reading examination.




Fig. C3—US Personnel per 1000 Partisans

Until December 1951 the figures include all US personnel in 8086 AU; from December 1951 on, the figures include only those FEC/LD (K) personnel assigned to the partisan section.

After the truce the UNPIK command continued to be critical of the Special Forces personnel assigned. It was stated that some were too young and immature, and that they had been bitterly disappointed when they found that all would not be on jump status. Interviews conducted by the ORO study team tended to substantiate this opinion to some degree. Some Special Forces personnel (and some pipeline personnel as well) were contemptuous and hostile toward the Koreans. They stated that they were disappointed in their assignments and generally lacking in pride for the organization. One source of difficulty (a handicap for the US personnel generally) was the language barrier. Unable to communicate satisfactorily, these men appear to have had no desire toward achieving a better understanding of another culture. On the other hand many of the Special Forces personnel stated that they liked their assignments once they were adjusted to the situation. These men—who included officers and men

with actual operational experience in the effort—asserted more dissatisfaction with the training and orientation received at Ft Bragg, which they felt had left them ill-prepared for what to expect, than with the situation as they later found it.

The rigid TOE units trained at Special Forces were considered unsuitable for the Far East. It was the opinion of CCRAFE officers that some cell-type units might be desirable but that they would have to be tailored to the mission. In addition the problem of rotation was pointed out. It was considered that the need to rotate an entire unit at one time would be most undesirable in partisan operations.

A summary of the comments of debriefed operational personnel on problems they encountered in Korea is reproduced in App E. In general, opinions on personnel requirements are in accord with those described above.

In conclusion three points in respect to the US personnel might be made. First, the ratio of US to partisan personnel rose considerably during this period as partisan strength was reduced. Second, FEC continued to request specialized personnel once they had been made available. And, third, in the opinion of theater authorities Special Forces organization and training did not fully meet Far East requirements in respect to partisan operations.

Partisans

On 16 Apr 53 the order was issued to cease partisan recruiting. The momentum of the expansion program continued for at least another month, however, and peak partisan strength of 22,227 was reached during May. Table C2, based on first-of-the-month reports, shows the rise and decline of partisan forces during this period and during two separated months after the cease-fire. The elimination of undesirables, discharge for service time, and desertions accounted for the drop in force during this period.

In December 1953 the 8250 ROK AU conducted a survey on the background of partisan personnel then with UNPIK. Owing to the attrition of 2½ years and the rate of partisan reduction after May the survey results can be only roughly indicative of the composition of the partisan force during the campaign. The survey does, however, provide the only systematic data available on this subject. Table C3 presents the survey results on places of birth.

It is interesting to note that only 42 percent of the partisans on the roster at this time were born in North Korea, and that the largest group of South Koreans came from the province of Kyongi-do, which is that containing the city of Seoul.

Table C4 based on the same survey, shows the age composition of the 13,967 males (39 were females). Almost 60 percent were 23 years of age or younger, and the largest group (26.3 percent) was 17 to 19 years old.

The state of mind of the partisans was considered a problem in this period, and the evacuation of the partisans from islands above the 38th Parallel in June caused considerable uneasiness. The operation, however, which was initiated by 12 June, proceeded smoothly. Except for a minor incident in the 5th PIR (in respect to disarming the partisans), morale was reported as good and the evacuation was orderly beyond all expectations. The partisan leaders generally proved to be cooperative in respect to refugees as well as to their own men.¹⁴

Another serious problem confronting the partisan command in this period was that of partisan status. The actual role performed by the partisans in the Korean conflict had long been hidden under the cloak of security. Occasional

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Table C2

REPRESENTATIVE PARTISAN STRENGTHS
[FEC/LD (K) weekly resumés of partisan operations]

Month	1st PIR	2d PIR	3d PIR	5th PIR	6th PIR	1st PAIR	Total
1953							
May	5601	4024	4844	3010	3001	1533	22,013
June	6128	4180	4638	3010	2932	1306	22,194
July	4826	4188	4592	1794	2464	1252	19,116
August	4592	4093	4125	1532	2099	539	16,973
November	3064	3724	3257	—	3699	586	14,330

Table C3

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTISANS BY PLACE OF BIRTH
(8250th AU, ROK Army, 15 Dec 53)

PIR	Seoul	Kyongi-do	South Korea	North Korea	Total	North Korean, %	South Korean, total
1st	3	1754	30	1068	2,855	37.4	1787
2d	23	2115	32	1425	3,595	39.6	2170
3d	538	877	941	1250	3,606	34.7	2356
6th	80	1276	149	1961	3,466	56.0	1505
1st PAIR	60	70	170	184	484	38.0	300
Total	704	6092	1322	5888	14,006	42.0	8118

Table C4

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTISANS BY AGE GROUP
(8250th AU, ROK Army, 15 Dec 53)

PIR	Under 16	17-19	20-21	22-23	24-28	29-33	34-40	Above 41	Total
1st	109	521	384	327	560	395	424	96	2,816
2d	54	820	744	565	806	477	162	27	3,595
3d	48	1252	711	429	556	414	192	4	3,606
6th	63	899	592	399	659	499	317	38	3,466
1st PAIR	0	184	85	47	82	67	19	0	484
Total	274	3696	2516	1707	2663	1852	1114	165	13,967
Percent	2.0	26.3	18.0	12.2	19.1	13.2	8.0	1.2	100.0

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criminal incidents and jurisdictional difficulties resulting from contacts with ROK authorities therefore led to friction and misunderstanding. Some ROK officials apparently considered the partisans little more than hoodlums who were exploiting security regulations as a cover for lawless behavior.

ROK reactions to the recruitment program by 1953 forced the UN Command to attempt clarification of the legal and military status of the partisans. Recruiters were accused of impressment, false promises, and the acceptance of fees for admission into partisan ranks.¹⁵ (The acceptance of "admission fees" was condoned by the OIC of the partisan section as necessary to help bear the cost of the recruiting campaign.)¹⁶ The subject was even brought up in the ROK Assembly, and partisan headquarters felt that the ROK Government was out to "get" the partisans.¹⁷

Since the Korean press tended to exaggerate incidents suggesting partisan lawlessness, the commander of FEC/LD (K) requested permission in February to issue news releases about partisan activity.¹⁸ Presumably on grounds of security, however, this was not permitted at this time.

Disciplinary problems within partisan units also raised questions in respect to partisan status. In May the new command queried US regimental commanders on this subject. In general they replied that the partisans took no oath and had little or no training in international law. Americans serving with partisan units were considered as advisers only, with the exception of the regimental commanders, who had the power to veto all plans. Other points made were as follows:¹⁹

- (a) The responsibility of the Korean partisan leader is not fixed as he and his command were all volunteers.
- (b) The partisans, although they wore US Army clothing, had no official insignia recognizable at any distance.
- (c) Discipline and law were left to the Korean unit commander, who in most instances was able to exercise rigid control. US personnel in demanding good discipline were able to use supply as a means of checking partisan leaders.
- (d) Violations of international law, where discovered, were punished.
- (e) Partisans were permitted to loot, but by verbal agreement rather than written permission.
- (f) Partisans had no status with the ROK Government and did not serve for a definite period of time.
- (g) Only the partisan officers received a written commission and took an oath of office, though ID cards were being made up on other personnel.
- (h) Operations included attacks on civilians, usually identified as Communists, who were attacked while attending meetings.
- (i) Wounded POWs taken by the partisans received the same medical attention as the partisans.

During the last months of the war attempts were made to settle the question of legal status in negotiations with ROK representatives. Tension was relieved somewhat after the recruiting was stopped, and CINCFE further informed the ROK Government that good records would be maintained on all partisan personnel.²⁰ Finally, in August, the 8250 ROK AU was formed to handle partisan personnel matters. This step gave ROK recognition to the partisan forces and provided a working arrangement pending their final disposition.

In this period the imminence of the cease-fire and the June evacuation of forward islands, along with the ambiguity of partisan status, led to serious

concern about partisan morale. In late June partisan headquarters requested special morale surveys. The number of criminal incidents, the number of AWOLs and desertions, the number of complaints from partisan leaders, and the number of partisans refusing to participate in raids were considered serious problems.²¹

Thus in respect to the partisan personnel during this period three developments occurred. First, partisan strength was reduced with a view to retaining only the more desirable elements. Second, the partisans were evacuated from forward areas in accordance with the forthcoming truce with a minimum of incidents. Third, an effort was made to maintain partisan morale until an agreement could be worked out relative to their status with the ROK Government.

LOGISTICS

During this period the partisans continued to be supplied under the revised Class IV Project. In Plan Phase IIA, finalized in May 1953, it was assumed that quarterly increments authorized by the Class IV Project would be supplied without interruption, even if the TA requested by the DA should be drafted successfully and approved. No such TA, however, was submitted or approved during the period of operations.

The logistics annex to Plan Phase IIA also illustrates something of the magnitude of partisan supply operations. It was there estimated that a flow of about 9600 tons per month would be required of which 55 tons were to be lifted by air, 1270 tons by rail, 2375 tons by water, and 5900 tons by truck. In addition it was planned that some 60 tons per month would be airdropped to interior units. Regiments were to maintain 3-day minimum and 7-day maximum stock levels in most classes of supply.

The supply problem in this period, however, was less that of procurement than that of waste. Most Americans were engaged in housekeeping duties, and a high proportion of the work centered around the apparently burdensome question of supply control. There was not only an annoying problem of partisan theft but also the task of getting the partisans to turn in old items when requesting new. Further, higher headquarters insisted on some accountability even for items such as Class X clothing. Regimental commanders on the other hand complained about the SOP on certificates of loss and felt that they should have the authority to survey items without requesting it from headquarters. In addition some objected that they did not have enough American personnel either to stand guard duty or to supervise warehousing properly. Adequate storage facilities, in fact, became a problem in itself in this period.²²

Some regimental commanders considered property accountability and responsibility to be their most serious problem. The June evacuation from forward islands aggravated the problem. Considerable losses in nonexpendable equipment were suffered during this move. Although the records do not reveal just how much was lost one regimental commander alone reported losses totaling upward of \$150,000.*

The approximate cost of the partisan campaign during the calendar year 1953, as reflected in CCRAK records, is broken down in Table C5. When compared with the cost figures for 1952 (Table B5), 1953 easily stands out as

* Interview with CO, 5th PIR, 5 Nov 53.

the most expensive year of the effort. At the same time it is to be noted that a considerable amount (not even approximate figures are available) of this supply was not accepted owing to the cut in partisan strength and the cease-fire. Much also was turned back in as unnecessary.

Table C5
CLASS IV PROJECT COSTS
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1953
(Figures supplied by G4, CCRAFE)

Total Class IV Costs (Class IV Project: ARMY-KCZ-CCRAK)	
Air Force	\$ 103,839.61
Chemical	375,474.00
Engineer	4,269,810.67
Medical	277,267.19
Navy	16,931.00
Ordnance	6,322,405.65
Ordnance (Ammo)	50,923,563.65
Quartermaster	14,554,214.15
Signal	1,679,046.07
Transportation	1,810,421.13
Total	\$80,332,973.12
Approximate Cost of Partisan Effort Only	
Supplies and equipment provided from Class IV Project	\$67,788,540.00
Grain at \$200,000 per month	2,400,000.00
Purchase of craft	500,000.00
Maintenance of craft	60,000.00
Maintenance of buildings	20,000.00
Ammunition	500,000.00
Indigenous cigarettes	60,000.00
Operation of vehicles	222,900.00
Total	\$71,551,440.00

In a letter explaining the basis for the figures CCRAFE stated:

The over-all approximate cost of UNPIK can only be determined from approved Class IV Project 009 and the changes thereto plus the support given UNPIK from other sources, such as Confidential Funds for cigarettes, supplies not programmed into the theater for UNPIK drawn by authority of LS-53, and supplies issued to UNPIK on an interim-approved TA. The cost of the expendable and nonexpendable items from the interim-approved TA must be an educated guess based on what was drawn from Class IV Project. It must be kept in mind that many rations, B with A supplement, were also drawn by UNPIK, the number of which cannot be determined. Also cigarettes (indigenous) have been issued in volume which were not programmed for UNPIK, the cost of which to QM is 0.0242 cents per pack. UNPIK draws 160,000 packs monthly as of Oct 53. POL supplies, maintenance of boats and buildings, and ammunition are also factors to be considered.

Class IV Project 009 contained equipment and supplies used by intelligence units. However, it can be estimated conservatively that UNPIK was the recipient of 90 percent of the supplies issued. UNPIK strength figures will verify at least this percentage.

The figures, therefore, do not represent actual supply costs but rather the expected costs had partisan forces remained fully operational throughout 1953. One interesting and unexplained discrepancy between the 1952 and 1953 figures can be noted regarding the cost of grain and other food supplies. The cost for 1952—when partisan strength was considerably less than in 1953—seems to have been more than three times as great as the projected cost for 1953.

In respect to logistics three aspects appear to stand out in this period. First, the partisans were supplied uninterruptedly and in quantity under the Class IV Project. Second, the storage, control, and responsibility for supply became a major problem for unit commanders. Third, the cost of the partisan effort as planned for 1953 appears to have risen more than proportionately to the increase in partisan strength.

OPERATIONS

Less than 650 actions were reported in this 4-month period. This represents a decrease in the level of activity from 220 actions per month in Period 2 to 160 per month in Period 3. The decline took place despite expansion in the size of the partisan forces, which reached a peak of more than 22,000 men in May 1953. The decline in activity was probably due to a number of factors, among them greater enemy resistance in the main operating areas, deterioration of partisan morale and incentives, and, on the part of US officers in charge, greater preoccupation with cease-fire and postwar matters such as evacuation of islands north of the 38th Parallel.

Operating Areas

Broadly speaking the relative geographical distribution of actions in Period 3 fell within the pattern established in Periods 1 and 2 and continued the trend already evidenced toward geographical concentration of activity. Figure C4 illustrates the percentages of actions in this period by grid squares, and Table C6 gives the monthly percentages.

Of the 643 actions for which locations were reported, 98.7 percent took place on the west coast and a little less than 1.4 percent took place on the east coast. These are almost exactly the proportions that obtained in Period 2. The percentage of actions in the Hwanghae grid squares increased, however, from 93.1 percent in Period 2 to 97.7 percent in Period 3. At the same time the percentage of actions on the northwest coast dropped from 5.7 percent in Period 2 to 1.0 percent in Period 3.

A decline also occurred with respect to the actions in the grid squares containing most of the noncoastal areas of Hwanghae. Table C7 gives the monthly percentages for YC and BT areas, and compares them with the percentages of actions in Hwanghae as a whole. The ratio of these internal to total Hwanghae actions fell somewhat from the Period 2 ratio and declined steadily during Period 3, indicating a tendency to operate closer to the coast.

The major change in operating areas, however, was the decided shift in emphasis from west to south Hwanghae, particularly to the coastal strip just south of the 38th Parallel. In Periods 1 and 2 the total percentages of actions

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


Fig. C4—Percentages of Actions by Grid Squares, April to July 1953

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in grid squares XB, YB, and BS had been 24.1 percent and 35.3 percent, respectively. In Period 3 the percentages in this area rose to 36 percent in April, 47 percent in May, 58 percent in June, and 81 percent in July. There is no evidence that this area was regarded as more fruitful in terms of available targets, but it was considered more accessible, the island bases within striking distance were more numerous and better protected, and the number of partisans

Table C6
ACTIONS BY GRID SQUARES, APRIL TO JULY 1953

Month	No. of actions	Percentages in grid squares ^a												Percentage in:		
		XC	YC	YB	YD	BS	XB	BT	XD	XE	DU	DT	CU	CT	Hwang-hae	East coast
April	232	32	24	13	1	22	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	93	0
May	212	25	24	25	0	19	3	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	96	2
June	87	18	20	28	0	29	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	99	1
July	112	16	0	15	0	42	24	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	97	3
Apr-Jul	643	25.7	19.7	19.6	0.5	25.8	6.1	0.8	0.5	0	1.4	0	0	0	97.7	1.4

^aZero equals less than 0.5 percent.

Table C7
HWANGHAE PROVINCE ACTIONS, APRIL TO JULY 1953

Month	Percentage of total actions		Ratio: internal to total Hwanghae
	Hwanghae	Internal-grids YC and BT	
April	93	25	0.27
May	96	24	0.25
June	99	22	0.22
July	97	0	0
Apr-Jul	97.7	20.5	0.21

on those bases was very large. (In April 1953 more than 9600 partisans had their home bases off south Hwanghae, as compared with 5200 whose home bases were off the west and northwest coasts.) The sharp increase in south Hwanghae actions between June and July, of course, reflects the withdrawals from bases north of the 38th Parallel in anticipation of the cease-fire.

Types of Action

Figure C5 shows the frequency with which partisans conducted various types of action, as compared with Periods 1 and 2. Table C8 gives the fre-

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quencies in monthly percentages. The main types of actions in Period 3 are shown by order of frequency in the accompanying tabulation.

Type of action	Period 1, %	Period 2, %	Period 3, %
Enemy troops	52.1	48.5	60.4
Transport	11.3	12.8	10.5
Civil administration	1.9	9.9	6.4
Intelligence	0.8	14.3	5.5
Supply and storage	9.2	4.5	3.6
Tactical installations	6.7	4.1	2.6
Naval-gunfire observation	13.8	2.2	2.1
Other	4.2	3.7	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0	99.9

As in the first two periods of the campaign, attacks on enemy troops constituted the most frequent type of action by a wide margin. Attacks on enemy troops were more frequent in this period, however, and increased during the period to a high of 73 percent of all actions in July. Attacks on transport remained at approximately the same relative level as in previous periods, and the percentage of naval-gunfire observation actions was about the same as in Period 2. The relative percentage of other types of actions recorded—attacks on civil administration, intelligence actions, attacks on supply and storage facilities, and attacks on tactical installations—declined markedly as compared with the previous period.

Within the period the relative number of attacks on enemy troops, naval-gunfire observation, and intelligence actions increased, while the relative number of all other types of actions decreased. The miscellaneous category of actions was high in April and June, principally because of attacks on communication facilities and psywar actions.

Size of Operating Groups

As in Period 2, operating groups tended to be small. Figure C6 illustrates the percentages of actions by size of the partisan groups involved, as compared with Period 2, and Table C9 gives the percentages on a monthly basis.

The percentages of actions conducted by groups of varying sizes in this period, as compared with the previous period, are given in the accompanying tabulation.

No. of partisans	Period 2, %	Period 3, %
1-10	39.3	29.5
11-25	32.4	33.3
26-50	21.1	28.8
51-100	4.7	6.3
101-200	1.8	1.8
Over 200	0.7	0.4
Total	100.0	100.1

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


Fig. C5—Types of Actions for Periods 1, 2, and 3

■ Period 1 ■ Period 2 ▨ Period 3

Table C8

ACTIONS BY TYPES, APRIL TO JULY 1953^a

Month	No. of actions	Percentages of actions							
		Enemy troops	Tactical installations	Transport	Supplies and storage	Civil administration	Intelligence	Naval gunfire observation	Other
April	225	50	2	13	6	6	5	2	14
May	208	67	5	11	1	9	3	0	4
June	91	64	0	5	4	3	10	2	11
July	55	73	0	0	2	0	11	11	4
For period	579	60.4	2.6	10.5	3.6	6.4	5.5	2.1	8.8

^aDiscrepancies in total actions between Tables C6 and C8 are due to failure of all after-action reports to include the particular category of information.

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The smallest size range did not predominate in Period 3 as it did in Period 2; rather there was a distinct shift from 1- to 10-man actions to 26- to 50-man actions, with the relative frequency of 11- to 25-man actions remaining approximately the same.




Fig. C6—Percentages of Partisan Actions of Various Strengths for Periods 2 and 3

Table C9

FREQUENCY OF ACTIONS BY SIZE OF OPERATING GROUP, APRIL TO JULY 1953

Month	No. of actions	Percentage of actions by size of partisan group ^a					
		1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-200	Over 200
April	200	35.5	36.0	21.5	6.5	0.5	0.0
May	202	28.7	31.7	28.7	7.9	2.5	0.5
June	86	26.7	40.7	26.7	3.5	2.3	0.0
July	65	16.9	20.0	53.8	4.6	3.1	1.5
Apr-Jul	553	29.5	33.3	28.8	6.3	1.8	0.4

^aSee Table E1 of App E for actual numbers of actions in these categories.

Within the period the general tendency toward larger operating groups was especially noticeable in July, when over half the reported actions were conducted by groups of 26 to 50 partisans. If this tendency was associated with the shift in actions to the south Hwanghae coastal areas and with the



increased proportion of enemy troop actions, it may have been due to intensified enemy countermeasures.

Interior-Based Actions

The after-action reports for this period permit, for the first time, a direct comparison of the activities of interior-based as against island-based partisan groups. Great caution must be exercised in extrapolating from these data but the results obtained from the analysis are interesting and worth presenting.

It was possible to determine, with fair reliability, the number of island- and interior-based actions from March to June 1953. Of 772 actions counted during these 4 months, 713 were identifiable as island- or interior-based and 59 were not identifiable as either. Table C10 presents the results.

Table C10
ISLAND-BASED VS INTERIOR-BASED ACTIONS, MARCH TO JUNE 1953^a

Month	No. of actions					Percentages of known actions		
	Island-based actions	Interior-based actions	Total island and interior	Unknown	Total known and unknown	Island-based actions	Interior-based actions	Total
March	54	149	203	37	240	26.6	73.4	100.0
April	103	118	221	9	230	46.6	53.4	100.0
May	117	90	207	3	210	56.5	43.5	100.0
June	58	24	82	10	92	70.7	29.3	100.0
Total	332	381	713	59	772	46.6	53.4	100.0

^aActions were classed as island-based when the report specified that the partisan group either "departed" from an island base or "landed" in the course of the action. Actions were classed as interior-based when the reports specified that the partisan group was an element of an interior unit. When an island-based unit remained on the mainland several days, all actions after the first day were classed as interior based. In order to minimize guesswork all other actions were considered unidentifiable.

The figures in Table C10 show that interior-based actions were a high but declining percentage of the total number of actions reported. For the 4-month period as a whole more than half the actions were reported as conducted by interior-based groups. During the same period units reported an average monthly strength of 1862 partisans (8.9 percent of total partisan strength) in interior units. According to these figures then, interior-based partisans at this time conducted ten times as many actions per man as were conducted by the remainder of the force. It must be remembered, however, that the interior-based actions, although they presumably represented deeper penetrations of the mainland than island-based actions, still occurred by and large in the coastal portions of Hwanghae.

The frequency with which interior units conducted various types of actions was also different from the pattern of actions conducted by island-based groups.

For a total sample of 686 actions, the percentages by types for interior- and island-based groups were as given in the accompanying tabulation.

Type of action	Interior, %	Island, %	Both, %
Enemy troops	39.5	73.0	53.6
Civil administration	25.2	4.5	16.5
Transport	22.2	5.2	15.5
Supply and storage	3.5	2.1	2.9
Tactical installations	3.0	10.4	6.1
Other	6.5	3.8	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

According to the tabulation island-based groups mainly conducted attacks on enemy troops and on tactical installations. Although the frequency with which interior-based groups engaged enemy troops was also high it was much less than that of island-based groups. Interior-based groups moreover, directed a large proportion of their attacks against civil administration and transport targets. Interior-based attacks on supply and storage facilities and on tactical installations were few.

The size characteristics of interior- and island-based operating groups were also studied, and it was found that interior-based groups tended to be somewhat smaller. The accompanying tabulation gives the general results for 640 individual actions.

Size of group	Interior, %	Island, %	Both, %
1-10	39.5	26.7	34.1
11-25	29.7	35.5	32.2
26-50	21.0	27.5	23.8
51-100	9.0	5.5	7.5
101-200	0.8	2.6	1.6
Over 200	0.0	2.2	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

These figures show that approximately an equal proportion of interior- and island-based actions were conducted by groups of under 50 partisans—roughly 90 percent. Of these actions, however, a larger percentage of interior-based actions were conducted by groups of 1 to 10 partisans, and larger percentages of island-based actions were conducted by groups of 11 to 50 partisans. Similarly almost all the large actions conducted by interior-based partisans were in the 51- to 100-man category, whereas half the actions by island-based partisans were conducted by groups of 100 or more.

Special Projects

Available records do not show any airborne operations after those in April 1953. Two special projects were initiated in this period, however, both aimed at developing a covert force capable of disrupting the civil and military administrations in the Yonbaek-gun area near Haeju when ordered to do so.

The first, Beehive, was launched on 26 May and utilized 102 partisans from the 2d PIR before the operation was terminated in February 1954. During the period 674 residents of the area were alleged to have been recruited for the underground, and results were deemed satisfactory. The collection of intelligence, originally intended to be a by-product of the operation, finally became its primary mission.




Fig. C7—Relation of Casualties Inflicted by Partisans to Number of Partisan Actions

--- Connect points for which data are not available

The second, Camel, was a similar project launched on 27 July, the day of the cease-fire. It utilized 82 partisans from the 2d PIR. It also was terminated in February 1954, with results considered satisfactory.

Both projects are important illustrations of the attention that was given to postwar planning during the last period of the Korean War.

Results

Casualties. From April to July 1953 partisans claimed to have inflicted 6172 casualties. This was a rate of 10.5 casualties inflicted per casualty sustained, and a rate of 9.6 casualties per action. Figure C7 compares the number of casualties in this period with the number of actions; Table C11 presents the monthly casualty claims, and Table C12 presents the monthly ratios of casualties inflicted per casualty sustained.



In this period both the number of actions and the number of casualty claims per month declined considerably as compared with the previous period. The number of casualties per action also declined, however, from 14.5 in Period 2 to 9.6—a decline that was evident in April and May and very pronounced in June and July. The ratio of casualties inflicted to casualties sustained in this period represents an equivalent decline, corresponding closely to the pattern in casualties per action. Along with the marked decline of partisan activity in

Table C11

CASUALTIES CLAIMED BY PARTISANS, APRIL TO JULY 1953

Month	KIA	WIA	POWs	Total	No. of actions	Casualties per action
April	2170	480	0	2650	232	11.4
May	1975	741	10	2726	212	12.9
June	410	112	0	522	87	6.0
July	184	87	3	274	112	2.4
Total	4739	1420	13	6172	643	9.6
Monthly avg	1185	355	3	1543	161	—
Percentage	76.8	23.0	0.2	100.0	—	—

Table C12

RATIO OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED TO CASUALTIES SUSTAINED, APRIL TO JULY 1953

Month	Casualties inflicted	Casualties sustained	Ratio
April	2650	222	11.9
May	2726	237	11.5
June	522	83	6.3
July	274	108	2.5
Total	6172	650	10.5

this period then, a decided decline occurred in the casualty-producing efficiency of the activity undertaken, in spite of the relative increase of casualty-producing types of action. This fact is the best available evidence to corroborate the impressions of US officers at the time that partisan morale in this period was poor and that their operating incentives had deteriorated in view of the imminence of the cease-fire.*

Materiel. The quantity of materiel destroyed or captured by partisans in this period also declined considerably. Materiel claims were computed for 3 of the 4 months of the period, and the results are presented in Table C13. Table C14 compares the claims reported for this period with those of the previous period on a per month and a per action basis. Table C15 compares all three periods for those items of materiel for which comparable data are available.

* Interviews with various 8240 AU personnel in October 1953 and January 1954.



Table C13
MATERIEL REPORTED CAPTURED OR DESTROYED, APRIL TO JUNE 1953
(After-action reports)

Item	Captured	Destroyed	Total	Monthly avg	No. per action ^a	Percentage captured
Small arms	313	791	1,104	368	2.07	39.6
Crew-served weapons	39	12	51	17	0.10	76.5
Ammunition						
Rounds	19,041	0	19,041	6347	36.00	100.0
Cases	302	123	425	142	0.80	71.1
Vehicles	23	217	240	80	0.45	9.6
Boats	1	20	21	7	0.04	4.8
Livestock	81	105	186	62	0.35	43.5
Food, tons	5.1	246.3	251.4	84	0.47	2.0
Buildings	—	432	432	144	0.81	—
Bridges	—	11	11	4	0.02	—

^aFor 531 actions.

Table C14
MATERIEL CLAIMS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED,
PERIODS 2 AND 3
(Based on Tables B14 and C13)

Item	Per month		Per action	
	2	3	2	3
Small arms	334	368	1.17	2.07
Crew-served weapons	33	17	0.12	0.10
Ammunition				
Rounds	43,909	6347	154	36
Cases	152	142	0.53	0.80
Vehicles	242	80	0.85	0.45
Boats	17	7	0.06	0.04
Livestock	223	62	0.78	0.35
Food, tons	355	84	1.24	0.47
Buildings	198	144	0.69	0.81
Bridges	7	4	0.02	0.02

Table C15
MATERIEL CLAIMS, PERIODS 1, 2, AND 3
(Based on Tables A7, B14, and C13)

Item	Per month			Per action		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Captured only						
Weapons	125	227	117	1.42	0.80	0.66
Ammunition, rounds	3421	18,932	6347	38.7	66.4	35.9
Food, tons	7.8	5.2	1.7	0.09	0.02	0.01
Destroyed only						
Vehicles	24.6	239	72.3	0.28	0.84	0.41
Bridges	7.5	7.0	3.7	0.09	0.02	0.02
Captured or destroyed						
Boats	8.8	17.0	7.0	0.09	0.06	0.04

Except for the number of small arms claimed captured or destroyed, the average amounts of different kinds of materiel claimed per month decreased from Period 2 to Period 3. The number of small arms claimed actually increased from 334 per month to 367 per month. All other items dropped sharply and in nearly all cases were less than half the amounts claimed per month in Period 2.

The general decline in materiel claims was not in all cases proportional to the decline in activity. The number of small arms captured or destroyed per action increased as compared with the previous period, as did the number of cases of ammunition and the number of buildings claimed per action. By contrast, however, the numbers of vehicles, boats, livestock, tons of food, and crew-served weapons claimed per action dropped. Whereas the number of bridges destroyed per month decreased from 7 to 4, the average number per action remained the same as in Period 2. In most cases the decline in materiel claims per action was comparable to the decline in casualty claims per action.

It is interesting to compare claims for all three periods for certain kinds of materiel for which comparable data are available. Table C15 shows that in some cases—weapons and food captured, bridges destroyed, and boats captured or destroyed—materiel claims per action were highest in Period 1 and declined in subsequent periods. Rounds of ammunition captured and vehicles destroyed per action increased in Period 2 but declined in Period 3.

These results are in general similar to those obtained with respect to casualty claims per action, which were found to be highest in Period 1 and which decreased in the following periods.

Redeployment of Troops. By March 1953 the number of enemy troops apparently engaged in coastal and/or zonal defense in west Korea had declined from 160,300 in October 1952 to 146,300. Between March and June 1953, however, these forces increased to 203,900. This was 57,600 more than the March 1953 figure and 43,600 more than the October 1952 total.

Figure C8 shows the following units in coastal and/or zonal defense positions in the west: The CCF 50th, 38th, 63d, and 54th Armies, with a total of 158,600 troops; the CCF-NK 9 Brig 81st AU, with 4500 troops; the NK 21st, 23d, and 26th Brig, with 12,300 troops; and the NK IV Corps, with 28,500 troops. These units brought the total defense force in the area to 203,900 as of June 1953.

Comparison of Figs. B17 and C8 shows that the large area of Hwanghae previously occupied by the NK IV Corps was reduced by June 1953, and portions were taken over by the NK 21st, 23d, and 26th Brig, as well as by the CCF 63d Army. The entire area of Hwanghae west of the Sariwon-Haeju line was blanketed, and responsibility was assigned to the NK 21st and 23d Brig. This was a significant portion of the main operating areas of the partisan forces.

Figure C9 continues the graph of enemy west coast defense troops (excluding those with obvious tactical missions), partisan strength, and number of partisan actions. The increase in enemy coastal and/or zonal defense forces in the west during this period took place after a considerable drop in the number of partisan actions. It occurred after the increase in partisan strength was well under way, however. It is conceivable, therefore, that the increase in enemy strength was caused in part by the large expansion of the partisan force in late 1952 and early 1953, combined with an anticipation of increased activity as a result of the expansion and the possible repetition of a strong upward trend in activity in the summer and fall months.




Fig. C8—Enemy Coastal Forces, June 1953

Phase I plan previously discussed. The report concluded that the partisan forces had accomplished their assigned mission of harassing the enemy, increasing attacks by interior units, and recruiting and training, but did not accomplish the missions of interdicting MSR's and destroying vital targets. Harassment of the enemy was reported accomplished with approximately 75 percent success only in the areas south of an east-west line through Chinnampo, west of north-south lines through Sariwon, and along the coast south of the Kaesong-Haeju MSR. Attacks by interior units were reported increased by approximately 25 percent between January and March 1953. Planned maximum effort directed at destruction of bridges and tunnels resulted in no tunnels and relatively few bridges destroyed or damaged.

Specific missions assigned PIRs were in general considered not accomplished or unsatisfactorily accomplished. These included the 1st PIR's missions of interdicting the Sariwon-Haeju MSR and LC and pinning down enemy reserves; the 2d PIR's missions of interdicting the Haeju-Kaesong and Koksan-Yangdok MSR's and continuing to build interior units; the 3d PIR's missions of interdicting MSR's in the Sinanju, Chongju, Kanggye, Kilchu, and Hamhung areas and preparing to support Eighth Army operations on the east coast; and the 1st PAIR's missions of attaining a strength of 3600 combat effectives and building interior units. The general conclusion of the report was that tasks assigned were far beyond partisan capabilities. It is also possible to conclude, from the evidence presented, that the military significance of the campaign in the period discussed was very limited.

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Appendix D

FOURTH PERIOD: JULY 1953 TO MARCH 1954

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POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

After the cease-fire in late July 1953 the attention of UN forces in Korea was directed toward four objectives: (a) expediting the "Big Switch" operation; (b) dismantling fortifications in the neutralized zone while maintaining an alert defense of lines held; (c) assisting in rehabilitation planning for South Korea; and (d) further development of the ROK Army. In addition an effort was made to offset the decline in troop morale that usually follows the conclusion of a campaign.

The close of active hostilities for regular forces, of course, meant a period of relative inactivity for partisan forces pending their final disposition. During the interim various tasks were assigned the partisans while the US command came to grips with a number of problems brought to the surface by the new situation.

COMMAND OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITY

As noted previously, evacuation of most partisan units from bases north of the 38th Parallel occurred some time prior to the cease-fire. Complete withdrawal after the truce, however, did not mean that the partisans no longer had a definite mission. As outlined by higher headquarters, this mission was as follows:

- (1) Defend the left flank of Eighth Army by defense of Kanghwa-do and Kyodong-do.
- (2) Defend islands currently occupied by partisan forces.
- (3) Maintain units at maximum degree of combat effectiveness.
- (4) Be prepared to implement plans for employment for stay-behind teams.
- (5) Be prepared for immediate employment of special-action teams against selected targets in North Korea.
- (6) Be prepared to initiate unconventional warfare by airborne and amphibious operations up to company size.
- (7) Be prepared to evacuate in the event it becomes necessary.

Consistent with this essentially defensive mission training emphasis during the fall and winter of 1953 was along more conventional lines. TOEs and TAs for a "type" partisan regiment were planned, with the objective of coordinating and training company-size units capable of implementing the mission.¹ The US commanders, however, were not overly satisfied with the effort to achieve more coordination between the disparate entities that comprised the partisan forces during combat operations.*

*Interviews with UNPIK field commanders.

Plans for covert operations and for a Special Task Group, which had been drafted before the cease-fire, were implemented during the balance of the year. Two of these special projects, Beehive and Camel, were considered operationally satisfactory, though less as underground movements than as intelligence nets. Both of these operations, however, were closed out by late February 1954. A third covert operation of the same type, coded Moose, failed to achieve a satisfactory net and was dropped earlier in the same month.² In accordance with the assigned mission some experimenting was done with stay-behind teams, but the occasion for their employment never arose.

Two other objectives appear to have been present in training the partisans along more orthodox lines. First, it kept the partisans occupied and disciplined until the time when disbandment would occur. Second, in the realization that such disbandment would ultimately become necessary, it was not considered desirable that what could become a hard-to-control mob be released in South Korea. In fact, the chief problem facing the command in this period was that of partisan demobilization, a problem that necessarily involved the arrangement of mutually satisfactory terms with the ROK Government in respect to partisan status.

ARMY DOCTRINE RELATIVE TO PARTISAN DEMOBILIZATION

Army doctrine, as expressed in FM 31-21,³ states both a policy for partisan employment and for partisan demobilization, and notes that long- and short-term planning should be contingent on the objectives of regular forces. In anticipation of the day when partisans must be disbanded three basic requirements for this eventuality are set forth: (a) effort should be made to maintain adequate records on partisan personnel so that their individual contribution can be proved and recognized; (b) early agreements with recognized area authorities should be sought in respect to partisan status, and these agreements should be supplemented to meet changing conditions as a matter of policy; and (c) whenever possible, partisans should be regularized to the extent of induction into military forces indigenous to the area of operations, or, if necessary, even into the US Army.

PARTISAN DEMOBILIZATION PROBLEM IN KOREA

The question of partisan status and disposition after the cease-fire became a more critical issue than it was during the first half of 1953. By this time the significant aspects of the problem were more clearly realized. Although they were Koreans—many of them South Koreans—the partisans were under direct US control and not the jurisdiction of the ROK Government. At the same time their status as either soldiers or civilians had not been clarified. In addition many of them appear to have been as much anti-Rhee as anti-Communist, and therefore fearful of ROK reprisals.

Initially, the ROK Army and Navy contacted and assisted the partisans who were forced out of enemy territory in early 1951. In fact, the ROK Army had direct control of east coast partisans and some west coast elements as late as March and April 1951.⁴ The ROK Navy also continued in a liaison and support

role to the US-led partisans for some time, but this was reduced to inconsequential proportions—a development protested without avail.⁵ The point, however, is that the original partisans had been willing to serve under ROK military authorities at that time. Then, as the partisans were absorbed under US control and ROK influence declined, they became highly dependent on US support and direction alone. Yet no agreement concerning their status was made with the ROK Government. They were literally cut off from any national jurisdiction as such, virtually becoming wards of the UN forces until such time as their home areas might be liberated.

As incidents and alleged incidents involving the partisans and various ROK authorities created tensions, the former, rightly or wrongly, became apprehensive of retaliation if reverted to ROK control. At the same time (as ROK Government action was ultimately to reveal) the authorities were equally fearful if so many partisans—trained in unconventional warfare—were simply released in South Korea at the close of hostilities. This mutual fear and possible animosity was immensely increased as a result of the expansion program of late 1952, which brought so many South Koreans into the partisan ranks.

In early 1951, in the initial stages of the partisan campaign while another UN attempt to liberate North Korea was probable, the question of partisan status was not a critical problem. But once the truce talks had begun it became a responsibility of the UN command. Successful negotiation merely to reestablish the prehostility status quo meant that (a) the partisans would be unable to return to their homes in North Korea; and (b) they were therefore certain to become “stateless” individuals unless taken under the ROK Government or other provision made for their future. Yet the situation was permitted to drift until it assumed proportions that appear to have hampered an equitable solution.

It can hardly be demonstrated that an early agreement with the ROK Government respecting partisan status would have resulted in a better solution to the status question. On the other hand it is logical to assume that friendlier relations would have been maintained had the partisans been given some assurance regarding their status and probable future. What in the end became a necessity—their induction into the ROK Army—could in the beginning have been a virtue. The partisans were volunteers. Given reason to be loyal to the ROK Government, they represented a long-term asset of greater potential to that government than to any other concerned in the Korean War, and they could have been developed into a special force of continuing significance. Further, a regularization of their status with the ROK Government—even apart from the morale factor involved—would in no way have meant a loss of operational control as a partisan force by the UN command during hostilities. Although this view of the situation, of course, represents the wisdom of hindsight, the lessons are no less clear, one of the more important of which is that sound doctrine based on experience cannot easily be ignored.

1953 AGREEMENT ON PARTISAN STATUS

An agreement effective 16 Aug 53 (Stuart-Sohn Agreement)⁶ was made between CG, CCRAK, and the ROK Minister of National Defense. This document called for the activation of the 8250 ROK AU, a provisional unit that was to administer the Korean personnel of the 8240 AU and that was placed under the

direct control of the Minister of National Defense. Personnel policy, awards and disciplinary action, and the granting of suitable ROK Army rank to the partisans were to be the responsibility of the new ROK unit. In addition wounded Korean paramilitary personnel and the families of partisans killed in action were to receive the same benefits provided ROK Army personnel. Operational control, logistic support, and training, however, remained the responsibility of the CO, 8240 AU. Provision was made also that further amendments or additions to the document could be made only by mutual agreement.⁶

The act of signing this paper, of course, set the stage for further developments. Implementation of its terms and the actual intent of the ROK Government had yet to be demonstrated, and it was not the intent of the US command to relinquish all control until partisan status could be better clarified. The partisans, as yet, were neither civilians nor soldiers in good standing with the ROK Government. It is notable that the 8250 ROK AU, though a military unit, was not placed under ROK Army command but rather the civilian arm of the defense establishment.

DEVELOPMENTS OF JANUARY 1954

The 8250 ROK AU was organized and became operational during the balance of 1953, and the US command made an effort to ensure that the terms of the agreement would be upheld by the ROK Government. On 8 Jan 54, however, the issue was finally brought to a climax when "... an order was published by the ROK Government transferring the 8250th ROK AU into the ROK Army, thereby unilaterally abrogating the agreement between CCRAK and the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea."¹ It was further learned, on 20 January, that an order had been published transferring the partisans out of the 8250 ROK AU and replacing them with regular ROK Army personnel. Two days later, after conferring with the US commanders concerned, the UN Commander accepted the position of the ROK Government and announced that UNPIK would be phased out, except for a small special-action team.¹

OPERATION QUICKSILVER

A plan known as Operation Order 2-54—"Quicksilver"—was prepared to transfer the partisans into the ROK Army by late January. Under this order it was assumed that (a) all partisans would be inducted prior to movement; (b) no major resistance would be encountered; and (c) the international situation would not deteriorate during the transition. D-day for the transfer was set for 24 February.⁷

By 23 Feb 54 ROK Army headquarters had issued a parallel order that fully reflected the official attitude toward the partisans. In part, the intelligence annex to this order read:

The induction of these 13,000 partisans into the ROK Army must not be considered a routine operation. Special precautionary measures must be taken in view of their peculiar background, training, indoctrination, and experience in unorthodox warfare during 3 years of guerrilla operations... Partisans must be dispersed as individuals throughout the ROK Army so that not more than five to seven are assigned to a company and they should not be from the same partisan group... Initially, members of the Partisan Forces should not be assigned to ROK Army units in the rear areas where it would be easy to desert and join bandit groups.⁸

During February authorization was also granted for a final US supply issue to the partisans. By agreement partisans with 2 years of service or who were unfit for further duty were to be honorably discharged, and this group received their uniforms, four blankets, mess gear, 200 lb of rice as a bonus, and transportation to any point in South Korea. Others received their uniforms, the 200-lb rice bonus, and an additional 100 lb as an enlistment inducement if they agreed to the full 2-year enlistment in the ROK Army.¹

Several days before Quicksilver, steps were taken to offset partisan dissatisfaction and fear. Partisan leaders were given commissions and an enlisted-grade structure was provided by the 8250 ROK AU. By 20 February ROK Army induction teams were out on the various partisan bases to process the personnel prior to transfer.⁹ Every precaution was taken to ensure the safety of US personnel, and unit leaders were requested to report on the following factors:

- (a) Rumors on how the ROK Army was to assume control.
- (b) Excessive desertions or indications of mass desertion.
- (c) Secret meetings and discussions by the partisans.
- (d) Lack of training interest.
- (e) Excessive thievery.
- (f) Young partisans suddenly being sent away to school.
- (g) Excessive requests by partisans to visit families.
- (h) Boat theft.
- (i) Overt acts indicating animosity toward US personnel.

The US command was apprehensive about the partisan attitude, a feeling that was not lessened by a report that details of the transfer plan had been compromised by a Korean officer in I ROK Corps. It was anticipated that the partisan leaders would cooperate, but it had also been observed that they were visibly affected when briefed on the details of the transfer operation.

As expected, excessive desertions did occur. There were 611 reported in early February and 1493 more before the transfer was completed in early March. In fact, the average partisan strength reported for February had dropped to 11,832, and the number finally reported as transferred to ROK Army control was under 10,000. The operation itself, however, proceeded smoothly and without incident. By 7 March 2161 men of the 3d PIR, 2594 partisans of the 6th PIR, 125 of the 1st PAIR, 2665 of the 2d PIR, and 1752 of the 1st PIR had been brought under the ROK Army. These figures, however, did not include clean-up details of 150 men temporarily retained in each regiment and 201 partisans of the 1st PAIR who were kept under US command as a cadre for the new special-action team.⁹

The new unit, which was to be a battalion-size UNPIK, involved the final over-all planning by the US command. A new TD for US personnel and a TOE for the Koreans was established, and the plan called for retention of the partisans of the 1st PAIR, noted above, until such time as acceptable ROK Army personnel could be airborne-trained.⁵ How long these few remaining partisans could be kept under US command, however, was indefinite, even though the command complained that the ROK Army personnel sent for screening were of a "disappointingly low standard."¹⁰ In any case the new UNPIK was established on the island of Yongyu-do during March, and the UN partisan effort in Korea was at an end.

Hence, during the period after the cease-fire, the objectives of the UN command were (a) to continue partisan training until favorable arrangements



for their demobilization could be made; and (b) to ensure an orderly transition when the necessity of that demobilization was forced on it. The period was also marked by a steady lessening of partisan morale, as expressed by many desertions and statements of dissatisfaction with policy concerning their status and disposition.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In retrospect it appears that many of the difficulties experienced with the partisan effort in Korea are traceable to the unique situation, which introduced a number of hampering factors largely beyond the control of the command. Other problems can be attributed to lack of experience or of an appreciation of existing Army doctrine for guerrilla warfare. These considerations, of course, are stated less in criticism of the operation than to highlight some questions relative to Army doctrine and to future partisan employment.

In respect to the unique situation that placed limitations on all military operations in Korea, it appears that Army doctrine as expressed in FM 31-21 may be too firmly based on pre-Korean experience and the more general doctrine of total defeat of the enemy. It is assumed that enemy-occupied territory will be liberated, with obviously resulting partisan advantages. In one sense—and this might have been observed in planning partisan operations after the truce talks began—the partisan effort never really transcended the situation described in FM 31-21 as Phase I. This directs attention to the lack of considered doctrine for a “limited war” situation, if something other than the type of operations prescribed for Phase I is to be attempted in another experience resulting in a stalemated situation or in a possible campaign in which offensives might be mounted for limited objectives. There is no detailed policy to guide planning for partisan employment in a “small war,” any more than there is for regular forces. Lack of such a guide can conceivably in itself lead commanders to ignore what doctrine there is for reasons of expediency.

Closely related to the above consideration is that concerning the status of partisans in a limited-warfare situation wherein either the objectives of restoring a status quo or limiting territorial gains might preclude partisans from a return to their home areas. Although, as noted previously, the doctrine does offer some guidance in respect to partisan status—guidance that was not accepted in Korea until very late in the effort—it does not anticipate a situation in which liberation would not ultimately occur.

It is unrealistic to argue that similar circumstances will not recur. They happened once and could conceivably happen again, perhaps on a much larger scale should Communist aggression occur in western Europe or the Far East through satellite powers. If partisans who are willing to continue the fight should be forced out to the friendly side of the lines, some policy respecting their status should be in effect if they are not to become stateless individuals or unwilling subjects of an allied government.

If such assets are desirable as another means of implementing US military objectives, the responsibility is clear. And in this regard it is not impossible to conjecture that the fate of the Korean partisans could affect future acquisition of similar assets in other areas of the Far East.



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Appendix E

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SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF KOREAN WAR

1950

JUNE

25. North Korean Communists invaded South Korea. UN Security Council called for cease-fire.
27. President Truman ordered US Air Force and Navy to give South Korea support.
29. Seoul fell to Reds.
30. President Truman ordered American ground troops into Korea.

JULY

1. First US troops of 24th Div reached Korea from Japan.
5. American troops went into action for first time.
8. Gen Douglas MacArthur named UN Supreme Commander by President Truman.
13. Lt Gen Walton H. Walker assumed command of ground forces in Korea as head of Eighth Army.
20. American troops withdrew from Taejon.
26. UN forces withdrew into Pusan beachhead.

SEPTEMBER

15. American troops made surprise amphibious landing at Inchon port for Seoul.
26. Seoul recaptured.

OCTOBER

1. South Koreans crossed 38th Parallel.
7. US 1st Cav Div invaded North Korea.
8. UN General Assembly approved crossing of 38th Parallel.
15. President Truman and Gen MacArthur conferred on Wake Island.
19. North Korean capital of Pyongyang fell to Americans.
26. South Koreans reached Yalu River.

NOVEMBER

2. Chinese Communists attacked Americans.
8. History's first all-jet air battle fought over North Korea.
21. American troops reached Yalu.
24. Gen MacArthur launched "end-the-war" offensive.
26. Chinese Reds launched all-out attack shattering center of UN line.
28. Gen MacArthur announced "we are fighting an entirely new war" as Chinese exploited their breakthrough and UN forces retreated.

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER

- 5. Reds reentered Pyongyang without fight.
- 23. Lt Gen Walker killed in jeep accident; Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded as Eighth Army Commander.
- 24. UN forces completed safe evacuation by sea from northeast Korean port of Hungnam.
- 30. First mass flight of Red MIG-15 jet fighters fought US jets near Yalu River.

1951

JANUARY

- 4. Reds recaptured Seoul.
- 24. Communist offensive stalled and UN began "limited-objective offensive."

FEBRUARY

- 1. UN Assembly after month of debate branded Red China aggressor.
- 21. Allies opened "killer offensive."

MARCH

- 14. South Koreans reentered Seoul.
- 25. ROK patrols crossed 38th Parallel again.

> APRIL

- 11. Gen Ridgway succeeded Gen MacArthur and Lt Gen James A. Van Fleet succeeded Gen Ridgway.
- 22. Communist launched spring offensive, knocking UN forces back below 38th Parallel on west and central fronts but failed to retake Seoul.

MAY

- 24. UN crossed 38th Parallel for third time and assaulted Communist "iron triangle" build-up area.

JUNE

- 23. Soviet UN Delegate Jacob A. Malik proposed cease-fire in Korea.

JULY

- 10. Armistice negotiations began at Kaesong.
- 26. Agreement reached on agenda for talks.

AUGUST

- 23. Reds broke off talks charging US planes violated Kaesong's neutrality.

OCTOBER

- 25. Truce negotiations resumed after being moved to Panmunjom.

NOVEMBER

- 27. Agreement reached on 30-day cease-fire line.
- 28. False rumors of cease-fire spread and fighting virtually stopped.

DECEMBER

- 18. POW lists exchanged.

1952

JANUARY

- 24. Gen Ridgway announced truce talks stalemated on Red demands for forcible repatriation of POWs.

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY

18. First major Communist prisoner riots broke out on Koje island; UN guards killed 75 prisoners.
19. Agreement reached to call high-level political conference to follow truce.

APRIL

28. Gen Mark W. Clark appointed to replace Gen Ridgway, who relieved Gen Eisenhower as NATO commander.

MAY

7. Communist prisoners seized Brig Gen Francis T. Dodd as hostage.

OCTOBER

8. UN called indefinite recess in truce talks.

DECEMBER

2. President-elect Eisenhower arrived in Korea for 3-day visit.
3. UN Assembly adopted India's plan to settle prisoner deadlock.

1953

JANUARY

23. Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor named to relieve retiring Gen Van Fleet as Eighth Army commander.

FEBRUARY

2. President Eisenhower cancelled order to US Seventh Fleet neutralizing Formosa.
22. Gen Clark proposed immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

MARCH

28. Radio Peiping said Reds willing to exchange ailing prisoners.
30. Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-Lai announced Reds agreed to exchange all prisoners on voluntary repatriation basis.

APRIL

1. Gen Clark agreed to resume truce negotiations provided quick agreement reached on sick and wounded exchange.
1. Agreement signed for exchange.
20. "Little Switch" exchange began.
26. Truce negotiations resumed.

MAY

3. Sick and wounded prisoner exchange completed.
7. Communists submitted 8-point compromise proposal on prisoners.
13. UN made 26-point counterproposal.
25. Allies presented new compromise plan and called for secret sessions; South Korean delegate began boycott of negotiations in protest against UN proposals.

JUNE

4. Communists reported to have made compromise proposal "extraordinarily close to UN's."
6. South Korean President Syngman Rhee said his government would not approve "unacceptable" truce.
9. Staff officers started drafting final cease-fire line.

14. Communists launched biggest offensive in more than 2 years pushing South Korean troops back as much as 8 miles on east central front.
18. Some 25,000 North Korean prisoners broke out of UN prison camps under secret orders from ROK authorities; UN and Communist staff officers completed truce negotiations.
20. Communist high command charged UN "deliberately connived" in prison breaks and demanded assurances President Rhee's army would abide by truce; armistice negotiations recessed "indefinitely."
23. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, acting as President Eisenhower's personal representative, flew to Korea to induce President Rhee to drop opposition to the truce.
28. Gen Clark proposed resumption of truce negotiations promising Reds to do all in his power to ensure that South Korean Army would observe armistice.

JULY

8. Reds agreed to proceed with truce talks on basis of Gen Clark's assurances.
10. Full truce talks resumed.
11. President Rhee and Sec Robertson issued joint statement in which Rhee promised to "collaborate" in armistice.
24. Substantially all truce terms and arrangements agreed; document awaited only decision on place and time of signing.
27. Truce signed and cease-fire orders issued.

CHRONOLOGY OF PARTISAN CAMPAIGN

1951

JANUARY

8. US Eighth Army informed of presence of semiorganized partisan groups in Hwanghae Province and retreating to west coast islands.
15. Attrition Sec organized under Miscellaneous Div, G3, Eighth Army, to direct overt partisan effort.
17. Eighth Army coordinated with theater relative to direction of overt partisan effort.

FEBRUARY

15. WILLIAM ABLE BASE (later LEOPARD BASE) in process of organization on the west coast island of Paengnyong-do to direct west coast partisans; BAKER Sec, to airborne-train partisans for behind-the-line activities, also organized near Pusan.

MARCH

1. Initial west coast partisan operations planned in support of Eighth Army's OPERATION KILLER and in preparation for probable UN offensive during spring.
15. Task Force VIRGINIA I, first partisan airborne mission, launched but fails in its objective.
25. Agreements made with British naval units (CTG 95.1) for naval gunfire and air strikes in support of partisan operations.

APRIL

15. Eighth Army assumed control of east coast partisan elements formerly under ROK Army, and KIRKLAND BASE organized at Chumunjin to direct east coast effort.

MAY

5. Attrition Sec reorganized as authorized TD unit, Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU.

JUNE

3. KIRKLAND mounted its first operation against east coast enemy mainland in support of ROK Army I and III Corps.
18. Task Force SPITFIRE, second partisan airborne operation, failed to accomplish its mission, but all 17 men of team (including 3 British and 2 US paratroopers) succeeded in exfiltrating.

JULY

21. LEOPARD reported operating from west coast islands stretching from Inchon almost to mouth of Yalu River, with a strength of about 7000 partisans.

AUGUST

3. KIRKLAND lost island of Sol-som, its forward operating base, to enemy action.

OCTOBER

14. Partisan unit Donkey 15 attempted capture of far northern island of Sinmi-do with support of HMS Cossack; attempt failed.

NOVEMBER

6. Enemy launched successful attacks on some west coast islands, particularly in area north of island of Cho-do; partisan interior units reported under increasing enemy pressure.

DECEMBER

10. FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, theater-level agency, assumed control of partisan operations; CCRAK, 8240 AU, assumed responsibility for coordination of all behind-the-lines activities in Korea.
18. US Navy expressed alarm over partisan loss of some west coast islands and was given responsibility for their defense by early 1952.
31. KIRKLAND's small force by this time decimated by desertions and combat operations.

1952

JANUARY

1. WOLFPACK BASE, formed out of eastern half of LEOPARD area between Inchon and Ongjin Peninsula, became operational.
22. MUSTANG III, airborne operation against enemy rail traffic, mounted without success.
31. Enemy continued attacks against west coast islands.

MARCH

1. KIRKLAND again operational on small scale. Chief activity infiltration and maintenance of interior units and furnishing Navy with target information.

1. LEOPARD and WOLFPACK Commands increased operations as weather conditions and supply improved.
16. Airborne operation MUSTANG IV mounted against enemy rail traffic.
25. Authorization for supply LS-51 rescinded and LS-52 issued pending preparation of Class IV Project.

APRIL

18. LEOPARD area hit hard by high winds and heavy seas and lost number of craft.

MAY

1. Two US officers and 40 partisans of Donkey 15 unit began junk reconnaissance of northern west coast islands lost to enemy action in late 1951.
1. US personnel began to participate occasionally in amphibious raids against mainland.
14. Airborne missions MUSTANG V and VI sent in to sabotage enemy rail traffic but operation failed.

JUNE

15. New SOP established between CCRAK and Fifth Air Force relative to air strikes through JOC.

AUGUST

3. LEOPARD reported decline in operations as more boats lost due to severe typhoons.

SEPTEMBER

3. WOLFPACK lost 3 motor and 10 sail junks in single gale.
27. Partisan program to expand strength to 20,000 men by 15 Mar 53 initiated.
28. WOLFPACK attempted 475-man operation, accompanied by four Americans, against enemy-held mainland.

OCTOBER

5. CCRAK redesignated as 8242 AU and assumed operational control of FEC/LD (K).
31. MUSTANG's VII and VIII airdropped into North Korea on rail and highway sabotage missions.

NOVEMBER

13. Partisans reported using silencer-equipped arms in raid for first time.
21. Partisan forces redesignated as "United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK)"; units also redesignated as "Partisan Infantry Regiments (PIRs)."
24. Partisans used flamethrowers on operation for first time.
24. Specialized personnel (Special Forces) for partisan operations offered to FEC by DA.
31. Partisans reported 408 actions during November, peak operational period of effort; also reported inflicting 6785 enemy casualties, the highest number claimed for 1 month. At same time US relative to partisan strength reached nadir with but 4.9 Americans per 1000 partisans.

DECEMBER

10. 3d PIR (formerly KIRKLAND) assigned larger operational area on east coast.

15. 3d PIR reported numerous desertions and other problems of morale, after strength had been built up from about 275 partisans in August to average of 1589 for month of December.
28. Airborne operations JESSE JAMES II and III mounted against enemy MSRs without success.
30. JESSE JAMES I airdropped for same purpose without success.

1953

JANUARY

1. Expansion program accelerated after decision to increase partisan strength to 40,000 by 15 Jul 53.
12. CINCFE requested plans for partisan operations during 1953.
22. AFPE requested that 60 officers and 15 enlisted men, to arrive directly from ZI in March, April, and May, be sent from Special Forces at Ft Bragg.
25. Airborne operation GREEN DRAGON launched.
28. Partisan Operations Plan for Phase I (28 Jan to 15 Mar 53) received interim approval.

FEBRUARY

4. DA requested that regular TA be drafted after finally granting approval of Class IV Project in early 1953.
7. BOXERS I and II airdropped to sabotage enemy rail traffic. BOXERS III and IV also dropped 9 and 11 Feb.
10. Partisan Operations Plan Phase IIA (15 Mar to 15 Sep 53) drafted.
21. All units warned by headquarters to take steps to avoid friction with ROK authorities due to increasing ROK resistance to partisan expansion program.
22. Partisan Operations Plan for Phase IIB (15 Mar to 15 Sep 53) submitted.

MARCH

31. Airborne operation HURRICANE mounted.
31. First contingent of requested Special Forces personnel operating with partisan units.

APRIL

1. 5th PIR, created out of western area of 2d PIR (formerly WOLFPACK), became operational.
1. Partisans airdropped to sabotage enemy rail traffic on RABBIT Operation.
5. New commanders assigned to CCRAK, FEC/LD (K), and partisan sec.
6. 6th PIR, created out of northern area of 1st PIR (formerly LEOPARD), became operational.
16. Orders issued to cease further recruiting of partisans and to cut strength to 20,000 by 15 Jul 53.
20. Two Americans and 22 partisans began junk reconnaissance of northern west coast islands.

MAY

12. Partisan Operations Plan Phase IIA revised and finalized.
17. 410-man raid accompanied by three Americans mounted against enemy by 2d PIR.
22. Partisan strength reached peak figure of over 22,000.

JUNE

12. Partisans evacuated from forward islands except for "stay-behinds" and small patrols maintained to observe enemy activity. Operations against enemy, however, continued on east coast and from west coast islands below 38th Parallel.

JULY

27. Cease-fire.

**COPY OF OPERATIONS PLAN "ABLE" PREPARED BY
MISCELLANEOUS DIVISION, G3, EIGHTH ARMY, 23 Jan 51**

SUBJECT: Organization and plan for partisan operations in Korea. (Plan ABLE)

1. **MISSION:** To establish in Korea, the cadre of partisan organizations that will perform covert-type missions of sabotage and intelligence, and be capable in organization and training so that, when supplied on a large scale, it may be expanded into large forces that can be employed in conjunction with a major effort of UN forces.
2. **GENERAL PLAN:** To establish at strategically located bases, a strong center which will be capable of:
 - a. Providing for its own security.
 - b. Operating a high-powered radio station for communications with central headquarters.
 - c. Operating a radio net which will ensure communications with partisan groups.
 - d. Training partisan cadre in the following subjects:
 - (1) Intelligence
 - (2) Radio operation and maintenance
 - (3) Individual weapons
 - (4) Organization of the fighting groups
 - (5) Supply, airdrops
 - (6) Demolitions
3. **ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE.**
 - a. The following chart shows the organization of the base. This organization will be modified depending on the tactical situation, should the need arise. Detailed discussion of each section and its responsibilities follows thereafter.

[Data not available]
 - b. **Commanding Officer:** Responsible for the security of the key base by utilizing the ROK Marines, and in coordination with Naval forces operating in that area.
 - c. **ROK Marines:** One hundred ROK Marines are assigned to the base for security purposes only. This security unit operates directly under the commanding officer. It should be noted that provisions have been made, in the TE for the base, to furnish crew-served weapons to augment individual weapons of this unit.
 - d. **Operations:** To be commanded by a US officer who will be responsible for all training and employment of the partisan groups (on orders from central headquarters) as well as the operation of all US radio nets. This will be accomplished with US personnel, plus a group of eight ROK Marines (separate from the security force) which will be utilized for small-arms training. The closest coordination will be exercised between this US officer and the commanding officer of the base.

- e. Communications: US operators will operate a high-powered radio station for communication to central headquarters and other stations as discussed herein. They will be responsible for conducting maintenance on all US radio sets used in the operation, as well as training key personnel in the partisan cadre in the operation and maintenance of radio sets used in carrying out their missions. The ROK Marines will operate a high-powered station, which is discussed under "Base communication nets" below.
- f. Training: This section is composed of US personnel and eight ROK Marines, and is responsible for training the partisan cadre in all subjects listed in 2d above, with the exception of communications.
4. **PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE.**
- a. Personnel to occupy these bases will be assigned from the original table of organization submitted for the Attrition Warfare Section. ROK Marines are assigned through ROK Naval Headquarters, Pusan.
- b. US Personnel:
- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) One officer | MOS 1542 Operations |
| (2) One officer | MOS 0200 Communications |
| (3) Three radio operators | MOS 0740 Communications |
| (4) One radio operator | MOS 0766 Communications |
| (5) One powerman | MOS 0166 Communications |
| (6) Two radio repairmen | MOS 0648 Communications |
| (7) One demolition instructor | MOS 3533 Operations |
| (8) One weapons | |
| (9) Total US personnel | 11 |
- c. ROK Personnel:
- (1) ROK Navy, Commander, commanding officer of the base.
 - (2) ROK staff officers for commander.
 - (3) One hundred ROK Marines for security.
 - (4) Eight ROK Marines for assistant instructors.
 - (5) All ROK personnel will be supplied by the ROK Naval Headquarters, Pusan.
5. **ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTISAN CADRE.**
- a. The Korean Gun (county) is made up of a varying number of townships. It is planned that from each Gun a cadre of loyal partisans will be organized and will undergo training to perform covert acts of sabotage and gather information of enemy forces operating in their area, or in other areas wherein a mission may be assigned.
- b. This partisan cadre will (under cover) organize loyal Koreans within their respective Guns into fighting groups, and train them sufficiently to be available for large-scale operations, upon being properly equipped.
- c. Training of the partisan cadre will be the responsibility of the Attrition Warfare Section and will be accomplished on strategically located bases. Training and organization of the groups within each Gun will be the responsibility of the partisan cadre, under the supervision of the US operations officer who will remain on the base. This training will take place within the Gun proper.
- d. Weapons and radios will be made available to the partisan cadre on completion of their training, to enable them to carry out their acts of sabotage and intelligence, but not to the entire Gun organization until such time as need arises.
- e. The partisan cadre, once trained, will remain in their respective localities and begin operations without delay, on order from Central Headquarters. Contact will be established between this cadre and the base, by the communications net operated by the communications section.
- f. The following is the organization of the Gun partisan cadre and the subjects in which they will be trained.
- (1) Gun leader and four assistant leaders
Intelligence

- ~~SECRET~~
- Organization of the fighting group
 Supply, airdrops
 Small arms and crew-served weapons
- (2) Assistant leader
 Operation and maintenance of low-powered radio set
 Small-arms instruction
- (3) Two assistant leaders
 Saboteur training, demolitions
 Small-arms instruction
- (4) Total partisan cadre from each Gun-8
6. BASE COMMUNICATIONS NET
- a. A high-powered radio station will be operated by US operators and will be in direct contact with the following stations:
- (1) Central Headquarters
 (2) UN blockade vessels
 (3) Other stations as deemed necessary
- b. Communications with partisan leaders (base to Gun).
- (1) Two plans for the establishment of direct communication with the partisan leaders (cadre) are available. The adoption of either depends on distance involved, terrain, and seasonal weather conditions. The success of the operations depends on adequate communications; therefore when one plan is unworkable owing to conditions described above, or mechanical failure, the other plan may be put into operation with a minimum of effort. In either plan, a system of pre-arranged visual signals will be available.
- (2) Plan "one": The partisan leaders are equipped with radios which will net with the high-powered radio on the base. By using US operators on these sets (which will be located with the leaders in Gun) adequate communications will be established under the most adverse conditions.
- (3) Plan "two": The partisan leaders are equipped with low-powered radio sets on which they received training and are capable of operating. A similar set will be available on the base for the establishment of direct communications.
- c. ROK communications net.
- (1) The ROK Marines will normally establish a high-powered radio station on the base and, by using their own equipment, maintenance personnel, and operators, will be in direct contact with the following stations:
- i. ROK Naval Headquarters.
 ii. ROK Naval vessels on blockade.
 iii. UN vessels on blockade, conditions permitting.
- d. Emergency: Should an emergency arise on the base, wherein fire support, evacuation, or other aid is needed without delay, the following means of communication, within the basic nets described, are available:
- (1) US operators will establish direct contact with central headquarters by means of the high-powered radio net. Central headquarters will contact COMET 159, who will contact, by direct communication, the jeep carrier (TF 77 or CTE 95.11) operation off the West coast. This method will give the desired results.
- (2) US operators will establish direct contact with UN blockade vessels, by means of the high-powered radio net.
- (3) ROK Marines will establish direct contact with ROK vessels. These ROK vessels will be an organic part within the defense plans of the base. Pre-arranged plans for fire support and evacuation will be drawn up under the direct supervision and orders of the commanding officer of the base. These plans will be rehearsed within the limits of secrecy from possible observation by enemy forces.
- (4) Naval vessels and friendly aircraft may be contacted by the following visual means:

- i. Blinker signal
 - ii. Signal flares
 - iii. Flags
 - iv. Panels
 - e. To render close support to the base, and to make certain acts of sabotage more effective, direct communication between the partisan leaders, the base, and friendly aircraft is highly desirable.
7. COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM
- a. The diagram on the following page portrays graphically the communication net for the execution of operation plan ABLE. It must be kept in mind that this communication plan, as well as any established in the future for other bases, must be flexible.
- [Data not available]
8. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION OF BASE.
- a. The equipment listed below is not included in the original table of allowances for the Attrition Warfare Section. It is felt that this equipment will become standard for all bases, except in the following cases:
 - (1) Unforeseen changes in the tactical situation, resulting in need for additional weapons.
 - (2) Expendable items such as wire, ammunition, demolitions, and batteries.
 - (3) Gradual increase in US carbines and M1 rifles as additional partisan cadre is trained.
 - (4) Weapons to arm partisan groups.
 - b. Ordnance
 - (1) Weapons
 - i. Three ea LMG cal .30 M1917-AG
 - ii. Three ea automatic rifles, Browning cal .30 M1918-A2
 - iii. Two ea rifles, recoilless, 75mm M20
 - iv. Four ea carbines, cal .30
 - v. Four ea rifles M1, cal .30
 - vi. Two ea projector, pyro, hand M9
 - vii. Sufficient magazines for carbines and BARs
 - (2) Vehicles
 - i. One ea 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck LWB 6x6 (for SCR 399)
 - ii. One ea $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck
 - iii. One ea 1-ton trailer (for PE 95)
 - (3) Miscellaneous
 - i. One ea, set, demolition (1, 2, 5, or 7)
 - c. Signal Corps
 - (1) One ea, SCR 399
 - (2) Two ea, receivers BC 342
 - (3) One ea, PE-95
 - (4) Two ea, PE-75
 - (5) Five ea, SCR 300
 - (6) Four ea, SCR AN/GRC-9
 - (7) Five ea, telephones EE8
 - (8) Five ea, wire W110-B on DR 5
 - (9) Fifteen ea, battery BA 70
 - (10) Fifty ea, battery BA30
 - (11) Ten ea, flashlights
 - (12) One ea, panel set AP30C
 - (13) One ea, panel set AP30D
 - d. Engineer
 - (1) One carpenter equipment set 2, engineer platoon
 - (2) Five ea, compass, wrist, induction-damped
 - e. Quartermaster
 - (1) Three ea, tents, CP M1945, complete with poles and pins



- (2) Three ea, stoves, tent M45, complete with burner
- (3) One ea, outfit, cooking, small detachment
- (4) Five ea, lantern, gasoline, leaded fuel
- (5) Twenty ea, drum, gasoline, 5-gal
- (6) Five ea, tubes, flexible, nozzle
- (7) Ten ea, cans water, 5-gal
- (8) Ten ea, cots, canvas folding

WILLIAM A. BURKE
 Major Armor
 S-3

**COPY OF OPERATIONS PLAN PHASE IIA
 (FINALIZED VERSION)**

HEADQUARTERS, FEC/LD(K)
 SEOUL, KOREA (CS 2050)
 APO 301
 10 May 1953

COPY NO. 12

OPERATION PLAN: PARTISAN OPERATIONS(K), PHASE IIA
 (Period 15 May 53 to 15 Sep 53)

Maps: Korea - 1:50,000
 1:250,000
 1:500,000

TASK ORGANIZATION:

- WEST COAST (NK) - 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment
 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment
 5th Partisan Infantry Regiment
 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment
- EAST COAST (NK) - 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment
- CENTRAL INTERIOR (NK) - 1st Partisan Airborne Regiment

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: See Annex 1 Intelligence
- b. Friendly Forces: See Annex 2 UN Forces Disposition
 Annex 7 Air Support
 Annex 8 Naval Support

During Phase IIA the UN Forces in Korea will continue on an active defense of the present battle lines across the peninsula.

c. Assumptions:

- (1) Operational:
 - (a) Partisan forces will be employed in keeping with the accepted tactics of unconventional warfare and will not be utilized as regular forces.
 - (b) UN Air and Naval Units will support FEC/LD(K) Partisan Operations.
 - (c) That an armistice in Korea will not be forthcoming during the period of Phase IIA.
 - (d) The state of operational readiness of partisans by 1 Jun 53 will permit committal of amphibious and airborne units up to 150-man companies.
- (2) Logistical:
 - (a) The strength of partisan forces will continue relatively static at the present total figures shown in Annex 3, Administrative.



(b) The required craft for amphibious training and operations as shown in Annex 4, Logistical, will be made available at proper time.

(c) The required aircraft are available for airlifts up to company-size airborne operations.

(d) That the required personnel, accompanying supply and resupply airborne equipment, and facilities will be available at the proper time to support these airborne operations.

(e) That the supplies and equipment forecast in Class IV Project and Change 1 to Class IV Project, Army KCZ-(CCRAK) - Gen-009-52-OP will continue to be forthcoming in the required quarterly increments.

2. MISSION:

a. General:

During Phase IIA the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea will:

(1) Conduct partisan operations and activities to cause the enemy to employ his troops to the maximum in counterpartisan operations. Emphasis will be placed on the following in priority sequence:

(a) General disruption in rear areas by inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy.

(b) Capture of prisoners of war and documents.

(c) Destruction of logistical supplies, particularly POL and ammunition.

(d) Destruction and interception of communication facilities and lines of communication.

(2) Protect Eighth Army's left flank by defending Kanghwa-Do and Kyodong-Do. (See Amendment.)

b. Intelligence:

As a secondary mission, all United Nations Partisan Forces Korea will:

(1) Report information identifying and locating major Communist ground and air units in Korea.

(2) Collect and forward tactical intelligence for the development and attack of air and naval gunfire targets which can contribute to the enemy's capability to launch and sustain a major offensive.

(3) Obtain information required for the establishment and operation of a covert evasion and escape system in North Korea.

(4) Collect and utilize intelligence information for own partisan operations.

c. Area Priorities: See Annex 5 Operations.

d. Target Priorities: See Annex 5 Operations.

3. TASKS:

WEST COAST (NK): See Annex 5 Operations

a. 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment will:

(1) From friendly island bases conduct partisan amphibious operations in the Hwanghae area within its assigned zone to cause general disruption in the coastal areas, to capture prisoners of war and documents, and to destroy logistical supplies and lines of communication.

(2) Utilize interior forces in the Hwanghae area within its assigned zone to interdict the Sariwon (YC 4064)-Haeju (YC 3713) MSRs and line of communication, to acquire intelligence information, and to harass, to the maximum, enemy military forces and civilian authorities.

b. 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Protect Eighth Army's left flank by defending Kanghwa-Do, and Kyodong-Do. (See amendment.)

(2) Conduct partisan amphibious operations within its assigned zone against the enemy-held coast lines and into the coastal areas to cause general disruption, to capture prisoners of war and documents, and to destroy selected targets.

(3) Occupy and defend Kyodong-Do and be prepared to reinforce Kanghwa-Do with elements of the forces on Kyodong-Do.

(4) Organize and utilize interior units on the enemy-held mainland within its assigned zone to conduct partisan operations which cause harassment and disruption in the enemy's rear area, to include interdiction of the MSR and lines of communications between Yonan (BS 5099) and Kaesong (BT 8505).



c. 5th Partisan Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Conduct partisan amphibious operations within its assigned zone along the coast line from BT 4302 to Ongin YC 0802 and between Haeju (YC 3814) and Sinwon-Ni (YC 3833) to include interdiction of MSR's and lines of communication, acquisition of intelligence information, and harassment of enemy military forces and civilian authorities within the coastal areas.

(2) Organize and utilize interior units within its assigned zone to conduct partisan operations and activities which cause general disruption in the enemy's rear, which acquire intelligence information, and which destroy logistical supplies and lines of communication.

d. 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Conduct partisan operations on the west coast from the south bank of Taedong-Gang to the south bank of the Yalu River and into the interior of North Korea as far as partisans can penetrate, either by amphibious raids or by utilizing interior units to include interdiction of MSR's and lines of communication, acquisition of intelligence information, and harassment of enemy military forces and civilian authorities.

(2) Conduct raids against enemy-held islands in the upper Korean Bay, XD area.

(3) Conduct operations, on order, to seize or occupy any of the following islands: Unmu-Do (XD 8364), Taehwa-Do (XD 3867), Chamchae-Do (XD 4864), Uri-Do (XD 5269), Sohwa-Do (XD 3970), Kom-Do (XD 4879), and Oesun-Do (XD 9268).

EAST COAST (NK): See Annex 5, Operations.

a. 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Conduct amphibious partisan operations on the East Coast from the bomb line to the south bank of the Tumen River, and into the interior of North Korea as far as partisans can penetrate in amphibious operations.

(2) Conduct airborne operations of not greater than company size, which can be logistically supported and conducted from the east coast.

(3) Conduct partisan operations to interdict the MSR's and lines of communication, disrupt and harass enemy military forces and civilian authorities, and acquire intelligence information within the Hamhung (CV 7519)-Wonsan (CU 6536) Yangdok (BU 9641) complex.

(4) Establish interior units in the eastern coastal areas of North Korea to conduct partisan operations which cause general disruption in the enemy's rear area, which capture prisoners of war and documents and which destroy logistical supplies and lines of communication.

INTERIOR (NK):

a. The 1st Partisan Airborne Regiment will:

(1) Provide the forces for mounting interior NK Special airborne missions and projects.

(2) Conduct partisan operations in the interior to establish areas from which interdiction of MSR's and lines of communication can be mounted, intelligence information transmitted, and an escape haven provided for UN prisoners of war.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Administrative:

The strength of United Nations Partisan Forces, (K), during Phase IIA is set at a 20,000-man level. This level will be reached and maintained by eliminating unqualified and undesirables, selective screening processes, and restricting recruiting to only qualified volunteers from the enemy-held mainland. All units will resurvey administrative and overhead indigenous employee needs for the purpose of reducing to the minimum requirements. Current training will be continued. See Annex 3. Administrative.

b. Plans and Operations:

(1) No partisan operations will be conducted in the Kaesong neutral area and Kaesong (BT 8505) - Panmunjom (BT9503) neutral corridor.

(2) Airborne operations larger than 150-man-company size will be mounted only if it envisions an early link-up with friendly ground and/or amphibious forces operation.

(3) The North Hanyong Province, Chakong Province, and Northern half of South Hamyong Province, except for coastal operations, will remain covert under this phase (IIA) unless ordered overt by this headquarters.



- (4) All plans for amphibious operations commitments exceeding 300 men or larger will be submitted to this headquarters for approval prior to execution.
- (5) All amphibious operations of company size or larger will be accompanied by US Military personnel, if available.
- (6) Partisan naval-gunfire spotting teams will be trained and employed in conjunction with amphibious operations.
- (7) All aspects of psychological warfare will be coordinated by CCRAK headquarters.
- (8) All plans for partisan operations will include and stress:
- Briefing of personnel on mission.
 - Rehearsal of operation.
 - Debriefing of personnel immediately after completion of operations.
 - Early critique of operation after return to base, in order to complete after-action reports, discuss lessons learned, and compile project control data.
- (9) All partisan regiments will report the number and location of their respective island and mainland radio nets, and keep this headquarters advised of changes.
- This plan will be placed into effect 15 May 1953.
4. Administrative and Logistics: See Annexes 3 and 4.
5. Command and Signal Matters:
- Signal: See Annex 6, Signal.
 - CPs:
 - FEC/LD(K), Seoul (CS 2050)
 - 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment, Paengnyong-Do (XD 4800)
 - 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment, Kanghwa-Do (BS 7480)
 - 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment, Sokcho-Ri (DT 6526)
 - 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment, (Advance)-Yodo (CU 8141)
 - 5th Partisan Infantry Regiment, Yongpyong-Do (YB 3872)
 - 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment, Chodo (XC 6065)
 - 1st Partisan Airborne Regiment, Seoul (CS 2050)

C. E. BREBNER
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

7 Inclosures:

- Annex 1 Intelligence
- Annex 2 UN Forces Disposition
- Annex 3 Administration
- Annex 4 Logistical
- Annex 5 Operations
- Annex 6 Signal
- Annex 7 Air Support
- Annex 8 Naval Support

~~SECRET~~

Annex 1
INTELLIGENCE

Headquarters, FEC/LD(K)
Seoul, Korea
12 May 1953

Annex 1 (Intelligence) to Operations Plan
Partisan Operations (K), Phase IIA
(Period 15 May 53 to 15 Sep 53)

Maps Korea - 1:50,000
1:250,000
1:500,000

1. Summary of Enemy Situation (See Sit Map Appendix 1)
 - a. Enemy forces opposing Eighth US Army.
28 infantry divisions supported by elements of five artillery divisions, two antitank divisions, one rocket-launcher division, and three tank regiments.
 - b. Reserved.
11 CCF Armies, three NK Corps.
 - c. Enemy forces opposing partisan operations.
 - (1) West Coast. From the Yalu River, South to the mouth of the Han River, 223,300 troops consisting of two CCF armies and one NKA Corps. In addition, elements of two CCF Armies and one mixed brigade are employed in defensive roles south and east of the Ongjin Peninsula.
 - (2) East Coast. From the Tumen River south to the line of contact, partisan forces are opposed by an estimated 79,000 troops, consisting of two NKA Corps. Two CCF Armies are in reserve.
 - (3) Enemy Quasi-Military Forces. An undetermined number of partially trained lightly armed militia troops are stationed throughout North Korea. This force, consisting of Railway Constabulary, Rural and Metropolitan Police, Self Guard Units, and a Farmer's Army, devotes considerable time and effort to the suppression of UN Partisan and Intelligence Activities.
 - (4) Navy. Negligible.
 - (5) Air. (See Capabilities.)
 - (6) Capabilities.
 - (a) Defend coastal and interior areas against UN Partisan attacks.
 - (b) Conduct limited-objective attacks up to a regiment in strength against friendly-held islands.
 - (c) Direct harassing artillery fire against friendly held islands.
 - (d) Conduct aerial reconnaissance and tactical air missions against friendly-held islands.
 - (e) Deny access to mainland by laying marine (sea) mines, underwater obstacles, antitank and antipersonnel minefields, tactical wire, and bamboo obstacles.
 - (f) Conduct covert and clandestine intelligence and sabotage activities against UN Forces including UN Partisans.
 2. Essential Elements of Information. (See CCRAK Intelligence Collection Program, dated 30 April 1953).
 3. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.
 - a. Orders to Subordinate and Adjacent units.
 - (1) 1st PIR, in its area of operations will:
 - (a) Perform such reconnaissance and observation missions as are necessary to develop enemy tactical situations.
 - (b) Report such tactical information including OB to higher Headquarters as obtained.
 - (c) Make determined effort to take CCF and NKA prisoners, enemy clothing, weapons, and documents.

- (2) 2d PIR, in its area of operation will:
- (a) Perform such reconnaissance and observation missions as are necessary to develop enemy tactical situations.
 - (b) Report such tactical information including OB to higher Headquarters as obtained.
 - (c) Make determined effort to take CCF and NKA prisoners, enemy clothing, weapons, and documents.
 - (d) Report as obtained any new or unusual enemy activity such as large-scale troop movements, new units, sudden appearances of armor or increase in military supplies in Hwanghae area.
- (3) 5th PIR, in its area of operations will:
- (a) Perform such reconnaissance and observation missions as are necessary to develop enemy tactical situations.
 - (b) Report such tactical information including OB to higher Headquarters as obtained.
 - (c) Make determined effort to take CCF and NKA prisoners, enemy clothing, weapons, and documents.
- (4) 6th PIR, in its area of operations will:
- (a) Perform such reconnaissance and observation missions as are necessary to develop enemy tactical situations.
 - (b) Report such tactical information including OB to higher Headquarters as obtained.
 - (c) Make determined effort to take CCF and NKA prisoners, enemy clothing, weapons, and documents.
 - (d) Reports as obtained any unusual increase or decrease in the flow of troops and military supplies from Manchuria.
- (5) 3d PIR, in its area of operations will:
- (a) Perform such reconnaissance and observation missions as are necessary to develop enemy tactical situations.
 - (b) Report such tactical information including OB to higher Headquarters as obtained.
 - (c) Make determined effort to take CCF and NKA prisoners, enemy clothing, weapons, and documents.
- (6) 1st Partisan Airborne Regiment, in its area of operations will:
- (a) Report as obtained all information regarding enemy locations, dispositions, identifications, and movements.
 - (b) Be prepared to conduct special interior intelligence missions in conjunction with tactical operations.
4. Measures for Handling Prisoners, Captured Documents, and Material. (See current directives.)
 5. Maps and Photographs (FEC/LD SOP).
 6. Counterintelligence (See Appendix 2).

BREBNER
Colonel, Armor

Appendixes:

1. En Situation Map.
2. Counterintelligence.

DISTRIBUTION:



DETAILED STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS

OBJECTIVE

To study individual partisan operations in order to determine the extent to which the production of casualties is affected by variations in type of action, strength of attacking group, the tactic used, and, where possible, the strength of the opposing force.

LIMITATIONS

The data used in this study are extracts from after-action reports submitted by the partisans themselves. No objective means exists for evaluating the reliability of the claims made. It is assumed, however, that the extent of exaggeration, if any, is constant for all categories of the variables studied, thereby permitting correct assessment of the relative orders of magnitude of the effects of changes in these variables.

METHOD

After-action reports submitted by partisans vary as to the type and detail of information recorded. In most instances for 1952 and 1953 a fairly clear idea of the strength of attacking force, type of action, and casualties inflicted may be obtained; less frequently, but in a large number of cases, the reports include the type of tactic used and the strength of the opposing force. In this study a sample of sufficiently detailed after-action reports, 669 in number, was analyzed. The periods selected for analysis were 15 Jul to 15 Aug 52, 15 Sep to 15 Oct 52, and 1 to 31 Jan 53. In order to codify the information in this sample, categories for each of the nonnumerical variables studied were established. The categories of types of action containing sufficient data for detailed analysis were attack on enemy troops, attack on tactical installations, attack on transport, attack on civil administration, attack on Communist Party meetings.* The categories of tactic occurring in sufficient number for analysis were:

Meeting engagement—a collision between opposing forces occurring while both are moving to contact, and before either can execute a planned attack or defense.

Raid—a sudden attack, without intention of holding territory invaded.

Ambush—a tactical trap by concealed troops with the purpose of attacking the enemy by surprise.

A variation in the ambush category was the use of mines in conjunction with the ambush in attacks on transport.

For each action studied a record was made of the categories of type and tactic, together with the strengths of attacking and opposing forces and the casualties inflicted.

* Included in the main body of the memo as attacks on civil-administration personnel and facilities.



RESULTS

Major emphasis in this analysis was placed on actions involving less than 125 partisans.* It has been shown that nearly all the partisan actions were of this size or smaller. Of the 669 actions studied, 603 fall within the categories of type and tactic given above; the others are primarily intelligence patrols and

Table E1

STRUCTURE OF PARTISAN ACTIVITIES BY TYPE OF ACTION,
TACTIC, AND ATTACKING STRENGTH

Partisan strength	Attack on enemy troops			Tactical-installation raid	Transport			Civil-admin raid	Party-meeting raid	Total	Percent of total
	Ambush	Meeting engagement	Raid		Ambush without mines	Ambush with mines	Raid				
1-5	8	19	11	4	8	5	8	12	3	78	13.11
6-10	18	45	10	6	12	8	6	13	6	124	20.84
11-15	18	45	19	11	11	2	6	7	7	126	21.18
16-20	2	30	8	9	5	2	2	7	1	66	11.09
21-25	4	13	8	11	1	1	1	3	0	42	7.06
26-30	7	18	6	7	2	0	0	4	2	46	7.73
31-35	4	13	6	7	2	0	1	4	2	39	6.55
36-40	1	3	4	2	0	1	0	1	1	13	2.18
41-45	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	1.18
46-50	3	5	6	4	2	0	0	0	0	20	3.36
51-55	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	0.84
56-60	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	1.01
61-65	1	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	1.18
66-70	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.34
71-75	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.34
76-80	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.67
81-85	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.34
86-90	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.34
91-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
96-100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
101-105	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
106-110	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.17
111-115	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.17
116-120	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.34
121-125	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
Total	68	202	88	76	43	19	25	52	22	595	100.02
Percent of total	11.43	33.95	14.79	12.77	7.23	3.19	4.20	8.74	3.70	100.00	—

attacks on villages. Of the 603, only 8 actions involved partisan strengths in excess of 125 and in most cases can be differentiated from the remaining raids by their having had naval and air support. The structure by type, tactic, and strength of the 595 remaining actions is given in Table E1.

*But see subsection "Large Raids" at the end of this section.



In these actions partisans claimed 7429 enemy casualties, or 12.49 casualties per action. How the numbers of casualties per action varied with differences in type of action, tactic, and strength of attacking force is shown in Table E2. It will be noted that the number of casualties per action tends to

Table E2

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES PER ACTION BY TYPE OF ACTION,
TACTIC, AND ATTACKING STRENGTH

Partisan strength	Attack on enemy troops			Tactical-installation raid	Transport			Civil-admin raid	Party-meeting raid	Period avg
	Ambush	Meeting engagement	Raid		Ambush without mines	Ambush with mines	Raid			
1-5	8.9	3.6	8.1	10.8	4.2	19.4	1.2	4.1	46.3	7.69
6-10	9.2	3.6	10.1	5.3	7.8	10.1	1.0	7.8	12.5	6.62
11-15	8.0	8.0	13.4	5.8	6.8	23.0	3.7	14.6	26.0	9.96
16-20	12.0	9.6	17.1	14.6	16.2	22.0	9.0	12.9	20.0	12.61
21-25	19.0	8.4	14.9	8.0	18.0	18.0	3.0	9.3	0	10.93
26-30	13.7	14.6	10.2	10.4	18.0	0	0	22.8	21.5	14.41
31-35	24.8	10.0	16.0	14.9	4.0	0	1.0	11.8	18.0	13.33
36-40	18.0	17.7	19.0	18.0	0	36.0	0	87.0	2.0	23.69
41-45	67.5	14.0	27.0	3.0	0	0	0	18.0	0	32.00
46-50	53.0	9.8	39.7	29.0	33.0	0	0	0	0	31.40
51-55	0	26.5	31.0	97.0	0	0	0	0	0	41.80
56-60	0	3.0	54.0	21.5	0	0	0	0	0	36.33
61-65	18.0	26.0	15.5	21.7	0	0	0	0	0	20.00
66-70	0	21.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21.00
71-75	0	0	32.0	32.0	0	0	0	0	0	32.00
76-80	0	22.5	16.0	18.0	0	0	0	0	0	19.75
81-85	0	0	0	29.5	0	0	0	0	0	29.50
86-90	0	26.0	0	17.0	0	0	0	0	0	21.50
91-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
96-100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
101-105	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
106-110	0	0	0	40.0	0	0	0	0	0	40.00
111-115	0	0	0	35.0	0	0	0	0	0	35.00
116-120	0	27.0	0	72.0	0	0	0	0	0	49.50
121-125	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—
Period avg	14.85	9.01	17.01	15.37	9.58	16.95	3.52	11.81	22.59	—

increase with increased strength for all types of action and tactics, but this increase is by no means proportionate. An analysis based on the number of casualties inflicted per partisan is made in the following paragraphs.

Factors in Casualty Production

In this subsection the effect of three factors on the production of casualties by partisans will be considered. These factors are type of action, tactic, and strength of attacking force. In addition in the cases where sufficient data exist the size of the opposing force will be considered; in those cases in which these



data do not exist the analysis will be in a sense partial, and the validity of any comparisons will depend on the assumption of at least rough similarity in the sizes of opposing forces. However, even in those cases in which this assumption is not tenable, consideration of the variations in casualty production as a function of attacking strength alone is worth while.

The primary basis on which the analysis is presented is the ratio of casualties inflicted in each action to the number of participants in the attack. These ratios have been computed for each of the actions studied and for each type of action and tactic. These ratios were then averaged for five-man intervals of strength of attacking force. The number of actions entering the computation of this average is given in Table E1.




Fig. E1—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for All Types of Action and Tactic

In order to indicate the manner in which casualty production per participant varies with increase in strength of attacking force, the average ratio for all types of action and tactic has been found for each strength interval and is presented graphically in Fig. E1. This curve shows that the production of casualties per participant in the attack tends to decrease as the strength of the attacking force increases, except for strengths of approximately 35 to 65 men, in which an increase in casualty production is observed. As can be observed from Table E2, these increases reflect the occurrence of a number of relatively successful raids on tactical installations, enemy troops, and civil administration as well as successful ambushes.

Attacks on Enemy Troops

This type of action includes all actions in which fire fights between partisans and enemy troops (including quasi-military forces) occurred, unless these fights took place in the process of an attack in any of the other categories. Inclusion of an action in this category does not necessarily imply that enemy troops were the original objective. Since objectives that are not attained are not recorded in the after-action reports, it is possible that many groups whose intentions were to attack other objectives either intercepted or were intercepted by enemy troops. The resulting actions are consequently included in this category.

The tactic most frequently used (or forced on the partisans) was the meeting engagement, which accounted for 56.4 percent of the actions in this category; raids and ambushes accounted for 24.6 and 19.0 percent of the actions, respectively. The average number of casualties inflicted per partisan participant in each action has been computed for each of these tactics and is presented graphically in Fig. E2. As would be expected the ambush is in general the most efficient means of casualty production, although raids are only slightly less efficient and for larger-sized actions are superior to ambushes. The meeting engagement is the least efficient tactic in this group, resulting in roughly half the casualty production of ambushes at any strength.




Fig. E2—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks on Enemy Troops

Attack on enemy troops is the only type of action for which sufficient data on the strengths of opposing forces are available. Of the 385 actions of this type, 203 after-action reports record this strength. Of the actions so recorded, 52 percent are meeting engagements and 24.6 and 23.2 percent, respectively, are ambushes and raids. Table E3 gives the average ratio of opposing strength to partisan strength for five-man strength intervals for each tactic together with the percentages of the opposing force that became casualties as the result of the attack. The values in Table E3 show little basis for differentiating between the effectiveness of raids and of ambushes, but the values do indicate a somewhat lower level of effectiveness for meeting engagements. It is of interest that consideration of the strength of the enemy force as an additional factor does not alter the pattern of results previously obtained.

Attack on Tactical Installations

This category constituted 12.77 percent of the actions studied. The tactic used in this type of action was invariably a raid. Included among the targets of the raids were such installations as battalion, company, and platoon CPs, and

mortar, artillery, and AAA emplacements, as well as bunkers and trenches. Certain actions in this category involved partisan strengths in excess of 125 but were also accompanied by naval and air support. The average number of casualties inflicted per partisan participating in the attack is shown in Fig. E3 as a function of partisan strength.

Table E3

RATIO OF PARTISAN AND OPPOSING STRENGTHS AND PERCENTAGE REDUCTION
IN ENEMY FORCE FOR ATTACKS ON ENEMY TROOPS

Partisan strength	Meeting engagements			Ambushes			Raids		
	No. of actions	Ratio: opposing to partisan strength	Avg percent of opposing force casualties	No. of actions	Ratio: opposing to partisan strength	Avg percent of opposing force casualties	No. of actions	Ratio: opposing to partisan strength	Avg percent of opposing force casualties
1-5	12	2.45	54	4	4.25	38	3	2.23	50
6-10	31	1.65	25	13	3.16	42	5	2.42	53
11-15	25	1.87	33	16	1.31	43	10	1.80	43
16-20	10	2.67	16	2	0.71	100	4	1.18	64
21-25	8	1.24	37	3	0.93	51	4	2.02	53
26-30	9	2.57	32	5	1.44	40	5	1.40	40
31-35	5	1.26	28	2	2.45	47	5	1.38	41
36-40	1	0.80	63	0	0	0	1	1.60	42
41-45	0	0	0	2	1.05	80	2	1.20	50
46-50	2	0.90	26	3	1.70	64	4	1.60	27
51-55	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.70	80
56-60	1	2.15	2	0	0	0	1	1.80	39
61-65	1	0.60	65	0	0	0	1	0.50	60
66-70 ^a	1	0.70	34	0	0	0	0	0	0
76-80	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.60	12
All actions	106	1.88	—	50	2.05	—	47	1.67	—

^aThere was no partisan group of the 71-75 size.

As was the case for attacks on enemy troops, the highest number of casualties produced per partisan occurs at the 1- to 5-man strength interval. For strengths larger than this the production of casualties is relatively stable, with only slight decreases with additional increases in strength.

It will be noted that the rate of casualty production for raids in this type of action is, in general, lower than for raids against enemy troops. Data on the strength of enemy force in this type of action are insufficient for analysis.

Attack on Transport

Attack on transport constituted 14.62 percent of the actions studied. This category includes attacks against transport vehicles, trucks, horse and ox carts, and even wheelbarrows, as well as the mining and destruction of transport facilities such as bridges and roads. The principal tactics used were ambushes, with or without mines, and raids. Of the 87 actions of this type, 43 were am-

bushes without mines, 25 were raids, and 19 were ambushes supplemented by mines. The curves of casualties produced per partisan for different attacking forces are given in Fig. E4.

From Fig. E4 it is seen that the use of mines in conjunction with an ambush resulted in an increase of from 25 percent (for lower strength) to 50 percent (at strengths of 20 to 25) in casualty production over the use of ambushes without mines.* The raid is less productive of casualties than the ambush, except for actions involving more than 50 partisans. This is, of course, to be




Fig. E3—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks on Tactical Installations

expected since the raid is carried out without the concealment aspect afforded by an ambush, and is often undertaken by a force considerably in excess of the strength of the attacked group. Unfortunately this cannot be verified as a general proposition since data on opposing strengths are inadequate.

Attacks on Party Meetings and Civil Administration

Actions in this category constituted 12.44 percent of the actions studied and consisted of 52 actions against civil administration (NK Police, People's Committees, etc.) and 22 attacks against Communist Party meetings. The only tactic used was the raid. Actions against Party meetings frequently involved the use of demolition charges and infiltration techniques. Figure E5 is the curve of casualty production per partisan for attacks on civil administration as a function of strength of attacking force. This curve shows the typical decreased production of casualties per partisan with increased strength of attacking force.

*A fourth tactic, which is not included in this analysis, is the laying of mines without ambush. The casualties resulting from this tactic are recorded only rarely and are not in sufficient number to be used in analysis.




Fig. E4—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks on Transportation




Fig. E5—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks on Civil Administration



The corresponding curve for attacks on Party meetings is given in Fig. E6. This curve shows that against this type of objective small units are capable of inflicting extremely high casualties.




Fig. E6—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks on Party Meetings

General

All the curves given above exhibit the tendency toward less casualty production per partisan with increased attacking strength. In some cases the casualty production per man in the 1- to 5-man strength interval differs extremely from other strength intervals.*

In addition to the categories given above, after-action reports for the periods studied also record two types of action that cannot be brought consist-

*It is in consideration of these points that the assumption of consistency in exaggeration is susceptible to strongest challenge. It is not believed, however, that the credibility of the general conclusion about relative casualty production is seriously impaired. The general tendency, as shown, is exhibited throughout the range of strengths studied for most types of action and tactic.



ently into the context of the foregoing analysis. These are patrols and attacks on villages. During these periods 48 patrol missions were conducted, of which 27 were in the 1 to 10 strength interval and 21 were in the 11 to 25 strength interval. Of these, 33 percent of the 1- to 10-sized groups and 24 percent of the 11- to 25-sized groups made contact with the enemy, with fire fights resulting. Casualty figures for those groups that entered into fire fights have been included in the subsection "Attack on Enemy Troops" under the tactic "meeting engagement."




Fig. E7—Relation of Casualties Inflicted per Partisan to Strength of Attacking Force for Attacks against Villages

After-action reports for these periods list 15 attacks on villages. Results are so variable that it is not felt that worth-while conclusions can be drawn from them. It is of interest, however, that this category of action is the only one in which a large increase in casualties inflicted per partisan results from an increase in attacking strength. Figure E7 shows this relation.

Large Raids

It was mentioned previously that eight actions recorded for the periods studied involved partisan strengths in excess of 125. Of these, four were attacks on tactical installations, three were attacks on enemy troops (one ambush,



one raid, and one meeting engagement), and one was an attack on a village. In addition two of the raids were repulsed before reaching the mainland. Table E4 shows the results of these actions. It is seen from this table that on a basis of casualties inflicted per partisan these large raids were relatively inefficient except for one attack on a tactical installation and one raid on a village.

Table E4

RESULTS OF LARGE RAIDS

Type of action	Partisan	Casualties		Support
		Inflicted	Sustained	
Attacks on tactical installations	475	76	10	Naval and air
	225	66	7	—
	150	90	3	Naval and air
	185	229	0	—
Attacks on enemy troops				
Raids	287	38	0	Naval and air
Ambushes	133	75	11	—
Meeting engagements	153	13	2	—
Attack on villages	143	219	20	—
Repulsed landings	225	—	—	—
	323	—	—	—

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the data presented and assumptions made, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. Small attacking strengths were relatively more successful in terms of number of casualties inflicted per participant than were large strengths. The general tendency of the relation of casualties produced per participant to attacking strength is a decreasing one. (Casualty production per participant is, however, hardly the only criterion for determining desirable strengths since the size of the attacking force must in any case be related to the objective.)

2. In general, however, raids of 50 to 60 men tend to be more efficient in terms of casualties produced per participant than do raids by smaller groups. (Note that the term "raid" is used to describe a specific tactic and not all partisan actions.)

3. Ambushes are in general the most efficient producers of casualties. This is particularly true in attacks on transport when they are supplemented by the use of mines.

4. Because of the types of actions and tactics in which partisans engaged there was a need in most attacking groups for a high volume of fire for a short period of time. This is particularly true in the cases of ambushes and small raids. This indicates the desirability of having many partisans armed with automatic weapons.



OPERATIONS STATISTICS

INTRODUCTION

This section presents the basic data from which the tables in the body of this memorandum were derived. In addition, as pertinent to the analysis made of partisan operations, several tables and figures not included in the body of the memorandum are presented here.

In all tabulations the month given identifies the month in which the data were reported, whether as current or somewhat delayed information. Reports from interior-based partisan units were sometimes retarded, and some overlap is to be expected.

CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS BY TYPES

In the body of the memorandum and in Table E6, partisan actions were categorized as follows:

(a) Attacks on enemy troops (including quasi-military personnel; excluding attacks on tactical installations or positions and excluding attacks on troops in vehicles).

(b) Attacks on tactical installations (including bunkers, trenches, emplacements, CPs, OPs, etc.).

(c) Attacks on transport and transport facilities (including carts and vehicles as well as roads, rails, and bridges).

(d) Attacks on supply and storage facilities (e.g., food and ammunition dumps, and warehouses).

(e) Attacks on civil administration (including police stations and police contingents and including Communist Party facilities and personnel).

(f) Intelligence activities (including escorting of agents, reconnaissance, patrols).

(g) Observation for naval gunfire (including fire adjustment but excluding the furnishing of target information).

(h) Other activities, of which the most important were attacks on communication facilities and equipment, attacks on entire villages, naval engagements with armed junks, and distribution of psywar materials.

The attempt to classify actions under these general headings was not always easy, and the reader should recognize that subjective interpretation was sometimes unavoidable. It is probable that no two persons would arrive independently at exactly the same results. The authors feel, however, that any persons following their rules for guiding the interpretation of ambiguous cases would, short of perfect agreement, arrive at substantially the same conclusions. The chief rules followed were of two types:

(a) If an action report included more than one type of activity, as the types were defined above, an attempt was made to determine whether there was a significant distinction in time or location between the "parts" of the action. If there was, the action was divided into two or more actions.

Table E6

NUMBER OF REPORTED ACTIONS BY TYPES, MAY 1951 TO JULY 1953^{a,b}

Month	Enemy troops	Tactical installations	Transport	Supplies and storage	Civil administration	Intelligence	Naval gunfire observation	Other	Total
1951									
May	40	0	16	8	1	1	6	5	77
June	35	6	13	7	2	1	5	3	72
July	21	19	24	5	5	1	5	3	83
August	47	1	8	11	1	2	5	5	80
September	83	1	5	5	0	1	28	4	127
October ^c	75	2	8	13	2	0	11	7	118
November	44	19	7	17	3	0	39	3	132
December ^d	30	1	2	4	0	0	2	2	41
Subtotal	375	49	83	70	14	6	101	32	730
1952									
January ^e	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
February ^e	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March	14	0	0	0	0	9	3	3	29
April ^e	27	2	2	1	0	10	7	3	52
May	39	5	5	3	4	33	9	7	105
June	80	6	19	9	8	56	10	5	193
July	104	4	30	5	13	41	15	38	250
August	148	18	28	10	20	51	1	17	293
September	147	16	37	3	31	88	0	15	337
October	130	14	22	17	20	47	2	25	277
November	195	4	67	21	48	29	1	19	384
December	146	18	43	16	39	13	3	15	293
Subtotal	1030	87	253	85	183	377	51	147	2213
1953									
January	128	13	39	13	28	12	6	10	249
February	97	11	27	17	39	4	3	13	211
March	101	6	47	11	34	18	2	24	243
April	112	5	33	14	15	11	4	31	225
May	140	10	22	3	19	6	0	8	208
June	58	0	6	3	3	9	2	10	91
July	40	0	0	1	0	6	6	2	55
Subtotal	676	45	174	62	138	66	23	98	1282
Total	2081	181	510	217	335	449	175	277	4225 ^f

^aReport of Operations, Hq, Miscellaneous Group, 8086 AU, 1 May to 9 Dec 51; Report of Guerrilla Operations, CCRACK, 13 to 14, 17 to 21, 23 to 31 Dec 51; Report of Guerrilla Operations, FEC/LD (K), 1 Mar to 31 Dec 52; Guerrilla Summary, FEC/LD (K), 1 to 31 Jan 53; Partisan Summary, FEC/LD (K), 1 Feb to 31 Jul 53. Hereafter these reports will be called after-action reports.

^bActions counted do not include intelligence reports; reports of air, naval gunfire, or artillery strikes, or the results thereof; reports of artillery rounds received; or position reports. Data for January and February 52 not available.

^cReports for 1 week not available.

^dReports for approximately 2 weeks not available.

^eNo data available.

^fReports for 3 days not available.

^gDiscrepancies in number of actions between Tables E5 and E6 are due to failure of the after-action reports to include the particular type information in all cases.



Table E7

NUMBER OF ACTIONS BY SIZE OF OPERATING GROUP,
MAY 1952 TO JULY 1953
(After-action reports)

Month	No. of partisans						Total actions reported by size
	1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-200	Over 200	
1952							
May	23	26	15	2	3	3	72
June	60	30	7	3	1	5	106
July	112	78	34	8	4	1	237
August	159	98	45	16	3	1	322
September	81	89	44	16	7	2	239
October	86	98	63	14	8	0	269
November	151	188	68	16	7	1	381
December	117	83	66	12	5	0	283
Subtotal	789	640	342	87	38	13	1909
1953							
January	104	86	34	12	3	1	240
February	92	79	26	7	2	2	208
March	83	75	47	21	7	2	235
April	71	72	43	13	1	0	200
May	58	64	58	16	5	1	202
June	23	35	23	3	2	0	86
July	11	13	35	3	2	1	65
Subtotal	442	424	266	75	22	7	1236
Total	1231	1064	608	162	60	20	3145

Table E8

NUMBER OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ACTIONS BY SIZE OF OPERATING GROUP^a

Types of action	Size of partisan group						Total
	1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-200	Over 200	
Enemy troops	233	257	181	50	18	11	750
Tactical installations	10	25	15	12	1	1	64
Transport	120	92	27	2	1	0	242
Supplies and storage	38	27	4	2	0	0	71
Civil administration	64	64	29	4	2	0	163
Intelligence	64	36	6	4	1	0	111
Total	529	501	262	74	23	12	1401

^aAfter-action reports for June, September, November, and December 1952 and for January and February 1953, including all actions for which both type and size of the partisan group were reported.



Table E9

SELECTED MATERIEL CLAIMS, JUNE 1952 TO JUNE 1953^a

Materiel	Captured	Destroyed	Total
Small arms			
MI rifles	1,545	1,592	3,137
Japanese "99" rifles	18	0	18
Russian rifles and pistols	96	0	96
Carbines	31	4	35
PPSHs	696	371	1,067
Pistols	19	70	89
Flame throwers	0	240	240
Total	2,405	2,277	4,682
Crew-served weapons			
LMGs	161	66	227
HMGs	33	36	69
Russian MGs	3	0	3
Mortars	14	4	18
Guns	1	46	47
ARs	7	4	11
AA weapons	0	6	6
Total	219	162	381
Ammunition			
Small arms, rounds	169,921	229,746	399,667
Hand grenades			
Rounds	3,876	563	4,439
Cases	519	51	570
Artillery			
Rounds	33,782	19,152	52,934
Cases	0	1,373	1,373
Mines	789	300	1,089
Explosives, cases	0	6	6
Total rounds	208,368	249,782	458,129
Total cases	519	1,430	1,949
Vehicles			
Trucks	1	509	510
Carts	52	2,092	2,144
Locomotives	0	3	3
Tractors	0	3	3
Bicycles	1	1	2
Total	54	2,608	2,662
Boats	52	143	195
Bridges	0	80	80
RR tracks, feet	0	495	495
Livestock			
Oxen	653	1,632	2,285
Horses	17	96	113
Cows	8	8	16
Total	678	1,736	2,414
Food, lb^b			
Rice	59,097	3,656,416	3,715,513
Grain	3,332	1,789,913	1,793,245
Beans	4,500	1,273,200	1,277,700
Salt	28,800	8,600	37,400
All other	17,960	762,915	780,875
Total lb	113,689	7,491,044	7,604,733
Total tons	56.8	3,745.5	3,802.4

Table E9 (continued)

Material	Captured	Destroyed	Total
Fuel, gal			
Diesel	450	7,000	7,450
Gasoline	0	35,450	35,450
Total	450	42,450	42,900
Buildings and facilities			
Warehouses	—	44	44
Barracks	—	81	81
Mess halls	—	7	7
CPs	—	41	41
Bunkers	—	301	301
Trenches	—	21	21
Guardhouses	—	26	26
Observation posts	—	11	11
Air-raid shelters	—	13	13
Houses	—	1,209	1,209
Police stations	—	28	28
"Buildings"	—	469	469
Rice mills	—	76	76
Salt mills	—	3	3
Cowsheds	—	8	8
Workshops	—	3	3
Total	0	2,341	2,341
Individual equipment			
Uniforms	377	1,186	1,563
Shoes and boots, pr	153	300	453
Socks	93	—	93
Caps	94	—	94
Insignia, sets	122	—	122
Blankets	38	310	348
ID cards	39	47	86
Bedrolls	5	40	45
Tents	—	17	17
Coats and trousers	48	—	48
Underwear	70	—	70
Towels	14	—	14
Total	1,053	1,900	2,953
Communications equipment			
Radios	2	30	32
Telephones	26	61	87
Switchboards	—	2	2
Wire, meters	1,073	30,703	31,776
Wire, cuts	—	88	88
Poles	10	65	75
Industrial equipment			
Rice-cleaning machines	—	24	24
Rice-threshing machines	—	19	19
Generators	—	3	3
Sewing machines	2	4	6
Electric motors	—	12	12
Total	2	62	64

^aAfter-action reports, June 1952 to June 1953; only those items frequently claimed are included.

^bAssuming 100-lb bags.

Table E10

ENEMY CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY AIR
AND NAVY ON TARGETS LOCATED BY PARTISANS,
MARCH 1952 TO JUNE 1953^a

Month	KIA	WIA	Total
1952			
March	90	48	138
April	6	11	17
May	15	4	19
June	—	—	—
July	1,065	289	1,354
August	3,308	780	4,088
September	5,556	836	6,392
October	2,161	668	2,829
November	2,448	712	3,160
December	490	254	744
Total	15,139	3602	18,741
Monthly avg	1,682	400	2,082
1953			
January	522	318	840
February	431	262	693
March	395	192	587
April	534	137	671
May	300	193	493
June	33	3	36
Total	2,215	1105	3,320
Monthly avg	369	184	553
Total (1952-1953)	17,354	4707	22,061
Monthly avg	1,157	314	1,471

^aAs reported in after-action reports; data for June 1952 not available.

Table E11

ENEMY WEST COASTAL AND/OR ZONAL DEFENSE FORCES,
PARTISAN STRENGTH, AND PARTISAN ACTIONS,
MAY 1951 TO JUNE 1953

Month	Enemy troops ^a	Partisans ^b	Partisan actions ^c
1951			
May	29,200	—	77
June	21,600	—	79
July	50,000	7,800	83
August	—	—	94
September	77,700	—	127
October	77,700	—	118 ^d
November	66,200	—	132
December	84,900	6,000	44 ^e
1952			
January	84,900	6,000	—
February	84,900	—	—
March	84,900	—	29
April	88,200	6,000	57 ^f
May	89,700	—	105
June	89,700	—	193 ^d
July	—	7,575	262
August	132,500	7,725	326
September	—	8,175	361
October	160,300	8,975	277
November	150,800	14,150	408
December	150,800	16,236	304
1953			
January	150,800	18,395	257
February	146,300	18,491	221
March	146,300	20,025	244
April	154,700	21,385	232
May	195,100	22,200	212
June	203,900	21,600	91

^aFigures on enemy troops apparently engaged in coastal and/or zonal defense were taken from sample G2 Daily Intelligence Summaries for each month; the figures given include only those units reported on the southwest coast of North Korea, and strengths are as estimated by G2.

^b1951 and early 1952 figures are estimates.

^cThe number of partisan actions is taken from after-action reports; the number of actions listed for each month is the number reported during the month, whether as delayed or concurrent reports. In Fig. B16 the numbers represented for the months for which data are incomplete are extrapolated values.

^dReports for 1 week not available.

^eReports for approximately 2 weeks not available.

^fReports for 3 days not available.

Table E12

NUMBER, TYPES, AND AVERAGE CAPACITY OF AVAILABLE CRAFT,
JANUARY 1953^a

Unit	Motor junks ^b	Engine boats ^b	Sail junks ^b	Sampan ^b	Unit strength
1st PIR	23	11	74	40	7159, of which 4200 were island-based on 17 islands
2d PIR	20	1	48	10	7650, of which 7037 were island-based on 8 islands
3d PIR	1	0	0	1	1894, of which 100 were based on the forward island of Nan-do
Total	44	12	122	51	16,703 partisans, of whom 11,337 were island-based

^aMonthly Command Report, Hq, FEC/LD (K), 1 Jan 53.

^bThe average capacity of a motor junk (approximately 15 tons) was estimated at about 50 men, that of an engine boat (approximately 3 tons) about 25 men, that of a sail junk (approximately 2 tons) about 15 to 20 men, and that of a sampan (approximately 1 ton) about 10 men. These average capacities are estimates taken from a staff study made in the Partisan Section of FEC/LD (K) in the spring of 1953 by Capt Stewart Giffin, 8240 AU Files. It is to be noted that these are averages and not the actual capacity of any given craft. Sail junks, in particular, ranged considerably in size.




Fig. E8—Number of Actions against Enemy Personnel



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UNCLASSIFIED




Fig. E9—Number of Actions against Supply and Storage Facilities




Fig. E10—Number of Actions against Enemy Vehicles, Railroads, Roads, and Bridges




Fig. E11—Number of Actions against Civil Administration

[REDACTED]

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


Fig. E12—Number of Intelligence Actions




Fig. E13—Number of Naval-Gunfire Adjustments on Enemy Targets



(b) If an action report included more than one type of activity, but it was not possible to separate the different aspects by time or location, a few arbitrary rules were established in order to minimize the resort to subjective judgment. Category 1, for example, attacks on enemy troops, included only those actions in which the events described did not include vehicles, installations, etc. Thus an ambush of a truck loaded with soldiers was defined as an attack on transport rather than an attack on personnel, and a raid on a trench was defined as an attack on a tactical installation. Similarly attacks on vehicles might be primarily




Fig. E14—Ratio of Enemy Coastal Strength in West Korea to Total Enemy Rear Reserve Strength, May 1951 to July 1953

either attacks on troops carried in the vehicles, supplies in the vehicles, the vehicles themselves, or combinations thereof; they have all been called "attacks on vehicles." Again, attacks on roads (usually by mining them) could be considered attacks on troops, attacks on vehicles, or attacks on supplies being transported, depending on the context; for the purposes of this study they were considered attacks on transport and transport facilities.

In short rather than to attempt to determine from inadequate reports what the principal objective, target, feature, or result of the action was, the authors have fallen back on these rules. Their merit is that they minimize guesswork, while, it is hoped, still permitting the formulation of a worth-while account of what types of things partisans did in general, and the extent to which they did each of them. It is important in any case for the reader to have a clear notion of the definitions used with respect to the types of actions being discussed.

In the analysis of types of action certain separable types were finally grouped under the same heading for convenience. Attacks on vehicles were at first counted apart from attacks on transport facilities (roads, railroads, bridges). Of the 510 actions finally categorized as attacks on transport, 275

were attacks on vehicles and 235 were attacks on facilities, as defined. Two other types of actions were finally included in the category of miscellaneous actions. Attacks on communications numbered 82, or 1.9 percent of the total, and psychological warfare actions (actions in which psywar was the main activity performed) numbered 29, or 0.7 percent of the total.

The graph in Fig. E12 includes only intelligence actions, i.e., patrol or reconnaissance missions, or missions whose function was to escort agents or prisoners, or to carry messages to interior units. The partisans also submitted intelligence reports as a by-product of normal operations. From March 1952 to July 1953 they submitted 3110 intelligence reports, an average of approximately 183 per month. In general the number of reports submitted followed the number of actions conducted, with the largest number of reports in months of greatest activity (the summer and fall of 1952) and a marked decline in the winter and spring of 1953.

ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN*

PURPOSE

To train officers and enlisted men to conduct covert and clandestine activities for CCRAK in support of combat operations in Korea.

SCOPE

Description, purpose, and methods of covert and clandestine activities; documentation; evasion and escape; EEI, general and special; infiltration and exfiltration; target selection; indigenous intelligence net organization; briefing and debriefing of agents; intelligence report writing; project officer; psychology of Orientals; cover stories; confidential funds; recruiting, training, pay, and control of agents; sabotage; use of explosives; guerrilla warfare; covert and clandestine communications; black and gray propaganda; enemy and US weapons; map reading; order of battle; practical exercises and examinations.

PREREQUISITES

Officers and enlisted men assigned to or selected for assignment to intelligence duties; previous combat experience required; education, training, or previous experience suitable as background for intelligence assignment required; minimum of one (1) year service remaining in Far East Command; graduate of appropriate military intelligence school or equivalent experience. Security clearance through SECRET.

*Course given 25 May to 13 Jul 53, total 138 hours.

Subject	Series	Hours
Part I		
General		17
Introductory Address	1000	(1)
Orientation	1050	(1)
Foreign Intelligence Activities	1075	(1)
Foreign Intelligence Activities	1076	(1)
Confidential Funds	1100	(1)
Documents	1200	(1)
Report Writing	1400	(1)
Intelligence Orientation	1900	(6)
Strategic Intelligence	2025	(2)
Introduction to Tech Intell	2095	(1)
Collection of Tech Intell Information	2096	(1)
Espionage		11
Recruiting, Training, and Control of Agents	1600	(2)
Black and Gray Propaganda	1700	(2)
Infiltration and Exfiltration	2100	(1)
Cover Stories	2300	(1)
TLO Operations	2400	(2)
Project Officer	2425	(2)
Clandestine Communications	2600	(1)
Evasion and Escape		6
Introduction to Evasion and Escape	3000	(1)
Basic Survival and Evasion	3100	(1)
Conduct of UN Prisoners of War	3200	(1)
Escape	3300	(1)
Evasion	3400	(1)
Contacting Friendly Units	3500	(1)
Sabotage and Demolitions		16
Sabotage and Demolitions	4000	(8)
Demolitions (Demolitions Range)	4100	(8)
Unconventional Warfare		7
U/W Orientation	5000	(1)
Guerrilla and Partisan Missions	5100	(1)
Recruiting and Training	5200	(1)
Guerrilla Organization	5300	(1)
Guerrilla Tactics	5400	(1)
Guerrilla Operations in Korea	5450	(1)
Guerrilla Intell Collection Effort	5475	(1)
Part II		
General		22
Sun, Moon, and Tide Phases	1060	(1)
Tide Phases	1061	(1)
Geography of the Far East	3121	(3)
History and Traditions	3125	(2)
History and Traditions	3126	(2)
Geography of China	3200	(2)
Geography of Korea	3300	(2)
The Intelligence Production Cycle	4005	(1)

Subject	Series	Hours
EEI	4025	(1)
The Collection Plan	4031	(2)
Information Sources	4035	(1)
Control of Civilians	5300	(1)
Interrogation Techniques	6021	(2)
Techniques of Interrogating Orientals	6024	(1)
Order of Battle		12
CCF Organization	5041	(2)
CCF Infantry and Infantry Tactics	5080	(2)
General History of the NKA	7002	(1)
NKA Organization	7041	(2)
NK Infantry and Infantry Tactics	7080	(2)
Situation in Korea	8202	(2)
Enemy Support Units	8080	(1)
Map Reading and Aerial Photos		8
Grid Coordinates	1015	(1)
Representative Fractions and Graphic Scales	1025	(2)
Direction: Intersection and Resection	2015	(2)
Elevation	2035	(2)
Terrain: Map and Photo	4070	(1)
Part III		
Commanding Officer		18
Map-Reading Examination	0391	(1)
Map-Reading Examination	0392	(2)
Practical Exercise	3900	(6)
Practical Exercise	5900	(6)
Critique	5950	(2)
Critique (Map-Reading Examination)	6392	(1)
Assistant Commandant		21
Physical Training	CO	(7)
Reserved for Assistant Commandant	CO	(12)
Graduation and Clearance	CO	(2)

Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
Part I (57 hours)		
General	17	
Introductory Address	1	
AI 1000.1 (S)	C	Greeting; outline of FEC/LG, CCRAK, FEC/LD (K); mission and its importance
Orientation	1	
AI 1050.1 (S)	C	General outline of conduct of covert-clandestine operations in Korea
Foreign Intelligence Activities (S)	1	
AI 1076.1 (S)	C	General orientation on the methods and characteristics of some of the intelligence activities of the foreign countries
Foreign Intelligence Activities	1	
AI 1076.1 (S)	C	General orientation on the methods and characteristics of some of the intelligence activities of the foreign countries

Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
Confidential Funds AI 1100.1 (S)	1 C	Source, use, and accounting of confidential funds
Documents AI 1200.1 (S)	1 C	Types, use, source, and reproduction of documents utilized to facilitate agent operations
Report Writing AI 1400.1 (S)	1 C	Types and uses; preparation, editing, distribution, importance of accuracy
Intelligence Orientation AI 1900.6	6 C	A general discussion of FEC/LD (K) operations
Strategic Intelligence AI 2025.2	2 C	General; discussion of the components of strategic intelligence (history, geography, transportation and communications, sociology, politics, economics, science and technology, Armed Forces biography)
Introduction to Technical Intelligence AI 2095.1	1 C	Explanation of the problems involved and techniques employed in the collection of technical intelligence information
Collection of Technical Intelligence Information AI 2096.1 (S)	1 C	Techniques employed and the information obtained from analytical study of enemy material
Espionage	11	
Recruiting, Training, and Control of Agents AI 1600.2 (S)	2 C	Source of personnel; methods of instruction; background, intelligence, and physical considerations; influence of pay; methods of payment; physical control of agents, billeting, travel passes and disposition
Black and Gray Propaganda AI 1700.2 (S)	2 C	Definitions, purpose, objectives; effect on operations; enemy and friendly methods of dissemination; security considerations; preparation of radio programs and written material
Infiltration and Exfiltration AI 2100.1 (S)	1 C	Purpose, methods, and disguises; equipment, supplies, barter items; route planning, stay-behinds
Cover Stories AI 2300.1 (S)	1 C	Purpose and use; procedures and precautions in developing cover stories
TLO Operations AI 2400.2 (S)	2 C	An explanation and discussion of the cycle of activities in mounting TLO Operations
Project Officer AI 2425.2 (S)	2 C	Mission planning and the role of the project officer; the complete cycle of activity and events
Clandestine Communications AI 2600.1 (S)	1 C	Methods and mechanics; types of means available; codes and ciphers; secret inks, etc.
Evasion and Escape Introduction to Evasion and Escape AI 3000.1	6 1 C	To impress on the individual soldier the possibility of his being cut off from his unit, or captured, and to instill in the soldier the will and desire to evade capture or escape if captured,

SECRET

Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
Basic Survival and Evasion AI 3100.1 (S)	1 C	by showing him his moral obligation as a soldier, his individual future, and by building his confidence by training To train the individual soldier on the basic principles of EE by showing him that success or failure depends on first aid, water, food, energy conservation, shelter and clothing, plans, equipment, barter material, caution and patience, cover and concealment, study of local inhabitants, selection of evasion routes, employment of evasion techniques in combat areas, and communications
Conduct of UN Prisoners of War AI 3200.1 (S)	1 C	To show the individual soldier what he may expect in the way of treatment from the enemy and the manner in which he should conduct himself
Escape AI 3300.1 (S)	1 C	To provide the individual soldier with the knowledge of how to make and exploit opportunities to escape
Evasion AI 3400.1 (S)	1 C	To instruct the individual soldier in the methods necessary to effect successful evasion after escape
Contacting Friendly Units AI 3500.1 (S)	1 C	To provide the individual with the knowledge and technique of contacting friendly units by timing of contact and identification of friendly forces
Sabotage and Demolitions	16	
Sabotage and Demolitions AI 4000.8 (S)	8 C	Purpose, types of sabotage, and techniques employed: planning and coordination of sabotage missions; selection and evaluation of suitable targets, use of various type of ex-targets, use of explosives and devices and their use in sabotage
Demolitions (Demolitions Range) AI 4100.8 (S)	8 R	Practical field work in the handling and use of demolitions
Unconventional Warfare	7	
U/W Orientation AI 5000.1 (S)	1 C	A general background orientation of unconventional-warfare activities in Korea
Guerrilla and Partisan Missions AI 5100.1 (S)	1 C	Partisan and guerrilla missions in general with emphasis on the missions in Korea
Recruiting and Training AI 5200.1 (S)	1 C	Recruiting; sources and methods; training of guerrillas and guerrilla units in Korea
Guerrilla Organization AI 5300.1 (S)	1 C	Methods and types of organizations, with particular emphasis on the organization of partisan forces in Korea
Guerrilla Tactics AI 5400.1 (S)	1 C	Guerrilla tactics in general and how they are employed in Korea
Guerrilla Operations in Korea	1 C	Mission; organization; general orientation on operations

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Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
AI 5450.1 (S) Guerrilla Intelligence Collection Effort AI 5475.1	1 C	Sources and methods of intelligence collection by guerrilla forces; the type and nature of their own intelligence needs
Part II (42 hours)		
General	22	
Sun, Moon, and Tide Phases	1 C	The military significance of sun, moon, and tide phases and the source and use of such information
GI 1060.1 (R) Tide Phases	1	
GI 1061.1 (R)	C	The military significance of tide phases and the source and proper use of such information
Geography of the Far East	3 C	A review of the natural resources, agriculture and industrial centers, harbors, and topographical features of Asia
GI 3121.3 (R) History and Traditions	2	
GI 3125.2 (R)	C	A review of the historical background and cultural factors in the Far East, Part I
History and Traditions GI 3126.2 (R)	2 C	A review of the historical background and cultural factors in the Far East, Part II
Geography of China GI 3200.2 (R)	2 C	General geography, place names, provinces, railroads, roads, winter weather; to include Manchuria
Geography of Korea GI 3300.2 (R)	2 C	General geography and place names in Korea
The Intelligence Production Cycle GI 4005.1 (R)	1 C	Steps in the production of combat intelligence
EEI GI 4025.1 (R)	1 C	Definition and formulation of EEI
The Collection Plan GI 4031.2 (R)	2 C	Form and function of the collection plan, explanation of each part
Information Sources GI 4035.1 (C)	1 C	Sources of information available to intelligence officers
Control of Civilians GI 5300.1 (R)	1 C	The principles, measures, and agencies for civilian control during both combat and occupational phases
Interrogation Techniques GI 6021.2 (R)	2 C	Psychological aspects of interrogation, approach control, types of questions, use of documents and special techniques used in interrogation of enemy POWs
Techniques of Interrogating Orientals GI 6024.1 (R)	1 C	Types of Oriental POWs; fundamentals for successful interrogation
Order of Battle	12	
CCF Organization OB 5041.2 (C)	2 C	A discussion on the organization and the capabilities of the CCF in the present Korean conflict
CCF Infantry and Infantry Tactics	2 C	An explanation of the infantry organization, weapons, and the tactics em-

SECRET

Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
OB 5080.2 (S)		ployed in the offense as well as the defense
General History of the NKA	1 C	A general history of the NKA including the evolution of the NKA in Manchuria and in North Korea
OB 7002.1 (C)		
NKA Organization	2	A discussion on the formation, routes, engagements, reorganization, and combat effectiveness of the NKA units
OB 7041.2 (S)	C	
NKA Infantry and In- fantry Tactics	2 C	An explanation of the infantry organization, weapons, and tactics employed in the offense as well as the defense
OB 7080.2 (S)		
Situation in Korea	2	A discussion of the current situation in Korea, covering both the enemy and friendly situation
OB 8202.2 (S)	C	
Enemy Support Units	1	A discussion and explanation of enemy support units and their influence on the combat effectiveness of the enemy
OB 8080.1 (C)	C	
Map Reading and Aerial Photos	8	
Grid Coordinates	1	Location and reference to places by military grid and thrust line; use of engineers' scale and coordinates, location of and reference to places by use of geographic coordinates
PI 1015.1	C	
Representative Fractions and Graphic Scales	2 C	Distance on the map and ground; relation and conversion of map scales to ground measurements; English and metric systems; use of the ratio between map or photo distances and corresponding ground distances as a means of expressing the scale of a map
Direction: Intersection and Resection	2 C	Directions, azimuths, and map declination; plotting azimuths, orientation methods; the use of intersecting azimuths for determining point locations
Elevation	2	Contours and characteristics, profile, defilade, representations of terrain forms on the map; ridges, streams, slopes, profiles, and visibility; terrain nomenclatures
PI 2035.2	C	
Terrain: Map and Photo	1	Characteristics of Korean terrain and vegetation; introduction to aerial photoreading; uses; definitions and terms; marginal data; comparison of aerial photos and topographic maps; methods of identification
PI 4070.1	C	
Part III (18 hours)		
Commanding Officer	18	
Map-Reading Examination	1	A map-reading examination designed to reveal to the instructor as well as the students the weakness of the class,
CO 0391.1	PE	

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Subject, file number, classification	Hour, type	Scope
		thereby serving as a guide to the instructors as to what phases of map reading should be most emphasized in the instruction to follow
Map-Reading Examination	2	A comprehensive map-reading examination to determine the proficiency of the class; to be entered in the individuals Form 66-1
Practical Exercise AI 3900.6 (S)	6 PE	Written paper on subjects covered; practical solution for various subjects to be required
Practical Exercise AI 5900.6 (S)	6 PE	A written paper requiring practical solutions to various problems
Critique AI 5950.2 (S)	2 C	Question-and-answer period on all subjects covered and discussion of the examination
Critique (Map-Reading Examination)	1 C	To clear up and discuss student questions and/or comments

COPY OF LOGISTICS ANNEX OF FEC/LD (K) EVACUATION PLAN

Headquarters, FEC/LD (K)
Seoul, Korea (CS2050)
121200I June 1953

Annex 1 (Logistics) to Operation Order 5.

Maps and Charts:

Task Organization:

- a. First PIR, Lt Col Edwin R. Perry, Cmdg.
Consists of Donkey 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 21.
- b. Fifth PIR, Lt Col Ralph L. Todd, Cmdg.
Consists of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Battalions.
- c. Sixth PIR, Major Gerald C. Burch, Cmdg.
Consists of Dragon 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13.

1. GENERAL SITUATION

In the event of an armistice agreement between UN and Communist forces, the United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea, now occupying the west coast islands north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do except for the islands of (1) Paengnyong-do, (2) Taechong-do, (3) Sochong-do, (4) Yonpyong-do, and (5) U-do, must be evacuated to new locations. The first four excepted islands named above will serve as interim stations for evacuees to facilitate the withdrawal to new locations. Many logistical problems will arise which must, of necessity, be met by the individual commander on the ground. It is the intent of this annex to outline procedure and supply points to assist in the successful resolution of these problems.

a. Enemy Information

(1) Enemy capabilities are:

- (a) Covertly hampering evacuation of islands.
- (b) Infiltrating partisan units and refugees. The possibility of enemy having already effected such infiltration will necessitate institution of careful and continuous screening to eliminate enemy agents prior to evacuation.
- (c) Preventing shipment of supplies and equipment through sabotage and/or pilferage.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) The FS assigned to ROK naval forces by CTG 95.1 will be replaced by an LST.
- (2) In addition to the FS in subparagraph (1), above, and the LST to be assigned by CTF 95, any LSTs currently operating on the west coast which are on loan to CTF 95 from TF 90 will be assigned to CTG 95.1 for the execution of "Pandora."
- (3) For planning purposes it may be assumed that LSTs above will be able to reach the Cho-do/Sok-to area by the times indicated:

(a) ROK LST	H + 24 hours
(b) TF 95 LST	H + 48 hours
(c) Logistics (TF 95) LSTs	H + 36 hours or less if already unloaded
- (4) ROK naval craft assigned to the control of fishing in the Haeju area may be used for evacuation purposes.
- (5) The aircraft carrier of TU 95.11 is expected to be used for movement of personnel.

c. Assumptions

- (1) That the regiments will be able to evacuate UN and partisan personnel, supplies, and equipment, utilizing organic transportation, to previously selected islands of Tammui-to, Yongyu-do, and Anmyon-do.
- (2) That the regimental commanders will request naval assistance locally or through this headquarters if organic transport proves inadequate.
- (3) That supplies and equipment in quantities sufficient to the individual needs of the three partisan regiments will be available on call.

2. LOGISTICAL MISSION

To provide logistical support and transportation, where needed, from naval facilities available, and to provide supplies, rations, and/or such other equipment as may be necessary to implement the evacuation outlined in paragraph 1, above. To provide further all logistical requirements to properly settle and house the evacuated personnel on permanent stations at Yongyu-do, Tammui-to, and Anmyon-do.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS

a. CO, 1st PIR will:

- (1) Through utilization of organic transportation, move UN personnel and equipment and partisan personnel, equipment, and dependents from the islands of Paengyong-do, Wallae-do, Kirin-do, Mahap-to, Owha-do, Yongho-do, Sunwi-do, Taesup-to, Yuk-to, and Yongmae-do to the island of Taechong-do for staging and thereupon arrange movement to permanent location on the island of Tammui-to (BS7340).
- (2) Arrange for movement of UN personnel and equipment and partisan personnel, equipment, and dependents from Cho-do to new permanent location on the island of Tammui-to (BS7340).
- (3) Arrange through local coordination with CTF 95.1 for such naval transport as may be required to accomplish (1) and (2), above.

b. CO, 5th PIR will:

- (1) Through utilization of organic transportation, move UN personnel and equipment and partisan personnel, equipment, and dependents from the islands of Taesup-to, Yongmae-do, Sosup-to, and Mu-do to Yonpyong-do (YB3872) and then arrange for further evacuation of all above-named personnel to the island of Tammui-to (BS7340).
- (2) Through local coordination with representatives of CTF 95.1 arrange for such naval assistance as may be required to effect movements in (1), above.

c. CO, 6th PIR will:

- (1) Through utilization of organic transportation, move UN personnel and equipment and partisan personnel, equipment, and dependents from the islands of TOK-to, Nap-Som, and Sangchwira-do to the island of Cho-do (XC6066) and then further evacuate the above-named personnel to permanent location at the island of Yongyu-do (BS 7047).
- (2) Through local coordination with representatives of CTF 95.1 arrange for such naval assistance as may be required to effect movements in (1), above.

d. (1) This annex becomes effective upon receipt.

- (2) Units will determine tentage requirements at both interim stations and permanent location, and requisition to fill needs from S4, FEC/LD (K).
- (3) Units will make necessary surveys of water supply at interim station and permanent location and, if inadequate, arrange through local coordination with representatives of CTF 95.1 for installation of necessary water-distillation facilities.

- (4) Units will requisition water cans from S4, FEC/LD (K).
 (5) Where possible and material is available, units will box all weapons. If this is not possible, weapons will be stacked and guarded on partisan craft.
 (6) All weapons will be tagged for identification purposes.
 (7) Units will transport weapons and ammunition via partisan craft to new location under immediate supervision of qualified American personnel.
 (8) Each unit will provide necessary grain and supplies to supply officer of each CTF 95.1 ship for preparation and feeding of UN and partisan personnel, refugees, and dependents being evacuated.

4. SUPPLY

a. Requirements

- (1) The accompanying table indicates tonnages and numbers of personnel to be moved from each individual island:

Island	US personnel	Partisan personnel	Inhabitants & refugees	Partisan families	Tons
Sunwi-do	3	1375	1,406	361	124.0
Cho-do	41	3480	2,499	672	567.0
Kirin-do	2	174	387	210	48.1
Mahap-to	1	192	58	6	13.5
Wallae-do	0	484	110	120	75.0
Yuk-to	0	132	60	45	20.0
Changin-do	0	253	912	111	50.0
Owha-do	2	336	561	72	75.1
Yongho-do	0	65	0	0	0.0
Taesuap-to	3	641	1,400	150	8.5
Yongmae-do	5	1213	0	1200	36.0
Sosuap-to	2	595	200	100	16.3
Mu-do	3	447	100	10	14.5
Nap-Som	0	118	0	0	0.0
Tok-to	0	0	0	0	0.0
Hachwire-do	0	107	0	0	0.0
Paengnyong-do	22	21	0	0	21.5
Yonpyong-do	28	60	7,000	10	36.0
Totals	112	9693	14,693	3067	1105.5

- (2) In the second phase, or the movement of the personnel and equipment from the three interim stations to permanent locations, the location and breakdown will be as follows:

Island	US personnel	Partisan personnel	Inhabitants & refugees	Partisan families	Tons	Vehicles
Cho-do	41	3705	2,449	672	567.0	7
Taechong-do	30	3032	3,494	925	427.2	5
Yonpyong-do	41	2956	8,700	1470	111.3	4
Totals	112	9693	14,693	3067	1105.5	16

b. Procurement

- (1) Naval assistance will be available through CTF 95 and will be arranged locally by unit commanders in coordination with representatives of CTG 95.1 at each regimental location.

(2) Water supplies on Taechong-do, Tammui-to, Yongyung-do, and Yonpyong-do are inadequate. UN naval forces will provide water-distillation facilities upon request from the regimental commander concerned through representatives of CTF 95.1.

(3) Tentage is available on 48-hour call at this headquarters.

(4) 4000 water cans are available on call at this headquarters.

(5) Flares and flashlights are available on call at this headquarters. Flashlight requirements will be considered as being nine per ship.

(6) Unit commanders will requisition all required supplies through normal supply channels of S4, FEC/LD (K).

(7) Provisions of paragraph 4d, Types of Supplies and Supply Points, of Annex 4 (Logistics) to Partisan Operations Plan (K), Phase IIA, Headquarters, FEC/LD (K) dated 13 May 1953, will continue in effect, except for one minor change under 4d(6), Signal. The signal supply point will be S4, FEC/LD (K).

c. Captured Supplies

Captured supplies and equipment not required for partisan operations or other FEC/LD (K) operations will be turned over to appropriate section of FEC/LD (K) for evacuation to appropriate technical intelligence units. When it is not practicable to evacuate captured equipment, it will be destroyed. Captured North Korean currency will be reported to CO, FEC/LD (K), for disposition.

d. Responsibilities

(1) S4, FEC/LD (K), will be responsible for maintenance of proper stocks of required supplies for normal operation, and will arrange procurement of special stocks to cover emergency needs.

(2) Unit commanders will be responsible to see that proper surveys of supply needs are made and necessary requisitions are submitted to S4, FEC/LD (K).

5. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Evacuation

(1) Seriously ill or wounded UN or partisan troops will be evacuated by parent organization to nearest US Army hospital.

(2) Emergency air evacuation of seriously wounded will normally be coordinated through Partisan Operations Section, FEC/LD (K).

b. Hospitalization

West coast units, 121st Evacuation Hospital, Yongdong-po.

6. TRANSPORTATION

See Annex 4 (Logistics) to Partisan Operations Plan Phase II, Headquarters, FEC/LD (K), dated 13 May 1953.

7. SERVICES

See Annex 4 (Logistics) to Partisan Operations Plan Phase II, Headquarters, FEC/LD (K), dated 13 May 1953.

BREBNER
Col, Armor

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DEBRIEFING US PERSONNEL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS PARTISAN INFANTRY KOREA
8240TH ARMY UNIT
APO 301

21 March 1954

SUBJECT: Debriefing US Personnel

TO: Commanding General
CCRAFE, 8177th AU
APO 613
ATTN: ACofS G3

1. Reference

Letter, AG 380.1 GB, Headquarters Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East, 8177th Army Unit, APO 613, 9 November 1953, subject: "Debriefing of US Personnel."

2. Transmitted herewith are fifty-one monographs prepared by officers and key non-commissioned officers who departed this organization during January and February 1954.

3. A summary of the monographs was prepared and circulated within this headquarters inviting comments on the analysis as it applied to each staff section. A recapitulation of the summary and staff comments by topic is set forth herewith for your information.

a. Topic: Assignment (3 officers, 12 EM).

(1) Summary

It was felt that Special Forces trained personnel were improperly utilized. The younger officers and enlisted men evidenced strong resentment after being led to believe that they would be assigned to combat jump missions, combat raids, and amphibious landings behind enemy lines. For the same reasons these people were not particularly adapted to working with partisans in what became a relatively static situation.

b. Topic: Selection of Personnel (5 officers, 7 EM).

(1) Summary

(a) Five officers and seven EM felt that greater care should have been taken to select personnel either on a volunteer basis or by selection on basis of aptitude, sympathetic attitude, and desire to work with indigenous personnel.

(b) For work with partisans, older officers and EM are preferable.

(c) There was a notable lack of qualified specialists such as motor mechanics, boat repairmen and operators, communications personnel, and administrative personnel.

(d) One EM suggested the selection of men with a diversified experience and background as a manpower economy measure and one providing more mature individuals.

(2) Comment

(a) Procurement of qualified personnel, particularly specialists, has always been difficult. However, all possible efforts to include letters of acceptance have been made by this headquarters to obtain mature and qualified replacements.

(b) The 8240th AU has always suffered from a lack of qualified supply personnel. Undoubtedly, some of the "looseness" in supply procedures stems from that basic condition. Prior to the truce, training of supply personnel was accomplished by "on the job" training, not a concerted effort to instill sound supply procedures. There is evidence of a feeling of resistance toward adopting standard supply accounting procedures throughout the unit by commanders and supply personnel concerned. This is probably due to the nature of the operations which required lavish expenditures of supplies and equipment required for maintenance and operations of the partisan force.

(c) The monographs indicate also that an effort was made since the Truce to clean up the supply picture and to instill measures of supply accounting and supply economy throughout the command.

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c. Topic: Supply (4 officers, 10 EM).

(1) Summary

(a) All personnel who mentioned the subject of supply and equipment brought out the loose handling of American equipment and supplies by partisan personnel--their lack of "appreciation" of and need for conservation of supplies and equipment. Comments range from deliberate maltreatment to the need for more training in supply economy.

(b) There is a definite feeling by some officers and EM that issue to partisans should be on the basis of immediate need only, that any TOE should be made to fit the particular unit and situation.

(c) There is a feeling that the "hand-outs" of clothes, rice, tents, and stoves destroyed partisan incentive to make raids into enemy territory. Instead there was the tendency to settle down to "easy living" and to start "building empires." This tendency progressed to the point where equipment was stolen and sold in order to procure more rice and maintain the new standard of comfort.

(d) American personnel were unable to carry out sound supply procedure since partisans received no pay and could not be held pecuniarily liable for lost articles of clothing and equipment. The problem of thievery by partisans might be lessened by a program of aid to their dependents.

(e) Equipment issued partisans should be simple to operate and maintain. Indigenous equipment should be used when practicable.

(2) Comment

(a) The lack of appreciation by partisan personnel of supplies and equipment is concurred in. This lack of appreciation is the result of two principal conditions. First, the partisans were provided with typical US military equipment for their operations. They were not familiar with the complexity of the equipment or the necessity for maintenance. The American cadre with the partisan units was too small to permit the supervision and training required to maintain the equipment and teach proper usage thereof. Secondly, there seems to be evidence of overprogramming of supplies and equipment for partisan operations. The partisans were well equipped with tentage, stoves, fuel, rice, weapons, etc.--obtained without effort on their part. It is felt that only the absolute minimum essential be provided partisan forces and that an adequate American cadre be provided to supervise and direct partisan operations to include supply and maintenance practices.

(b) The monographs emphasize the disadvantage of not being able to hold the partisans pecuniarily liable for equipment that was lost, damaged, or destroyed through their negligence. This was further emphasized in that all reports of survey were initiated by US personnel even though the supplies had been issued to partisan leaders and signatures had been obtained from them. Due to the peculiar nature of partisan operations there was little that could be done to alleviate this condition.

(c) Equipment issued to partisans was not maintained adequately, as discussed above. This was generally due to ignorance on the part of the indigenous personnel involved and the lack of qualified maintenance personnel throughout the unit. Instruction manuals printed in English and Korean would perhaps alleviate the maintenance problems encountered. A larger cadre of American personnel with partisan units would provide more supervision of maintenance practices.

d. Topic: Training (2 officers, 3 EM).

(1) Summary

Comments state that partisan personnel lacked training in the knowledge of proper care and maintenance of equipment as well as training in the operation of ordnance items. Lack of appreciation of equipment, caused by lack of training in its use, prompted an attitude of careless extravagance. One EM stressed need for training in teamwork. Comments with respect to the type of training given evidence a feeling that less stress should have been placed on company-type training and more stress placed on raids, ambush, demolition, and amphibious training--with emphasis on the individual and small team units. Greater emphasis was felt to be needed on individual weapon training.

(2) Comment

(a) There was evidence that in some instances partisans did not appreciate equipment because of lack of training. Experience indicates, however, that partisans with proper training will take care of equipment.

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(b) Evidence indicates that the partisans were not trained in the basic fundamentals prior to the cease-fire. Since that time an intensive training program was initiated. Individual training emphasized weapons training. All partisans fired the M1 for record. Additional weapons training to include crew-served weapons was curtailed owing to the phase-out program. Basic unit training covered squad, platoon, and company training. Since the mission of UNPIK included the capability of conducting amphibious and airborne operations up to company size, company training was included in the program.

(c) Relative to the alleged shortage of trained communications personnel the TA for FEC/LD (K) and UNPIK was never more than adequate in this respect, but sufficient personnel to accomplish the mission were generally available. At specific places and during certain times the people were required to work long hours to accomplish the mission but never failed to do so. Most communications personnel were adequately trained, but the situation, being far from normal and calling for special efforts, was new to them and at times quite baffling. Only experience can overcome these factors, and in most cases personnel have responded quickly and have satisfactorily performed their assigned tasks. The only critical shortage was maintenance personnel. There were never enough qualified signal repairmen available to satisfactorily maintain the tremendous amount of equipment in the hands of the troops. This is one phase that the partisans cannot do themselves. Owing to their inexperience and complete indifference to first- and second-echelon maintenance, a larger repair load than American maintenance personnel could satisfactorily handle was generated.

(d) Partisan troops were not as proficient in specialized work as regulars, but continuing effort has been placed on training them in their assigned tasks both by the people on the ground and by UNPIK. The need for emphasis on specialist training has been well recognized but is a difficult problem to eliminate because of the lack of technical background and the language barrier. It is felt that considerable progress has been made in this respect even though much more would have been needed had the unit remained operational. This lack of specialist training is one of the reasons for the difficult supply problems encountered throughout the operation.

(e) Schools for first-aid men were recommended by the surgeon UNPIK and were conducted. Although Korean manuals on American drugs were not available the American doctors and aid men worked constantly to impress Korean doctors with the uses and limitations of American drugs.

e. Topic: Security (1 officer, 1 EM).

(1) Summary

One officer commented that documentation of security information was too voluminous and hence more subject to compromise. One EM remarked on the lack of security consciousness among the partisans. One officer was concerned with the duplication and overlap of intelligence agencies—that many other agencies were duplicating his unit's intelligence operations.

(2) Comment

(a) It is understandable that personnel involved in special projects are apt to feel that details of such operations should not be reduced to writing. However, plans must be prepared for proper coordination and control. This information was disseminated only on a need-to-know basis.

(b) It is agreed that the control of security information among partisans has been quite a problem. The control of such information in certain units could have possibly been more rigidly controlled by added classes and lectures explaining its necessity and importance.

f. Topic: Command (2 officers, 2 EM).

(1) Summary

One officer commented that the organization of 8240th AU was cumbersome as pertained to partisan operations. He states that plans for raids had to be completely staffed and approved by UNPIK. This ponderous procedure destroyed the essential elements of surprise and aggressive action. The feeling too was that more reliance should have been placed on the unit commanders on the ground. There was evidence of a feeling of insufficient support of and lack of confidence in field commanders. This was the only major comment on the subject of the American command aspects of the partisan operations.

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g. Topic: General (4 officers, 10 EM).

(1) Summary

(a) Two officers and three EM felt strongly that the mission assigned a partisan regiment could have been done more effectively and at less expense to the American taxpayers by a US Army infantry or Ranger company.

(b) One corporal expressed a considerable feeling of pride in having served in the 8240th AU and in his being "able to teach the Koreans ... a few of the things I know."

(c) Morale generally declined among the partisans after the end of active hostilities when chances for returning to their homes dropped.

(d) Morale among American EM was dependent on whether or not they were assigned in their proper MOS—and on how they were affected by the promotion policy.

(e) Morale among younger Special Forces personnel suffered from their assignment to an operation other than what they had been led to believe it would be.

(f) More mature officers and enlisted men adjusted more readily to the type of operations conducted by the units of the 8240th AU.

(g) Expressions of praise for or pride in the partisan organizations with which officers and EM served are few.

(h) A M/Sgt who described a specific raid with an American officer and a partisan group termed the conduct of the partisans "disgraceful." Few other specific comments with respect to partisan conduct under fire were found.

(2) Comment

(a) The drop in morale after a war is not unusual in any organization. This would be particularly so in a partisan unit as is borne out by the fact that the partisans in this unit commandeered food and material to supplement what was given them by the US.

(b) It is felt that the assignment of enlisted personnel out of their MOS had little effect on the morale of the individual or the unit as a whole. Most of the EM volunteered for assignments out of their MOS in order to remain with an organization of this type.

(c) The postwar drop in morale of American personnel (which was never reported less than excellent by the units) can be attributed to the fact that there was a period of idleness, suspension of combat pay and the point system, and the constant association with partisans in isolated areas. As stated above, the morale was never dangerously low, this being evident from reports and observation.

(d) In reviewing the attached monographs it is noted that some of the people are extremely bitter, indicating a trend of low morale. Even though a few reasons for their feelings were stated in writing, there are more. There is always the man's personal life and mental attitude to be considered and some of these men had such problems.

(e) Isolation over a long period of time was a contributing factor in the case of some. Other people were mistaken in the mission and function of the unit.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
a/s

DELVIN C. GLENN
1st Lt, AGC
Adjutant

EVALUATION OF PHASE I OPERATIONS

25 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operation Plan, Partisan Operations, Phase I

4. Analysis of results of partisan operations as related to missions outlined in Operation Plan, Partisan Operations, Phase I, FEC/LD (K), dated 28 January 1953:

a. General Mission

(1) Harassment of enemy through normal operations: This was accomplished with approximately 75 percent success only in the western section of Hwanghae Province in the area south of an E-W line through Chinnampo (YC 0590) and west of a N-S line through Sariwon (YC 3864) and along the coast line south of the Kaesong-Haeju MSR. Additional coverage was obtained in the vicinity YD 0805.

(2) Increase attacks by interior units, particularly Hwanghae Province: Interior units activity increased by approximately 25 percent in the second half of the period 28 Jan-15 Mar over the first half of the period. This increase in activity was mainly along the Changnyon (XC 9874)/Changyon (XC 8235) MSR.

(3) Maximum effort at destruction of bridges and tunnels: Negative tunnels were reported damaged or destroyed by partisan activity. A total of 15 bridges were reported destroyed or damaged.

b. PIR Missions

(1) 1st PIR

(a) Attack, from island bases, in Hwanghae area to interdict Sariwon-Haeju MSR and LC: during the period eleven partisan actions were directed at this MSR. Estimated effectiveness: 5 percent.

(b) Utilizing interior forces in Hwanghae area, pin down enemy reserves and interdict Sariwon-Haeju MSR and LC. Enemy reserves in the area included the CCF 6th Army (confirmed), the 8th AA Division and 45th AA Regiment (reported) in the area. In addition, the 21st and 23d NK Brigades were available for action against the partisans. Results: UNPFK interior units strength of 1st PIR totaled 1600 to 1700 during the period of Phase I. These were mostly in groups of from 2 to 10. Ten partisan actions were directed against the Sariwon-Haeju MSR during period of Phase I operations. Results: 34 enemy KIA, 2 enemy WIA, 4 trucks destroyed, 5 oxen killed and 8000 rounds of S/A ammunition and 100 rounds 76.2 Arty ammunition destroyed. Estimated effectiveness: 10 percent.

(c) Continue building interior units: At the beginning of the period, 1st PIR had a total of 1708 personnel in 46 interior units, these groups varying in strength from 3 to 140. At end of period there were 1612 personnel in 62 interior units, groups varying from 2 to 125. The increase in number of units was chiefly groups of from 2 to 10 men.

(d) Continue training. No comment.

(2) 2d PIR

(a) Protect flank of Eighth Army: this has been done by continued occupation of the islands Kanghwa and Kyodong.

(b) Defend Kanghwa—see 1 above.

(c) Defend Kyodong—see 1 above.

(d) Interdict Haeju-Kaesong MSR. Ten partisan operations were conducted along this MSR. Results: One operation was actually against the MSR—three enemy were killed and so were three oxen. Effectiveness: negative.

(e) Interdict Koksan-Yangdok MSR, utilizing Force Green Dragon. Mission of this group is to establish a safe-entry area for additional partisan troops. Results: On 25 Jan 53, 97 men from Green Dragon Able were airdropped into BU area. On 3 March, first (radio) message was received from this unit. Since that date, communications have been maintained and resupply drops have been made to the unit. Two actions against the enemy were reported as of 31 March. The first involved a fire fight with NK

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Constabulary Guards. Six enemy were killed, seven partisan were killed, and three captured. The second action was an attack against two NK trucks. Three enemy were captured by the partisans. When airdropped on 25 January, 47 of the 97-man force were able to assemble. On 31 March approximately 30 of the original group remained effective. Effectiveness: negative.

(f) Continue building interior units: Beginning of period—strength 7995; interior units—negative. End of period—strength 8095; interior units reported—negative.

(g) Continue training.

(3) 3d PIR

(a) Interdict MSR: Sinanju-Kaechon; Chongju-Namsam-ni; Kanggye-Huilchon; Kilchu-Pongdu-ri; Hamhung-Wonsan. Negative operations conducted against these MSR by 3d PIR.

(b) Be prepared to support Eighth Army operations on east coast Korea on 24 hours notice through amphibious landings. Results: Partisan forces were not called upon to furnish this support. However, 3d PIR had no capability for furnishing this support, having had no amphibious training prior to or during the period of Phase I operations.

(c) Continue building interior units: negative operations conducted.

(d) Continue training: reports indicate this has been only function of 3d PIR.

(4) 1st Prcht A/B Regt.

(a) Conduct recruiting and training for special operations: this has been accomplished on a continuing basis.

(b) Attain strength of 3600 combat effectives by 1 Jul 53: strength at start of period—390; at end of period—372.

(c) Build interior units: one group of 97 partisans trained and airdropped into BU area on 26 January 1953. Partisan reports do not reflect whether the increase in interior units from 46 to 62 in the 1st PIR were trained by 1st Prcht A/B Regt or whether the teams were infiltrated overland by 1st PIR.

5. Results of operations with regard to assigned target priorities

a. Require enemy troops to engage in antiguerrilla operations: intelligence reports indicate that at end of period antiguerrilla operations have been conducted in Kuwal-san (XC 9865) and Paegak-san (BT 9098) areas by the enemy. Six such actions reported by UNPFK. Reports do not indicate any large-scale antiguerrilla operations throughout Hwanghae Province or North Korea.

b. Capture of prisoners and documents: fifteen prisoners captured; coverage on capture of documents: Estimated effectiveness: fair.

c. Destruction of supplies with priority on POL and ammunition stocks.

d. Wire communications.

e. Troop housing (see Incl 1).

f. Intelligence information: 369 reports submitted by UNPFK during period, 13 percent of total—CCRAK produced 2761 reports during the same period. This is 7 percent lower than usual collection of report.

g. Attached chart (Incl 1) shows all UNPFK actions during Phase I operations to include number of operations and breakdown of strength of groups involved in partisan operations. Figures on extreme right indicate actions in which this number UNPFK were involved.

h. Attached map (Incl 2) indicates by blue dots the location of all reported UNPFK operations for period 28 Jan—14 Mar (red dots are Phase II opns).

i. Incl 3, Map, is accepted and reported enemy OB.*

6. Conclusions

a. UNPFK accomplished their assigned mission of harassment of the enemy, increasing attacks by interior units and recruiting and training. UNPFK did not accomplish operational missions of interdicting specific MSR and destruction of vital targets.

b. Partisan Regiments

(1) 1st PIR was assigned two principal missions by CCRAK

(a) Attack from island bases in Hwanghae area to interdict Sariwon (YC 4064)—Haeju (YC 3713) MSR and LC: unsatisfactory accomplishment of mission.

(b) Utilizing interior forces in Hwanghae area, pin down enemy reserves and interdict Sariwon—Haeju MSR: unsatisfactory accomplishment of mission.

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- (b) Utilizing interior forces in Hwanghae area, pin down enemy reserves and interdict Sariwon-Haeju MSR: unsatisfactory accomplishment of mission.
- (c) Continue building interior units—no comment.
- (d) Continue training—mission accomplished.
- (2) Second PIR missions assigned by CCRAK
- (a) Protect flank of Eighth Army: mission accomplished.
- (b) Defend Kanghwa and Kyodong-do: mission accomplished.
- (c) Interdict Haeju-Kaesong MSR: unsatisfactory accomplishment of mission.
- (d) Interdict Koksan-Yangdok MSR, utilizing Force Green Dragon: interdiction mission unsatisfactorily accomplished.
- (e) Continue building interior units: mission not accomplished.
- (f) Continue training: mission accomplished.
- (3) Third PIR missions assigned by CCRAK
- (a) Interdict MSRs in Sinanju, Chongju, Kanggye, Kilchu and Hamhung areas: mission not accomplished.
- (b) Be prepared to support Eighth Army operations on east coast Korea on 24 hours notice through amphibious landings: mission could not have been accomplished.
- (c) Continue building interior units: mission not accomplished.
- (d) Continue training: mission accomplished.
- (4) 1st Prcht A/B Regt missions assigned by CCRAK
- (a) Conduct recruiting and training for special operations: mission accomplished.
- (b) Attain strength of 3600 combat effectives by 1 July 1953: mission not accomplished.
- (c) Build Interior Units: mission partially accomplished.
- (5) Tasks assigned PIRs by FEC/LD (K) and approved by CCRAK were far beyond their capabilities and went beyond requirements of Hq AFFE.

*[Inclosures not available]

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